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HISTORY 

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OTTOMAN TURKS. 




STANDARD LITERATURE OF THE 
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CREASY’S HISTORY of THE OTTOMAN 
TURKS: From the Beginning of their Empire 
to the Present Time. By Sir Edward S. Creasy, 
M.A., author of “The Fifteen Decisive Battles of 
the World,” “Rise and Progress of the English 
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GAUTIER’S RUSSIA. Reduced to*% 1.75. 

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to $1.75. _ 

HENRY HOLT & CO., Publishers, N. Y. 









HISTORY 

OP 

THE OTTOMAN TURKS 


FROM TIIE BEGINNING OF THEIR EMPIRE TO 
THE PRESENT TIME 


BY 

SIR EDWARD S. CREASY, M.A. 

SLl —- ’ 

(LATE CHIEF JUSTICE OPYTEYLON) 

Emeritus Professor of History in University College, London; Late Felloio of 

King's College, Cambridge. 

Author of “ The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," u Bise and Progress 
of the English ConstitutionEtc. 

First American Edition 
From tiie New Revised English Edition 



NEW YORK 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 

1878 





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TO 

THE REV. C. 0. GOODFORD, D.D., 

PROVOST OF ETON, 

* BY 


HIS FRIEND THE AUTHOR. 








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PREFACE. 


Having been requested to prepare a Second Edition of this work, 
which has long been out of print, I have made in it many correc¬ 
tions, and some curtailments. I have added a few pages as to 
events subsequent to the Crimean War; but these are written 
with studious brevity. 

The book (as I stated when it first appeared) is chiefly founded 
on Von Hammer. I have also carefully sought information from 
Knollcs, Rycaut, Montecuculi, Roe, Han way, Manstein, D’Ohsson, 
Thornton, Eton, Ubicini, Porter, Marmont, Sir F. Smith, Col. 
Chesney, Urquhart, Moltke, Hamel, Sismondi, Ranke, Finlay, 
Tricoupi, Campbell, Bosworth Smith, and others. I have also 
availed myself of the fragmentary wealth that lies heaped up in 
the back numbers of our periodical literature. The indices to 
both the “ Quarterly ” and the “ Edinburgh ” point out several 
articles on Turkish subjects, from which I have repeatedly gained 
intelligence and warnings. I have also consulted some admirable 
papers entitled “ Chapters on Turkish History,” which were con¬ 
tributed about thirty years ago to “Blackwood” by the late Mr. 
Hulme, a profound Oriental scholar, and a writer of such taste and 
vigour, that if he had lived to complete the work, portions of 
which were then sketched out by him, a full, accurate, and 



viii 


PREFACE . 


brilliant History of the Turks would have ceased to be one of the 
desiderata in our literature. 

Yon Hammer’s “History of the Ottoman Empire” will always be 
the standard European book on this subject. That history was 
the result of the labours of thirty years, during which Yon Ham¬ 
mer explored, in addition to the authorities which his predeces¬ 
sors had made use of, the numerous works of the Turkish and 
other Oriental writers on the Ottoman history, and other rich 
sources of intelligence which are to be found in the archives of 
Venice, Austria, and other states, that have been involved in re¬ 
lations of hostility or amity with the Sublime Porte. Yon Ham¬ 
mer’s long residence in the East, and his familiarity with the 
institutions and habits, as well as with the language and the 
literature of the Turks, give an additional attractiveness and 
value to his volumes. His learning is as accurate as it is varied ; 
his honesty and candour are unquestioned; and his history is 
certainly one of the best productions of the first half of our 
century. 

This great work has never been translated into English. Its 
length has probably caused it to be thus neglected, while the 
historical productions of other German writers, though of less 
merit, have been eagerly translated and extensively read in this 
country. The first edition of Yon Hammer (published at Pesth) 
consists of ten thick closely-printed volumes. The second and 
smaller edition occupies four. This second edition omits the 
notes and observations, many of which are highly instructive and 

r 

valuable. And Yon Hammer does not bring the Turkish history 
lower down than to the treaty of Kainardji, 1774. A translation 
of his entire work, with a continuation of equal copiousness, would 
make up at least twenty octavo volumes, such as are usually 


PREFACE . 


ix 


printed in this country. Both writers and publishers have 
evidently feared that such a work would lack readers among our 
busy and practical population. 

I have not made a mere abridgment of Yon Hammer; but I 
have sought to write an independent work, for which his volumes 
have supplied me with the largest store of materials. In using 
them I have arranged, and amplified, and omitted, and added at 
discretion, so as to assume general responsibility for comments and 
opinions. Where I have adopted those of Yon Hammer, I have 
generally referred to him as their author. My intention was 
always to do so, but there may be instances where this has been 
omitted. 

The references to the pages of Yon Hammer, in the notes, 
apply to the second edition of the German. 

E. S. CBEASY. 

Athenaeum Club, 

March 10 Ih, 1877 . 





















’ 

■ 










CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER I. 

TAGS 

HIST .appearance and exploits of the ottoman turns under er- 

T0GI1RUL IN ASIA MINOR—THEIR SETTLEMENT AT SULTAN-CENI—REIGN 
OF OTHMAN I.—Ills DREAM—IIIS CONQUESTS—DEATH AND CHARACTER 1 

CIIAPTER II. 

ACCESSION OF ORCnAN—HIS TIZIER ALAEDDIN ’S LEGISLATION— THE JANIS¬ 
SARIES-—CAPTURE OF NICE AND NICOMEDIA—DESCENT ON EUROPE— 
CONQUEST OF SOLYMAN PACHA —HIS DEATH AND ORCHAN’s DEATH . 12 

CIIAPTER III. 

* 

AMURATH I. —CAPTURE OF ADRIANOPLE—RATTLE OP THE MARIZZA—CON¬ 
QUESTS IN EUROPE AND ASIA—VICTORY OF KOSSOVA—DEATH OF AMU¬ 
RATH—BAJAZET’S ACCESSION—CONQUESTS—DEPRAVITY OF MANNERS— 
VICTORY OF NICOPOLIS—TIMOUR—DEFEAT OF EAJAZET AT ANGORA . 22 

CIIAPTER IY. 

INTERREGNUM AND CIVIL WAR—MAHOMET I. REUNITES THE EMPIRE— 

HIS SUCCESSFUL REIGN—niS DEATH AND CHARACTER—ACCESSION OF 
AMURATH II.—SIEGE OF CONSTANTINOPLE—CIVIL WAR IN ASIA—WARS 
WITH THE SERVIANS, HUNGARIANS, AND OTHER NATIONS—VICTORIES 
OF HUNYADES—TREATY OF SZEGEDDIN—BROKEN BY THE CHRISTIANS— 
BATTLE OF VARNA— SCANDERBEG — SECOND BATTLE OF KOSSOVA—DEATH 
OF AMURATH ... 52 




CONTENTS . 


xii 

CHAPTER V. 

REIGN AND CHARACTER OF MAHOMET II.—SIEGE AND CONQUEST OF CON¬ 
STANTINOPLE—FURTHER CONQUESTS IN EUROPE AND ASIA—REPULSE 
BEFORE BELGRADE—CONQUEST OF THE CRIMEA—UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK 
ON RHODES—CAPTURE OF OTRANTO—DEATH OF MAHOMET . • .75 

CHAPTER VI. 

INSTITUTES OF MAHOMET II.—TURKISH GOVERNMENT—ARMIES—TENURES 
OF LAND—INSTITUTIONS—EDUCATION—THE ULEMA—THE RAYAS— 
SLAVERY—RENEGADES—TURKISH CHARACTER—TURKISH WARFARE . 93 

CHAPTER VII. 

BAJAZET II.—PRINCE DJEM—CIVIL WAR—ADVENTURES AND DEATH OF 
DJEM IN CHRISTENDDM—FIRST WAR WITH EGYPT—BAJAZET DETHRONED 
BY HIS SON, SELIM.. . . .114 

CHAPTER VIII. 

SELIM I.—HIS CHARACTER—MASSACRE OF THE SHIIS—WAR WITH PERSIA 
—CONQUESTS IN UPPER ASIA—WAR WITH THE MAMELUKES—CONQUEST 
OF SYRIA AND OF EGYPT—NAVAL PREPARATIONS—DEATH OF SELIM— 

THE MUFTI DJEMALE’S INFLUENCE OVER HIM.127 

CHAPTER IX. 

IMPORTANCE OF THE EPOCH OF SOLYMAN’S REIGN—HIS CHARACTER-JOY 
AT HIS ACCESSION—CONQUEST OF BELGRADE AND RHODES—BATTLE OF 
MOHACZ—SIEGE OF VIENNA—CRITICAL REPULSE OF THE TURKS . . 150 


CHAPTER X. 

WARS AND TREATIES WITH AUSTRIA—CONQUESTS OVER PERSIA—AUSTRIA 
TRIBUTARY TO TnE PORTE—EXPLOITS OF THE TURKISH ADMIRALS— 
BARBAROSSA—PIRI REIS—SIDI ALI —DRAGUT—PIALE—SOLYMAN’S DO¬ 
MESTIC TRAGEDIES—DEATHS OF PRINCE MUSTAPHA AND PRINCE BAJAZET 
—SIEGE OF MALTA—SIEGE OF SIGETH—DEATH OF SOLYMAN—EXTENT 
OF THE EMPIRE UNDER HIM—ARMY—NAVY—INTERNAL ADMINISTRA¬ 
TION—LAWS—COMMERCE—BUILDINGS—LITERATURE ; • , .171 

CHAPTER XI. 

SELIM II.—HIS DEGENERACY—PEACE WITH AUSTRIA—FIRST CONFLICT 
BETWEEN TURKS AND RUSSIANS—CONQUEST OF CYPRUS—BATTLE OF 
LEPANTO—OULOUDJ ALl’S ENERGY—DEATH OF SELIM . . . .212 



CONTENTS. xiii 

CHAPTER XII. 

TAGB 

AMUR ITH III.—RAPID DECLINE OE THE EMPIRE—CONQUESTS PROM PERSIA 
—PROGRESS OP CORRUPTION AND MILITARY INSUBORDINATION—WAR 
WITH AUSTRIA—MAHOMET III.—BATTLE OF CERESTES—ACHMET I.— 
PEACE OF SITVATOROK—UNSUCCESSFUL WARS WITH PERSIA—REVOLTS— 
MUSTAPHA I. DEPOSED—OTIIMAN I.—VIOLENCE OF THE TROOPS—OTH- 
MAN MURDERED — MUSTAPHA RESTORED AND AGAIN DEPOSED — 
WRETCHED STATE OF TnE EMPIRE.. * 224 

CHAPTER XIII. 

MISERY OF THE EMPIRE AT TnE ACCESSION OF AMURATH IV.—MILITARY 
REVOLTS—AMURATH TAKES POWER INTO HIS OWN HANDS AND RESTORES 
ORDER—HIS SEVERITY AND CRUELTY—RECONQUERS BAGDAD—HIS DEATH 24G 

CHAPTER XIV. 

CHARACTER OF THE LATTER PORTION OF TURKISH HISTORY—ACCESSION 
OF SULTAN IBRAHIM—FOLLY AND WICKEDNESS OF HIS GOVERNMENT— 
REVOLUTION—IBRAHIM DEPOSED AND PUT TO DEATH—FOREIGN EVENTS 
DURING IBRAHIM’S REIGN—WAR WITH THE COSSACKS—BEGINNING OF 
THE WAR OF CANDIA—MAHOMET IV., AT THE AGE OF SEVEN, RAISED TO 
THE THRONE—CONTINUED TUMULT AND MISERY—THE FIRST KIUPRILI 
MADE VIZIER . . .258 

CHAPTER XV. - 

MOHAMMED KIUPRILI—RIGOUR AND SUCCESS OF HIS MINISTRY—HIS SON 
AHMED KIUPRILI SUCCEEDS HIM IN THE VIZrERATE—GREAT QUALITIES 
OF AHMED KIUPRILI—WEAKNESS OF SULTAN MAHOMET IV.—WAR WITH 
AUSTRIA—GREAT DEFEAT OF THE TURKS BY MONTECUCULI AT ST. G0- 
THARD—TRUCE WITH AUSTRIA—AHMED KIUPRILI TAKES CANDIA—WAR 
WITH RUSSIA AND POLAND—SOBIESKI DEFEATS THE TURKS AT KHOCZIN 
AND LEMBERG—PEACE OF ZURAUNA—DEATH AND CHARACTER OF AHMED 
KIUPRILI . 273 

CHAPTER XVI. 

KARA MUSTAPHA VIZIER—UNSUCCESSFUL WAR WITH RUSSIA—WAR WITH 
AUSTRIA—SIEGE OF VIENNA—RESCUE OF THE CITY AND COMPLETE 
OVERTHROW OF THE TURKS BY SOBIESKI—HEAVY LOSSES OF THE 
OTTOMANS—MAHOMET IV. DEPOSED—HIS CHARACTER—CHANGE OF THE 
JANISSARY FORCE—THE BARBARESQUE REGENCIES—THE PRETENDED 
MESSIAH SABBATHAI—MAHOMET IV.’S PATRONAGE OF LITERATURE . 290 




XIV 


CONTENTS. 




CHAPTER XVII. 

PACK 

SOLYMAN II.—INSURRECTIONS AND DEFEATS—SUCCESSES AGAINST RUSSIA 
— KIUPRILI-ZADE MUSTAPHA MADE GRAND YIZIER—HIS CHARACTER AND 
MEASURES—WISE POLICY TO THE RAYAS—SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN— 
DEATH OF SOLYMAN II.—AHMED II. SULTAN —KIUPRILI DEFEATED AND 
KILLED AT SALANKEMAN—DISASTROUS REIGN OF AHMED II.—MUSTAPHA 
II. SUCCEEDS, AND HEADS THE ARMIES—VICTORIOUS AT FIRST, BUT DE¬ 
FEATED BY EUGENE AT ZENTA—HOUSEIN KIUPRILI GRAND VIZIER—CON¬ 
QUESTS OF PETER THE GREAT OF RUSSIA OVER THE TURKS—AZOPH 
TAKEN—NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE—TREATY OF CARLO WITZ, . .301 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

DEATH OF KIUPRILI HOUSEIN—ABDICATION OF MUSTAPHA II.—ACCESSION 
OF ACHMET III.—CHARLES XII. IN TURKEY—WAR WITH RUSSIA—SUC¬ 
CESS OF THE TURKS AND TREATY OF THE PRUTH—WAR WITH VENICE— 

THE MOREA RECOVERED—WAR WITH AUSTRIA—DISASTERS OF THE TURKS 
—PEACE OF PASSAROWITZ—LEAGUE WITH RUSSIA AGAINST PERSIA—DE¬ 
POSITION OF ACHMET III.—THE HOSPODARS—THE FANARIOTS. • . 323 

CHAPTER XIX. ! 

MAHMOUD I.—TOTAL OSMAN—PEACE WITH PERSIA—RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 
ATTACK TURKEY—RUSSIAN INVASIONS OF THE CRIMEA—SUCCESSES OF 
TURKS AGAINST THE AUSTRIANS—BELGRADE RECOVERED—TREATY OF 
BELGRADE—PACIFIC POLICY OF TURKEY—DEATH OF SULTAN MAHMOUD 
—SHORT PACIFIC REIGN OF OTHMAN III. ...... 350 

CHAPTER XX. 

RUSSIAN ATTACK ON POLAND—TURKISH REMONSTRANCE9—WAR WITH 
RUSSIA—OPINIONS OF EUROPE—DEFEATS OF THE TURKISH ARMIES — 
RUSSIAN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN—BATTLE OF TCHESME—EX¬ 
PLOITS OF HASSAN OF ALGIERS—LOSS OF THE CRIMEA—NEGOTIATIONS— 

WAR RENEWED—SILISTRIA AND SHUMLA DEFENDED—DEATH OF MUS¬ 
TAPHA III.—ABDUL HAMID SULTAN—TREATY OF KAINAEDJI. , . 3S0 

CHAPTER XXI. 

ATTEMPTS OF GAZI HASSAN TO RESTORE THE EMPIRE—FRESH ENCROACH¬ 
MENTS OF RUSSIA—CONVENTION OF 1779 —RUSSIA ANNEXES THE CRIMEA. 

—VAIN ATTEMPTS OF FRANCE TO INDUCE ENGLAND TO ACT WITH HER 
AGAINST RUSSIA-CONVENTION OF 17S3— SCHEME3 OF AUSTRIA AND 


CONTENTS . 


?:v 


TAGE 

RUSSIA FOR THE DISMEMBERMENT OF TURKEY—WAR—RESISTANCE OF 
THE TURKS TO AUSTRIA—AUSTRIA MAKES PEACE—DISASTERS SUSTAINED 
BY THE TURKS IN THE WAR WITH RUSSIA—ACCESSION OF SULTAN SELIM 
III.—INTERVENTION OF ENGLAND AND PRUSSIA—TREATY OF JASSY . 415 

CHAPTER XXII. 

VIEW OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF SELIM 
III.’s REFORMS—TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS; EYALETS, LIVAS, KAZAS— 
APPOINTMENTS OF THE PACHAS—THE AYANS—EXTENT OF THE EMPIRE 
—ITS MISRULE AND MISERY—FEEBLENESS OF THE SULTAN’S AUTHORITY— 

THE WAIIABITES, DRUSES, MAMELUKES, AND SULIOTES—REVOLTS OF THE 
PACHAS—ABUSES OF THE FEUDAL SYSTEM—TYRANNY OF THE FARMERS 
OF THE REVENUE—MILITARY WEAKNESS OF THE EMPIRE—THE JANI3- . 

SARIES AND OTHER TROOPS—THE HOUSE OF OT1IMAN AT ITS NADIR . 41G 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

SELIM’S REFORMS—THE NEW TROOPS—NAPOLEON ATTACKS EGYPT—WAR 
BETWEEN TURKEY AND FRANCE—ALLIANCE WITn RUSSIA AND ENGLAND 
—DEFENCE OF ACRE—FRENCH EVACUATE EGYPT—GENERAL PEACE— 
TROUBLES IN SERVIA—THE DAHIS—KARA GEORGE—WAR WITH RUSSIA 
AND ENGLAND—THE PASSAGE OF THE DARDANELLES—TRUCE WITH 
RUSSIA—SELIM III.—DEPOSED BY THE JANISSARIES—MUSTAPHA IV. 
SULTAN—DEPOSED BY MUSTAPHA BAIRACTAR—MAHMOUD II.—DEATH 
OF BAIRACTAR—TRIUMPH OF THE JANISSARIES, AND APPARENT END 
OF REFORMS—RUSSIAN WAR CONTINUED—TREATY OF BUCHAREST . 457 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

CHARACTER OF MAHMOUD IT.—MEHEMET ALI—OVERTHROW OF THE MAME¬ 
LUKES AND THE WAHABITES—FRESn TROUBLES IN SERVIA—MILOSCH 
OBRENOWITCH—GENERAL EXCITEMENT AMONG THE RAYAS—THE HE- 
TiERIA—THE GREEK REVOLUTION—MAHMOUD DESTROYS THE JANIS¬ 
SARIES—RUSSIA, UNDER NICHOLAS I., FORCES THE TREATY OF AKKERMAN 
ON TURKEY—FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND RUSSIA INTERFERE ON BEHALF OF 
THE GREEKS—BATTLE OF NAVARINO—WAR WITH RUSSIA—TREATY OF 
ADRIANOPLE—REVOLT OF MEHEMET ALI—BATTLE OF KONIEH—RUSSIAN 
TROOPS PROTECT THE SULTAN—TREATY OF UNKIAR SKELESSI—FRESH 
WAR WITH MEHEMET ALI—DEATH OF MAHMOUD—THE TURKS DEFEATED 
—SULTAN ABDUL MEDJID AIDED BY ENGLAND AGAINST MEHEMET ALI— 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WITH EGYPT • • « • . 492 


0 


XVI 


CONTENTS . 


CHAPTER XXV. 

PAGE 

REFORMS OF SULTANS MAHMOUD IT. AND ABDUL MEDJID—ABOLITION OF 
THE COURT OF CONFISCATION—FOWER OF LIFE AND DEATH TAKEN 
FROM THE PACHAS—THE VAKOUFS—THE TIMARS AND THE ZIAMETS 
ABOLISHED—THE DEREII BEYS PUT DOWN—FINANCIAL REFORMS— 
EDICTS IN FAVOUR OF THE RAYAS—REFORM OF THE CENTRAL AD¬ 
MINISTRATION-ACCESSION OF ABDUL MEDJID—ARMY REFORMS—THE 
TANZIMAT—RUSSIAN AGGRESSIONS—THE CRIMEAN WAR—PEACE OF 
PARIS—HATTI-Y-HUMAYOUN—ACCESSION OF SULTAN ABDUL-AZIZ— 
CRETAN WAR—ROUMANIA AND SERVIA MADE INDEPENDENT STATES 
—SULTAN VISITS ENGLAND—RUSSIA REPUDIATES THE TREATY OF PARIS 
AS TO THE BLACK SEA—TROUBLES IN HERZEGOVINA—NATIONAL IN¬ 
SOLVENCY—DETHRONEMENT AND DEATH OF ABDUL-AZIZ—MURAD V. 
MADE SULTAN, DEPOSED—AHMED HAMTD II. PRESENT SULTAN—SER¬ 
VIAN WAR—MENACES OF WAR WITH RUSSIA—HOPES OF PEACE NOT 
EXTINCT. ..528 



HISTORY 

CHAPTER I. 

FIRST APPEARANCE AND EXPLOITS OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS 
UNDER ERTOGHRUL IN ASIA MINOR—THEIR SETTLEMENT AT 
SULTAN-CENI—REIGN OF OTHMAN I.—HIS DREAM—HIS CON¬ 
QUESTS—DEATH AND CHARACTER . 1 

About six centuries ago, a pastoral band of four hundred Turkish 
families was journeying westward from the upper streams of the 
river Euphrates. Their armed force consisted of four hundred 
and forty-four horsemen ; and their leader’s name was Ertoghrul, 
which means “The Right-Hearted Man.” As they travelled 
through Asia Minor, they came in sight of a field of battle, on 
which two armies of unequal numbers were striving for the 
mastery. Without knowing who the combatants were, The 
Right-Hearted Man took instantly the chivalrous resolution to 
aid the weaker party: and charging desperately and victoriously 
with his warriors upon the larger host, he decided the fortune of 
the day. Such, according to the Oriental historian Neschri, 2 is 
the first recorded exploit of that branch of the Turkish race, 
which from Ertoghrul’s son, Othman, 3 has been called the nation 
of the Ottoman Turks. 

1 See Von Hammer, books 1 and 2. 

2 Neschri states this on the authority of Mewlana Ayas, who had heard 
the battle narrated by the stirrup-holder of Ertoghrul’s grandson Orchan, 
who had heard it from Ertoghrul himself, and had told it to his followers. 
See Von Hammer’s note to p. 62 of his first volume. 

3 “ Osman” is the real Oriental name of the Eponymus hero, and the 
descendants of his subjects style themselves “Osmanlis.” But the cor¬ 
rupted forms “ Othman” and “ Ottoman” have become so fixed in our lan¬ 
guage and literature, that it would be pedantry to write the correct 
originals. I follow the same principle in retaining “Amuratli” for “Murad/ 1 
“Bajazet” for “Bayezid,” “Spahi” for “Sipahi,” &c., &c. 



OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


o 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


The little band of Ertoghrul was a fragment of a tribe of 
Oghouz Turks, which, under Ertoghrul’s father, Solyman Shah, 
had left their settlements in Khorassan, and sojourned for a time 
in Armenia. After a few years, they left this country also ; and 
were following the course of the Euphrates towards Syria, when 
their leader was accidentally drowned in that river. The greater 
part of the tribe then dispersed; but a little, remnant of it fol¬ 
lowed two of Solyman’s sons, Ertoghrul and Dundar, "who deter¬ 
mined to seek a dwelling-place in Asia Minor, under the Seljukian 
Turk, Alaeddin, the Sultan of Iconium. It so happened, that it 
was Alaeddin himself who commanded the army, to which Er¬ 
toghrul and his warriors brought such opportune succour on the 
battle-field, whither their march in quest of Alaeddin had casually 
led them. The adversaries, from whose superior force they de¬ 
livered him, were a host of Mongols, the deadliest enemies of the 
Turkish race. Alaeddin, in gratitude for this eminent service, 
bestowed on Ertoghrul a principality in Asia Minor, near the 
frontiers of the Bithynian province of the Byzantine Emperors. 

The rich plains of Saguta along the left bank of the river 
Sakaria, and the higher districts on the slopes of the Ermeni 
mountains, became now the pasture-grounds of the father of 
Othman. The town of Saguta, or Scegud, was his also. Here he, 
and the shepherd-warriors who had marched with him from 
Khorassan and Armenia, dwelt as denizens of the land. Erto- 
ghrul’s force of fighting men was largely recruited by the best and 
bravest of the old inhabitants, who became his subjects; and, still 
more advantageously, by numerous volunteers of kindred origin 
to his own. The Turkish race 1 had been extensively spread 
through Lower Asia long before the time of Ertoghrul. Quitting 
their primitive abodes on the upper steppes of the Asiatic con¬ 
tinent, tribe after tribe of that martial family of nations had 
poured down upon the rich lands and tempting wealth of the 
southern and western regions, when the power of the early Khalifs 
had decayed, like that of the Greek Emperors. One branch of 
the Turks, called the Seljukian, from their traditionary patriarch 
Seljuk Khan, had acquired and consolidated a mighty empire, 
more than two centuries before the name of the Ottomans was 
heard. The Seljukian Turks were once masters of nearly all Asia 
Minor, of Syria, of Mesopotamia, Armenia, part of Persia, and 

1 See, for the ethnology of the Turks, Dr. Latham’s work on Taissia. 
According to that high authority, all the early great Asiatic conquerors from 
the parts north of the Oxus have been of Turkish race, except Zenghis 
Ivhan and his descendants, and except the Mantchoo conquerors of China. 


EET 0 GHRUL'S CONQUESTS. A.D. 1250-1288. 3 

Western Turkestan: and their great Sultans, Toghrul Beg, Alp 
Arslan, and Melek Shah, are among the most renowned conquerors 
that stand forth in Oriental and in Byzantine history. But, by 
the middle of the thirteenth century of the Christian era, when 
Ertoghrul appeared on the battle-field in Asia Minor, the great 
fabric of Seljukian dominion had been broken up by the assaults of 
the conquering Mongols, aided by internal corruption and civil 
strife. The Seljukian Sultan Alaeddin reigned in ancient pomp 
at Koniah, the old Iconium; but his effective supremacy extended 
over a narrow compass, compared with the ample sphere through¬ 
out which his predecessors had exacted obedience. The Mongols 
had rent away the southern and eastern acquisitions of his race. 
In the centre and south of Asia Minor other Seljukian chiefs 
ruled various territories as independent princes; and the Greek 
Emperors of Constantinople had recovered a considerable portion 
of the old Roman provinces in the north and east of that penin¬ 
sula. Amid the general tumult of border warfare, and of ever- 
recurring peril from roving armies of Mongols, which pressed upon 
Alaeddin, the settlement in his dominions of a loyal chieftain and 
hardy clan, such as Ertoghrul and his followers, was a welcome 
accession of strength; especially as the new comers were, like the 
Seljukian Turks, zealous adherents of the Mahometan faith. The 
Crescent was the device that Alaeddin bore on his banners; 
Ertoghrul, as Alaeddin’s vicegerent, assumed the same standard; 
and it was by Ertoghrul’s race that the Crescent was made for 
centuries the terror of Christendom, as the sign of aggressive 
Islam, and as the chosen emblem of the conquering Ottoman 
power. 

There was little peace in Ertoghrul’s days on the frontier near 
which he had obtained his first grants of land. Ertoghrul had 
speedy and frequent opportunities for augmenting his military 
renown, and for gratifying his followers with the spoils of suc¬ 
cessful forays and assaults. The boldest Turkish adventurers 
flocked eagerly to the banner of the new and successful chieftain 
of their race; and Alaeddin gladly recognised the value of his 
feudatory’s services by fresh honours and marks of confidence, and 
by increased donations of territory. 

In a battle which Ertoghrul, as Alaeddin’s lieutenant, fought 
against a mixed army of Greeks and Mongols, between Brusa and 
Yenischeer, he drew up his troops so as to throw forward upon the 
enemy a cloud of light cavalry, called Akindji; thus completely 
masking the centre of the main army, which, as the post of honour, 
was termed the Sultan’s station. Ertoghrul held the centre him- 


4 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


self, at the head of the four hundred and forty-four horsemen, who 
were his own original followers, and whose scimetars had won 
the day for Alaeddin, when they first charged unconsciously in his 
cause. The system now adopted by Ertoghrul of wearying the 
enemy by collision with a mass of irregular troops, and then 
pressing him with a reserve of the best soldiers, was for centuries 
the favourite tactic of his descendants. The battle in which he 
now employed it was long and obstinate; but in the end the 
Turkish chief won a complete victory. Alaeddin, on being in¬ 
formed of this achievement of his gallant and skilful vassal, 
bestowed on him the additional territory of Eskischeer, and in 
memory of the mode in which Ertoghrul had arrayed his army, 
Alaeddin gave to his principality the name of Sultan-CEni, which 
means “ Sultan’s Front.” 

The territory which received that name, and still bears it, as 
one of the Sanjaks, or minor governments of the Ottoman Empire, 
is nearly identical with the ancient Phrygia Epictetos. It was 
rich in pasturage, both in its alluvial meadows and along its moun¬ 
tain slopes. It contained also many fertile cornlands and vine¬ 
yards ; and the romantic beauty of every part of its thickly 
wooded and well-watered highlands still attracts the traveller’s 
admiration . 1 

Besides numerous villages, it contained, in ErtoghruTs time, 
the strongholds of Karadjahissar, Biledjik, Inseni, and others; 
and the cities or towns of Eskischeer (so celebrated in the history 
of the crusades under its old name of Dorylseum), Seid-e-ghari, 
Lefke, and Ssegud, near which is the domed tomb of Ertoghrul, 
an object still of the deepest veneration to frequent pilgrims from 
all parts of the Ottoman Empire. Many of the places that have 
been mentioned were, at the time when Alaeddin, as their titular 
sovereign, made grant of them to Ertoghrul, held by chieftains, 
who were practically independent, and who little heeded the 
sovereign’s transfer of their lands and towns. It was only after 
long years of warfare carried on by Ertoghrul and his more re¬ 
nowned son, Othman, that Sultan-CEni became the settled posses¬ 
sion of their house. 

Othman, or, according to the Oriental orthography, Osman, is 
regarded as the founder of the Ottoman Empire; and it is from 
him that the Turks, who inhabit it, call themselves Osmanlis, the 
only national appellation which they recognise . 2 Ertoghrul never 

1 “Anadol,” p. 274 . 

8 They consider that the name of Turk implies rudeness and barbarism. 


OTHMAN /. A.D. 12SS-1320. 5 

professed to act save as the vassal and lieutenant of the Sultan of 
Iconium. But Othman, after the death of the last Alaeclclin 
in 1307 , waged wars and accumulated dominions as an inde¬ 
pendent potentate. He had become chief of his race twelve 
years before, on Ertoghrul’s death, in 1288 . Othman, at his 
succession, was twenty-four years of age, and was already of 
proved skill as a leader, and of tried prowess as a combatant. 
His early fortunes and exploits are favourite subjects with the 
Oriental writers, especially his love adventures in wooing and 
winning the fair Malkhatoon. These legends have probably been 
coloured by the poetical pens, that have recorded them in later 
years ; but it is less improbable that they should be founded on 
fact, than that no similar traditions should have been handed 
down by the children and followers of so renowned a chief, as the 
founder of the Ottoman Empire. 

The Scheikh Edebali, celebrated for his piety and learning, had 
come, while Othman was very young, to Itbourouni, a village 
near Eskischeer. Othman used often to visit the holy man, out 
of respect for his sanctity and learning; and the young prince’s 
visits became still more frequent, after he had one evening acci¬ 
dentally obtained a view of the Scheikh’s fair daughter, Malkha¬ 
toon, a name which means “ Treasure of a Woman.” Othman 
confessed his love; but the old man thought that the disparity of 
station made a marriage imprudent, and refused his consent. 
Othman sought consolation for his disappointment in the society 
of his friends and neighbours, to whom he described with a lover’s 
inspiration, the beauty of Malkhatoon. He discoursed so elo¬ 
quently on this theme to the young chief of Eskischeer, that the 
listener fell in love with Malkhatoon upon hearsay ; and, going to 
her father, demanded her hand for himself. Edebali refused him 
also; but fearing his vengeance more than that of Othman, the 
old man removed from the neighbourhood of Eskischeer to a 
dwelling close to that of Ertoghrul. The chief of Eskischeer 
now hated Othman as his rival. One day when Othman and his 
brother Goundonroulp were at the castle of their neighbour, the 
lord of Inseni, an armed force suddenly appeared at the gate, led 
by the chieftain of Eskischeer and his ally, Michael of the Peaked 
Beard, the Greek lord of Khirenkia, a fortified city at the foot of 
the Phrygian Olympus. They demanded that Othman should bo 
given up to them; but the lord of Inseni refused to commit such 
a breach of hospitality. While the enemy lingered irresolutely 
round the castle wall, Othman and his brother seized an advan¬ 
tageous moment for a sudden sally at the head of a few com- 


6 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

panions. They chased the chief of Eskischeer off the field in 
disgrace, and took Michael of the Peaked Beard prisoner. The 
captive an- the captors became staunch friends ; and in after 
times, when Othman reigned as an independent prince, Michael 
left the Christian for the Mussulman creed to join him, and 
was thenceforth one of the strongest supporters of the Ottoman 
power. 1 

Othman had by this encounter at Ino?ni, triumphed over his 
rival, and acquired a valuable friend; but he could not yet gain 
the maiden of his heart. For two more years the course of his 
true love ran through refusal and anxiety, until at length, old 
Edebali was touched by the young prince’s constancy, and he inter¬ 
preted a dream as a declaration of Heaven in favour of the long- 
sought marriage. 

One night, when Othman was resting at Edebali’s house (for 
the shelter of hospitality could never be denied even to the suitor 
whose addresses were rejected), the young prince, after long and 
melancholy musing on her whom he loved, composed his soul in 
that patient resignation to sorrow, which, according to the Arabs, 
is the key to all happiness. In this mood he fell asleep, and he 
dreamed a dream. 

He saw himself and his host reposing near each other. From 
the bosom of Edebali rose the full moon (emblem of the beauteous 
Malkhatoon), and inclining towards the bosom of Othman, it sank 
upon it, and was lost to sight. Thence sprang /forth a goodly 
tree, which grew in beauty and in strength ever greater and 
greater. Still did the embracing verdure of its boughs and 
branches cast an ampler and an ampler shade, until they canopied 
the extreme horizon of the three parts of the world. Under the 
tree stood four mountains, which he knew to be Caucasus, Atlas, - 
Taurus, and Hcemus. These mountains were the four columns, 
that seemed to support the dome of the foliage of the sacred tree, 
with which the earth was now pavilioned. From the roots of the 
tree gushed forth four rivers, the Tigris, the Euphrates, the 
Danube, and the Nile. Tall ships and barks innumerable were 
on the waters. The fields were heavy with harvest. The moun¬ 
tain sides were clothed with forests. Thence in exulting and 
fertilising abundance sprang fountains and rivulets, that gurgled 
through thickets of the cypress and the rose. In the valleys 
glittered stately cities, with domes and cupolas, with pyramids 
and obelisks, with minarets and towers. The Crescent shone on 


1 Von Hammer, vol. i. p. 63 . 


OTHMAN /. A.D, 12SS-1325. 7 

their summits : from their galleries sounded the Muezzin’s call to 
prayer. That sound was mingled with the sweet voices of a 
thousand nightingales, and with the prattling of countless parrots 
of every hue. Every kind of singing bird was there. The 
winged multitude warbled and flitted round beneath the fresh 
living roof ct the interlacing branches of the all-overarching tree ; 
and every leaf of that tree was in shape like unto a seimetar. 
Suddenly there arose a mighty wind, and turned the points of the 
sword-leaves towards the various cities of the world, but es¬ 
pecially towards Constantinople. That city, placed at the 
junction of two seas and two continents, seemed like a diamond 
set between two sapphires and two emeralds, to form the most 
precious stone in a ring of universal empire. Othman thought 
that he was in the ret of placing that visioned ring on his finger, 
when he awoke. 1 

Othman related this dream to his host; and the vision seemed 
to Edebali so clearly to presage honour, and power, and glory, to 
the posterity of Othman and Malkhatoon, 2 that the old Scheikh 
no longer opposed their union. They were married by the saintly 
Dervise Touroud, a disciple of Edebali. Othman promised to 
give the officiating minister a dwelling-place near a mosque, and 
on the bank of a river. When Othman became an independent 
prince, he built for the dervise a convent, which he endowed richly 
with villages and lands, and which remained for centuries in the 
possession of the family of Touroud. 

The Ottoman writers attach great importance to this dream of 
the founder of their empire. They dwell also on the prophetic 
significance of his name, signifying the resistless energy with 
which he and his descendants were to smite the nations of the 
earth. “ Othman ” means the “ Bone-breaker.” It is also a name 
given to a large species of vulture, commonly called the royal 

1 See Von Hammer, vol. i., p. 49. The author of “Anadol” recounts 
this dream, and remarks on the part of it respecting Constantinople :— 
“That link, Constantinople, fell into the hands of Osman Bey’s descendant, 
Sultan Mohammed II., and the Turkish Empire was constituted. It is, 
indeed, an aggregation of many nations, and the prophetic allegory of 
the multitudes of foreign birds gathering under the Ottoman tent has been 
fully realised. For in a population of thirty-five millions, upwards of 
seven are Sclavonians, four claim Roman origin, two assert their Greek 
descent, the Arabs number nearly five, and there are two millions and a 
half of Armenians, fifteen hundred thousand Albanians, and a million of 
Kurds.”—“Anadol,” p. 45. 

2 Some of the Ottoman historians call her “ Kameriye,” which means 
5< Beautiful Moon.”—Von Hammer, vol. i. p. S3. 


8 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


vulture, and which is, in the East, the emblem of sovereignty 
and warlike power, as the eagle is with the nations of the West. 

Othman is celebrated by the Oriental writers for his personal 
beauty, and for “his wondrous length and strength of arm.” 
Like Artaxerxes Longimanus, of the old dynasty of Persian kings, 
and like the Highland chieftain of whom Wordsworth sang, 
Othman could touch his knees with his hands when he stood 
upright. He was unsurpassed in his skill and graceful carriage as 
a horseman ; and the jet black colour of his hair, his beard, and 
eyebrows, gained him in youth the title of “ Kara,” that is to say, 
“Black” Othman. The epithet “Kara,” which we shall often 
find in Turkish history, 1 is, when applied to a person, considered 
to imply the highest degree of manly beauty. His costume was 
simple as that of the first warriors of Islam. Like them he wore 
a turban of ample white linen, wreathed round a red centre. His 
loose flowing kaftan was of one colour, and had long open hanging 
sleeves. Such in outward appearance was the successful lover of 
the fair Malkhatoon, whose lineal descendant still rules the Otto¬ 
man Empire. 

Othman’s conquests were soon extended beyond the limits of 
Sultan-CEni, partly at the expense of rival Turkish chieftains, but 
principally by wresting fortress after fortress* and region after 
region from the Greek Empire. At the close of the thirteenth 
century of our era, the Ottoman head-quarters of empire were 
advanced as far north-westward as the city of Yenischeer, within 
a short march of the important Greek cities of Brusa and Nicrea, 
which were now the special objects of Turkish ambition. 

It would, however, be unjust to represent Othman as merely an 
ambitious military adventurer, or to suppose that his whole career 
was marked by restless rapacity and aggressive violence against the 
neighbouring states. From 1291 A.D. to 1298, he was at peace; 
and the war that next followed was, at its commencement, a de¬ 
fensive one on his part, caused by the jealous aggressions of other 
Turkish Emirs, who envied his prosperity, and who were aided by 
some of the Greek commandants in the vicinity. Thus roused 
into action, Othman showed that his power had been strengthened, 
not corrupted by repose, and he smote his enemies in every direc¬ 
tion. The effect of his arms in winning new subjects to his sway 
was materially aided by the reputation which he had honourably 
acquired, as a just lawgiver and judge, in whose dominions Greek 

1 E. g. Karadhissar, “The Black Castle;” Kara-Denis, “The Black Sea;’* 
Kara Mustapha, “Black MustaphaKaradagli, “Black Mountain;” Kara- 
Su, “ Black Water.” 


OTHMAN 1. A.D. 1238 - 1325 . 9 

and Turk, Christian and Mahometan, enjoyed equal protection for 
property and person. It was about this time, A.D. 1299, that he 
coined money with his own effigy, and caused the public prayers 
to be said in his name. These among the Oriental nations are 
regarded as the distinctive marks of royalty. 1 The last prince of 
the family of Alaeddin, to which that of Othman had been in¬ 
debted for its first foundation in Asia Minor, was now dead. 
There was no other among the various Emirs of that country who 
could compete with Othman for the headship of the whole Turkish 
population, and dominion over the whole peninsula, save only the 
Emir of Caramania. 2 A long and fierce struggle between the 
Ottoman and Caramanian princes for the ascendency, commenced 
in Othman’s lifetime, and was protracted during the reigns of 
many of his successors. Othman himself had gained some ad¬ 
vantages over his Caramanian rival; but the weak and wealthy 
possessions of the Byzantine Emperor in the north-east of Asia 
Minor were more tempting marks for his ambition than the Cara¬ 
manian plains : and it was over Greek cities and armies that the 
chief triumphs of the last twenty-six years of Othman’s life were 
achieved. 

Some of Othman’s counsellors hesitated at the entrance of the 
bold path of conquest on which their chief strode so firmly; but 
Othman silenced all remonstrance, and quelled all risk of dissen¬ 
sion and mutiny by an act of prompt ferocity, which shows that 
the great ancestor of the Ottoman Sultans had, besides the traits 
of chivalrous and noble feelings which we have recorded, a full 
share of the ruthless cruelty, that has been the dark characteristic 
of the Turkish Royal House. Othman’s uncle, the aged Dundar, 
who had marched with Ertoghrul from the Euphrates, seventy 
years before, was still alive, when Othman, in 1299, summoned a 
council of his principal followers, and announced to them his in¬ 
tention to attack the lord of the important Greek fortress of 
Koeprihissar. The old uncle opposed the enterprise; and urged 
the danger of provoking by such ambitious aggrandisement all the 
neighbouring princes, Turkish as well as Greek, to league against 
them for the destruction of their tribe. Enraged at the chilling 
caution of the grey-headed man, and, observing probably that 
others were beginning to share in it, Othman met the arrows of 
the tongue by the arrows of the bow. He spake not a word in 

1 Von Hammer discusses (vol. i. pp. 75, and 593) the question, whether 
these marks of sovereignty were assumed by Othman or his son Orchan. 
He comes to a different conclusion from that adopted above. 

8 Von Hammer, vol. i. p. 72. 


IO 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


reply, but he shot his old uncle dead upon the spot—a bloody 
lesson to all who should harbour thoughts of contradiction to the 
fixed will of so stern a lord. The modern German historian, who 
recounts this scene, well observes that “ This uncle’s murder marks 
with terror the commencement of the Ottoman dominion, as the 
brother’s murder that of Rome; only the former rests on better 
historical evidence. Edris, justly esteemed the most valuable 
historian of the Turks, who, at the beginning of his work, openly 
declares that, passing over in silence all that is reprehensible, he 
will only hand down to posterity the glorious deeds of the royal 
race of Othman, relates among the latter the murder of Dundar, 
with all the circumstances detailed above. If then such murderous 
slaughter of their kindred be reckoned by the panegyrists of the 
Osmanlies among their praiseworthy acts, what are we to think of 
those which cannot be praised, and of which their history is there¬ 
fore silent T 1 

Koeprihissar was attacked, and fell; and numerous other strong¬ 
holds in the vicinity of Nice soon shared the same fate. In 1301, 
Othman encountered for the first time a regular Greek army, 
which was led against him by Muzaros, the commander of the 7 
guards of the Byzantine Emperor. This important battle took 
place at Koyounhissar (called Baphoeum by the Greeks) in the 
vicinity of Nicomedia. Othman gained a complete victory; and 
in the successful campaigns of the six following years, he carried 
his arms as far as the coast of the Black Sea, securing fortress 
after fortress, and hemming in the strong cities of Brusa, Nice, and 
Nicomedia (which yet were retained by the Greeks), with a chain 
of fortified posts, where his garrisons, under bold and skilful chiefs, 
were ever on the watch for the chance of a surprise or the mate¬ 
rial for a foray. It was in vain that the Byzantine court sought 
to avert the pressure of this ever-active enemy, by procuring a 
Mongol army to attack Othman’s southern dominions. Othman 
sent his son Orchan against the invaders, and the young prince 
utterly defeated them. Age and infirmity began now to press 
upon Othman, but his gallant son filled his place at the head of 
the troops with undiminished energy and success. In 1326, the 
great city of Brusa surrendered to the Ottomans. Othman was 
on his death-bed, at Scegud, the first town that his father Erto- 
ghrul had possessed, when his son effected this important con¬ 
quest ; but he lived long enough to hear the glad tidings, and to 
welcome the young hero. The Oriental writers narrate the last 


1 Von Hammer, vol. i. p. 78. 




II 


OTHMAN /. A.D. 1288 - 1325 . 

scene of Othman’s life, and profess to record his dying advice to 
his successor. The fair Malkhatoon had gone before him to the 
grave ; hut the two brave sons whom she had borne him, Orchan 
and Alaeddin, and a few of his veteran captains and sages, were 
at the monarch’s death-bed. “ My son,” said Othman to Orchan, 
“ I am dying; and I die without regret, because I leave such a 
successor as thou art. Be just; love goodness, and show mercy. 
Give equal protection to all thy subjects, and extend the law of 
the Prophet. Such are the duties of princes upon earth ; and it 
is thus that they bring on them the blessings of Heaven.” Then, 
as if he wished to take actual seisin of Brusa, and to associate 
himself with his son’s glory, he directed that he should be buried 
there; and advised his son to make that city the seat of empire. 1 
His last wishes were loyally complied with; and a stately mauso¬ 
leum, which stood at Brusa until its destruction by fire in the 
present age, marked the last resting-place of Othman, and proved 
the pious reverence of his descendants. His banner and his sabre 
are still preserved in the treasury of the empire : and the martial 
ceremony of girding on that sabre is the solemn right, analogous 
to the coronations of Christendom, by which the Turkish Sultans 
are formally invested with sovereign power. 

Othman is commonly termed the first Sultan of his race; but 
neither he nor his two immediate successors assumed more than 
the title of Emir. He had, at the time of his death, reigned as an 
independent Emir twenty-seven years, and had been chief of his 
tribe for thirty-nine years of his life of sixty-eight. His career 
fully displays the buoyant courage, the subtle watchfulness, the 
resolute decision, the strong common-sense, and the power of 
winning and wielding the affections and energies of other men, 
which are the usual attributes of the founders of empires. And, 
notwithstanding his blood-guiltiness in his uncle’s death, we must 
believe him to have been eminently mild and gracious for an 
Oriental sovereign, from the traditional attachment with which his 
memory is still cherished by his nation, and which is expressed at 
the accession of each new Sultan by the formula of the people’s 
prayer, “ May he be as good as Othman.” 


1 Von Hammer, vol. i. p. 86. 


12 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


CHAPTER II. 

ACCESSION OF ORCHAN—HIS VIZIER ALAEDDIN’S LEGISLATION— 
THE JANISSARIES—CAPTURE OF NICE AND NICOMEDIA—DE¬ 
SCENT ON EUROPE—CONQUEST OF SOLYMAN PACHA—HIS DEATH 
AND ORCHAN’S DEATH . 1 

Emir Othman now slept at Brusa, and Emir Orchan reigned in 
his stead. Fratricide was not yet regarded as the necessary safe¬ 
guard of the throne; and Orchan earnestly besought his brother 
Alaeddin to share with him his sovereignty and his wealth. 
Alaeddin firmly refused to consent to any division of the empire, 
and so contravene the will of their father, who had addressed 
Orchan only as his successor. Nor would Alaeddin accept more 
of the paternal property than the revenues of a single village, near 
Brusa. Orchan then said to him, “ Since, my brother, thou wilt 
not take the flocks and the herds that I offer thee, be thou the 
shepherd of my people ; be my Vizier.” The word “ Vizier,” in 
the Ottoman language, means the bearer of a burden; and 
Alaeddin, in accepting the office, took on him, according to the 
Oriental historians, his brother’s burden of power. Alaeddin did 
not, like many of his successors in that office, often command in 
person the armies of his race; but he occupied himself most 
efficiently with the foundation and management of the civil and 
military institutions of his country. 

According to some authorities, it was in his time, and by his 
advice, that the semblance of vassalage to the ruler of Koniah, by 
stamping money with his effigy, and using his name in the public 
prayers, was discontinued by the Ottomans. 2 These changes are 
more correctly referred by others to Othman himself; but all the 
Oriental writers concur in attributing to Alaeddin the introduction 
of laws, which endured for centuries, respecting the costume of the 
various subjects of the empire, and of laws which created a stand- 

1 See Von Hammer, books 3, 4. 

2 See the authorities collected in Von Hammer, a 3 cited in note to p. 9, 
Myi-a, 


ORCHAN. A.D . 1326 - 1359 . 23 

lug army of regular troops, and provided funds for its support. 
It was, above all, by bis advice and that of a contemporary Turkish 
statesman, that the celebrated corps of Janissaries was formed, an 
institution which European writers erroneously fix at a later date, 
and ascribe to Amurath I. 

Alaeddin, by his military legislation, may be truly said to have 
organised victory for the Ottoman race. He originated for the 
Turks a standing army of regularly paid and disciplined infantry 
and horse, a full century before Charles VII. of France es¬ 
tablished his fifteen permanent companies of men-at-arms, which 
are generally regarded as the first standing army known in modem 
history. Orchan’s predecessors, Ertoghrul and Othman, had made 
war at the head of the armed vassals and volunteers, who thronged 
on horseback to their prince’s banner, when summoned for each 
expedition, and who were disbanded as soon as the campaign was 
over. Alaeddin determined to ensure and improve future suc¬ 
cesses, by forming a corps of paid infantry, which should be kept 
in constant readiness for service. These troops were called Yaya, 
or Piade; and they were divided into tens, hundreds, and thou¬ 
sands, under their respective decurions, centurions, and colonels. 
Their pay was high ; and their pride soon made them objects of 
anxiety to their sovereign. Orchan wished to provide a check to 
them, and he took counsel for this purpose with his brother Alaed¬ 
din and Kara Khalil Tschendereli, who was connected with the 
royal house by marriage. Tschendereli laid before his master 
and the vizier a project, out of which arose the renowned corps 
of the Janissaries, so long the scourge of Christendom; so long, 
also, the terror of their own sovereigns; and which was finally 
extirpated by the Sultan himself, in our own age. Tschendereli 
proposed to Orchan to create an army entirely composed of 
Christian children, who should be forced to adopt the Mahometan 
religion. .Black 1 Khalil argued thus: “The conquered are the 
property of the conqueror, who is the lawful master of them, of 
their lands, of their goods, of their wives, and of their children. 
We have a right to do what we will with our own; and the 
treatment which I propose is not only lawful, but benevolent. By 
enforcing the conversion of these captive children to the true faith, 
and enrolling them in the ranks of the army of the true believers, 
we consult both their temporal and eternal interests; for, is it 
not written in the Koran that all children are, at their birth, 
naturally disposed to Islam %” He also alleged that the for- 


1 See note, p. G. 


14 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


mation of a Mahometan army out of Christian children mould 
induce other Christians to adopt the creed of the Prophet; so 
that the new force would be recruited, not only out of the children 
of the conquered nations, but out of a crowd of their Christian 
friends and relations, who would come as volunteers to join the 
Ottoman ranks. 

Acting on this advice, Orchan selected out of the families of the 
Christians whom he had conquered, a thousand of the finest boys. 
In the next year a thousand more were taken; and this annual 
enrolment of a thousand Christian children was continued for three 
centuries, until the reign of Sultan Mahomet IV., in 1648. When 
the prisoners made in the campaign of the year did not supply a 
thousand serviceable boys, the number was completed by a levy 
on the families of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. This 
was changed in the time of Mahomet IV., and the corps was 
thenceforth recruited from among the children of Janissaries 
and native Turks ; but during the conquering period of the Otto¬ 
man power, the institution of the Janissaries, as designed by 
Alaeddin and Tschendereli, was maintained in full vigour. 

The name of Yeni Tscheri, which means “ new troops,” and 
which European writers have turned into Janissaries, was given to 
Orchan’s young corps by the Dervish Hadji Beytarch. This der¬ 
vish was renowned for sanctity; and Orchan, soon after he had 
enrolled his first band of involuntary boyish proselytes, led them 
to the dwelling-place of the saint, and asked him to give them his 
blessing and a name. The dervish drew the sleeve of his mantle 
over the head of one in the first rank, and then said to the Sultan, 
“ The troop which thou hast created shall be called Yeni Tscheri. 
Their faces shall be white and shining, their right arms shall be 
strong, their sabres shall be keen, and their arrows sharp. They 
shall be fortunate in fight, and they shall never leave the battle¬ 
field save as conquerors.” In memory of that benediction, the 
J anissaries ever wore, as part of their uniform, a cap of white felt, 
like that of the dervish, with a strip of woollen hanging down 
behind, to represent the sleeve of the holy man’s mantle, that had 
been laid on their comrade’s neck. 

The Christian children, who were to be trained as Janissaries, 
were usually chosen at a tender age. They were torn from their 
parents, trained to renounce the faith in which they were born and 
baptised, and to profess the creed of Mahomet. They were then 
carefully educated for a soldier’s life. The discipline to which 
they were subjected was severe. They were taught the most 
implicit obedience; and they were accustomed to bear without 


ORCHAN. A.D. 1326 - 1359 . 15 

repining fatigue, pain, and hunger. But liberal honours and 
prompt promotion were the sure rewards of docility and courage. 
Cut off from all ties of country, kith, and kin, but with high pay 
and privileges, with ample opportunities for military advancement, 
and for the gratification of the violent, the sensual, and the sordid 
passions of their animal natures amid the customary atrocities of 
successful warfare, this military brotherhood grew up to be the 
strongest and fiercest instrument of imperial ambition, which 
remorseless fanaticism, prompted by the most subtle statecraft, 
ever devised upon earth. 

The Ottoman historians eulogise with one accord the sagacity 
and piety of the founders of this institution. They reckon the 
number of conquerors whom it gave to earth, and of heirs of para¬ 
dise whom it gave to heaven, on the hypothesis that, during three 
centuries, the stated number of a thousand Christian children, 
neither more nor less, was levied, converted, and enlisted. They 
boast, accordingly, that three hundred thousand children were 
delivered from the torments of hell by being made Janissaries. 
But Von Hammer calculates, from the increase in the number of 
these troops under later Sultans, that at least half a million of 
young Christians must have been thus made, first the helpless 
victims, and then the cruel ministers of Mahometan power. 

After the organisation of the Janissaries, Alaeddin regulated 
that of the other corps of the army. In order that the soldier 
should have an interest, not only in making, but in preserving 
conquests, it was determined that the troops should receive allot¬ 
ments of land in the subjugated territories. The regular in¬ 
fantry, the Piade, had at first received pay in money ; but they now 
had lands given to them on tenure of military service, and they 
were also under the obligation of keeping in good repair the public 
roads that led near their grounds. The irregular infantry, which 
had neither pay like the Janissaries, nor lands like the Piade, was 
called Azab, which means “ light.” The lives of these undisci¬ 
plined bands were held of little value ■ and the Azabs were thrown 
forward to perish in multitudes at the commencement of a battle 
or a siege. It was over their bodies that the Janissaries usually 
marched to the decisive charge or the final assault. 

The cavalry was distributed by Alaeddin, like the infantry, into 
regular and irregular troops. The permanent corps of paid 
cavalry was divided into four squadrons, organised like those 
which the Caliph Omar instituted for the guard of the Sacred 
Standard. The whole corps at first consisted of only 2400 horse¬ 
men ; but under Solyman the Great the number was raised to 


i6 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


4000. They marched on the right and left of the Sultan; they 
camped round his tent at night, and they were his body-guard in 
battle. One of these regiments of Eoyal Horse-guards was called 
the Turkish Spahis, a term applied to cavalry soldiers generally, but 
also specially denoting these select horse-guards. Another regiment 
was called the Silihdars, meaning the “ vassal cavalry.” A third 
was called the Ouloufedji, meaning the “ paid horsemenand the 
fourth was called Ghoureba, meaning “ the foreign horse.” Be¬ 
sides this permanently embodied corps of paid cavalry, Alaeddin 
formed a force of horsemen, who received grants of land like the 
Piad6. As they paid no taxes for the lands which they thus held, 
they were termed Moselliman, which means “tax-free.” They 
were commanded by Sandjak Beys (princes of standards), by Bin- 
baschi (chiefs of thousands), and Soubaschi (chiefs of hundreds). 
There were other holders of the grand and petty fiefs which were 
called Ziamets and Timars. These terms will be adverted to here¬ 
after, when we reach the period at which the Turkish feudal 
system was more fully developed and defined. But in the earliest 
times, their holders were bound to render military service on 
horseback, when summoned by their sovereign; and they were 
arrayed under banners, in thousands and in hundreds, like the Mo- 
sellimans. In addition to the regular and feudal cavalry, there were 
the Akindji, or irregular light horse, receiving neither pay nor 
lands, but dependent on plunder, who were still called together in 
multitudes, whenever an Ottoman army was on the march; and 
the terror which these active and ferocious marauders spread far 
and wide beyond the regular line of operations, made the name of 
the Akindji as much known and dreaded in Christendom, as that 
of the Janissaries and Spahis. 

Orchan had captured the city of Nicomedia in the first year of 
liis reign (1326); and with the new resources for warfare which 
the administrative genius of his brother placed at his command, he 
speedily signalised his reign by conquests still more important. 
The great city of Nice (second to Constantinople only in the 
Greek Empire) surrendered to him in 1330. Orchan gave the 
command of it to his eldest son, Solyman Pacha, who had directed 
the operations of the siege. Numerous other advantages were 
gained over the Greeks : and the Turkish prince of Karasi (the 
ancient Mysia), who had taken up arms against the Ottomans, was 
defeated; and his capital city, Berghama (the ancient Pergamus), 
and his territory, annexed to Orchan’s dominions. On the con¬ 
quest of Karasi, in the year 1336 of our era, nearly the whole of 
the north-west of Asia Minor was included in the Ottoman 


OR CHAJV. A.D S 1326-1359. 17 

Empire; and the four great cities of Brusa, Nicomedia, Nice, and 
Pergamus had become strongholds of its power. 

A period of twenty years, without further conquests, and with¬ 
out war, followed the acquisition of Karasi. During this time the 
Ottoman sovereign was actively occupied in perfecting the civil 
and military institutions which his brother had introduced; in 
securing internal order, in founding and endowing mosques and 
schools, and in the construction of vast public edifices, which yet 
attest the magnificence and piety of Orchan. It is indeed a re¬ 
markable trait in the characters of the first princes of the Ottoman 
dynasty, that, unlike the generality of conquerors, especially of 
Asiatic conquerors, they did not hurry on from one war to 
another in ceaseless avidity for fresh victories and new dominions; 
but, on the contrary, they were not more eager to seize, than they 
were cautious and earnest to consolidate. They paused over each 
subdued province, till, by assimilation of civil and military institu¬ 
tions, it was fully blended into the general nationality of their 
empire. They thus gradually moulded, in Asia Minor, an homo¬ 
geneous and a stable power; instead of precipitately heaping 
together a motley mass of ill-arranged provinces and discordant 
populations. To this policy the long endurance of the Ottoman 
Empire, compared with other Oriental empires of both ancient and 
modern times, is greatly to be ascribed. And the extent to which 
this policy was followed in Asia Minor, compared with their subse¬ 
quent practice in European Turkey, in Syria, and in Egypt, may 
have conduced in giving to the Ottomans a firmer hold on the 
first-named country, than they possess on their territories west¬ 
ward of the Hellespont and southward of Mount Taurus. Every 
traveller notes the difference; the Ottomans themselves acknow¬ 
ledge it; and Anatolia (a name generally though not accurately 
used as co-extensive with that of Asia Minor) is regarded by the 
modern Turks as their stronghold in the event of further national 
disasters. They call it emphatically, “The last Home of the 
Faithful.” 1 The facts (which have been already mentioned) of the 
general diffusion of Turkish populations over Asia Minor, before 
Othman’s time, must unquestionably have greatly promoted the 
solidity as w T ell as the extent of the dominion which he and his suc¬ 
cessor there established; but the far-sighted policy, with which they 
tempered their ambition, was also an efficient cause of permanent 
strength; and their remote descendants still experience its advan¬ 
tageous operation. 


x See “ Anadol,” p. 228 ; and Ubicini, vol. ii. p. 523 . 


o 

U 


18 HISTORY OF 1HE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

The friendly relations which Orchan formed with the Emperor 
Andronicus, and maintained (though not uninterruptedly) with 
that prince and some of his successors, contributed to give a 
long period of twenty years general repose to the Ottoman 
power. But in the civil wars which distracted the last ages 
and wasted the last resources of the Greek Empire, the auxiliary 
arms of the Turkish princes were frequently called over and 
employed in Europe. The Emperor Cantacuzene, in the year 
1346, recognised in Orchan the most powerful sovereign of the 
Turks; and he hoped to attach the Ottoman forces permanently 
to his interests by giving his daughter in marriage to their ruler, 
notwithstanding the difference of creed, and the disparity of years 
between the young princess and the old Turk, who was now a 
widower of the age of sixty. The pomp of the nuptials between 
Orchan and Theodora is elaborately described by the Byzantine 
writers; but in the next year, during which the Ottoman bride¬ 
groom visited his imperial father-in-law at Scutari, the suburb of 
Constantinople on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, scenes of a 
less pleasing character to the Greeks ensued. Orchan’s presence 
protected the Greek Emperor and his subjects during the display 
of festive splendour which Scutari exhibited at the meeting of the 
sovereigns 1 ; but when Orchan had returned to his Bithynian 
capital, some Ottoman bands crossed the Hellespont, and pillaged 
several towns in Thrace; but they were at last, after a series of 
sanguinary encounters, all killed or taken by the superior forces 
sent against them. 

Not long afterwards, the war that raged between the two great 
maritime republics of Venice and Genoa along, almost every coast 
of the Mediterranean and its connected seas, was the immediate 
cause of hostilities between the troops of Orchan and those of his 
father-in-law; and led to the settlement of the Ottomans in 
Europe. The Genoese possessed the European suburb of Con¬ 
stantinople, called Galata; and the Bosphorus was one of the 
scenes on which the most obstinate contests were maintained 
between their fleets and those of their rivals. Orchan hated the 
Venetians, whose fleets had insulted his seaward provinces, and 
who had met his diplomatic overtures with contempt, as if coming 
from an insignificant barbarous chieftain. The Venetians were 
allies of Cantacuzene; but Orchan sent an auxiliary force across 
the straits to Galata, which there co-operated with the Genoese. 
Orchan also aided the Emperor’s other son-in-law, John Palceolo- 
gus, in the civil war that was kept up between him and the Greek 
Emperor. In the midst of the distress and confusion with which 


ORCHAN . A . D . 1326-1359. 19 

the Byzantine Empire was now oppressed, Orchan’s eldest son, 
Solyman Pacha, struck a bold blow in behalf of his own race, 
which gave the Turks a permanent establishment on the European 
side of the Hellespont. This important event in the world’s his¬ 
tory took place in 1356. The Ottoman writers pass over in 
silence the previous incursions of the Turks into Europe, which 
gained no conquest and led to no definite advantage; but they 
dwell fully on this expedition of Solyman, and adorn it with 
poetic legends of the vision that appeared to the young chieftain 
as he mused on the sea-shore near the ruins of Cyzicus. They tell 
how the crescent of the moon rose before him as the emblom of his 
race, and united the continents of Europe and Asia with a chain 
of silver light, while temples and palaces floated up out of the 
great deep, and mysterious voices blended with the sounding sea, 
exciting in his heart a yearning for predestined enterprise, and a 
sense of supernatural summons. 1 The dream may have been both 
the effect of previous schemings, and the immediate stimulant that 
made Solyman put his scheming into act. With but thirty-nine 
of his chosen warriors, he embarked at night in a Genoese bark 
on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, and surprised the Castle of 
Tzympe, on the opposite coast. Reinforcements soon pushed 
across to the adventurers; and in three days Tzympe was garri¬ 
soned by three thousand Ottoman troops. 

At this crisis, Cantacuzene was so severely pressed by his rival 
John Palseologus, that, instead of trying to dislodge the invaders 
from Tzympe, or even remonstrating against their occupation of 
that fortress, he implored the help of Orchan against his domestic 
enemy. Orchan gave up his brother-in-law’s cause, and provided 
assistance to the old Emperor. But he ordered that assistance to 
be administered by Solyman, the conqueror of Tzympe, an 
auxiliary the most formidable to those with whom he was to co¬ 
operate. Ten thousand more Turks were sent across to Solyman, 
who defeated the Sclavonic forces which Pal^eologus had brought 
into the empire : but the victors never left the continent on which 
they had conquered. 

Cantacuzene offered Solyman ten thousand ducats to retire from 
Tzympe. The sum was agreed on; but before the ransom was 
paid, a terrible earthquake shook the whole district of Thrace, 
and threw down the walls of its fenced cities. The Greeks 
trembled at this visitation of Providence; and the Turks saw 
in it the interposition of Heaven in their favour, and thought that 


1 Von Hammer, voh i. p. 132 , 


20 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


the hand of God was smoothing the path for their conquest of tho 
Promised Land. Two of Solyman’s captains, Adj6 Bey, and Ghasi 
Fasil, instantly occupied the important town of Gallipoli, marching 
in over the walls which the earthquake had shattered, and unre¬ 
sisted by the awe-struck inhabitants. The fields in the neighbour¬ 
hood still are called after Adje; and the tombs of these two 
captains of the Ottoman host are yet to be seen in Gallipoli. 
They were buried on the scene of their great exploit; and Turkish 
pilgrims throng hither in veneration of the warriors, who gave to 
their race the strong city, the key of the Hellespont, the gate of 
easy passage into Europe. 

Solyman, on hearing that his troops Jiad occupied Gallipoli, 
refused to give up Tzympe; and threw large colonies of Turks 
and Arabs across the straits, which he planted in the territory 
which had been thus acquired. The fortifications of Gallipoli 
were repaired, and that important post was strongly garrisoned. 
Solyman took possession of other places in the Thracian Cherso¬ 
nese, which he strengthened with new walls and secured with 
detachments of his best troops. The Greek Emperor made a 
formal complaint of these aggressions to Orchan, who replied that 
it was not the force of arms that had opened the Greek cities to 
his son, but the will of God, manifested in the earthquake. The 
Emperor rejoined that the question was not how the Turks had 
marched into the cities, but whether they had any right to retain 
them. Orchan asked time to consider the subject; and afterwards 
made some proposals for negotiating the restoration of the cities; 
but he had firmly resolved to take full advantage of the opportuni¬ 
ties for aggrandising the Ottoman power, which now were afforded 
by the basis for operations in Europe which had been acquired, 
and by the perpetual dissensions that raged between Cantacuzene 
and his son-in-law Palseologus; each of whom was continually 
soliciting Orchan’s aid against the other, and obtaining that aid 
according to what seemed best for the interests of the Turkish 
sovereign—the real enemy of them both. 

Orchan only lived three years after the capture of Tzympe and 
Gallipoli: his son Solyman, to whom he owed those conquests, 
and in whom he had hoped to leave a successor who should sur¬ 
pass all the glories hitherto won by the house of Othman, had 
died before him. An accidental fall from his horse, while he was 
engaged in the favourite Turkish sport of falconry, caused the 
young conquerors death. Solyman was not buried at Brusa; but, 
by Orchan’s order, a tomb was built for him on the shore of tho 
Hellespont, over which he had led his race to a second empire. 


21 


ORCHAN . A . D . 1326-1359. 

Orchan died in the year 1359 of our era, at the age of seventy- 
five, after a reign of thirty-three years, during which the most 
important civil and military institutions of his nation were founded, 
and the Crescent w T as not only advanced over many of the fairest 
provinces of Asia, but was also planted on the European continent, 
whence its enemies have hitherto vainly sought to dislodge it 
during five centuries 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


CHAPTER III. 

AMURATH I.—CAPTURE OF ADRIANOPLE—BATTLE OF THE MARIZZA 
—CONQUESTS IN EUROPE AND ASIA—VICTORY OF KOSSOVA— 
DEATH OF AMURATH—BAJAZET’S ACCESSION—CONQUESTS— 
DEPRAVITY OF MANNERS—VICTORY OF NICOPOLIS—TIMOUR 
—DEFEAT OF BAJAZET AT ANGORA . 1 

The death of Solyman Pacha had opened to his younger brother 
Amurath (or, as the Orientals name him, Murad), the inheritance 
of the Ottoman throne. Amurath was forty years of age when 
he succeeded his father, Orchan; and he reigned thirty years over 
the Ottomans in prosperity and glory. His first projects after his 
accession were to extend the European conquests of his father and 
brother; but he was checked for a time by the enmity of the 
Prince of Caramania, who stirred up a revolt in the Ottoman 
dominions in the centre of Asia Minor. Amurath marched an 
army rapidly to the scene of the insurrection, which he completely 
quelled, tie then (in 1360) led his troops to the passage of the 
Hellesjmnt; and commenced a series of victories in Europe, which 
were only terminated by his death on the field of battle at Kossova 
in 1389. Besides wresting from the Greeks numerous places of 
secondary value, Amurath captured, in 1361, the great city of 
Adrianople, which thenceforth became the capital of the Ottoman 
dominions in Europe, until Constantinople fell before Mahomet 
II. Pushing his conquests towards Macedonia and the Haemus, 
Amurath next took Sagrae and Philippopolis. 

The Turkish armies, like the ancient Roman legions, found a 
principal part of their booty in the prisoners they made, and who 
were all destined for sale as slaves. The number of prisoners had 
increased to such a multitude during these campaigns of Amurath, 
that one of his statesmen pointed out to him the importance of 
steadily enforcing the royal prerogative (neglected by his prede¬ 
cessors) of taking a fifth part of the spoil. This was thenceforth 
exercised by the Sultans, who sometimes took their double tithe 

1 See Von Hammer, books v. vi. vii. viii# 

’ ( Li 


23 


AMURATH /. A . D . 1359-1389. 

in kind; but more frequently received a stated sum per head, as 
the fifth of the value of each slave. In after ages, when a Christian 
nation remonstrated against this practice, a formal stipulation; 
excepting prisoners of war of that nation from such liability, was 
usually established by express treaty. 

Hitherto the Turkish victories in Europe had been won over the 
feeble Greeks; but the Ottomans now came in contact with the far 
more warlike Sclavonic tribes, which had founded kingdoms and 
principalities in Servia and Bosnia. Amurath also menaced the 
frontiers of Wallachia and Hungary. The Roman See, once so 
energetic in exciting the early crusades, had disregarded the pro¬ 
gress of the new Mahometan power, so long as the heretical Greeks 
were the only sufferers beneath its arms. But Hungary, a country 
that professed spiritual obedience to the Pope, a branch of Latin 
Christendom, was now in peril; and Pope Urban V. preached 
up a crusade against the infidel Turks. The King of Hungary, the 
princes of Servia, of Bosnia and Wallachia, leagued together to 
drive the Ottomans out of Europe; and their forces marched 
towards Adrianople until they crossed the river Marizza at a point 
not more than two days’ journey from that city. Lalaschahin, who 
then was in command of the Ottoman forces in Europe, was unable 
to assemble an army equal in numbers to that of the confederate 
chieftains, who mustered more than twenty thousand men. But 
the Christians, in the pride of assured victory, neglected all mili¬ 
tary precautions against their enemy; and suddenly, while they 
were all engaged in a nightly revel, the sound of the Turkish 
drums and fifes, 1 and the shouts of “ Allah ” were heard amid the 
darkness. Their active enemy was on them; and they fled in 
panic rout. “ They were caught,” says Seadeddin, the Oriental 
historian, “ even as wild beasts in their lair. They were driven 
before us as flames are driven before the wind, till plunging into 
the Marizza they perished in its waters.” Such was the issue of 
the first encounter of the Hungarians and Servians with the 
Turks; and centuries of further disaster and suffering to the 
Christians were to follow. 

A long list of battles won, and towns taken by Amurath or his 
generals between the year of the battle of Marizza, in 1363, and 
the year 1376, may be found in the Turkish historians. In the 
last-mentioned year, the capture of the strong city of Nissa by the 
Ottomans, forced the Prince of Servia to beg peace, which was 
granted to him on the condition of supplying a tribute of a thou- 

1 All the European nations have borrowed their military music from tho 
Turks. See Yon Hammer, Supplement. 


24 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


sand pounds of silver, and a thousand horse-soldiers every year. 
Sisvan, the King of the Bulgarians, had also taken part in the 
hostilities waged by the European Christians against Amurath, 
and he also was compelled to sue for mercy. Sisvan disliked pay¬ 
ing money, and preferred to obtain peace by jiving up his daughter 
in marriage to the conqueror. 

Amurath now rested from warfare for six years, during which 
time he employed himself unremittingly in the internal affairs of 
his state. He improved the organisation of his military force, 
and completed the feudal system by which grants of land in each 
conquered country were made to Mahometans, on condition that 
each district so granted should supply one or more Spahis or armed 
horsemen in time of war. These granted districts, or fiefs (as we 
may term them by applying the phraseology of mediaeval Europe) 
were classified into minor fiefs, called Timars; and grand fiefs, 
called Ziamets. We shall revert hereafter to the consideration of 
the effect of these feudal institutions both on the conquering and * 
the conquered races. Amurath also formed out of the Christian 
subjects of his dominions a corps of camp-followers called Woinaks; 
on whom devolved all the humble and laborious duties of the 
barracks, the encampment, and the march; such as cleaning the 
stables and attending to the baggage-wagons. The red colour 
was now chosen for the banner of the Spahis, and became the 
national colour of the Ottoman armies. 

During this season of peace Amurath was still solicitous to ex¬ 
tend his dominions; and he used for that purpose his political 
and diplomatic skill in forming such matrimonial alliances for 
members of his family, as seemed to promise the future acquisi¬ 
tion of new provinces. He married bis eldest son Bajazet to the 
daughter of the Prince of Kermian, a Turkish state in Asia Minor, 
that adjoined the Ottoman territories in that country. The bride 
brought as her dowry a new kingdom to the throne of Othman. 
Amurath’s own daughter Nifisay was given in marriage to the 
powerful Turkish Prince of Caramania. Amurath himself, and 
two of his sons, at a later period, permitted each a Byzantine 
princess to be added to their list of wives. Ever since the capture 
of Adrianople the Greek Emperor had cringed to the Ottoman 
sovereign, and sought eagerly to keep up such treaties with his 
infidel neighbour, as would promise him a quiet reign, though 
upon mere sufferance, at Constantinople. But Palseologus hated 
him whom he feared; and the Greek Emperor vainly, in 1380, 
underwent the expense and ignominy of a voyage from Constanti¬ 
nople to Borne, where he sought, by the most abject submissions 


AMURATH T. A.D. 1359-13C9. 25 

to the papacy, to obtain a new crusade by the Frankish kings of 
Christendom against the Mahometan invaders of its eastern 
regions. In terror at the wrath which this attempt was likely to 
excite in Amurath, Palseologus sent his third son Theodoras to 
the Ottoman court, with a humble request that he might be 
allowed to serve in the ranks of the Turkish army. This serviF 
humility allayed the anger of Amurath. Andronicus, another sen 
of the Greek Emperor, formed about the same time a friendship 
with Prince Saouclji, Amurath’s eldest son, which led to fatal 
results. The two young princes persuaded each other, and them¬ 
selves, that they were neglected by their fathers, and that their 
brethren were unduly preferred to them. They seized an oppor¬ 
tunity for insurrection, given by the absence of Amurath from 
Adrianople, whence he had been summoned by the tidings of 
disturbances in Asia, and during which he had left Saouclji in 
command of all the Ottoman dominions in Europe. They openly 
revolted, and established their joint camp near Constantinople, 
where Paleeologus lay trembling at their threats. Amurath, on 
hearing of the insurrection, instantly hurried back across the 
straits, and summoned the Greek Emperor to appear before him 
to answer for his son’s conduct. Pakeologus earnestly disavowed 
all participation in his schemes; and, that he might completely 
allay the suspicions of Amurath, he promised to join him in act¬ 
ing against their sons, and agreed that the rebels should lose their 
eyes for their crime. The Ottoman army then advanced to a 
little stream near Apicidion, behind which the insurgent princes 
had taken post. At nightfall, without any escort, Amurath 
spurred his horse across the water, and called out to the soldiery 
in the rebel camp to return to their duty upon promise of pardon. 
At the sound of the well-known voice of their old sovereign, 
which had so often cheered them to victory, the troops of Saouclji 
deserted the two princes, and flocking round Amurath, implored 
forgiveness for the treason which they had been led into by his 
viceroy. Saouclji and Andronicus escaped into the town of I)idy- 
moticha with a small band of Turks and of young Greek nobles, who 
had taken part in their plot. They were besieged, and. starved 
into surrender. Amurath had his own son led before him; and 
after the prince’s eyes had been put out, so that the agreement 
between the imperial sires might be kept, Saouclji was beheaded 
in his father’s' presence. The young Greek nobles were tied 
together in knots of two or three at a time, and flung into the 
river Marizza, while Amurath sat by, and smiled with grim satis¬ 
faction at the rapidity with which they sank beneath the waves. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


20 

Having found the fathers of some of the youthful rebels, he made 
them kill their children with their own hands. Two parents re¬ 
fused the horrible office,, and were themselves slain for their dis¬ 
obedience. When his vengeance had been satiated by these 
spectacles, Amurath sent young Andronicus in chains to his father, 
and bade Palceologus deal with him as lie himself had dealt with 
Saoudji. The Greek Emperor, dreading his stern ally, caused lii3 
child’s eyes to be scalded with burning vinegar. Amurath was 
pleased to consider this a sufficient obedience to his behest; and 
did not take notice that Andronicus’s life was spared, or that the 
horrid puishment of blinding was so imperfectly performed, as to 
leave the wretched prisoner some faint power of vision. 

Notwithstanding the Ottoman ruler’s policy in forming a bond 
of marriage between his house and that of the Turkish ruler of 
Caramania, a war broke out in 1387 between these two powerful 
rivals for the headship of the Turkish race in Asia Minor. A 
great battle was fought between them at Iconium, in which the 
valour of Prince Bajazet on the side of the Ottomans was par¬ 
ticularly signalised. He is said, by the lightning-like rapidity and 
violence of his charge upon the enemy on that day, to have 
acquired the surname of Yilderim, or “ the Lightning,” by which 
he is known in history. It is an appellation that will remind 
the classical reader of the Ptolemy Ceraunus of the Greeco-Mace- 
donian era; and still more appropriately of Hamilcar Barcas, the 
father of the great Hannibal. 

The Caramanian prince was utterly defeated at Iconium, and 
owed the preservation of his life and kingdom to the interposition 
of his wife, who succeeded in calming the anger of her victorious 
father, and induced him to be satisfied with his defeated rival 
acknowledging his superiority, and kissing his hand in token of 
submission. Amurath dismissed his army and repaired to Brusa, 
where he hoped to enjoy a period of repose. He refused to be 
roused again by the temptation of conquering and annexing the 
little independent territory of Tekke, that lay near his Asiatic 
dominions. One of his generals advised an expedition against 
that place; but Amurath rejected the proposal with disdain. 
“ The Prince of Tekke,” said he, “ is too poor and feeble. I 
should feel ashamed in making war on him. A lion does not 
hunt flies.” But the old lion was soon roused from his rest, to 
encounter far more formidable foes, who were leagued together to 
tear his European conquests from his grasp. 

The Ottoman dominions in Europe at this time (1338) com¬ 
prised nearly the whole of ancient Thrace and modern Boumeliu. 


AMURATH /. A.D. 1359 - 1389 . 27 

Some important acquisitions beyond the boundary of this province 
had also been effected ; and the conquerors pursued the system of 
planting colonies of Turks and Arabs from Asia in the conquered 
districts, while they removed large portions of the old population. 
By this, and by their custom of recruiting their Janissaries from 
the flower of the Christian children, they excited the alarm of the 
neighbouring Christian states, who saw a fierce race, alien to them 
in blood and in creed, thus taking root on their frontier, and 
organising the resources of the subdued country for future military 
enterprises. The Bulgarians, the Servians, the Bosnians, all of 
Sclavonic blood, 1 now united in one great national effort against 
the intrusive Turks. Servia was chief of the movement. She 
could not forget her proud position, which she had held before the 
Ottomans had come into Europe, when her great King Stephen 
Dushan ruled victoriously, from Belgrade to the Marizza, from 
the Black Sea to the Adriatic, and assumed the high titfe of 
“ Emperor of the Roumelians, the Macedonian Christ-loving 
Czar.” 2 Beside these Sclavonic nations, the Skipetars, 3 of Al¬ 
bania now armed against the common enemy from Asia. The 
powers thus allied against Amurath expected also and received 
assistance from the semi-Roman population of Wallachia and from 
the Magyars of Hungary, who, like their kinsmen the Ottoman 
Turks, 4 had won by force a settlement in Europe; but who, unlike 
the Turks, adopted the creed and the civilisation of European 
Christendom, and became for ages its chivalrous defenders. 
Sclavonic Poland also sent aid to her sister Sclavonic kingdom of 
the south. No further succour was obtainable. The other great 
kingdom of that family of nations, Russia, lay at this time in 
wretched slavery under the Mongols. The great kingdoms of 
western Christendom heard with indifference the sufferings and 
the perils, to which its eastern portions were exposed by the new 
Mahometan power. The old crusading enthusiasm had faded 
away; nor could, indeed, the immediate stimulant of a cry to the 
rescue of the Holy Land be employed against the Ottomans, who 
had not yet approached the Syrian territory. The internal con¬ 
dition, at the latter part of the fourteenth century, of each of the 
great European states, wdiich had supplied the heroes of the early 
crusades, was peculiarly unfavourable for the efforts of those who 

1 For their ethnology, see Latham’s “Ethnology of Europe.” 

2 See Ranke’s “ History of Servia,” p. 16 . 

3 See Latham, p. 13 . 

4 For the connection between the Magyars, the Huns of Attila, and the 
Ottoman Turks, see Latham. 


23 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


strove to arouse their descendants to a similar expedition. And 
the personal character of the sovereigns of England, France, and 
Germany, in 1388, forbade all hopes of seeing the examples of 
Richard Cceur cle Lion, of Edward I., of Philip Augustus, 
of St. Louis, of Conrad, and Frederick II., imitated by 
their successors. The weak and worthless Richard II. was 
sovereign of England; the imbecile Charles VI. was enthroned 
at Paris. Both countries were the scenes of perpetual strife 
between powerful nobles, and of general confusion and law¬ 
lessness. The German Empire, under the coarse and dissolute 
Wenceslaus, was in a still more wretched condition : and the great 
civil war between the confederations of brigand knights and the 
burghers of the free cities was raging from the Danube to the 
Rhine. The Christian princes of Spain were still fully occupied 
with their long struggles against their own Moorish invaders. The 
difficulty of uniting the powers of the West in any enterprise 
against the common foe of their religion was augmented tenfold 
by the schism in the Papacy, which divided the whole of Western 
Christendom. Consciences were perplexed, zeal was distracted 
and chilled, scepticism and indifference were created by the con¬ 
flicting pretensions and behests of two Popes, one at Avignon, 
and one at Rome; each of whom anathematised the other and his 
adherents with assiduity and animosity at least equal to any that 
could be displayed against the Ottomans. 

But although the great powers of Western Christendom stood 
aloof from the struggle made by the Christian nations of the East 
to free themselves from the pressure of the Ottoman conquests, 
Amurath saw that the league which the ruler of Servia had suc¬ 
ceeded in organising against him, was one which it would tax his 
utmost energies to encounter. He made full and cautious arrange¬ 
ments for the military protection and civil government of the 
Asiatic states, and then recrossed the Hellespont, with the design 
of baffling the superior resources of his enemies by the celerity of 
his operations. The Bulgarians and Servians had commenced the 
war by falling upon an Ottoman army which was moving through 
Bosnia. They destroyed fifteen out of twenty thousand Turks by 
the impetuous suddenness of their attack, and the great superiority 
of their numbers. After this vigorous blow, the Christians re¬ 
laxed in their exertions. The vacillations and delays, which 
usually mark the movements of a confederacy, kept the forces of 
the greater number of the allies inactive during several months of 
the year 1389 ; while their vigorous and resolute adversary was 
pouring his forces into Bulgaria, and completing the conquest of 


29 


AMURATH /. A.D. 1359 - 1389 . 

that important member of their league. Amurath was especially 
incensed against Sisvan, the Bulgarian King, who had kept up the 
appearance of submissive devotion to the Turkish interests, until 
he suddenly joined the Servians in the attack upon his son-in-law’s 
forces in Bosnia. The necessity of making regulations for the de 
fence and internal government of Boumelia during the war, and 
of calling into active service and arranging the full military force 
of the province, detained Amurath himself for a short time in 
Adrianople; but he sent his general, Ali Pacha, forward into Bul¬ 
garia with an army of thirty thousand men. The Turks now 
(1389) marched northward to conquest across that mountain chain 
of the Balkan, which their descendants in the present century 
trust to so earnestly, as a barrier against attacks upon themselves. 
Ali Pacha advanced with the main army through the passes of 
Nadir Derbend 1 upon Schumla, so celebrated in modern Russian 
wars. Schumla surrendered to the Turks, nor has it yet ever 
been retaken from them. Tirnova and Pravadi were also cap¬ 
tured by Ali Pacha and his lieutenant, Yakshibey; and the Bui 
garian King took refuge in Nicopolis on the Danube. Ali Pacha 
besieged him there, and Sisvan begged for peace. Amurath 
granted it, on condition that Silistria should be ceded to him, and 
that the conquered Sisvan should pay him a regular tribute. But 
disputes broke out as to the fulfilment of the terms of ptace; the 
war was recommenced, and the Turks stormed the strong places of 
Driclja and Plirschova. Besieged again in Nicopolis, the Bulgarian 
King surrendered at discretion. His life was spared ; but Bulgaria 
was now annexed to the Ottoman Empire, which thus advanced 
its northern frontier to the Danube. 

The Servian King Lazarus, alarmed at the destruction of his 
confederate, now earnestly collected the forces of the remaining 
members of the anti-Turkish league, and prepared for a resolute 
struggle. So large was the force which he drew around him, that 
in the pride and confidence of his heart he sent Amurath a formal 
challenge to a decisive battle. Amurath had now taken in person 
the command of the Turkish army, and continued his policy of 
acting on the offensive, and making his enemy’s territory the seat 
of war. He marched westward from Bulgaria through a difficult 
and mountainous country to the neighbourhood of Kossova, on 
the frontiers of Servia and Bosnia, where his enemies had collected 
their troops. The plain of Kossova, on which the fate of Servia 

1 See the excellent description of the passes of the Balkan and the for¬ 
tresses near them, in Colonel Chesney’s “Narrative of the Turko-Ilussian 
Campaigns of 1S2S-29.” 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


3° 

was decided on the 27th of August, 1389, is traversed by the little 
stream of the Schinitza. On the north side of this rivulet the 
combined levies of Servia, Bosnia, and Albania, with their 
auxiliaries from Poland, Hungary, and Wallachia, were arrayed, in 
numbers far exceeding those of the troops which Amurath had in 
hand for battle. According to the Ottoman historians, Amurath 
summoned a council of war to deliberate whether he should attack 
the enemy that seemed so superior in force. Several of the 
Turkish chiefs advised that he should draw up all the camels of 
their baggage-train in a line before the army, so as to serve as a 
living rampart, and to disorder the enemy’s horse by the sight 
and smell of those animals. 1 Amurath’s eldest son, Prince Ba- 
jazet, opposed this project: he fiercely urged that Heaven had 
ever manifestly favoured the arms of the house of Othman, and 
that to employ such artifices would show a distrust of Providence. 
“The honour of our flag,” said he, “requires that those who 
march beneath the Crescent, should meet their enemy face to face, 
let that enemy be who he will.” The grand vizier gave his vote 
also for open fighting, on the authority of what he believed to be 
a supernatural warning. He had opened the Koran at random, 
and had fallen upon the verse, “ 0 Prophet, fight the unbelievers 
and the hypocrites.” Pie had tried these sortes Koranicas again, 
and the verse which then presented itself was, “ Verily a large 
host is often beaten by a weaker one.” Another officer, the Bey- 
lerbey (lord of lords) Timourtash, also opposed the scheme of the 
camels, on reasons not of religion, but of common sense. He said 
that it was probable that the camels themselves would take fright 
at the sight and sound of the hostile cavalry, and that then they 
would rush back on the Turkish ranks, and create there the con¬ 
fusion which it was wished to cause amid the enemy. Night put 
an end to the deliberations of the council, without any settled 
plan being formed. Amurath had observed that the wind blew 
from the side of the enemy, wafting clouds of dust, which 
threatened to cause serious disadvantage to his troops in the 
action. He spent the whole night in earnest prayer for the aid of 
Heaven, 2 and asked that it might be vouchsafed him to close his 
life in fighting for the true faith ;—the only death that ensures 
the martyr’s prize of eternal felicity. 

In the other camp the discussions of the confederate princes 

1 See Herodotus, Clio, 7S, 80, for the employment of this very stratagem 
by Cyrus against the Lydian cavalry at the battle of Sardis, b.c. 546. 

2 Yon Hammer, vol. i. p. 176, cites the Turkish, historians who narrate 
the council of war, Amurath’s prayer, &c. 


AMURATH /. A.D. 1359 - 1389 . 31 

■were equally long and uncertain. Some advised an attack on the 
Turks by night, in revenge probably for the disaster of the 
Marizza, twenty-six years before. Others opposed this plan as 
full of risk and confusion, and also because the enemy would have 
a better chance of escaping in the night, than if they waited for 
daylight for the victory which they deemed secure. The morning 
at last broke upon the two camps ; and with the dawn there came 
a heavy fall of rain, which completely laid the dust, and seemed 
to Amuratk and his followers to be an express sign that God was 
with them. 

The rain ceased after a while, and the two armies came forth 
from their tents on a fair and open held, and drew themselves up 
for battle. The Turks ■were arranged in their customary order. 
As the battle was in Europe, the European feudatory troops were 
on the right wing; and those of Asia on the left. Prince Bajazet 
commanded on the right; the other wing was led by Amurath’s 
other surviving son, Prince Yacoub. Amurath himself v r as in the 
centre with the Janissaries, and the cavalry regiments of his guard. 
The irregulars, horse and foot, the Akindji, and the Azabs, 
skirmished in the van. On the Christian side, King Lazarus 
commanded the centre. His nephew, Vuk Brankowicli, led the 
right, and the King of Bosnia the left wing. Both armies advanced 
resolutely to the charge, encountered each other fiercely, stood 
their ground firmly; and the event of the day w^as long doubtful. 
The Asiatic troops in the left wing of the Mahometan army began 
at last to give v T ay before the ■warriors of Servia and Albania, who 
pressed them on the Christians’ right. Prince Bajazet brought 
succour from the right wing of the Ottomans, and restored the 
fight. Armed with a heavy mace of iron, he fought in person in 
the thick of the battle, and smote down all who dared to cross his 
path. While the two armies thus strove together, and the field 
was heaped thickly with carnage, a Servian nobleman, Milosch 
Kabilovitsch, rode to the Ottoman centre, pretending that he was 
a deserter, and had important secrets to reveal to Amurath in 
person. He was led before the Turkish sovereign; he knelt as if 
in homage before him, and then stabbed Amurath with a sudden 
and mortal stroke of his dagger. Milosch sprang up from his 
knees, and, gifted with surprising strength and activity, he thrice 
cleared himself from the vengeful throng of the Ottomans who 
assailed him, and fought his way to the spot where his horse had 
been left; but ere he could remount, the Janissaries overpowered 
him, and hewed him into pieces. Amurath knew that his wound 
was mortal; but he had presence of mind sufficient to give the 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS ,. 


orders for a charge of his reserve, which decided the victory in his 
favour. His rival, the Servian King, was brought captive into his 
presence, and Amurath died in the act of pronouncing the death- 
doom of his foe. 

The execution of King Lazarus was not the only one of which 
the royal Ottoman tent was the scene before the close of that day. 
Prince Baiazet, when the victory over the Christians was secure, 
returned to the Turkish camp, and was acknowledged by his 
father’s generals as their sovereign. Forthwith, and in the very 
presence of his father’s lifeless remains, Bajazet ordered his 
brother Yacoub, who had fought valiantly through the battle, to 
be seized and put to death. This fratricide (according to the 
historian of the empire, Seadeddin), was committed in pursuance 
of the maxim of the Koran, “ Disquiet is worse than putting to 
death.” It was, according to the same authority, rendered 
particularly proper by the evil example of revolt which their 
brother Saoudji had given in Amurath’s lifetime, which proved 
the necessity of cutting off those, who were likely to imitate such 
conduct.. The death of Yacoub was also, according to Seadeddin, 
justifiable, because the Sultan, the shadow of God upon earth, 
and the Lord of all true believers, ought to reign in conformity 
with the ever-to-be-imitated example of God, alone upon the 
throne, and without the possibility of any one revolting against 
him. 

According to some authorities it was from Bajazet’s deadly 
rapidity in securing his accession by his brother’s death that he 
acquired the surname of “ Yilderim but his energy in war may 
well have been the more honourable cause of his obtaining this 
designation. His reign commenced in the camp, and he followed 
lip the war against the Servians with vigour and success, that 
showed him to be the heir of his father’s valour as well as of his 
throne. Stephen Lasarevich, the new King of Servia, found that 
it was hopeless to continue the struggle, and entered into a treaty 
by which Servia became the vassal state of the Ottomans. Lasare¬ 
vich gave the Sultan his sister to wife, and agreed to pay as tribute- 
money a certain portion of the produce of all the silver mines in his 
dominions. He undertook also to render, in person, military ser¬ 
vice to the Sultan in all his campaigns; and throughout his life he 
honourably performed his portion of the compact. In the great 
battles of Nicopolis and Angora, Lasarevich fought by the side of 
his brother-in-law. He was (says the modern historian of Servia) 
apparently bound to this house by an oath, and with the zeal of a 


BAJAZET I. A.D. 1389 - 1402 . 33 

kinsman he exerted himself in the adjustment of quarrels that 
broke out in the Ottoman family. 1 

Having successfully concluded the Servian war, Bajazet passed 
over to his Asiatic dominions, which he increased by fresh con¬ 
quests over the neighbouring states. In 1390 the Turkish “ Light¬ 
ning ” was again in Europe, waging war on Wallachia, Bosnia, 
Hungary, and the wretched remnants of the Byzantine Empire. 
Myrtche, the Prince of Wallachia, submitted to Bajazet in 1391, 
and thenceforth Wallachia was for centuries in the list of the 
tributary states of the Ottoman Porte. The Bosnians, aided by 
the Hungarians, offered a more obstinate resistance. In 1392 the 
Hungarian King, Sigismund, advanced into Bulgaria and gained 
several advantages, but was at last overpowered by the superior 
forces of the Turks, and driven in utter rout back into his own 
kingdom. It was while King Sigismund in the course of his 
retreat from the campaign traversed the county of Huniade, that 
he saw and became enamoured of the fair Elizabeth Morsiney. It 
is said and sung that monarchs seldom sigh in vain ; and from this 
love-passage of the fugitive Sigismund ensued the birth of Huny- 
ades the Great, the conqueror of the Turks in many a well- 
fought field. 

Bajazet’s European enemies obtained a seasonable relief from 
the pressure of his arms, by the sudden attack which the Prince 
of Caramania made in 1392 upon the Ottoman possessions in Asia. 
The Caramanian armies were at first so far successful that the 
Ottoman troops suffered a complete overthrow between Angora 
and Brus’a; and Timourtash, Bajazet’s viceroy in Asia, was taken 
prisoner. But on the arrival of Bajazet himself in Asia, the 
fortune of the Avar was speedily changed. The Caramanian prince 
Avas defeated and captured, and placed in the custody of his OAvn 
former prisoner, Timourtash. Without waiting for orders from 
Bajazet, Timourtash put the unhappy Caramanian to death. 
Bajazet Avas at first angry at such an act b ing been done on the 
general’s own authority, but he excused it on consideration of high 
state policy, and justified it by the maxim that “ The death of a 
prince is not so bad as the loss of a province.” That maxim Avas 
afterwards regularly quoted by the Turkish rulers Avhen they 
ordered the execution of any prince. 

Caramania hoav submitted to the Ottomans, and all the south 
of Asia Minor acknoA\dedged Bajazet as sovereign. He then sent 
his armies into the east and north of that country, and annexed 

1 Ranke’s “ History of Servia,” p. 25. Mrs. Kerr’s translation. 

3 


34 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Sivas (the ancient Sebaste) Kastemouni, Samsoun and Amassia, 
with their territories to his dominions. Bajazet disdained the 
title of Emir, which his three predecessors had borne; and obtained 
from the successor of the caliphs (who was maintained in empty 
state by the Mameluke sovereign of Egypt, but still recognised as 
the religious chief of the Mahometan world) the superior title of 
Sultan. Proud of his numerous victories and rapidly augmented 
power, Bajazet now gave himself up for a time to luxurious ease 
and to sensual excesses of the foulest description. He is the first of 
the Ottoman princes who infringed the law of the Prophet which 
forbids the use of wine. His favourite general, Ali Pasha, had set 
his master the example of drunkenness ; and Bajazet debased him¬ 
self by sharing and imitating his subject’s orgies. The infamy 
with which their names are sullied even in the pages of Oriental 
writers does not end here: they introduced among the Ottoman 
grandees (and the loathsome habit soon spread far and wide) the 
open and notorious practice of those unutterable deeds of vice and 
crime, which the natural judgment of mankind in every age and 
among every race has branded as the most horrible of all offences 
against Gocl and man. The Koran is explicit in its denunciation 
of such acts; but the Turks, though in other respects faithful 
observers of the law of the Prophet, on this point compromised 
with their consciences and their creed. The pen recoils from this 
detestable subject; and it is indeed one of the shameful peculi¬ 
arities of such vice, that its very enormity secures to a great 
extent its oblivion. But it is the stern duty of History not to 
flinch from the facts, which prove how fearful a curse the Ottoman 
power was to the lands which it overran during the period of its 
ascendency. It became a Turkish practice to procure by treaty, 
by purchase, by force, or by fraud, bands of the fairest children of 
the conquered Christians, who were placed in the palaces of the 
Sultan, his viziers, and his pachas, under the title of pages, but too 
often really to serve as the helpless materials of abomination. 
Frequently wars were undertaken and marauding inroads made 
into other states to collect this most miserable human spoil for 
purposes at which humanity shudders. Sufficiently appalling is 
the institution of the Janissaries, by which the Christian boy was 
taken from his home, and trained to deadly service against his 
father’s race and his father’s faith. It might seem worthy of 
having been suggested by the fiend, whom Milton describes as— 

“ The strongest and the fiercest spirit 
That fought in heaven.” 


35 


BAJAZET I. A.D. 1389 - 1402 . 

u Moloch, horrid king, besmear’d with blood 
Of human sacrifice and parents’ tears 

but infinitely more detestable is the Belial spirit that prompted 
these other ineffable atrocities of Turkish rule. We find an 
aggravation, not a mitigation of such crimes, when we read that 
the wretched beings, the promise of whose youth was thus turned 
into infamy; were frequently, when they grew to manhood, placed 
by their masters in posts of importance; and that the Ottoman 
Empire has owed many of her ablest generals and statesmen to 
this foul source. Pity must be blended with the loathing with 
which we regard the dishonest splendours of these involuntary 
apostates; but as unmixed as inexpressible is our abhorrence of 
the authors of their guilt and shame. 

Bajazet was startled from his flagitious revels by a crusade of 
the Christian chivalry of Frankistan (a.d. 1396). Sigismund the 
King of Hungary felt deeply after the day of Kossova and the 
fall of Servia, the imminence of the peril to which, his own country 
was exposed ; and he succeeded in moving the sympathies of other 
members of the Latin Church into active enterprise 011 his behalf. 
Pope Boniface IX., in the year 1394, proclaimed a crusade against 
the Ottomans, with plenary indulgence to all Christians who should 
forthwith repair to the rescue of Hungary and the neighbouring 
kingdoms. Sigismund was especially earnest in his endeavours to 
move the Court of France to send troops to his assistance. The 
cessation of hostilities between France and England, about this 
time, favoured the grant of the Hungarian request; and many of 
the martial youth of France and Burgundy were now eager for 
new adventures and fresh scenes of distinction. It was resolved 
that the Count de Nevers, the son of the Duke of Burgundy, 
should lead a body of men-at-arms to the aid of the Hungarian 
King, and that he should be commander-in-chief of the French and 
other chivalry, “who ” (in the words of the contemporary chroni¬ 
cler) “ were to break the force of Bajazet in Hungary, and when 
this was done, were to advance to Constantinople, cross the 
Hellespont, enter Syria, gain the Holy Land, and deliver Jerusalem 
and the holy sepulchre from the hands of the infidels.” 1 Knights 
and squires began now to gather together, with other gentlemen 
who were desirous of renown. The chief commanders, under the. 
Count de Nevers, were the Count de la Manche and the three 
cousins of the French King, James of Bourbon, and Henri and 
Philippe de Bar. Among other chiefs who joined this crusade, 

1 Froissart. 


i \ 



3—2 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


were Philippe of Artois, Count of Eu, prince of the blood royal, 
and Constable of France ; the Lord de Courcy, Sir Guy de la 
Tremouille, Sir John de Vienne, Admiral of France, Boucicault, 
Marshal of France, Sir Reginald de Roye, the Lords of St. Pol, de 
Montmorel, and Sampi, and many more, the very flower of the 
French chivalry. They marched from France in companies, about 
the middle of March, 1396; and as they traversed Germany, they 
were joined by Frederic, Count of Hohenzollern, Grand Prince of 
the Teutonic Order, and the Grand Master Philibert de Naillac, 
who came from Rhodes at the head of a strong body of the 
Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. Besides this splendid auxiliary 
force, the King of Hungary had obtained the services of a body 
of Bavarian knights, commanded by the Elector Palatine and the 
Count of Munspelgarde ; and he had also been joined by a band of 
the chivalry of Styria, headed by Herman, second Count de Cilly. 
Altogether, the crusaders of Western Christendom who marched to 
the Danube against the Ottomans in 1396, appear to have been 
from ten to twelve thousand in number, 1 all men “ of tried courage 
and enterprise,” as the old chronicler calls them, full of confidence 
in their cause and in their own valour, and who boasted in the 
pride of their hearts that “ if the sky were to fall, they would 
uphold it on the points of their lances.” Sigismund had collected 
the full strength of his own kingdom, and had also prevailed on 
Myrtcli&, the Prince or Voivode of Wallachia, to join him in this 
grand combined attack on the Ottoman power, although Wallachia 
had some time before obtained peace from the Turks on condition 
of paying a stipulated tribute. 

The confederate Christian army marched in divisions, partly 
through Transylvania and Wallachia, and partly through Servia, 
against the Ottoman dominions. The Servian prince remained 
faithful to his alliance with Bajazet, and his subjects were there¬ 
fore visited with merciless pillage and devastation by the army of 
fellow-Christians who marched through their land. The first 
Turkish town that Sigismund attacked was Widdin, which sur¬ 
rendered immediately. Orsova yielded after five days’ resistance. 
Raco was taken by assault, and the garrison put to the sword, 
though they laid down their arms and asked for quarter. The 
practice of refusing mercy to a fallen enemy was by no means 
confined to the Turkish side : and, indeed, even in the hostilities 
of one Christian nation against another, no law or custom of war 

__ 1 Von Hammer collects careful and full data for this enumeration, which 
differs from that of Gibbon. 


37 


BAJAZET /. A.D. 1389 - 1402 . 

against butchering defeated and unresisting enemies was yet re¬ 
cognised. When lives were spared, it was generally from the 
hope of obtaining ransom, or from sheer weariness and satiety of 
slaughter. The Christian army marched next against Nicopolis, 
which was closely invested. The commander of the Turkish 
garrison, Yoglan Bey, made a gallant and obstinate resistance, in 
the full hope that Bajazet would not suffer so important a city to 
fall without making an effort for its relief. The Sultan had 
indeed now crossed the Bosphorus from Asia, and was leading 
the best troops of his empire to encounter these new foes from 
the Far West. The stubborn valour of the commander of Nico¬ 
polis was of the utmost value to his sovereign, by giving him time 
to concentrate and bring up his forces to the scene of action. 
Bajazet’s generalship was far superior to the military conduct on 
the side of the Christians. They, and especially the French, in 
arrogant confidence of their invincibility, gave themselves up to 
riotous carousals, and neglected the most ordinary precautions to 
ascertain whether any enemy was advancing. “ Bajazet would 
not dare to come across the Bosphorus.” Such was their boast, 
at the very time when Bajazet was swiftly and silently approach¬ 
ing with his well-appointed and well-disciplined army within six 
leagues of their camp. The Count de Nevers and liis French 
chivalry were at table on the 24th of September, 1396, when 
messengers hurried in with the tidings that some marauders from 
the camp had come upon a great army of Turks, which was even 
then close at hand. The young paladins of France rose hot and 
flushed at the tidings, and ran to arms, demanding that they 
should be led instantly to battle. The Turkish irregular troops, 
the Azabs and the Akindji, were now seen hovering near; and 
the Count de Nevers, while his French cavalry was forming 
hastily in line, required of King Bigismund that they should be 
the van of the Christian army, and fill the post of honour in the 
battle. Sigismund, who knew well the Turkish tactics, urged on 
the Count that it would be wiser to send some light troops against 
the half-armed and undisciplined hordes, which they saw before 
them, and to reserve the French chivalry, as the flower of the 
Christian army, to meet the Janissaries and Spahis, the best troops 
on the other side. The Sire de Courcy and the Admiral advised 
compliance with the King’s advice, but the Constable and the 
Marechal Boucicault opposed it, out of a spirit of rivalry, and 
insisted that the French cavalry should not suffer any Hungarians 
to precede them to battle. The young knights all applauded 
these proud words; and in ferocious insolence of spirit, they 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


33 

massacred some Turkish prisoners, whom they had in their power, 
and who had surrendered on promise of quarter—an act of 
useless perfidy and cruelty, which was soon to receive its chas¬ 
tisement. 

Bajazet had halted his main army in a plain at a short distance 
from the Christian camp. There was some rising ground in the 
interval, which screened the Turks from the enemy’s observation. 
The Sultan sent his irregular troops forward and supported them 
by a body of Janissaries, and by a large division of his cavalry ; 
but he reserved forty thousand of his best troops, and kept them 
under arms, and drawn up in perfect order on the plain. On the 
other side the French cavalry, about six thousand strong, galloped 
impetuously onward, disdaining to wait for the co-operation of 
the main Hungarian army, with which King Sigismund moved 
forward more slowly. The French rode the Turkish irregulars 
down like reeds, and then with levelled spears they charged the 
advanced division of the Janissaries. They broke this redoubtable 
infantry; and next encountered with equal success the foremost 
squadrons of the Turkish regular cavalry that attempted to cover 
the retreat of their comrades. The triple success which the fiery 
valour of the young French nobles had thus achieved was 
splendid, and might have led to a complete victory, had they 
listened to the sage advice of the Sire de Courcy and the Admiral, 
who earnestly implored the Count de Fevers to order a halt, and 
wait for the Hungarians to come up ; or at least to give time 
enough for the horses to recover their wind, and for rearranging 
their disordered ranks. But carried away by the excitement of 
the strife, and the intoxication of their partial triumph, the 
French knights and their young commander continued to chase 
the flying Spahis, till, on gaining the summit of the high ground, 
they saw before them, not as they expected, a scared remnant of 
the defeated Turks, but a steady forest of hostile spears, and the 
Sultan himself at the head of his chosen troops, which soon 
began to extend, and wheel their enclosing lines round the scanty 
band of the rash assailants. The Turkish troops, which they had 
defeated in the first part of their advance, had now rallied, and 
formed in the rear of the French knights, cutting off all hope of 
retreat. In this extremity, charged furiously in every quarter by 
superior numbers, obliged to combat in confusion and disorder, 
and with their own strength and that of their horses exhausted 
by their previous efforts, the Christian chevaliers fought on 
heroically till they were nearly all cut down or made prisoners. 
A few only made their way back to the main army of the con- 


BAJAZET 1 . A.D. 1389-1402. 39 

federates. Into which they carried the disheartening tidings of 
defeat. Bajazet, after the French were overpowered, restored the 
regular formation of his troops, and then moved forward against 
King Sigismund. The two wings of the Christian main army 
fled at once without striking a blow. The central division of 
Hungarians, which the king himself commanded, and the Ba¬ 
varians and the Styrians, who also were posted in the centre, 
stood firm. They repulsed the Turkish charge, and advanced in 
turn against the Janissaries and Spahis, forcing these chosen 
troops of the Ottomans to recoil, when they were themselves 
fiercely charged by the Servians, who, under their king, Stephen 
Lasarevich, fought as allies of Bajazet in this battle. The over¬ 
throw of the Christian army was now complete. Sigismund’s 
Hungarian division was almost destroyed; all the Bavarian knights 
and many of the Styrians died gloriously around their standards. 
King Sigismund and a few more of the leaders escaped with 
difficulty from the field; but nearly all the best and bravest of the 
gallant army which had marched on that crusade, lay stark on the 
bloody field of Nicopolis, or were helplessly waiting for the doom 
which it might please the triumphant Sultan to pass upon his 
captive foes. 

After the conflict, Bajazet fixed his camp in front of the rescued 
city of Nicopolis, and then rode over the field of battle. He was 
enraged to find from the number of his men who lay dead, how 
dear the victory had cost him. He said, “ This has been a cruel 
battle for our people : the Christians have defended themselves 
desperately ; but I will have this slaughter well avenged on those 
who are prisoners.” Accordingly on the next morning the whole 
Turkish army was drawn up in the form of a crescent, the Sultan 
being in the centre. He commanded the Christian prisoners to be 
brought before him, and they were led out to the number of ten 
thousand, with their Mnds bound behind them, and with halters 
round their necks. Among them was a youth of Munich, named 
Schildberger, who had gone to that campaign as attendant on a 
Bavarian nobleman who fell in the battle. Schildberger, more 
fortunate than his lord, escaped death in the conflict and in the 
massacre that followed. He lived to witness and to share the 
captivity of his first captors; and, after thirty-four years of 
slavery, returned to his home and wrote there a memoir of his 
own life, which is the most interesting and most trustworthy 
narrative that we possess of the campaign of Nicopolis, and of 
many of the subsequent scenes of Turkish history. The com¬ 
mander of the French chivalry, the Count de Nevers, had been 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


40 

taken in the battle. Bajazet ordered that he should be spared, 
and permitted him to select twenty-four more of the Christian 
nobles from among the prisoners, whose lives were also granted. 
The Sultan then gave the signal for the slaughter of the rest to 
commence; and the unhappy captives were led in detachments 
before the royal tent, at the entrance of which Bajazet stood with 
the Count de Nevers and the twenty-four other Christian nobles 
who had been spared, but who were forced to witness the fate of 
their comrades and fellow-Christians. The contemporaneous 
chronicler of chivalry, old Froissart, tells the fate of the martyred 
chevaliers with natural sympathy : 

“Many excellent knights and squires of France and other 
nations, who had been taken in battle or in the pursuit, were now 
brought forth in their shirts, one after another, before Bajazet, 
who eyeing them a little, they were led on; and as he made a 
signal were instantly cut to pieces by those waiting for them with 
drawn swords. Such was the cruel justice of Bajazet this day, 
when upwards of three hundred gentlemen of different nations 
were thus pitilessly murdered. It was a cruel case for them to 
suffer for the love of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and may he receive 
their souls ! 

“ Among the murdered of that day was the gallant knight Sir 
Henry d’Antoing : may God show gracious merit to his soul! 
The Lord Boucicault, Marshal of France, was led naked like the 
others, before Bajazet, and would have suffered the same cruel 
death, had not the Count de Nevers left his companions, who were 
motionless at the sad sight, and flung himself on his knees to the 
Sultan, entreating him to spare the Lord Boucicault, who was 
much beloved by the King of France, and well able to pay a 
considerable ransom ; and the Count made signs, as paying from 
one hand to the other, that he would give a large sum of money, 
to soften the anger of the Sultan. Bajazet consented to the 
request of the Count de Nevers, and the Lord Boucicault was put 
aside with those who were not to be killed. Others were brought 
forward, until the number I have mentioned was completed ; such 
was the cruel revenge the infidels had on the Christians. It seems, 
according to what I heard, that Bajazet took delight that the 
victory he had gained over the Christians, and the capture of the 
Count de Nevers, should be known in France, and carried thither 
by a French knight. Three knights, of whom Sir James de Iielly 
was one, were brought before Bajazet and the Count de Nevers, 
who was asked which of the three he wished should go to the 
King of France and to his father the Duke of Burgundy. Sir 


4 i 


BAJAZET I. A.D. 1389-1402. 

James cle Helly had the good fortune to be made choice of, be¬ 
cause the Count cle Nevers was before acquainted with him : he 
therefore said to the Sultan—‘ Sir, I wish that this person may 
go to France from you and from me.’ This was accepted by 
Bajazet, and Sir James de Helly remained with him and the other 
French lords; but the two unsuccessful knights were delivered over 
to the soldiery, who massacred them without pity.” 

It is truly characteristic of Froissart and his age, that while he 
thus bewails the slaughter which befell the three hundred captives 
of gentle birth, he says not a word respecting the thousands of 
the common soldiery of the Christian army, who were massacred 
at the same time. It is from the lowly-born Bavarian that we 
learn the extent and the cruelty of the carnage of that day. 
Schildberger saw his comrades cut down in heaps by the scimetars 
of the Turkish executioners, or battered to death by the maces of 
the Janissaries, who were called forward to join in the bloody 
work. He himself was saved by the intercession of Bajazet’s son, 
who was moved to pity by the evident youth of the captive. The 
Sultan sate there from daybreak till four in the afternoon enjoying 
with inexorable eye the death-pangs of his foes, when at last the 
pity or the avarice of his grandees made them venture to come 
between him and his prey, and implore that the Christians who 
yet remained alive might be made slaves of, instead of being slain. 
Bajazet assented, and the surviving captives, after the Sultan had 
chosen his fifth part from among them, were given up, each to the 
Mahometan who had taken him in battle. The Count de Nevers 
and the other lords were ransomed after a long captivity, during 
which Bajazet carried them about his dominions as trophies of his 
power and glory, little thinking that he himself was soon to drink 
still deeper of the same bitter cup of defeat and shame, and to 
furnish a still more memorable spectacle of baffled ambition and 
fallen pride. 

Bajazet and his captives were at Brusa, in 1397, when the money 
for their ransom arrived. Before he dismissed them, he gave them 
an opportunity of witnessing both his barbaric magnificence and 
his barbaric justice. Froissart thus relates the two scenes, and 
the haughty leave-taking which the Sultan accorded to the Christian 
lords : 

“ The Sultan had at this time seven thousand falconers, and as 
many huntsmen: you may suppose from this the grandeur of his 
establishments. One day, in the presence of the Count de Nevers, 
he flew a falcon at some eagles; the flight did not please him; 
and he was so wroth, that, for this fault he was on the point of 


42 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


beheading two thousand of his falconers, scolding them exceed¬ 
ingly for want of diligence in their care of his hawks, when the 
one he was fond of behaved so ill. Another time, when the 
Count cle Nevers and the French barons were with the Sultan, a 
poor woman came to him in tears, to demand justice against one 
of his servants, and said — 1 Sultan, I address myself to thee, as 
my sovereign, and complain of one of thy servants, who is, I 
understand, attached to thy person. He, this morning, entered 
my house, and seized by force the goat’s milk I had provided for 
myself and children, and drank it against my will. I told him 
that I should complain to thee of this outrage, but I had no 
sooner uttered the words, than he gave me two great cuffs, and 
would not leave me, though I ordered him in thy name. Sultan, 
do me justice, as thou hast sworn to thy people thou wouldest, 
that I may be satisfied, this injury be punished, and that every 
one may know thou wilt see the meanest of thy subjects righted.’ 

“ The Sultan was very rigidly determined that all crimes com¬ 
mitted within his dominions should be severely punished : he 
therefore listened to her attentively, and said he would do her 
justice. He then ordered the varlet to be brought, and confronted 
with the woman, who repeated her complaint. The varlet, who 
dreaded Bajazet, began to make excuses, saying it was all false. 
The woman told a plain tale, and persisted in its truth. The 
Sultan stopped her, and said—‘ Woman, consider well thy accusa¬ 
tion ; for, if I find thou hast told me a lie, thou shalt suffer death.’ 
‘ Sir,’ replied the woman, ‘ I consent to it; for were it not true, I 
could have no reason to come before thee, and I only ask for 
justice.’ ‘ I will do it,’ answered the Sultan, Tor I have so sworn, 
and indiscriminately to every man or woman within my dominions.’ 
He then ordered the varlet to be seized, and to have his belly 
opened, for otherwise he would not have known if he had drank 
the milk or not. It was there found, for it had not had time to 
be digested; and the Sultan, on seeing it, said to the woman, 
‘ Thou hadst just cause of complaint: now go thy way, for the 
injury done thee has been punished.’ She was likewise paid for 
her loss. This judgment of Bajazet was witnessed by the French 
lords, who were at the time in his company. 1 

“ When the Count de Nevers and the lords of France who were 
made prisoners at the battle of Nicopolis (excepting the Count 

1 Dr. Newman, in his lectures on the Turks, when he relates this instance 
of the judicial system which makes the punishment supply the evidence, 
quotes appropriately Virgil’s description of Rhadamanthus: 

“ Castigatque auditque dolos.” 


BAJAZET I. A.D. 13S9-1402. 43 

d’Eu and the Lord de Courcy, who had died), had been some time 
entertained by the Sultan, and had seen great part of his state, he 
consented they should depart, which was told them by those who 
had been ordered to attend to their personal wants. The Count 
and his companions waited on the Sultan in consequence, to thank 
him for his kindness and courtesy. On taking his leave, the Sul¬ 
tan addressed him, by means of an interpreter, as follows :—‘ John, 
I am well informed that in thy country thou art a great lord, and 
son to a powerful prince. Thou art young, and hast many years 
to look forward to; and, as thou mayest be blamed for the ill 
success of thy first attempt in arms, thou mayest perchance, to 
shake off this imputation and regain thine honour, collect a power¬ 
ful army to lead against me, and offer battle. If I feared thee, I 
would make thee swear, and likewise thy companions, on thy faith 
and honour, that neither thou nor they would ever bear arms 
against me. But no: I will not demand such an oath: on the 
contrary, I shall be glad that when thou art returned to thy 
country, it please thee to assemble an army, and lead it hither. 
Thou wilt always find me prepared, and ready to meet thee in the 
field of battle. What I now say, do thou repeat to any person, to 
whom it may please thee to repeat it; for I am ever ready for, 
and desirous of deeds of arms, as well as to extend my conquests. * 

“ These high words the Count de Nevers and his companions 
understood well, and never forgot them as long as they lived.” 

Nothing indeed could surpass the arrogant confidence in the 
strength of his arms with which Bajazet was inspired by this 
victory over the chosen warriors of the Christian nations. It was 
his common boast, that he would conquer Italy, and that his horse 
should eat his oats on the high altar of St. Peter’s. From his 
capital at Brusa, he sent vaunting messages to the princes of Asia 
and Egypt, announcing his victory at Nicopolis; and the messengers 
to each Mahometan court took with them a chosen band of the 
Christians who had been taken in the battle, as presents from the 
conqueror, and as attesting witnesses of his exploits. Nor was it 
in words only that Bajazet showed his unceasing energy against 
the yet unsubdued nations of the West. His generals overran 
and devastated Styria, and the south of Hungary; and the Sultan 
himself led the Turkish armies to the conquest of Greece. He 
marched through Thessaly, as Xerxes had marched nearly nine¬ 
teen centuries before. But no modern Leonidas guarded Ther¬ 
mopylae ; and Locris, Phocis, and Boeotia fell almost without 
resistance into the Turkish power. Bajazet’s lieutenants passed 
with equal celerity across the isthmus of Corinth, and subdued the 


44 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


whole Peloponnesus. Thirty thousand Greeks were removed 
thence by Bajazet’s order, and transported into Asia; and Turco¬ 
man and Tartar colonies were settled in their stead in the classic 
regions of Laconia, Messenia, Achaia, Argolis, and Elis. Athens 
was taken in 1397, and the Turkish Crescent waved over “The 
City of the Wise/’ as she is termed by the Oriental historians who 
narrate the triumphs of Bajazet. 

Constantinople had more than once been - menaced, and had 
been pressed with actual siege by Bajazet, from which the Greek 
Emperor obtained a temporary respite by turning one of the 
churches of Constantinople into a mosque, and by binding him¬ 
self to pay the Sultan an annual tribute of 10,000 ducats. But, in 
1400, Bajazet, no longer sated in his ambition with such conces¬ 
sions, commanded the Greek Emperor to surrender his crown to 
him, threatening extermination to all the inhabitants of the city 
in case of refusal. The Byzantines nobly replied—“We know 
our weakness, but we trust in the God of justice, who protects the 
weak and lowly, and puts down the mighty from on high.” 
Bajazet was preparing to execute his threats, when the desolater 
was laid desolate and the victor overthrown, not by any efforts of 
European statesmanship or violence, but by the superior might of 
another Asiatic conqueror, before whom the spirit of the Ottoman 
power, high and unmatchable where Timour’s was not, “ became 
a Fear as being overpowered.” 

Timour the Tartar, as he is usually termed in history, was 
called by his countrymen Timourlenk, that is, Timour the Lame, 
from the effects of an early wound; a name which some European 
writers have converted into Tamerlane, or Tamberlaine. He was 
of Mongol origin, and a direct descendant, by the mother’s side, 
of Zenghis Khan. He was bom at Sebzar, a town near Samar- 
cand, in Transoxiana, in 1336, and was consequently nearly seventy 
years of age, when his conquests clashed with those of Bajazet, 
and the Ottoman power was struck by him to the dust. Timour’s 
early youth was passed in struggles for ascendency with the petty 
chiefs of rival tribes, but at the age of thirty-five, he had fought 
his way to undisputed pre-eminence, and was proclaimed Khan of 
Zagatai by the couroultai, or general assembly of the warriors of 
his race. He chose Samarcand as the capital of his dominion, and 
openly announced that he would make that dominion comprise the 
whole habitable earth. When he took possession of the throne of 
Samarcand, he assumed, in addition to his name of Timour (which 
means “ Iron,” and which typified, in the eyes of the Orientals, 
the resistless might with which he subdued all things), the titles 


BAJAZET /. A.D. 1389-1402. 45 

of the Great Wolf (Gurgan), the Lord of the Age (Sahet Kiwan), 
and Conqueror of the World (Jehargyr). The boastful appella¬ 
tions of Eastern sovereigns are frequently as ridiculous as they are 
pompous; but those which Timour bore were emblems of fearful 
truths; for in the thirty-six years of his reign he raged over the 
world from the great wall of China to the centre of Russia on the 
north; and the Mediterranean and the Nile were the western 
limits of his career, which was pressed eastward as far as the 
sources of Ganges. He united in his own person the sovereignties 
of twenty-seven countries, and he stood in the place of nine several 
dynasties of kings. He was often heard to quote a passage of an 
Eastern poet, which declares that as there is but one God in heaven, 
so there ought to be but one lord on earth, and that all the 
kingdoms of the universe could not satiate the ambition of one 
great sovereign. 

The career of Timour as a conqueror, is unparalleled in history; 
for neither Cyrus, nor Alexander, nor Caesar, nor Attila, nor 
Zenghis Khan, nor Charlemagne, nor Napoleon, ever won by the 
sword so large a portion of the globe, or ruled over so many 
myriads of subjugated fellow-creatures. Timour’s triumphs were 
owing not only to personal valour and to high military genius, but 
to his eminent skill as a politician and a ruler. His code of laws, 
which he drew up for the regulation of his army, for the ad¬ 
ministration of justice, and for the finances of his empire, shows 
keen observation, and deep and sound reflection. The chief force 
of his art of government, and of his foreign policy, was derived 
from the admirable system, which he established of gaining ac¬ 
curate and full intelligence from the reports of emissaries, who 
were sent by him to travel in all directions, under various dis¬ 
guises, and especially as pilgrims or dervises. He thus knew the 
strength and the weakness of his enemies in each place, and at 
each crisis. Whatever information he obtained from his agents 
was by his orders carefully collected in registers and delineated on 
maps, which were kept ready for immediate reference. Thoughtful 
and provident in balancing probabilities, and guarding well against 
each contingency before he undertook an enterprise, he was un¬ 
shaken in his resolution when his plans were matured. He 
countermanded no order which had once been issued ; and it was a 
maxim with him never to repent, and never to regret. He had 
such an ascendency over his soldiers, that they not only under¬ 
went the severest privations, and lavished their lives at his bidding, 
but would, if Timour ordered, abstain from plunder in the hour of 
victory, and give up the spoils of war without a murmur. He was 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


46 

* 

a generous master; but his cruelty to those who ventured to 
resist him surpasses all the similar horrors with which military 
history is so rife. Timour evidently employed terror as one of his 
principal instruments of conquest; and the punishments which he 
inflicted on whole populations often show the cold calculating 
subtilty of a practised tormentor, rather than the mere savage 
ferocity of an irritated despot. 

Bajazet had, by his generals, extended the frontier of his empire 
in the east of Asia Minor during the three years that followed the 
battle of Nicopolis. Timour’s dominions were already spread over 
Georgia, and other countries west of the Caspian Sea, so that a 
collision between these two great potentates of the Mahometan 
world became inevitable. Each sheltered the princes whom the 
other had dethroned, and a series of angry complaints and threats 
followed, which soon led to open insult and actual war. The 
strong city of Sivas (the ancient Sebaste in Cappadocia) near the 
Armenian frontier, which had submitted to Bajazet, was the first 
place in the Ottoman dominions which Timour assailed; and it 
was by the tidings of the fall of Sivas that Bajazet was recalled 
from the siege of Constantinople. Bajazet had sent Ertoghrul, the 
bravest of his sons, with a chosen force to protect Sivas ; and the 
strength of the fortifications, the number and spirit of the popu¬ 
lation, and the military skill with which they were directed, had 
seemed to set the threats of its Tartar assailants at defiance. But 
Timour employed thousands of miners in digging huge cavities 
beneath the foundations of the city walls, taking care to prop up 
the walls with timber planking and piles until the excavations were 
complete. When this was done, the miners set fire to the timber, 
and the walls sank down by their own weight. The defenders of 
Sivas saw their town and ramparts thus swallowed up by the 
earth before their eyes, and implored in despair the mercy of the 
conqueror. Never had Timour shown himself so merciless. Four 
thousand Christian warriors from Armenia, who had formed part 
of the garrison, were buried alive by his orders. Their heads 
were tied clown by cords lashed tightly round the neck and under 
the thighs, so as to bring the face between the legs. Bound in 
this agonising posture, they were flung into graves, which were 
planked over before the earth was thrown back, so as to prolong 
the torture of the wretched victims as long as possible. Prince 
Ertoghrul, and the Turkish part of the garrison were put to the 
sword. The fall of Sivas delayed that of Constantinople. Bajazet 
proceeded to Asia Minor in bitterness of heart for the blow that 
had been struck at his empire, and in deep affliction for the loss 


BAJAZET I. A.D. 1309-1402. 


47 

of the best beloved of his sons. One day, on his march, he passed 
near where a shepherd was singing merrily, and he exclaimed, 
“ Sing me this burden : 

“ Leave not Sivas to be taken, 

And thy son to die forsaken.” 

Before Bajazet had reached the eastern provinces of his domin¬ 
ions, Timour had marched southward from Sivas, spreading devas¬ 
tation far and wide through the southern regions of Asia Minor. 
An insult from the Sultan of Egypt had drawn the wrath of the 
Tartar conqueror in a southern direction, and Syria experienced 
for two years the terror and the cruelty of his arms. In the 
spring of 1402 Timour marched again against the Ottomans. A 
new interchange of letters and embassies had taken place between 
him and Bajazet, which had only incensed still more each of these 
haughty conquerors against the other. But though professing the 
utmost scorn for his adversary, Timour knew well how formidable 
were the Turkish arms, and he carefully drew together for this 
campaign the best-appointed, as well as the most numerous army, 
that his vast dominions could supply. He practised also the subtle 
policy of weakening his enemy by sowing discontent and treachery 
among Bajazet’s troops. Timour’s secret agents were sent to the 
Ottoman camp, and urged on the numerous soldiers of Tartar race 
■who served there, that they ought not to fight against Timour, 
who was the true chief of all Tartar warriors, and that Bajazet 
was unworthy to command such brave men. The efforts of these 
spies and emissaries -were greatly aided by the dissatisfaction 
which Bajazet’s ill-judged parsimony and excessive severity in 
discipline had already created in his army. His best generals 
observed the bad spirit which was spreading among the men, and 
implored their Sultan not to risk a decisive encounter with tho 
superior forces of Timour, or at least to regain the good-will of his 
soldiers by judicious liberality. Bajazet was both arrogant and 
avaricious; he determined to attack his enemy, but to keep back 
his treasures; reserving them, as one of his generals bitterly re¬ 
marked, as certainly for Timour’s use, as if the Turkish bullion 
was already stamped with Tartar coinage. Bajazet advanced with 
about 120,000 men against the far superior forces of Timour, 
which were posted near Sivas. The Mongol Emperor did not im¬ 
mediately encounter the Ottomans; but manoeuvred so as to ensure 
that the battle should take place on ground most advantageous for 
the action of cavalry, and on which he could avail himself most 
fully of his numerical superiority. By an able forced march 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


43 

through Kaisyraiah and Kirschehr he evaded Bajazet, and reached 
the city and plain of Angora. He immediately formed the siege 
of the city, knowing that Bajazet would not suffer the shame of 
letting so important a place fall without an effort to relieve it. As 
he expected, the Ottoman Sultan hurried to the rescue of Angora, 
and Timour then took up an advantageous position on the broad 
plain of Tchibukabad, to the north-west of the town. Notwith¬ 
standing the immense preponderance of numbers which he pos¬ 
sessed, the Mongol sovereign observed all military precautions. 
One of his flanks was protected by the little river Tchibukabad, 
which supplies Angora with water; on the other he had secured 
himself by a ditch and strong palisade. Bajazet, blinded by his 
former successes, seemed to have lost all the generalship which he 
usually exhibited, and to have been seized at Angora by the same 
spirit of rashness which possessed the Frankish chivalry whom he 
overthrew five years before at Nicopolis. He camped first to the 
north of Timour’s position; and then, to show his contempt for 
his enemy, he marched his whole army away to the high grounds 
in the neighbourhood, and employed them in a grand hunting. 
The troops were drawn out, according to the Asiatic custom, in a 
vast circle, enclosing many miles ; and they then moved in towards 
the centre, so as to drive the game to where the Sultan and his 
officers were posted. Unfortunately the districts in which Bajazet 
made this, his last chase, were destitute of water, and the suffer¬ 
ings of his troops whom he thus devoted to the image of war, 
equalled those which an army ordinarily endures in war’s stern 
reality. Five thousand of the Ottoman soldiers perished with 
thirst and fatigue to promote their Sultan’s fatal sport. After 
this imperial folly, Bajazet marched back to his enemy; but he 
found that the camp which he had left was now occupied by the 
Tartars, and that the only stream of water to which the Ottoman 
army could gain access, had been turned and filled up by Timour’s 
orders, so as to be almost unserviceable. Bajazet was thus obliged 
to seek a battle, nor would he have declined it even if he had the 
choice, such was his pride and confidence in his power. On the 
20th of July, 1402, the decisive conflict took place. The Mongol 
army is said to have exceeded 800,000 men, and it certainly was 
far more numerous than that led by Bajazet, who could not have 
brought more than 100,000 into the field; and not only in 
numbers, but in equipment, in zeal, and in the skill with which 
they were directed, the superiority was on the side of the Mongols. 
Except the corps of Janissaries, who were under the Sultan’s im¬ 
mediate orders, and the Servian auxiliaries who fought gallantly 


INTERREGNUM. A.D. 1402-1413. 49 

for the Ottomans under their king, Stephen Lasarevich, Bajazet’s 
troops showed little prowess or soldiership at Angora. The arts 
of Timour’s emissaries had been effective; and, when the action 
commenced, large numbers of the Tartars who were in Bajazet’s 
service, passed over to the ranks of his enemies. The contingents 
of several of the Asiatic tributary princes took the same course ; 
and it was only in the Ottoman centre, where Bajazet and his 
Janissaries stood, and in the left centre, where the Servians fought, 
that any effective resistance was made to the fierce and frequent 
charges of the Mongol cavalry. Bajazet saw that the day was 
irreparably lost, but he rejected the entreaties of his officers to fly 
while escape was yet practicable. He led his yet unbroken 
veterans to some rising ground, which he occupied with them, and 
there beat off all the attacks of the enemy throughout the day. 
But his brave Janissaries were sinking beneath thirst, fatigue, and 
wounds; and it was evident that the morning would see them a 
helpless prey to the myriad enemies who swarmed around them. 
At nightfall Bajazet attempted to escape from the field, but he 
was marked and pursued ; his horse stumbled and fell with him; 
and Mahmoud, the Titular Khan of Jagetai, who served in 
Timour’s army, had the glory of taking the great Sultan of the 
Ottomans prisoner. Of his five sons who had been in the battle, 
three had been more fortunate than their father. Prince Solyman 
had escaped towards the H£gean Sea, Prince Mahomet to Amassia, 
and Prince Issa towards Caramania. Prince Musa was taken 
prisoner; and the fifth, Prince Mustapha, disappeared in the 
battle, nor was his fate ever certainly known. 

Bajazet was at first treated by Timour with respect and kind¬ 
ness ; but an ineffectual attempt to escape incensed the conqueror, 
and increased the rigour of the Sultan’s captivity. Thenceforth 
Bajazet was strictly watched by a numerous guard, and was placed 
in fetters every night. When the Mongol army moved from place 
to place, Timour took his captive with him; but, in order to avoid 
the hateful sight of his enemies, Bajazet travelled in a covered 
litter with iron lattice-work. The similarity of sound between 
two Turkish words caused the well-known story that the Tartar 
king carried the captive Sultan about in an iron cage. 1 The real 

1 In Marlowe’s play of “Tamburlaine,” Bajazet and “the Turkess,” his 
wife, brain themselves against the bars of the cage on the stage. Though 
he stoops to much bombast and extravagance, Marlowe breathes nobly the 
full spirit of the ferocious energy and fiery pride of the great Oriental con¬ 
querors. His “Tamburlaine'’ is immeasurably superior to the benevolent 
Tamerlane of ltovve, both as a dramatic character, and as an image of historic 
truth. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


50 

ignominy which Bajazet underwent was sufficient to break a proud 
heart, and he died in March, 1403, eight months after the battle 
of Angora. Timour had sufficient magnanimity to set at liberty 
Prince Musa, Bajazet’s son, and to permit him to take the dead 
body to Brusa for honourable interment in the burial-place of the 
Ottoman sovereigns. He himself did not long survive his fallen 
rival. He died at Otrar, on the 1st of February, 1405, while on 
his march to conquer China. In the brief interval between his 
victory at Angora and his death, he had poured his desolating 
armies throughout the Ottoman dominions into Asia Minor, sack¬ 
ing the Turkish cities of Brusa, Nice, Khemlik, Akshehr, Kara- 
hissar, and many more, and then assailing the great city of 
Smyrna, which had escaped the Ottoman power, and had been for 
half a century held by the Christian Knights of St. John of Jeru¬ 
salem. Timour directed the siege of Smyrna in person. In fifteen 
days a mole had been thrown across the harbour, which deprived 
the besieged of all succour, and brought the Mongol troops close 
to the seaward parts of the city; large portions of the landward 
walls had been undermined; huge movable towers had been con¬ 
structed, from which the besiegers boarded the city’s battlements, 
and Smyrna was taken by storm, notwithstanding the heroic de¬ 
fence of the Christian knights. Timour ordered a general massacre 
of the inhabitants without mercy to either age or sex. 

It was the custom of the Tartar Conqueror to rear a vast 
pyramid of human heads, when any great city had been captured 
lay his troops. The garrison and population of Smyrna proved 
insufficient to supply materials for one of these monuments on his 
accustomed scale of hideous grandeur. But Timour was resolved 
not to leave the site of Smyrna without his wonted trophy; and 
he ordered that the supply of heads should be economised, by 
placing alternate layers of mud between the rows of heads in the 
pyramid. After other similar acts of gigantic cruelty in Asia 
Minor, he marched into Georgia to punish the prince of that 
country for not having come in person when required to the 
Tartar camp. The unhappy Georgians perished by thousands for 
the imputed fault of their sovereign, and seven hundred towns 
and villages were destroyed by the troops of Timour. In 1404, 
the Conqueror rested for a short time from blood-shedding, and 
displayed his magnificence in his capital city of Samarkand, which 
he had not seen for seven years. But the unslaked thirst of con¬ 
quest and slaughter urged him onward to the attack of the Chinese 
Umpire before the year was closed ; and that wealthy and populous 
realm must have been swept by his destroying hordes, had it not 


INTERREGNUM . A.D . 1402-1413. 51 

been saved by the fever which seized him at Otrar, after his pas¬ 
sage of the river Sihoon on the ice in February, 1405. Timour 
died in that city, at the age of seventy-one, having reigned thirty- 
six years, during which he shed more blood and caused more 
misery than any other human being that ever was bom upon the 
earth. 


52 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

\ 


CHAPTER IV. 

INTERREGNUM AND CIVIL WAR—MAHOMET I. REUNITES THE 
EMPIRE—HIS SUCCESSFUL REIGN—HIS DEATH AND CHARACTER 
—ACCESSION OF AMURATH II.—SIEGE OF CONSTANTINOPLE— 
CIVIL WAR IN ASIA—WARS WITH THE SERVIANS, HUNGARIANS, 
AND OTHER NATIONS—VICTORIES OF HUNYADES—TREATY OF 
SZEGEDDIN—BROKEN BY THE CHRISTIANS—BATTLE OF VARNA 
—SCANDERBEG—SECOND BATTLE OF KOSSOVA—DEATH OF 
AMURATH . 1 

The Ottoman Empire, which during the fourteenth century had 
acquired such dimensions and vigour, lay at the beginning of the 
fifteenth century in apparently irretrievable ruin. Besides the 
fatal day at Angora, when its veteran army was destroyed, and its 
long-victorious sovereign taken captive, calamity after calamity 
had poured fast upon the house of Othman. Their ancient rivals 
in Asia Minor, the Seljukian princes of Caramania, Aiclian, Ker- 
mian, and other territories which the three first Ottoman sove¬ 
reigns had conquered, were reinstated by Timour in their 
dominions. In Europe the Greek Empire accomplished another 
partial revival, and regained some of its lost provinces. But the 
heaviest and seemingly the most fatal of afflictions was the civil war 
which broke out among the sons of Bajazet, and which threatened 
the utter disintegration and destruction of the relics of their 
ancestral dominions. At the time of Bajazet’s death, his eldest 
son, Solyman, ruled at Adrianople. The second son, Prince 
Issa, established himself as an independent ruler at Brusa, 
after the Mongols retired from Asia Minor. Mahomet, the 
youngest and the ablest of the brothers, formed a petty kingdom 
at Amassia. War soon broke out between Mahomet and Issa, in 
which Mahomet was completely successful. Issa fled to Europe, 
where he sought protection and aid from Solyman, who forthwith 
attacked Mahomet, so that European Turkey and Asiatic Turkey 
were now arrayed against each other. At first Solyman was suc- 


1 See Yon Hammer, books 8, 9, 10, 11. 


INTERREGNUM. sf. D. 1402-1413. 53 

cessful. He invaded Asia, and captured Brusa and Angora. 
Meanwhile the other surviving son of Bajazet, Prince Musa, had, 
after his liberation by Timour, been detained in custody by the 
Seljukian Prince of Kermian, through whose territories he was 
passing with the remains of Bajazet, which he was to bury at 
Brusa. The interposition of Mahomet had put an end to this de¬ 
tention, and Prince Musa fought on Mahomet's side against Soly- 
man in Asia. After some reverses which they sustained from 
Solyman in the first campaign, Musa persuaded Mahomet to let 
him cross over to Europe with a small force, and effect a diversion 
in Mahomet’s favour by attacking the enemy in his own territories. 
This manoeuvre soon recalled Solyman to Europe, where a short 
but sanguinary contest between him and Musa ensued. At first 
Solyman had the advantage; but the better qualities of this prince 
were now obscured by the debasing effects of habits of debauchery. 
He treated his troops with savage cruelty, and heaped the grossest 
insults on his best generals. The result was that his army passed 
over to the side of Musa, and Solyman was killed while endeavour¬ 
ing to escape to Constantinople ( 1410 ). 

Musa was now master of the Ottoman dominions in Europe, 
and speedily showed that he inherited a fall proportion both of 
the energy and of the ferocity of his father Bajazet. In an expe¬ 
dition which he undertook against the Servian Prince, whom he 
accused of having treacherously aided Solyman in the civil war, 
he is said to have not only practised the customary barbarities of 
ravaging the country, carrying off the male youth as captives, and 
slaughtering the rest of the population; but according to the 
Byzantine writer Ducas, Musa caused the carcasses of three Servian 
garrisons to be arranged as tables, and a feast to be spread on 
them, at which he entertained the generals and chief captains of 
the Ottoman army. 

The Greek Emperor, Manuel Palreologus, had been the ally ox 
Solyman; Musa therefore attacked him, and besieged his capital. 
Palxeologus called over Mahomet to protect him, and the Asiatic 
Ottomans now garrisoned Constantinople against the Ottomans of 
Europe. Mahomet made several gallant but unsuccessful sallies 
against his brother’s troops, and was obliged to recross the Bos¬ 
phorus, to quell a revolt that had broken out in his own territories. 
Musa now pressed the siege of the Greek capital; but Mahomet 
speedily returned to Europe, and obtained the assistance of 
Stephen, the Servian King. The armies of the rival Ottoman 
brethren were at last arrayed for a decisive conflict on the plain 
of Chamurli, near the southern Servian frontier. But Musa had 


54 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

alienated the loyalty of liis soldiers by conduct similar to that by 
which Solyman’s desertion and destruction had been caused, while 
Mahomet was as eminent for justice and kindness towards those 
who obeyed him, as for valour and skill against those who were his 
opponents. When the two armies were about to close in battle, 
Hassan, the Aga of the Janissaries on the side of Mahomet, stepped 
out before the ranks, and exhorted his old comrades, who were on 
the part of Musa, to leave the cause of a madman from whom they 
met with constant outrage and humiliation, and to range them¬ 
selves among the followers of the most just and virtuous of the 
princes of the house of Othman. Enraged at hearing his troops 
thus addressed, Musa rushed against Hassan, and cut him down 
with his own hand, but was himself wounded by an officer who 
had accompanied Hassan. Musa reeled back bleeding towards 
his own soldiers, who were seized with a panic, and broke their 
ranks, and fled in all directions. Musa endeavoured to escape, 
but was found by the pursuers lying dead in a marsh near the 
field where the armies had met. His death ended the war of suc¬ 
cession in the Ottoman Empire, for Prince Issa had disappeared 
some years before, during the hostilities between Solyman and 
Mahomet in Asia; and Mahomet was now, after Musa’s death, 
the sole known surviving son of Bajazet. 

Sultan Mahomet. L, was surnamed by his subjects Pehlevan, 
which means the Champion, on account of his personal activity 
and prowess. His graciousness of disposition and manner, his 
magnanimity, his love of justice and truth, and his eminence as a 
discerning patron of literature and art, obtained for him also the 
still more honourable title of Tschelebi, which, according to Yon 
Hammer, expresses precisely the same idea which is conveyed by 
the English word “ gentleman.” Other Turkish sovereigns have 
acquired more celebrity; but Mahomet, the Champion and the 
Gentleman, deserves to be cited as one of the noblest types of the 
Ottoman race. His humanity and his justice are attested by 
Greek as well as by Oriental historians. He was through life the 
honourable and firm ally of the Byzantine Emperor; the dreaded 
foe of the rebellious Turcomans; the glorious bulwark of the 
throne of Othman ; and, as his country’s histories term him, “ The 
Noah who preserved the ark of the empire, when menaced by the 
deluge of Tartar invasions.” 

After the fall of Musa, Mahomet received at Adrianople the 
ready homage of the European subjects of the Ottoman Empire, 
and the felicitations of the neighbouring rulers. The Emperor 
Palseologus and Mahomet had reciprocally aided each other against 


MAHOMET /. A.D. 1413-1421. 55 

Musa; and Mahomet honourably showed his gratitude and good 
faith by restoring according to promise to the Greek Empire the 
strong places on the Black Sea and the Propontis, and the Thes¬ 
salian fortresses which had been previously wrested from it by the 
Turks. A treaty of amity was also concluded between the Sultan 
and the Venetians. The little republic of Bagusa had in the 
reign of Mahomet’s grandfather placed itself by treaty under the 
protection of the Turks, and that treaty was now renewed with 
Sultan Mahomet. The Ambassadors of the Princes of Servia, of 
Wallachia, of the Albanian Prince who reigned at Yanina, of the 
petty sovereigns or despots of the Morea, ■who after Bajazet’s ruin 
had established themselves at Lacedaemon and in Achaia, came 
also before Mahomet at Adrianople. The Sultan received them 
all with friendly courtesy; and on their departure he said to them, 

“ Forget not to tell your masters that peace I grant to all, peace I 
accept from all. May the God of peace be against the breakers of 
peace !” 

A brief season of unusual calm was thus obtained for the 
countries westward of the Bosphorus and the Hellespont; but 
Asia was seething with insurrection and war, and Mahomet was 
speedily obliged to quit his feast of peace at Adrianople to recon¬ 
quer and secure the ancient possessions of his house. The im¬ 
portant city of Smyrna and the adjacent territory were at this 
period commanded by an Ottoman governor of the name of 
Djouneid, who had resumed possession of them after the Mongols 
had withdrawn from Asia Minor, and who had succeeded after¬ 
wards in making himself also master of the principality of Aidin. 
Djouneid had submitted first to Solyman, and afterwards to 
Mahomet, as his Sultan; but during the last civil war he had 
openly revolted against Mahomet and he now aspired to make 
himself an independent sovereign. At the same time the Prince 
of Caramania had taken advantage of the absence of Mahomet 
and his best troops from Asia to attack the very heart of the 
Ottoman Asiatic dominions, and had laid siege to Brusa. The 
city was well garrisoned, and held out firmly against him; but ho 
burnt to the ground the mosques and other public buildings of the 
suburbs ; and, in the rage of his heart against the race of Othman, 
he ordered the tomb of Bajazet, which was outside the city walls, 
to be opened, and the remains of that Sultan to be given to the 
flames. While the Caramanians were thus engaged in profaning 
the sanctuaries of their own creed, and in violating the repose of 
the dead, they suddenly saw approaching them from the west the 
funeral procession of Prince Musa, whose body had been borne by 


56 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

Mahomet’s orders from Europe to Asia for burial in the mosque 
of Amurath at Brusa. The besiegers were panic-stricken at this 
unexpected spectacle : and the Caramanian Prince, thinking pos¬ 
sibly that Sultan Mahomet with an army was close at hand, or 
perhaps seized with remorse and ghostly terror at the sepulchral 
apparition, fled from Brusa, unchecked by the bitter reproach of 
one of his own followers, who said to him, “If thou fhest before 
the dead Ottoman, how wilt thou stand against the living one T 

The Sultan, when he had crossed over from Europe to Asia 
with his forces, marched first against his rebellious vassal. He 
besieged Smyrna, and compelled it to surrender; and Djouneid 
was soon reduced to beg for mercy, which Mahomet, moved by 
the tears of the fallen rebel’s family, accorded him. He then 
marched against the Caramanians. He captured many towns in 
person; but was obliged to leave his army by a sudden and severe 
malady, which baffled the skill of all his physicians save one, the 
celebrated Sinan, who prescribed the news of a victory as the best 
medicine that the Sultan could receive. His * favourite general, 
Bajezid Pacha, soon supplied the desired remedy by completely 
defeating the Caramanians, and taking their Prince, Moustapha 
Bey, prisoner. Mahomet recovered his health at the joyous in¬ 
telligence of this success. The Caramanians now sued for peace, 
which the Ottoman Sultan generously granted. The captive 
Caramanian Prince in Mahomet’s presence placed his right hand 
within the robe on his own bosom, and solemnly pronounced the 
oath, “ I swear that so long as there is breath in this body I will 
never attack or covet the Sultan’s possessions.” Mahomet set him 
at liberty with every mark of honour; but while he was yet in' 
sight of the conquerer’s camp, the Prince, who held that between 
the Caramanians and the Ottomans war ought to reign from the 
cradle to the grave, commenced marauding on some of the herds that 
were grazing on the plain round him. His officers reminded him 
of the oath which he had just taken ; but he drew from his bosom 
a dead pigeon squeezed tightly in his right hand, and sarcastically 
repeated the words of his oath, “ So long as there shall be breath 
in this body.” 

Incensed at this perfidy, Mahomet renewed the war, and gained 
great advantages; but he again was generous enough to grant 
peace on the reiterated entreaties of the Caramanians. They had 
received such severe blows in the last war, that terror now kept 
them quiet for several years, and the Asiatic dominions of the 
Sultan enjoyed peace and tranquillity; which Mahomet further 
secured by entering into friendly diplomatic relations with the 


MAHOMET I. A.D. 1413-1421. 57 

various princes of Upper Asia, so as to avert further invasions 
like those of Timour. 

On his return to Europe, in 1416 , Mahomet became involved in 
a war with the Venetians. The petty lords of many of the islands 
of the -ZEgean Sea were nominal vassals of the Republic of Venice; 
but, in disregard of the treaty between that power and the Sultan, 
they continued to capture the Turkish shipping and to plunder 
the Turkish coasts. Mahomet fitted out a squadron of galleys to 
retaliate for their injuries, and this led to an encounter with the 
Venetian fleet, which, under their Admiral, Loredano, completely 
defeated the Turks off Gallipoli, on the 29 th May, 1416 . Peace 
was soon restored; and a Turkish ambassador appeared at Venice 
in the same year, with a new treaty between his master and the 
Republic. Mahomet’s troops sustained some severe reverses in 
expeditions undertaken against Styria and Hungary between 1416 
and 1420 ; but no very important hostilities were waged between 
him and his neighbours in European Christendom. A far more 
serious peril to the Sultan was a revolt of the Dervishes, which 
broke out both in Europe and Asia; and was only quelled by the 
Sultan’s troops after several sanguinary battles. This insurrection 
was organised by the judge of the army, Bedreddin, aided by ail 
apostate Jew, named Tirlak. The nominal chief of the fanatics 
was a Turk of low birth, named Bserekludye Mustapha, whom 
they proclaimed as their spiritual lord and father. All these 
three perished either in battle or by the executioner, and their 
sect was extinguished with them. Their revolt is remarkable, as 
being, with the exception of the Wahabite rebellion in the last 
and present centuries, the only religious war by which the Otto¬ 
man Empire has ever been troubled. 

After this formidable peril had passed away, Mahomet was 
called on to defend his throne from another domestic enemy. It 
has been mentioned, that one of Bajazet’s sons, Prince Mustapha, 
who was present on the day of Angora, disappeared after the 
defeat of the Turks in that battle. His body was not found 
among the slain, though Timour caused diligent search to be 
made for it; nor was the mode of his escape (if he escaped) ever 
ascertained. Certain it is, that, in 1420 , a claimant to the Otto¬ 
man sovereignty appeared in Europe, who asserted that he was 
Mustapha, the son of Sultan Bajazet, and who was recognised as 
such by many of the Turks. Supported by the Prince of Walla- 
chia, and by Djouneid, the old rebel against Mahomet, the 
pretender penetrated into Thessaly with a large army. Mahomet 
met him with his customary vigour, and a pitched battle was 


53 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

fought near Salonica, in which the claimant was utterly defeated, 
and fled for protection to the Greek commandant of that city. 
The Byzantine Emperor refused to surrender the suppliant 
fugitive, but consented to keep him in strict custody on condition 
of Mahomet paying annually a large sum of money, ostensibly for 
the captive’s maintenance, but in reality as the wages for his im¬ 
prisonment. 

There was one other son of Sultan Bajazet, who figures little in 
history, but whose melancholy lot must not be passed over for the 
sake of uniformly preserving the bright colour, in which we would 
gladly represent the character of Mahomet I. Prince Kasimir 
does not appear to have fought at Angora, like his five brethren, 
or to have taken any part in the subsequent civil wars between 
them. He came into Mahomet’s power; and though he was not 
put to death in conformity with the precedent which Bajazet had 
established, he was deprived of sight by his brother’s order. The 
blinded prince received the grant of a domain near Brusa, where 
he resided; and Turkish historians praise the good-nature of 
Sultan Mahomet, who, whenever he visited his Asiatic capital, 
sent for his sightless brother to the palace and treated him with 
benevolence truly fraternal. Another stain on the memory of 
Mahomet the Gentleman is his guilty weakness in seeking to 
strengthen his sovereignty by the death of the son of his brother 
Solyman. But in this case, as in his conduct towards Prince 
Kasimir, Mahomet recoiled from following out to its full extent 
the stern principle of extinguishing in the blood of those nearest 
to the throne all risk of their rivalry with its occupant. He 
spared a daughter whom Solyman had also left; and when that 
daughter was married, and bore a son, Mahomet conferred ample 
wealth on the child, so that it should be maintained in a manner 
worthy of its rank. Mahomet indeed showed on his death-bed, 
that no sophistry or statecraft could blind his natural sense to 
the heinous guilt of fratricide. He was stricken with apoplexy 
near the close of the year 1421; and though he partially recovered, 
lie knew that his end was approaching, and earnestly implored 
his favourite general, Bajezid Pacha, to place his two infant sons 
under the protection of the Greek Emperor, lest their elder 
orother, Prince Amurath, on becoming Sultan, should imitate the 
crimes of his grandfather and his father, and study his own 
security by their destruction. Mahomet did not long survive the 
shock which his system had received; but his death was concealed 
from the public by his general and chief officers of state for moro 
than forty days, while intelligence of the event was sent to Prince 


MAHOMET /. A.D. 1413-1421. 59 

Amurath, who, at the time of his father’s mortal illness, held a 
command on the frontiers of Asia Minor. 

Mahomet I. was hut forty-seven years of age at the time of his 
death; and his reign, as Sultan of the re-united empire, had 
lasted only eight years. But he had been an independent prince 
for nearly the whole preceding period of eleven years that passed 
between his father’s captivity at Angora and his own final victory 
over his brother Musa at Chamurli. For nineteen years, there¬ 
fore, he was a ruler over his people; and his memory is still 
deservedly cherished and honoured among them. He was buried 
at Brusa, in a mausoleum erected by himself near the celebrated 
mosque which he built there, and which, from its decorations of 
green porcelain, is called the Green Mosque. This edifice is said 
to be the most beautiful specimen of Saracenic architecture and 
carving that is in existence. Mahomet I. also completed the 
vast and magnificent mosque at Brusa, which his grandfather 
Amurath I. had commenced, but which had been neglected during 
the reign of Bajazet. It is deserving of mention that Mahomet 
founded in the vicinity of his own mosque and mausoleum two 
characteristic institutions, one a school, and one a refectory for 
the poor, both of which he endowed with royal munificence. 
The reign of this Sultan is cited by Yon Hammer as the period 
when a taste for literature and fondness for poetry first prevailed 
among the Ottomans. He was a liberal patron of intellectual 
merit; and the name of an early literary Turkish politician, 
Sehiri, is preserved in honourable reputation for having, while 
Mahomet was Governor of Amassia, and Sehiri his Defterclar or 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, inspired the young prince with an 
enduring zeal for the advancement of literature and art, and for 
the generous patronage of their professors. 

Amurath II., when called from his vice-royalty in Asia Minor 
to become the sovereign of the Turkish Empire, was only eighteen 
years of age. He was solemnly recognised as Sultan, and girt 
with the sabre of Othman, at Brusa; and the troops and officers 
of state paid willing homage to him as their sovereign. But his 
reign was soon troubled by insurrection. The Greek Emperor, 
despising the youth of Amurath, released the pretender Mustapha 
from confinement, and acknowledged him as the legitimate heir to 
the throne of Bajazet; having first stipulated with him that he 
should, if successful, repay the Greek Emperor for his liberation 
by the cession of a large number of important cities. The pre¬ 
tender was landed by the Byzantine galleys in the European 
dominions of the Sultan, and for a time made rapid progress. 


60 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Large bodies of the Turkish soldiery joined him, and he defeated and 
killed the veteran general Bajezid Pacha, whom Amurath first 
sent against him. He then crossed the Dardanelles to Asia, with 
a large army; but the young Sultan showed in this emergency 
that he possessed military and political abilities worthy of the 
best of his ancestors. Mustapha was out-manoeuvred in the field; 
and his troops, whose affection to his person and confidence in his 
cause he had lost by his violence and incapacity, passed over in 
large numbers to Amurath. Mustapha took refuge in the strong 
city of Gallipoli; but the Sultan, who was greatly aided by a 
Genoese commandant named Adorno, beseigecl him there, and 
stormed the place. Mustapha was taken and put to death ; and 
the Sultan then turned his arms against the Greek Emperor, and 
declared his resolution to punish the unprovoked enmity of Palseo- 
logus by the capture of Constantinople. 

The embassies, charged with abject apology, by which the 
Greeks now sought to appease the Sultan’s wrath, were dismissed 
with contempt; and in the beginning of June, 1422 , Amurath 
was before the trembling capital with twenty thousand of his best 
troops. Ten thousand of the dreaded Akindji, under their 
hereditary commander, Michael Bey, had previously been let loose 
by the Sultan upon the lands which the Greek Emperor yet re¬ 
tained beyond the city walls, and had spread fire and desolation 
through the doomed territory, without any attempt being made 
by the Byzantines to check or to avenge their ravages. Amurath’s 
own army seemed still more irresistible; and the Sultan carried 
on the siege with a degree of skill as well as vigour, rarely to be 
found in the military operations of that age. He formed a line of 
embankment only a bowshot from the city wall, and extended it 
from the sea to the Golden Horn, so as to face the whole land¬ 
ward side of the city. This rampart was formed of strong timber, 
with a thick mound of earth heaped up along its front; and it 
received uninjured the discharges of firearms and the shocks of 
the heaviest stones that the balistas of the Greeks could hurl 
against it. Under cover of this line, Amurath’s army urged on 
the work of attack. Movable towers were built to convey 
storming parties to the summits of the city wall; mines were 
laboriously pushed forward ; and breaching cannon were now for 
the first time employed by the Ottomans, but with little effect. 
Wishing to increase the zeal and the number of the assailants, Amu¬ 
rath proclaimed that the city and all its treasures should be given up 
to the true believers who would storm it; and crowds of fanatic 
volunteers flocked to the camp to share in the harvest of piety and 


AMURATH //. A.D. 1421-1451. 61 

plunder. Among the recruits were a large number of dervishes, 
headed by a renowned saint named Seid Bokhari, who announced 
the day and the hour at which it was fated for him to lead the 
Mahometans to the capture of Constantinople. Accordingly, at 
the appointed time, one hour after noon on Monday, the 25 th of 
August, 1422 , Seid Bokhari led on the Ottoman army to the 
assault. 500 dervishes, who had stipulated that the Christian 
nuns of Constantinople should be assigned as their particular share 
of the booty, formed the forlorn hope of the stormers. The 
Ottomans attacked vehemently, and the Greeks resisted steadily 
along the whole length of the city wall; but it was near the gate 
of St. Romanus that the combat raged most fiercely. The 
Christians as well as the Mahometans were animated by religious 
enthusiasm, and by the assurance that their arms were aided by 
the interposition of supernatural power. At last some said that 
they beheld, and all believed that there was seen on the outer 
bastions a bright apparition of a virgin robed in garments of violet 
hue and dazzling lustre, whose looks darted panic amid the 
assailing columns. This was the Panagia, the Holy Virgin, who 
had descended for the special protection of the sacred maids of the 
Christian city from the boastful impiety of the monks of Mahomet. 
The besiegers themselves (not unwilling perhaps to find some 
pretext for their defeat, besides the strength of the fortifications 
and the bravery of the defenders) gave credit and confirmation 
to this legend. It is certain that the attack failed, and that the 
siege was soon afterwards raised. But it is little consonant with 
the character of Amurath, that a single repulse, in which the loss 
of life was inconsiderable, should have made him abandon a siege 
for which he had made such ample and scientific preparations. 
The intrigues of the Byzantine Emperor had lit up a new civil 
war in his enemy’s Asiatic dominions; and Amurath, like his 
grandfather Bajazet, was obliged to relinquish Constantinople, 
when the prize seemed to be within his grasp, and to fight 
for safety as well as for empire on the eastern side of the 

Bosphorus. • '' • \ „ 

Besides the two infant brothers, of whom mention has already 
been made, Amurath had another brother named Mustapha, who 
was in Asia Minor at the time of their father’s death. Prince 
Mustapha was of the age of thirteen when that event occurred; 
and his attendants, ignorant of the character of Amurath, fled 
with their princely charge into Caramania. He had grown up to 
manhood there without Amurath making any attempt against his 
life or liberty; but after the overthrow of the pretender, Mustapha, 


62 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

\ 

his supposed uncle, he listened to the suggestions and promises of 
the emissaries whom the Greek Emperor now sent to him; and 
being supported with some troops by the Princes of Caramania 
and Kermian, he suddenly invaded his brother’s dominions, made 
himself master of several places of importance, and laid siege to 
Brusa. The rapidity with which Amurath marched a veteran 
and well-appointed army to the rescue, disconcerted all young 
Mustapha’s projects. The Ottomans who had joined him after his 
first successes deserted him; his Greek allies were far too feeble 
to encounter Amurath’s forces; and the unfortunate prince fled 
for his life, but was pursued, overtaken, and captured by some of 
his brother’s officers, who instantly hanged their prisoner on the 
nearest tree, without giving an opportunity to their master either 
to exercise a perilous clemency, or to become an actual participator 
in taking away his brother’s life. 

The civil war was thus promptly extinguished; and in 1424 
Amurath returned to Europe, having re-established perfect order 
in his Asiatic provinces, and chastised the neighbouring sovereigns 
who had promoted the late hostilities against him. Amurath did 
not renew the siege of Constantinople, but accepted a treaty by 
which the Greek Emperor bound himself to pay an annual tribute 
of 30,000 ducats to the Sultan, and surrendered the city of Zeitoun 
(Lysimachia) and all the other remaining Greek cities on the river 
Strania (Strymon) and the Black Sea, except Selymbria and 
Derkos. 

In 1430 Amurath besieged and captured the important city of 
Thessalonica, which had thrown off its allegiance to the Emperor, 
and placed itself under the protection of the Venetians, who were 
at that time in enmity with the Sultan. Other accessions of power 
in the same quarter, and successful hostilities with various Asiatic 
princes, are recorded in the detailed narratives of the acts of 
Amurath; but the main feature of the reign of this great Sultan 
is his long contest with the warlike nations on the northern and 
•western frontiers cf his European dominions; a struggle marked 
by many vicissitudes, and which called forth into energetic action 
the high qualities of Amurath himself, and also of his renowned 
opponents, Hunyades, the hero of Hungary, and Scanderbeg, the 
champion of Albania. 

We have seen how valuable to the Turkish Empire, in its season 
of disaster, after the overthrow of Sultan Bajazet, was the steady 
fidelity and friendship with which the Lord of Servia, Stephen 
Lasarevitch, adhered to his engagements with the house of Oth- 
man. That prince died in 1427; and his successor, George 


AMURATHII. A.D. 1421-1451. 63 

Brankovich, who was bound by no personal ties, like those of his 
predecessor, to the interest of the Ottomans, resolved to check 
their further progress. The Hungarians also, whom the recollec¬ 
tion of dreadful defeat at Nicopolis had kept inactive during the 
temporary dismemberment and feebleness of the power which had 
smitten them, now felt their martial confidence in their own prowess 
revive; and their jealousy of the growth of the Turkish dominion 
was reawakened. Moreover, the Bosnians, who saw their country 
gradually overrun from the military frontier on which the Otto¬ 
mans had established themselves at Scupi, and the Albanians, who 
beheld their strong places, Argyro-castrum and Croia, in Amu- 
rath’s possession, were conscious that their national independence 
was in danger, and were favourably disposed for action against the 
common foe. 1 Wallachia was eager for liberation; and the un¬ 
sleeping hatred of the Caramanians to the Ottomans made it easy 
for the Christian antagonists of the Sultan in Europe to distract 
his arms by raising war and insurrection against him in Asia. Yet 
there was for several years no general and vigorous confederation 
against the Sultan; and a chequered series of partial hostilities 
and negotiations filled nearly twenty years, during which the 
different Christian neighbours of the Sultan were sometimes his 
antagonists and sometimes his allies against each other. At last 
the accession of Ladislaus, the third King of Lithuania and Poland, 
to the crown of Hungary, brought fresh strength and enterprise to 
the Sultan’s foes; and a severe struggle followed, which after 
threatening the utter expulsion of the house of Othman from 
Europe, confirmed for centuries its dominion in that continent, and 
wrought the heavier subjugation of those who were then seeking to 
release themselves from its superiority. 

In 1442 Amurath was repulsed from Belgrade ; and his generals, 
who were besieging Hermanstadt, in Transylvania, met with a 
still more disastrous reverse. It was at Hermanstadt that the 
renowned Hunyades first appeared in the wars between the Hun¬ 
garians and the Turks. He was the illegitimate son of Sigismond, 
King of Hungary, and the fair Elizabeth Morsiney. In his early 
youth he gained distinction in the wars of Italy; and Comines, in 
his memoirs, celebrates him under the name of the White Knight 
of Wallachia. After some campaigns in Western Christendom, 
Hunyades returned to protect his native country against the Otto¬ 
mans ; and in 1442 he led a small but chosen force to the relief of 
Hermanstadt. He planned his movements ably; and aided by an 


1 Eanke’s “ Servia,” p. 27 . 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


opportune sally of the garrison, lie completely defeated Mezid Bey, 
the Turkish general, killing 20,000 of his troops, and taking 
prisoner Mezid Bey himself, his son, and many more. Hunyades 
was no whit inferior to the fiercest Turkish generals in cruelty. 
Mezid Bey and his son were hewn to pieces in his presence; and 
one of the chief entertainments at the triumphal feast of the 
victorious Hungarians was to see captive Turks slaughtered during 
the banquet. 

Amurath sent Schehadeddin Pacha with an army of 80,000 men 
against Hunyades to avenge this disgrace. But the “ White 
Knight,” as the Christians called Hunyades, from the colour of 
his armour, met Schehadeddin at Vasag, and, though his numbers 
were far inferior, utterly routed the Turks with even heavier loss 
than they had sustained before Hermanstadt. The next year, 
1443, is the most illustrious in the career of Hunyades, and brought 
the Ottoman power to the very brink of ruin. The Servian, the 
Bosnian, and the Wallachian princes were now actively co-operating 
with King Ladislaus against the Sultan; and an attack of the 
Caramanians on the Ottoman dominions in Asia compelled Amu¬ 
rath to pass over to that continent and carry on the war there in 
person, while he left to his generals the defence of his empire in 
Europe against the Hungarians and their allies. 

The Christian army that invaded European Turkey in the 
remarkable campaign of this year, was the most splendid that had 
been assembled since the French chivalry and the Hungarians 
advanced against Bajazet at Nicopolis; and it was guided by the 
ablest general that Christendom had yet produced against the 
house of Othman. The fame of Hunyades had brought volunteers 
from all the nations of the West to serve under him in the holy 
war against the Mahometans; and the most energetic efforts of 
Pope Eugenius and his legate, Cardinal Julian, had been devoted 
to give to these champions of their faith the enthusiasm as well as 
the name of crusaders. The main body of the confederates, con¬ 
sisting chiefly of Hungarian, Servian, Wallachian, and German 
troops, crossed the Danube near Semendra. Hunyades, at the 
head of 12,000 chosen cavalry, then pushed forward"nearly to the 
walls of Nissa. King Ladislaus and the Cardinal Julian followed 
him with the Polish, and part of the Hungarian troops, and with 
the crusaders from Italy. On the 3rd of November Hunyades won 
the first battle of the campaign on the banks of the Morava, near 
Nissa. The grand army of the Turks was beaten, and fled beyond 
the Balkan, with the loss of nine standards, 4000 prisoners, and 
many thousand slain. Hunyades followed close upon the foe, 


AMURATH II, A.D . 1421 - 1451 . 65 

captured the city of Sophia, and then prepared to cross the Balkan, 
and advance upon Philippopolis. 

The passage of the Balkan is an exploit almost as rare in 
military history as those passages of the Alps that have conferred 
so much lustre on Hannibal, Charlemagne, and Napoleon . 1 Alex¬ 
ander forced the barrier of the Balkan in 335 B.C., probably 
through the same pass which Hunyades penetrated from the 
opposite direction, in A.D. 1443. Amurath I. crossed the Balkan , 
in 1390; and the Russian general, Diebitsch, forced this renowned 
mountain chain near its eastern extremity in 1827. Hunyades 
and Diebitsch are the only two commanders who have crossed it 
from north to south, in spite of armed opposition ; and the fact of 
their accomplishing that exploit against the same enemy (though 
with an interval of nearly four centuries), and the splendour of the 
success which each thereby obtained over the Ottoman power, 
make the similitude between their achievements more remarkable. 
If the Balkan campaign of Hunyades presents nothing equal to the 
noble audacity, with which Diebitsch threw a numerically feeble 
army across the mountain to Adrianople, trusting to the moral 
effect of such a blow at the crisis when it was dealt, the actual 
passage which the Hungarian leader effected in the December of 
1443 was a more brilliant scene of mountain-warfare, than that of 
the Russian marshal in 1S29, both on account of the enormous 
increase in the natural difficulties of the transit, caused by the 
difference of season, and by reason of the superior preparation on 
the part of the Turks, which Hunyades encountered and over¬ 
came. 

Two defiles, the openings of which on the northern side are near 
each other, one to the west named the defile of Soulourderbend, 
the other to the east that of Isladi, or Slatiza, lead through the 
Balkan on the road from Sophia to Philippopolis. The Turks, who 
defended the passage against Hunyades, had barricaded both 
these defiles with heaps of rocks ; and when they found the Hun¬ 
garian vanguard approach, they poured water throughout the night 
down the mountain slope, which froze as it fell, and formed at 
morning a wall of ice against the Christians. Undaunted by these 
obstacles and the weapons of the enemy, Hunyades encouraged 
his men by voice and example to clamber onward and through 
the western defile, until they reached a part where the old Roman 
works of Trajan completely barred the way. The Hungarians 

1 The operations of the Persian Darius Hystaspis (b.c. 506), and of the 
Russian Svatoslaus (a.d. 907), in the regions of the Hsernus, cannot be satis¬ 
factorily traced or verified. 


66 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


retreated; but it was only to advance up the eastern defile, which 
was less perfectly fortified. 

There, through the rest of the winter’s day, Hunyades and his 
chivalry fought their gallant upward battle against Turkish arrow 
and scimetar, amid the still more formidable perils of the 
precipice, the avalanche, the whelming snowdrift, and the bitter 
paralysing cold. They triumphed over all; and the Christmas- 
day of 1443 was celebrated by the exulting Hungarians on the 
snow-plains of the southern slopes of the conquered Balkan. 

The Turks, who had rallied and received reinforcements at the 
foot of Mount Cunobizza, again fought with Hunyades and were 
again defeated. It surprises us to read that after this last victory, 
the Christian army, instead of pushing forward to Adrianople, re¬ 
turned to Buda, where Hunyades displayed his trophies and his 
prisoners beiore his rejoicing fellow-countrymen. There is little 
sign here of such high spirit as afterwards animated Diebitsch, or 
even of common generalship or policy. But we may be acting 
unjustly if we throw on the hero of mediceval Hungary the blame 
of this infirmity of purpose. Such an army, as he led, was very 
different in subordination and discipline to the regular troops of 
modern times, or even to the Turkish troops who were its con¬ 
temporaries and opponents. 

Amurath had been personally successful in Asia; but the 
defeats which his forces had sustained in Europe, and the strength 
of the confederacy there formed against him filled him with grave 
alarm. He sought by the sacrifice of the more remote conquests 
of his House to secure for the rest of his European dominions the 
same tranquillity which he had re-established in the Asiatic. After 
a long negotiation a treaty of peace for ten years Avas concluded 
at Szegeddin on the 12th of July, 1444, by Avhich the Sultan re¬ 
signed all claims upon Servia, and recognised George Brankovich 
as its independent sovereign. Wallachia Avas given up to Hungary; 
and the Sultan paid 60,000 ducats for the ransom of Mahmoud 
Tchelebi, his son-in-laAV, Avho had commanded against Hunyades, 
and had been taken prisoner in the late campaign. The treaty 
was written both in the Hungarian and in the Turkish languages; 
King Ladislaus SAvore upon the Gospels, and the Sultan SAVore upon 
the Koran, that it should be truly and religiously observed. 

Amurath noAV thought that his realm Avas at peace, and that he 
himself, after so many years of anxiety and toil, might hope to 
taste the blessings of repose. We have watched him" hitherto as 
a man of action, and Ave have found ample reason to admire his 
capacity and vigour in council and in the field. But Amurath had 


AMURATH II. A.D. 1421 - 1451 . 67 

also other virtues of a softer order, which are not often to he found 
in the occupant of an Oriental throne. He was gentle and affec¬ 
tionate in all the relations of domestic life. Instead of seeking to 
assure his safety by the death of the two younger brothers, for 
whose fate their father had been so anxious, Amurath treated them 
with kindness and honour while they lived, and bitterly lamented 
their loss when they died of the plague in their palace at Brusa. 
The other brother, who took up arms against him, was killed with¬ 
out his orders. He forgave, for the sake of a sister who was 
married to the Prince of Kermian, the treasonable hostility with 
which that vassal of the House of Othman assailed him ; and the 
tears of another sister for the captivity of her husband Mahmoud 
Tchelebi, and her entreaties that he might be rescued from the 
power of the terrible Hunyades, were believed to have prevailed 
much in causing Amurath to seek the pacification of Szegeddin. 
When that treaty was concluded, Amurath passed over to Asia, 
where he met the deep affliction of learning the death of his eldest 
son Prince Alaeddin, who had shared with him the command of 
the Ottoman forces in Asia during the operations of the preceding 
year. The bitterness of this bereavement increased the distaste 
which Amurath had already acquired for the pomp and turmoil of 
sovereignty. He determined to abdicate the throne in favour of 
his second son, Prince Mahomet, and to pass the rest of his life in 
retirement at Magnesia. But it was not in austere privation, or in 
the fanatic exercises of Mahometan monasticism, that Amurath 
designed his private life to be wasted. He was no contemner of 
the pleasures of sense; and the scene of his retreat was amply 
iurnished with all the ministry of every delight. 

The tidings of warfare renewed by the Christian powers soon 
roused the bold Paynim, like Spenser’s Cymochles, from his Bower 
of Bliss. The King of Hungary and his confederates had recom¬ 
menced hostilities in a spirit of treachery that quickly received its 
just reward. Within a month from the signature of the treaty of 
Szegeddin the Pope and the Greek Emperor had persuaded the 
King of Hungary and his councillors to take an oath to break the 
oath whibh had been pledged to the Sultan. They represented 
that the confessed weakness of the Ottomans, and the retirement 
of Amurath to Asia, gave an opportunity for eradicating the Turks 
from Europe, which ought to be fully employed. The Cardinal 
Julian pacified the conscientious misgivings, which young King 
Ladislaus expressed, by his spiritual authority in giving dispen¬ 
sation and absolution in the Pope’s name, and by his eloquence in 
maintaining the infamously celebrated thesis, that no faith is to be 


03 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


kept with misbelievers. Hunyades long resisted such persuasions to 
break the treaty; but his conscience was appeased by the promise 
that he should be made independent King of Bulgaria, when that 
province was conquered from the Turks. He only stipulated that 
the breach of the treaty should be delayed till the 1st of September; 
not out of any lingering reluctance to violate it, but in order that 
the confederates might first reap all possible benefit from it by 
securely establishing their forces in the strongholds of Servia, 
which the Ottomans were then evacuating in honest compliance 
with their engagements. On the 1st of September the King, the 
legate, and Hunyades, marched against the surprised and unpre¬ 
pared Turks with an army of 10,000 Poles and Hungarians. The 
temerity which made them expect to destroy the Turkish power 
in Europe with so slight a force was equal to the dishonesty of 
their enterprise. They advanced into Wallachia, where Drakul, 
the prince of that country, joined them with his levies. That 
sagacious chieftain saw the inadequacy of King Ladislaus’s means 
for the task which he had undertaken, and remonstrated against 
advancing farther. This brought on a personal difference between 
him and Hunyades, in the course of which Drakul drew his sabre 
against the Hungarian general, and was punished by an imprison¬ 
ment, from which he was only released on promising fresh supplies 
of troops, and a large contribution of money. The Christian 
army, in full confidence of success, crossed the Danube, and 
marched through Bulgaria to the Black Sea. They then moved 
southward along the coast, destroying a Turkish flotilla at 
Kaundjik, receiving the surrender of many fbrtresses, and storm¬ 
ing the strongholds of Sunnium and Pezeeh. The Turkish 
garrisons of these places were put to the sword, or thrown over 
precipices. Kavarna was next attacked and taken, and finally 
the Christians formed the siege of the celebrated city of Varna. 

The possession of Varna was then, as now, considered essential 
for the further advance of an invading army against the Turkish 
European Empire. Hunyades was still successful; Varna sur¬ 
rendered to his arms : the triumphant Christians were encamped 
near it, when they suddenly received the startling tidings, that it 
was no longer the boy Mahomet that was their adversary, but that 
Sultan Amurath was himself again. They heard that the best 
warriors of Asiatic Turkey had thronged together at the summons 
of their veteran sovereign—that the false Genoese had been 
bribed to carry Amurath and his army, 40,000 strong, across the 
Bosphorus, by a ducat for each soldier’s freight, thus baffling the 
papal fleet that cruised idly in the Hellespont. Other messengers 


AMURATH II. A.D. 1421 - 1451 . 69 

soon hurried into the Christian camp, who announced that the 
unresting Sultan had come on against them by forced marches, 
and that the imperial Turkish army was posted within four miles 
of Varna. 

A battle was inevitable; but the mode, in which Hunyades pre¬ 
pared for it, showed that his confidence was unabated. He rejected 
the advice which some gave in a council of war to form intrench- 
ments and barricades round their camp, and there await the 
Sultan’s attack. He was for an advance against the advancing 
foe, and for a fair stricken field. The young King caught the 
enthusiastic daring of his favourite general, and the Christian 
army broke up from their lines, and marched down into the level 
ground northward 1 of the city, to attack the Sultan, who had 
carefully strengthened his encampment there by a deep ditch and 
palisades. 

On the eve of the feast of St. Mathurin, the 10th of November, 
1444, the two armies were arrayed for battle. The left wing of 
the Christian army consisted chiefly of Wallachian troops. The 
best part of the Hungarian soldiery was in the right wing, where 
also stood the Frankish crusaders under the Cardinal Julian. The 
King was in the centre with the royal guard and the young 
nobility of his realms. The rear-guard of Polish troops was under 
the Bishop of Peterwaradin. Hunyades acted as commander-in- 
chief of the whole army. On the Turkish side the two first lines 
were composed of cavalry and irregular infantry, the Beyler-Bey of 
Boumelia commanding on the right, and the Beyler-Bey of Anatolia 
on the left. In the centre, behind their lines, the Sultan took his 
post with his Janissaries and the regular cavalry of his body¬ 
guard. A copy of the violated treaty was placed on a lance- 
head, and raised on high among the Turkish ranks as a standard 
in the battle, and as a visible appeal to the God of Truth, who 
punishes perjury among mankind. At the very instant when the 
armies were about to encounter, an evil omen troubled the Chris¬ 
tians. A strong and sudden blast of wind swept through their 
ranks, and blew all their banners to the ground, save only that of 
the King. >' : 

Yet, the commencement of the battle seemed to promise them 
a complete and glorious victory. Hunyades placed himself at the 
head of the right wing, and charged the Asiatic troops with such 
vigour that he broke them and chased them from the field. On 

1 Amurath had probably crossed the Balkan by the pass that leads from 
Aides to Pravadi, and had then marched eastward upon Varna. This would 
bring him to the rear of Hunyades. 


70 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

tlie other wing, the Wallachians were equally successful against the 
cavalry and Azabs of Roumelia. King Ladislaus advanced boldly 
with the Christian centre; and Amurath seeing the rout of his two 
first lines, and the disorder that was spreading itself in the ranks 
round him, despaired of the fate of the day, and turned his horse 
for flight. Fortunately for the House of Othman, Karadja, the 
Beyler-Bey of Anatolia, who had fallen back on the centre with the 
remnant of his defeated wing, was near the Sultan at this critical 
moment. He seized his masters bridle, and implored him to fight 
the battle out. The commandant of the Janissaries, Yazidzi- 
Toghan, indignant at such a breach of etiquette, raised his sword 
to smite the unceremonious Beyler-Bey, when he was himself cut 
down by an Hungarian sabre. Amurath’s presence of mind had 
failed him only for a moment; and he now encouraged his Janis¬ 
saries to stand firm against the Christian charge. Young King 
Ladislaus, on the other side, fought gallantly in the thickest of the 
strife; but his horse was killed under him, and he was then sur¬ 
rounded and overpowered. He wished to yield himself up 
prisoner, but the Ottomans, indignant at the breach of the treaty, 
had sworn to give no quarter. An old Janissary, Khodja Khiri, 
cut off the Christian King’s head, and placed it on a pike, a fearful 
companion to the lance, on which the violated treaty was still 
reared on high. The Hungarian nobles were appalled at the 
sight, and their centre fled in utter dismay from the field. Hun- 
yades, on returning with his victorious right wing, vainly charged 
the Janissaries, and strove at least to rescue from them the ghastly 
trophy of their victory. At last he fled in despair with the wreck 
of the troops that he had personally commanded, and with the 
Wallachians who collected round him. The Hungarian rear¬ 
guard, abandoned by their commanders, was attacked by the 
Turks the next morning and massacred almost to a man. Be¬ 
sides the Hungarian King, Cardinal Julian, the author of the 
breach of the treaty and the cause of this calamitous campaign, 
perished at Varna beneath the Turkish scimetar, together with 
Stephen Bahory, and the Bishops of Eilau and Grosswardein. 
This overthrow did not bring immediate ruin upon Hungary, but 
it was fatal to the Sclavonic neighbours of the Ottomans, who had 
joined the Hungarian King against them. Servia and Bosnia were 
thoroughly reconquered by the Mahometans ; and the ruin of these 
Christian nations, which adhered to the Greek Church, was 
accelerated by the religious intolerance with which they were 
treated by their fellow Christians of Hungary and Poland, who 
obeyed the Pope, and hated the Greek Church as heretical. A 


7 i 


AMURATH II. A.D. 1421-1451. 

Servian tradition relates that George Brankovich once inquired of 
Hunyades what he intended to do with respect to religion, if he 
proved victorious. Hunyades answered that he would compel the 
country to become Roman Catholic. Brankovich thereupon asked 
the same question of the Sultan, who replied that he would build 
a church near every mosque, and leave the people at liberty to 
bow in the mosques or to cross themselves in the churches, accord¬ 
ing to their respective creeds. The Servians, who heard this, 
thought it better to submit to the Turks and retain their ancient 
faith, than to accept the Latin rites. 1 The tradition expresses a 
fact, for which ample historical evidence might be cited. So also 
in Bosnia, the bigotry of the Church of Rome in preaching up a 
crusade against the sect of the Patarenes, which was extensively 
spread in that country, caused the speedy and complete annexation 
of an important frontier province to the Ottoman Empire. Seventy 
Bosnian fortresses are said to have opened their gates to the Turks 
within eight days. The royal House of Bosnia was annihilated, 
and many of her chief nobles embraced Mahometanism to avoid a 
similar doom. 2 

Amurath’s projects for retirement had been disappointed by the 
necessity of his resuming the sovereign power to save the Ottoman 
Empire from the Hungarians and their confederates. After the 
decisive blow which he had dealt at Varna to the enemies of his 
race, the Sultan again sought to obtain the calm of private life, 
and was again compelled to resume the cares of state. Early in 
1445 he abdicated a second time in favour of his son, and went 
back to his Epicurean retreat at Magnesia. But the young hand 
of Mahomet was too feeble to curb the fierce Turkish soldiery; 
and the Janissaries showed their insubordinate violence in acts of 
pillage and murder, and in arrogant demands for increased pay, 
which threatened open mutiny and civil war. The veteran states¬ 
men, whom Amurath had placed as councillors round his son, saw 
the necessity of recalling their old master to the helm of the 
empire. Amurath yielded to their entreaties, and hastened to 
Adrianople, where he showed himself once more to the people and 
the army as their sovereign. He was rapturously welcomed. The 
ringleaders in the late disorders were promptly punished, and the 
masses were judiciously pardoned. Order was thoroughly restored 

1 Ranke’s “Servia,” p. 80. 

2 The complete degradation of Servia and Bosnia was not effected nntil 
the reign of Mahomet II., Amurath’s successor. But Ranke (“ History of 
Se via,” p. JS) rightly treats this as the result of the battle of Varna. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


72 

in court and camp. Young Prince Mahomet, who had twice 
during twelve months tasted supreme power, and twice been com¬ 
pelled to resign it, was sent to Magnesia, to remain there till more 
advanced age should make him more capable of reigning. Amu- 
rath did not venture a third time on the experiment of abdication. 
He has been highly eulogised as the only sovereign who had ever 
abdicated twice, and descended into private life after having learned 
by experience the contrast between it and the possession of a 
throne. 

The remaining six years of Amurath’s life and reign were sig¬ 
nalised by successful enterprises against the Peloponnesus, the 
petty despots of which became tributary vassals of the Ottomans, 
and by a great defeat which he gave his old antagonist, Hunyades, at 
Kossova, after a three days’ battle in October, 1448. In Albania 
his arms were less fortunate ; and during the latter part of Amu- 
rath’s reign his power was defied, and his pride repeatedly humbled 
by the celebrated George Castriot, called by the Turks Scander- 
beg, or Lord Alexander, the name by which he is best known in 
history. 

The father of this champion, John Castriot, Lord of Emalthia 
(the modern district of Moghlene), had submitted, like the other 
petty despots of those regions, to Amurath early in his reign, and 
had placed his four sons in the Sultan’s hands as hostages for his 
fidelity. Three of them died young. The fourth, whose name was 
George, pleased the Sultan by his beauty, strength, and intelligence. 
Amurath caused him to be brought up in the Mahometan creed ; 
and, when he was only eighteen, conferred on him the government 
of one of the Sanjaks of the empire. The young Albanian 
proved his courage and skill in many exploits under Amurath’s eye, 
and received from him the name of Iskanderbeg,the Lord Alexander. 
When John Castriot died, Amurath took possession of his princi¬ 
palities, and kept the son constantly employed in distant wars. 
Scanderbeg brooded over this injury; and when the Turkish 
armies were routed by Hunyades in the campaign of 1443, Scan¬ 
derbeg determined to escape from their side, and assume forcible 
possession of his patrimony. He suddenly entered the tent of the 
Sultan’s chief-secretary, and forced that functionary, with the 
poniard at his throat, to write and seal a formal order to the 
Turkish commander of the strong city of Croia, in Albania, to 
deliver that place and the adjacent territory to Scanderbeg, as the 
Sultan’s viceroy. He then stabbed the secretary, and hastened to 
Croia, where his stratagem gained him instant admittance and 
submission. He now publicly abjured the Mahometan faith, and 


AMURATH II. A.D. 1421-1451. 73 

declared his intention of defending the creed of his forefathers, 
and restoring the independence of his native land. The Christian 
population flocked readily to his banner, and the Turks were 
massacred without mercy. For nearly twenty-five years Scander- 
beg contended against all the power of the Ottomans, though 
directed by the skill of Amurath and his successor Mahomet, the 
conqueror of Constantinople. The difficult nature of the wild and 
mountainous country, which he occupied, aided Scanderbeg mate¬ 
rially in the long resistance which he thus opposed to the else- 
■where triumphant Turks. But his military genius must have been 
high : and without crediting all the legends of his personal 
prowess, we may well believe that the favourite chief of the 
Albanian mountaineers, in the guerilla warfare by which he chiefly 
baffled the Turks, must have displayed no ordinary skill and 
daring, and may have possessed strength and activity such as rarely 
fall to the lot of man. 1 The strongest proof of his valour is the 
superstitious homage which they paid to him when they occupied 
Lissa in the Venetian territories, whither Scanderbeg had at last 
retired from Albania, and where he died in 1567. The Turkish 
soldiers forced open his tomb, and eagerly sought portions of his 
bones to wear as amulets, thinking that they would communicate 
a spirit of valour similar to that of the hero to whose mortal fabric 
they had once belonged. 

The Sultan, under whom Scanderbeg fought in youth, died long 
before the bold Albanian, who once had been his favourite pupil 
in the art of war, and afterwards his most obstinate adversary. 
Amurath expired at Adrianople in 1451, after having governed 
his people with justice and in honour for thirty years. His noble 
qualities are attested by the Greek as well as by Turkish historians. 
He was buried at Brusa. Our own old historian, Knolles, who 
wrote in 1610, says of his sepulchre: “Here he now lieth in a 

1 According to the authorities that were used and decorated by Knolles, 
Scanderbeg “ ever fought against the Turks with his arm bare, and that 
with such lTerceness, that the blood did oftentimes burst out of his lips. It is 
written that he, with his own hand, slew three thousand Turks in the time 
of his wars against them.” One of the best of the numerous harangues 
which Knolles introduces in his history, is the speech which, at p. 198 of 
his first volume, he puts in the mouth of a Turkish soldier, “ a rough, bold- 
spirited fellow,” at Sfetigrade, in defiance of the threats of Scanderbeg. 
The Turk bids Scanderbeg’s messengers tell their master, that “If he seeks 
to impose those conditions on us, let him once more bare that arm of his which 
mm of courage fear not so much as he thinketh.” Byron, when a boy, wa 3 
(like Johnson) fond of reading Knolles, and he must have had this pictures 
of Scanderbeg in his mind when he described Alp in the “Siege of Corinth/* 


74 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


cliapel without any roof, his grave nothing differing from that of 
the common Turks, which they say he commanded to be done in 
his last will, that the mercy and blessing of God might come unto 
him by the shining of the sun and moon, and the falling of the 
rain and dew of heaven upon his grave.” 


MAHOMET II. A.D. 1451-1481. 


75 




Oj.u. 


CHAPTER V. 

DEIGN AND CHARACTER OF MAHOMET II.—SIEGE AND CONQUEST 
OF CONSTANTINOPLE—FURTHER CONQUESTS IN EUROPE AND 
ASIA—REPULSE BEFORE BELGRADE—CONQUEST OF THE CRIMEA 
—UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON RHODES—CAPTURE OF OTRANTO 
—DEATH OF MAHOMET . 1 

Mahomet II., surnamed by his countrymen “the Conqueror,” was 
aged twenty-one years when his father died. He heard of that event 
at Magnesia, whither the Grand Vizier had despatched a courier 
to him from Adrianople. He instantly sprang on an Arab horse, 
and exclaiming, 4 ‘Let those who love me, follow me,” galloped oft' 
towards the shore of the Hellespont. In a few days he was 
solemnly enthroned. His first act of sovereign authority showed 
that a different spirit to that of the generous Amurath would now 
wield the Ottoman power. Amurath had left a little son, a babe 
still at the breast, by his second wife, a princess of Servia. Ma¬ 
homet ordered his infant brother to be drowned in a bath; and 
the merciless command was executed at the very time when the 
unhappy mother, in ignorance of her child’s doom, was offering 
her congratulations to the murderer on his accession. Mahomet 
perceived the horror which the atrocity of this deed caused among 
his subjects; and he sought to avert it from himself by asserting 
that the officer who had drowned the infant prince had acted 
without orders, and by putting him to death for the pretended 
treason. But Mahomet himself, when in after years he declared 
the practice of royal fratricide to be a necessary law of the state, 
confessed clearly his own share in this the first murder of his 
deeply-purpled reign. 

He had now fully outgrown the boyish feebleness of mind, which 
had unfitted him for the throne when twice placed on it by his 
father six years before. For craft, capacity, and courage, he ranks 
among the highest of the Ottoman Sultans. His merits also as a 
far-sighted statesman, and his power of mind as a legislator, are as 

1 See Von Hammer books 12 to IS, 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


76 

undeniable as are his military talents. He was also keenly sen¬ 
sible to all intellectual gratifications, and he was himself possessed 
of unusually high literary abilities and attainments. Yet with all 
these qualities we find combined in him an amount of cruelty, 
perfidy, and revolting sensuality, such as seldom stain human 
nature in the same individual. 

Three years before Mahomet II. was girt with the scimetar of 
Othman, Constantine XI. was crowned Emperor of Constantinople 
—a prince whose heroism throws a sunset glory on the close of the 
long-clouded series of the Byzantine annals. The Roman Empire 
of the East was now shrunk to a few towns and a scanty district 
beyond the walls of the capital city; but that city was itself a 
prize of sufficient splendour to tempt the ambition and excite the 
hostility of a less aspiring and unscrupulous spirit than that of the 
son of Amurath. The Ottomans felt that Constantinople was the 
true natural capital of their empire. While it was in the hands of 
others, the communication between their European and their Asiatic 
provinces could never be secure. Its acquisition by themselves 
would consolidate their power, and invest them with the majesty 
that still lingered round those walls, which had encircled the 
chosen seat of Roman Empire for nearly eleven hundred years. 

The imprudence of Constantine, who seems to have judged the 
character of' Mahomet from the inability to reign which he had 
shown at the premature age of fourteen, hastened the hostility of 
the young Sultan. Constantine sent an embassy, demanding the 
augmentation of a stipend which was paid to the Byzantine Court 
for the maintenance of a descendant of Solyman, Sultan Bajazet’s 
eldest son. This personage, who was named Orkhan, had long 
been in apparent retirement, but real custody at Constantinople, 
and the ambassadors hinted that if their demands were not com¬ 
plied with, the Greek Emperor would immediately set him loose, 
to compete with Mahomet for the Turkish throne. Mahomet, 
who at this time was engaged in' quelling some disturbances in 
Asia Minor, answered with simulated courtesy; but the old 
Grand Vizier, Khalil, warned the Byzantines, with indignant 
vehemence, of the folly of their conduct, and of the difference 
which they would soon experience between the fierce ambition of 
the young Sultan and the mild forbearance of his predecessor. 
Mahomet had indeed bent all his energies on effecting the conquest 
of the Greek capital, and he resolved to secure himself against any 
interruption or division of his forces while engaged in that great 
enterprise. He provided for the full security of his territories in 
Asia; he made a truce of three years with Hunyades, which 


MAHOMET II. A.D. 1451-1481. 77 

guaranteed him from all attack from the north in Europe; and 
he then contemptuously drove away the imperial agents who re¬ 
ceived the revenues of the lands allotted for the maintenance of 
Orkhan, and began to construct a fortress on the European side of 
the Bosphorus, about five miles above Constantinople, at a place 
where the channel is narrowest, and immediately opposite one 
that had been built by Bajazet Yilderim on the Asiatic shore. 
Constantine remonstrated in vain against these evident prepara¬ 
tions for the blockade of his city; and the Ottomans employed in 
the work were encouraged to commit acts of violence against the 
Greek peasantry, which soon led to conflicts between armed bands 
on either side. Constantine closed the gates of his city in alarm, 
and sent another embassy of remonstrance to the Sultan, who 
replied by a declaration of war, and it was evident that the death- 
struggle of the Greek Empire was now fast approaching. 

Each party employed the autumn and winter of 1452 in earnest 
preparations for the siege, which was to be urged by the one and 
resisted by the other in the coming spring. Mahomet collected 
the best troops of his empire at Adrianople ; but much more than 
mere numbers of soldiery, however well disciplined and armed for 
the skirmish or the battle-field, was requisite for the capture of 
the great and strong city of Constantinople. Artillery had for 
some time previously been employed both by Turkish and Christian 
armies; but Mahomet now prepared a more numerous and for¬ 
midable park of cannon than had ever before been seen in warfare. 
A Hungarian engineer, named Urban, had abandoned the thank¬ 
less service and scanty pay of the Greeks for the rich rewards and 
honours with which the Sultan rewarded all who aided him in 
his conquest. Urban cast a monster cannon for the Turks, which 
was the object both of their admiration and terror. Other guns 
of less imposing magnitude, but probably of greater efficiency, 
were prepared; and ammunition and military stores of every 
description, and the means of transport, were collected on an 
equally ample scale. But Mahomet did not merely heap together 
the materials of war with the ostentatious profusion so common 
in Oriental rulers. He arranged all, he provided for the right use 
of all, in the keen spirit of skilful combination, which we admire 
in the campaigns of Caesar and Napoleon. He was almost inces¬ 
santly occupied in tracing and discussing with his officers plans of 
the city, of his intended lines, of the best positions for his batteries 
and magazines, of the spots where mines might be driven with 
most effect, and of the posts which each division of his troops 
should occupy. 


7‘J HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

In the devoted city, the Emperor, with equal ability, blit far 
different feelings, collected the poor resources of his own remnant 
of empire, and the scanty succours of the Western nations for the 
defence. The efforts which he had made to bring the Greek 
Church into communion with the Church of Rome, as the price of 
cordial and effectual support against the Mahometans, had alienated 
his own subjects from him; and the bigoted priests of Byzantium, 
when called on by the Emperor to contribute their treasures, and 
to arm in the defence of their national independence, replied by 
reviling him as a heretic. The lay leader of the orthodox Greeks, 
the Grand Duke Notaras, openly avowed that he would rather 
see the turban of the Sultan than the tiara of the Pope in Con¬ 
stantinople. 1 Only six thousand Greeks, out of a population of one 
hundred thousand, 2 took any part in the defence of the city; and 
the Emperor was obliged to leave even these under the command 
of the factious Notaras, whose ecclesiastical zeal showed itself in 
violent dissensions, instead of cordial military co-operation with 
the chiefs of the Latin auxiliaries. 

These auxiliaries were partly contributed by the Pope, who 
sent Cardinal Isidore with a small body of veteran troops, and 
some pecuniary aid, to the Greek Emperor. The Italian and 
Spanish commercial cities that traded with Constantinople, showed 
their interest in her fate, by sending contingents to her defence. 
Bands of Aragonese, of Catalans, and of Venetians, gave assistance 
to Constantine, which their skill and bravery made of great value, 
though their numbers were but small. His most important 
auxiliary was the Genoese commander, John Giustiniani, who 
arrived with two galleys and three hundred chosen men, a little 
before the commencement of the siege. Altogether, Constantine 
had a garrison of about 9000 troops to defend walls of fourteen 
miles in extent, the whole landward part of which, for a space of 
live miles, was certain to be attacked by the Turkish troops. The 
fortifications, built in ancient times, and for other systems of war¬ 
fare, were ill adapted to have heavy cannon placed and worked on 
them; and many places had been suffered to become dilapidated. 
Still, amid all this difficulty and distress, Constantine did his duty 
to his country and his creed. No means of restoring or improv¬ 
ing the defences were neglected, which his own military skill and 
that of his Latin allies could suggest, and which his ill-supplied 
treasury, and his disloyal subjects, would enable him to supply. 

1 Ducas, 148. Finlay, vol. ii. 627. 

2 Finlay, 646. 


79 


MAHOMET II. A.D. 1451-1481. 

But the patriotism, and even the genius, of a single ruler are vain 
to save the people that will not save themselves. The Greeks 
had long been ripe for slavery, nor could their fall be further de¬ 
layed. 

In the spring of 1453, the Turks were for the last time before 
the city, so often besieged by them and others, and so often be¬ 
sieged in vain. 1 Mahomet formed his lines, as Amurath had 
done, from the harbour to the sea, and they were strengthened 
with a similar embankment. Fourteen batteries were formed op¬ 
posite those parts of the landward wall of the city that appeared 
to be the feeblest. The chief attack was directed against the gate 
of St. Romanus, near the centre of the wall. Besides the Turkish 
cannon, balistas were planted along the lines, which hurled large 
stones upon the battlements. The Turkish archers kept up a 
showier of arrows on any part of the walls where the defenders 
showed themselves; and a body of miners, whom the Sultan had 
brought from the mines of Novoberda, in Servia, carried on their 
subterranean works as far as the city wall, and forced large 
openings in the outer of the two walls. The aggregate of the 
Turkish troops is variously estimated at from 70,000 to 250,000. 
The smaller number must have been sufficient for all the military 
operations of the siege ; nor is it probable that Mahomet would 
have increased the difficulty of finding sufficient provisions for his 
army by uselessly crowding its ranks. Besides the land forces, the 

1 Von Hammer enumerates twenty-nine sieges of the city since its found¬ 
ation by the Megarians, 658 B.C., under the name of Byzantium. It was 
besieged, 477 b.c., by Pausanias, Generalissimo of the Greeks, after the 
campaign of Plataea ; in 410 bc., by Alcibiades ; in 347 b.c., by Leon, 
General of Philip of Macedon ; in 197 A.D., by the Emperor Severus; in 313, 
by the Caesar Maximius ; in 315, by Constantine the Great; in 616, by 
Khosroes, King of Persia ; in 626, by the Chagan of the Avars ; in 654, by 
the Arabs under Moawya; in 667, by Yezid, the Arab ; in 672, by Sofien 
Ben Aouf, the Arab ; in 715, by Moslema and Omar Abdul-Aziz, the 
Arabs ; in 739, by Solyman, son of the Caliph Abdul Melek ; in 764, by 
Paganos, Krai of the Bulgarians ; in 780, by Haroun-al-Itasliid : in 798, by 
Abdul-Melek, Haroun’s general; in 811, by Kramus, Despot of the Sclavi; 
in 820, by the Sclavian Thomas ; in 866, by the Bussians, under Oswald and 
Dir ; in 914, by Simeon, Krai of the Bulgarians ; in 1048, by the rebel 
Thornicius ; in 1081, by Alexius Comnenus ; in 1204, by the Crusaders ; in 
1261, by Michael Palreologus; in 1356, by Bajazet Yilderim, for the first 
time ; in 1402, by the same, for the second time; in 1414, by Musa, 
Bajazet’s son ; in 1422, by Amurath II. ; and in 1453, by Mahomet II. 
Since then it has been unbesieged for four centuries. Of the numerous 
commanders who have attacked the city, eight only have captured it 
Pausanias, Alcibiades, Severus, Constantine, Alexius Comnenus, Baudolo, 
Michael Palseologus, and Mahomet, 


So 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Sultan had collected a fleet of 320 vessels, of various sizes, but all 
inferior to the large galleons of the Greeks and their allies. But the 
Christian ships were only fourteen in number. These were moored 
in the Golden Horn, or Great Harbour, the entrance of which was 
secured by a strong chain. The siege commenced on the 6th of 
April, and was prolonged by the bravery and skill of Constantine, 
Giustiniani, and their Latin troops until the 29th of May. Many 
gallant deeds were performed during this time. The ability with 
which Giustiniani taught the defenders to work their artillery, 
and to use the important arm of war which they still exclusively 
possessed in the Greek fire, excited the regretful eulogies of the 
Sultan himself. A general assault, which the Turks hazarded be¬ 
fore the walls were completely breached, and in which they em¬ 
ployed the old machinery of movable towers, was repulsed ; and 
the besiegers’ engines were destroyed. A squadron of four 
Genoese ships, and one Greek ship from Chios, forced their way 
through the Turkish flotilla, and brought seasonable supplies of 
corn and ammunitioQ to the city. This action, which took place 
in the middle of April, was the most brilliant episode of the siege. 
Mahomet had ordered out a division of his galleys, 150 strong, to 
intercept the five ships of the Christians, that were seen running 
swiftly and steadily through the Propontis, before a full and 
favourable wind. The Greeks thronged the walls, and the Turks 
crowded down to the beach to watch the issue of this encounter. 
The Sultan himself rode down to the water’s edge, in full expecta¬ 
tion of witnessing a triumph of his marine force, and the destruc¬ 
tion or capture of his enemies. On came the Christian 'ships, 
well-armed, well-manned, and well-manoeuvred. They crashed 
through the foremost of their brave but unpractised assailants. 
Their superior height made it impossible for their enemies to 
grapple or board them, and the very number and eagerness of the 
Turks increased the disorder in which their vessels soon were 
heaped confusedly together. Shouts of joy rose from the city 
walls; while Mahomet, furious at the sight, spurred his horse into 
the very surf, as if with his own hand he would tear the victory 
from the Greeks. Still onward came the exulting Christian sea¬ 
men. From their tall decks, they hurled large stones, and poured 
incessant volleys of the inextinguishable Greek fire upon the 
Turkish barks beneath and around them. Onward they came to 
the harbour’s mouth; the guard-chain was lowered to receive 
them ; and the welcome reinforcement rode securely in the G olden 
Horn, while the shattered remnant of the Turkish squadron crept 
back to the shore, where their sorrowing comrades of the land 


MAHOMET II. A.D. 1451-14S1. 81 

force, and their indignant Sultan awaited them. Mahomet, in 
his wrath at the loss, and still more at the humiliation which he 
had sustained, ordered his defeated admiral, Baltaoghli, to be im¬ 
paled cn the spot. The murmurs and entreaties of the Janissaries 
made him recall the atrocious command; but he partly wreaked 
his wrath by inflicting personal chastisement on his brave but un¬ 
successful officer. Four slaves stretched the admiral prostrate on 
the ground, and Mahomet dealt him one hundred blows with his 
heavy battle-mace. This reverse of the first Turkish admiral is 
said to have given rise to a national opinion among the Ottomans, 
that God had given them the empire of the earth, but had re¬ 
served that of the sea for the unbelievers. If such an opinion did 
really exist among the Turks before their late centuries of defeat 
and disaster, it must have been largely modified by the exploits of 
Barbarossa, Dragut, Piale, Piri Peis, Sidi-Ali, Kilig-Ali, and their 
other raval commanders, who have shed such splendour over the 
history of the Turkish navy. 

The victory which the five relieving galleys obtained, did more 
even than the material succour which they conveyed, to re-animate 
the defenders of Constantinople. But it was a solitary reinforce¬ 
ment. Constantine and Giustiniani never again “ saw the horizon 
whiten with sails ” that bore hope and succour on their wings. 
And Mahomet was no Xerxes, 1 to be disheartened by a single 
defeat, or to turn back from an enterprise because its difficulties 
surpassed expectation. Unable to gain the entrance of the har¬ 
bour, he determined by a bold engineering manoeuvre to transport 
part of his fleet across the land, and launch it at the upper part of 
the Golden Horn, where in the narrow smooth water, and with 
aid ready from either shore, his galleys would have the mastery 
over the far less numerous though larger vessels of the Greeks. A 
smooth road of planks was accordingly made along the five miles 
of land which intervene between the Bosphorus and the Golden 
Horn ; and a large division of the Turkish galleys was hauled along 
it, and safely launched in the harbour. As it was necessary to 
overcome a considerable inclination of the ground, this engineering 
achievement reflects great credit on Sultan Mahomet; though the 
transport of war-galleys over broad spaces of land was no novelty 
either in classical or mediaeval warfare ; and a remarkable instance 
had lately occurred in Italy, where the Venetians, in 1437, had 
moved a fleet overland from the Adige to the Lake of Garda. 

Thus master of the upper part of the port, Mahomet formed a 

1 See Herodotus, Urania, xc., and Aeschylus, Persse, 471, for the de¬ 
scription of Xerxes witnessing the defeat of his armament at Salamis. 


82 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

pontoon bridge across it, tlie western end of which was so near to 
the angle of the landward and the harbour walls, that cannon 
placed on the pontoon bridge could play upon the harbour side of 
the city. Giustiniani in vain attempted, with the Genoese and 
Greek galleys, to destroy this bridge and burn the Turkish flotilla. 
The Venetians renewed the attempt with equally bad success. 
Although no serious effect was produced on the fortifications from 
the additional line of attack along which the Ottomans now 
established their cannonade, the labours of the scanty garrison 
were made more severe; and it became necessary to weaken the 
defence on the landward side, by detaching men and guns to the 
wall along the harbour. Meanwhile, the exertions of the besiegers 
on the original and chief line of the siege were unremitting. The 
fire of their batteries, though slow and feeble in comparison with 
the artillery practice of modern times, was kept up for seven weeks, 
and its effects were at last visible in the overthrow of four large 
towers, and the yawning of a broad chasm in the city walls, near 
the gate of St. Komanus. The ditch was nearly filled up by the 
ruins of the defences, and the path into Constantinople was at last 
open. Mahomet now sent a last summons to surrender, to which 
Constantine nobly replied, that if the Sultan would grant him 
peace he would accept it, with thanks to Heaven, that he would 
pay the Sultan tribute if demanded, but that he would not sur¬ 
render the city which he had sworn to defend to the last moment 
of his life. 

The capitulation was demanded and refused on the 24th May, 
and the Sultan gave orders for a general assault on the 29th. He 
announced to his army that all the plunder of the city should be 
theirs ; and that he only reserved the land and the buildings. The 
Ottoman soldiery received the announcement with shouts of joy. 
The chiefs of the Janissaries pledged themselves that victory was 
certain, and a general illumination of the Turkish camp and fleet 
at night showed to the besieged the number, the purpose, and the 
exulting confidence of their foes. 

Within the city, the Greek population passed alternately from 
terror at the coming storm to turbulent confidence in certain 
superstitious legends, which promised the help of saints and angels 
to men who would not help themselves. Only a small proportion 
of his subjects listened to the expostulations and entreaties, by 
which their noble-minded Emperor urged them to deserve the 
further favour of Heaven by using to the utmost those resources 
which Heaven had already placed in their hands. Even among 
those who bore arms as part of the garrison, the meanest jealousy 


• MAHOMET II. A.D. 1451 - 1481 . 83 

of their Latin auxiliaries prevailed. On the very eve of the final 
assault, when Giustiniani, who was charged with the defence of 
the great breach, required some additional guns, the Grand Duke 
Notaras, who had the general control of the ordnance, refused the 
supply, saying that it was unnecessary. The Latins did their duty 
nobly. Of the twelve chief posts in the defence, ten were held 
by them. Giustiniani in particular distinguished himself by his 
valour and skill. He formed new works in rear of the demolished 
towers and gate of St. Komanus; and extorted the admiration of 
the Sultan, who watched his preparations, and exclaimed, “ What 
would I not give to gain that man to my service !” But the chief 
hero of the defence was Constantine himself. He knew that his 
hour was come; and prepared to die in the discharge of duty 
with the earnest piety of a true Christian and the calm courage of 
a brave soldier. On the night before the assault, he received tho 
Holy Sacrament in the church of St. Sophia. He then proceeded 
to the great palace, and lingered for a short time in the halls 
where his predecessors had reigned for so many centuries, but 
which neither he nor any prince sprung from his race was ever to 
see again. When he had passed forth from the palace to take his 
station at the great breach, and there await his martyrdom, all 
thoughts of earthly grandeur were forgotten; and turning to those 
around him, many of whom had been his companions from youth, 
Constantine asked of them, as fellow-Christians, their forgiveness 
for any offence that he had ever committed towards them. Amid 
the tears and prayers of all who beheld him, the last of the Ceesars 
then went forth to die. 

In the Ottoman camp all was ready for the work of death. 
Each column had its specified point of attack; and the Sultan had 
so arranged the vast masses of men at his command, that he was 
prepared to send fresh troops successively forward against the 
city, even if its defenders were to hold their ground against him 
from daybreak to noon. At sunrise, on the 29th May, 1453, the 
Turkish drums and trumpets sounded for the assault, and the 
leading divisions of the Sultan’s army rushed forward. Prodigal 
of lives, and reckoning upon wearing down the resistance of the 
garrison by sending wave upon wave of stormers against them, 
Mahomet placed his least valued soldiers in the van, to receive 
the first steady volleys of the Greek guns, and dull the edge of 
the Christian sword. The better troops were to follow. The 
main body of the Janissaries, under the Sultan’s own eye, was to 
assault the principal breach. Detachments of those chosen warriors 
were also directed against other weakened points of the defence. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


At the same time that the attack commenced from the camp, the 
Turkish flotilla moved against the fortifications along the harbour; 
and the assault soon raged by sea and by land along two sides of 
the Greek city. For two hours the Christians resisted skilfully 
and steadily; and though the Sultan in person, by promises, by 
threats, and by blows, urged his columns forward to the great 
breach, neither there nor elsewhere along the line could they bear 
back the stubborn courage of the defenders; nor could a living 
Mahometan come into Constantinople. At last Giustiniani, who, 
side by side with the Emperor, conducted the defence of the 
great breach, received a severe wound, and left his post to die on 
board his galley in the harbour. The garrison was dispirited at 
the loss ; and the chiefs of the assailing Janissaries observing that 
the resistance had slackened, redoubled their efforts to force a 
passage. One of them, named Hassan of Ulubad, conspicuous by 
his stature and daring, rushed with thirty comrades up the barri¬ 
caded ruins of one of the overthrown towers that flanked the 
breach. They gained the summit; and though Hassan and 
eighteen of his forlorn hope were struck down, others rapidly 
followed, and carried the Greek defences by the overwhelming 
weight of their numbers. Nearly at the same time, another 
Ottoman corps effected an entrance at a slightly-protected part of 
the long line of walls, and wheeling round, took the garrison in 
the rear. Constantine saw now that all was lost, save honour, 
and exclaiming, “ I would rather die than live!” the last of the 
Homans rushed amid the advancing foe, and fell stretched by two 
sabre wounds among the undistinguished dead. 

Torrent after torrent of the conquerors now raged through the 
captured city. At first they slew all whom they met or overtook; 
but when they found that all resistance had ceased, the love of 
plunder predominated over the thirst for blood, and they strove to 
secure the fairest and strongest of the helpless thousands that 
cowered before them, for service or for sale as slaves. About the 
hour of noon, Sultan Mahomet, surrounded by his viziers, his 
pachas, and his guards, rode through the breach at the gate of 
St. Komanus into the city which he had conquered. He alighted 
at the church of St. Sophia, and entering the splendid edifice, he 
ordered one of the muezzins who accompanied him to summon 
the true believers to prayer. He then himself mounted the high 
altar, and prayed. Having thus solemnly established the creed of 
the Prophet in the shrine where his fallen adversary had on the 
preceding eve celebrated the holiest Christian rite, and where so 
many generations of Christians had worshipped, Mahomet ordered 


MAHOMET II. A.D. 1451-14S1. 85 

search to be made for Constantine’s body. It was found under a 
heap of slain in the great breach, and was identified, beyond all 
possibility of dispute, by the golden eagles that were embroidered 
upon the Emperor’s buskins. The head was cut off, and exhibited 
for a time between the feet of the bronze horse of the equestrian 
statue of Justinian in the place called the Augustan. The ghastly 
trophy of Mahomet’s conquest was subsequently embalmed, and 
sent round to the chief cities of Asia. The greater number of 
the Emperor’s Latin auxiliaries had shared his noble death. Some 
few had made their way to the harbour, and escaped through the 
Ottoman fleet. Others came as captives into Mahomet’s power, 
and were either put to death or required to pay heavy ransoms. 
The Genoese inhabitants of the suburb of Galata obtained terms 
of capitulation, by which they were protected from pillage. The 
Grand Duke Notaras was brought prisoner before Mahomet, who 
made a show of treating him with favour, and obtained from him 
a list of the principal Greek dignitaries* and officers of state. The 
Sultan instantly proclaimed their names to his soldiers, and 
offered 1000 sequins for each of their heads. 1 

On the day after the capture of the city, Mahomet continued 
his survey of his conquest, and took possession of the imperial 
palace. Struck by the solitude of its spacious halls, and the 
image of desolation which it presented, Mahomet repeated two 
lines of the Persian poet Firdousi:—“ The spider’s web is the 
royal curtain in the palace of Csesar; the owl is the sentinel on 
the watch-tower of Afrasiab.” 2 The quotation showed the well- 
read and elegant scholar, and the subsequent deeds of the Sultan 
on that day exemplified the truth that intellectual eminence is no 
sure guarantee against the co-existence of the vilest depravity. 3 
On leaving the palace, Mahomet repaired to a sumptuous banquet 
which had been prepared for him in the vicinity. He there drank 
deeply of wine; and he ordered the chief of his eunuchs to bring 
to him the youngest child of the Grand Duke Notaras, a boy aged 
fourteen years of age. Notaras during the siege had only dis- 

1 The general accuracy of Gibbon’s splendid description of the taking of 
Constantinople is not impeached by the minute diligence of Von Hammer 
or Finlay, though they supply us with some not unimportant connections 
and additions. I think that Mr. Finlay’s vindication of the Genoese com¬ 
mander Giustiniani from the heavy censures of Gibbon is successful, and 
have gladly followed it. 

2 The full meaning of this couplet, with reference to the customs of Eastern 
Courts, is explained in a note to Thornton’s “ Turkey,” p. 10. 

3 See Arnold’s remarks (p. 255, vol.i., “ History of the later Roman Com¬ 
monwealth ”) on the character of Sylla. 


86 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


played the qualities of a factious bigot; but he now acted as 
became a Christian, a father, and a man. He told the messenger 
that his child should never minister to the Sultan’s brutality, and 
that he would rather see him under the executioner’s axe. Furious 
at hearing this reply, Mahomet ordered Notaras and his whole 
family to be seizect and put to death. Notar as met his fate with 
dignity, and exhorted his children to die as fitted Christians. He 
saw their heads fall one by one before him; and then, after having 
asked a few moments for prayer, he gave himself up to the 
executioner, acknowledging with his last breath the justice of God. 
The bloody heads were brought to Mahomet, and placed by his 
order in a row before him on the banquet table. Many more 
executions of noble Christians followed on that day, to please the 
tyrant’s savage mood; and it was said that the natural ferocity of 
Mahomet was goaded on by the malevolent suggestions of a French 
renegade, whose daughter was in the Sultan’s harem, and was at 
that time the object of his % passionate fondness. 

But though thus merciless in his lust and wrath, Mahomet 
knew well that for Constantinople to become such a seat of empire 
as his ambition desired, it was necessary that the mass of the 
Greek population which had escaped death and captivity during 
the sack of the city, should be encouraged to remain there, and to 
be orderly and industrious subjects of their new master. The 
measures taken by him with this design attest the clear-sighted 
statesmanship which he possessed. Constantine had alienated his 
subjects from him by conforming to the Latin Church. Mahomet 
now gratified the Greeks, who loved their orthodoxy far more 
than their liberty, by installing a new patriarch at the head of 
the Greek Church, and proclaiming himself its protector. This 
was on the 1st of June, only ten days after the storm. He 
then by solemn proclamation invited all the fugitives to return to 
their homes, assuring them of safety, and encouraging them to 
resume their former occupations. A formal charter was after¬ 
wards granted by him, which declared the person of the Greek 
patriarch inviolable, and exempted him and the other dignitaries 
of his Church from all public burdens. The same document assured 
to the Greeks the use of their churches, and the free exercise of 
their religious rites according to their own usages. 1 But the 
Greek population of Constantinople had been long declining, and 
even before its sufferings in the fatal siege, had been far inadequate 

1 The contents of this charter (which had been destroyed in a fire) were 
colemnly proved in the reign of Selim I. by an old Janissary, who had been 
at the taking of Constantinople.—Yon Hammer. 


MAHOMET II. A.D . 1451-14S1. 87 

for the vast space occupied by the buildings. Mahomet there¬ 
fore sought other modes of replenishing the city. Thousands 
of families were transplanted to the capital from various parts of 
his empire; and throughout his reign, at every accession of 
territory that he made, he colonised his capital with portions of 
his new subjects. Before the close of his reign, Constantinople 
was again teeming with life and activity; but the Greek character 
of the city was merged amid the motley crowds of Turkomans, 
Albanians, Bulgarians, Servians, and others, who had repaired 
thither at the Sultan’s bidding. 

The vision of Othman was now accomplished, and Constanti¬ 
nople had become the centre jewel in the ring of Turkish Empire. 
The capture of that city closes the first of the seven periods into 
which Von Hammer divides the Ottoman history. 1 The first 
period consists of 150 years of rapid growth, from the assump¬ 
tion of independent sovereignty by Othman to the consolidation 
of the European and Asiatic conquests of his house by the taking 
of Constantinople. The second is the period of its further growth 
by eonquest until the accession of Solyman I. in 1520. The third 
is its period of meridian ascendency under Solyman and Selim II., 
(from 1520 to 1574). The fourth is the commencement of its 
decline under Amurath III. (1574) to the epoch when the sangui¬ 
nary vigour of Amurath IV. (from 1623 to 1640) restored for a 
time its former splendour. The fifth is the period of anarchy and 
insurrection, between the death of Amurath IV. (1640) and the 
ministry of the first Kiuprili (1656). The sixth is the period of 
new energy given to the empire by men of the family of Kiuprili, 
from 1656 to the calamitous war with Austria, which was closed 
by the treaty of Carlowitz in 1688. Then comes the seventh 
period, one of accelerated disaster and downfall, to 1763, when the 
treaty of Kainardji with Kussia confirmed its humiliation. 

Mahomet II. was but twenty-three years of age when he took 
Constantinople; being one year older than Alexander was when 
he fought the battle of the Granicus, and three years less than the 
age of Napoleon when he commanded at Lodi. The succession 
of wars and victories which filled the thirty years of Mahomet’s 
reign might perhaps bear comparison with the exploits of the other 
two imperial conquerors whom we have mentioned. The fragments 
of the Greek Empire, which had lingered for a while unconnected 
with the central power of the Emperor, were speedily subdued by 
the new ruler of Constantinople. The Peloponnesus was con* 


1 Von Hammer. Supplement. 


88 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


quered in 1454, and Trebizond in the following year. Servia and 
Bosnia were completely reduced into Turkish provinces. The last 
Bosnian King and his sons surrendered to Mahomet on a capitu¬ 
lation which guaranteed their lives, and which the Sultan swore 
to observe. Mahomet obtained a decision from the Mufti Ali- 
Bestami, which declared that the Sultan’s treaty and oath were not 
binding on him, as being made with unbelievers, and that he was 
at liberty to put his prisoners to death. The Mufti begged as a 
favour that he might carry his own opinion into effect by acting as 
executioner. The captive Bosnian King was ordered into the 
Sultan’s presence, and came with the treaty of capitulation in his 
hand. The Mufti exclaimed, “ It is a good deed to slay such in¬ 
fidels,” and cut the King down with his own sabre. The princes 
were put to death in the interior of the tent. The elder and 
better spirited of the Ottomans, who witnessed this treacherous 
murder, must have thought with shame how completely Maho¬ 
metan and Christian had changed characters since the days of 
Amurath and of Cardinal Julian. 

In Albania, Scanderbeg held out gallantly against the power of 
the Sultan, who, in 1461, was even forced to accede to a tempo¬ 
rary treaty which acknowledged Scanderbeg as Lord cf Albania 
and Epirus. Hostilities were soon renewed, and the Turks gradu¬ 
ally gained ground by the lavish sacrifice of life and treasure, and 
by the continued pressure of superior numbers. But the break¬ 
water which Scanderbeg long formed against the flood of Maho¬ 
metan conquest, and the glorious resistance which Hunyades 
accomplished at Belgrade, were invaluable to Western Christendom. 
They delayed for many years the cherished projects of Mahomet 
against Italy; and the victory of Hunyades barred the principal 
path into the German states. It was in 1456 that the Sultan 
besieged Belgrade, then regarded as the key of Hungary. Hun¬ 
yades exerted in its defence all the fiery valour that had marked 
him from his youth up, and the skill and caution which he had 
acquired during maturer years. He was powerfully aided by the 
bands of Crusaders, whom the efforts of Pope Calixtus II., and the 
celebrated preacher, St. John Capistran, brought to his assistance. 
The tidings of the fall of Constantinople had filled Western Christen¬ 
dom with shame, indignation, and alarm. Formal vows of warfare 
for the rescue of the fallen city from the Infidel were made by many 
of the chief princes, but evaporated in idle pageants and unexecuted 
decrees. But when another great Christian city was assailed, and 
when it was evident that, if Belgrade fell, V ienna, and other Western 
capitals would soon be in jeopardy, religious zeal and patriotic caution 


89 


MAHOMET II. A.D. 1451- 14S1. 

were for a time active; and a large and efficient auxiliary force was 
led by Cap's bran in person to fight under the banner of Hunyades. 
Mahomet had been made over-confident by his success at Constanti¬ 
nople, and boasted that Belgrade would be an easy prize. His 
powerful artillery soon shattered the walls; and in a general assault 
on the 21st July, 1456, the Janissaries carried the trenches, and 
forced their way into the lower part of the town. But the Christians 
at Belgrade were numerous, were brave, and ably commanded. 
Capistran rallied the garrison ; the Turks were repulsed from the 
upper town ; and after six hours’ hard fighting they were driven 
out of the portion which they had occupied. At this critical 
moment the martial saint, with the discernment of a great 
general, and the fiery energy of a devotee, sallied with a thou¬ 
sand Crusaders upon the enemy’s batteries. Calling on the name 
of Jesus, while their panic-stricken enemies fled with cries of 
“ Allah,” the Christians fought their way into the Ottoman camp, 
and captured the whole of the besiegers’ artillery. Mahomet, in¬ 
dignant at the flight of his troops, strove in vain to stem the tide, 
and fought desperately in person against the advancing foes. 
With a blow of his sabre he struck off the head of one of the 
leading Crusaders, but received at the same instant a wound in the 
thigh, and was obliged to be carried off by his attendants. Furious 
at his defeat and disgrace, he saw, as they bore him away, Hassan, 
the general of the Janissaries, and overwhelmed him with re¬ 
proaches and threats. Hassan replied that many of his men 
were slain, and that the rest would no longer obey the word of 
command. He then, before his sovereign’s eyes, threw himself 
among the advancing Hungarians, and met a soldier’s death. The 
Sultan’s horseguards checked the further pursuit of the Christians, 
and secured the retreat of their wounded master. But three 
hundred cannons, and the whole of the Turkish military stores, 
were captured ; and 25,000 of Mahomet’s best troops had fallen. 
Hunyades did not long survive this crowning triumph of his gal¬ 
lant though chequered career. He died at Belgrade twenty days 
after the flight of Mahomet from before the walls ; and the other 
hero of the defence, to whom even more than to Hunyades the 
Christian victory was due, died also in the October following. 
John Capistran was canonised by the Pope; and there are few 
saints in the long Romish calendar whose names Christendom has 
worthier cause to venerate. 

In Asia Mahomet’s arms were more uniformly successful. He 
conquered and annexed to his empire Sinope and Trebizoncl, and 
he finally subdued the princes of Caramania, those long and ran- 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


90 

corous enemies of the House of Othman. The most important of 
all his conquests, after that of Constantinople, was the subjugation 
of the Crimea in 1475, by one of the most celebrated of the 
Turkish captains, Ahmed, surnamed Kediik, or Broken-mouth, 
who was Mahomet’s Grand Vizier from 1473 to 1477. The im¬ 
mediate causes of the expedition to the Crimea were the Sultan’s 
hostility with the Genoese, who possessed the strong city of Kaffa 
in that country, and the entreaties which the deposed Khan of the 
Crim Tartars addressed to Mahomet for aid against his revolted 
brothers. But it cannot be doubted that a prince of Mahomet’s 
genius discerned the immense value of the Crimea to the occupiers 
of Constantinople, and the necessity of securing his dominions by 
its annexation. Ahmed Kediik attacked Kaffa with a powerful 
fleet, and an army of 40,000 men. That city, then called Little 
Constantinople from its wealth and strength, surrendered in four 
days. The booty which the conqueror seized there was immense ; 
40,000 of the inhabitants were transplanted to Constantinople; 
and 1500 young Genoese nobles were compelled to enter into the 
corps of Janissaries. The whole of the Peninsula was speedily 
occupied by the Turkish troops; and the Crimean Khans wero 
thenceforth for three centuries the vassals of the Ottoman Sultans. 

Mahomet was frequently engaged in hostilities with the Vene¬ 
tians as well as with the Genoese. The Archipelago and the 
coasts of Greece were generally the scenes of these wars; in the 
course of which the Sultan obtained possession of Euboea, Lesbos, 
Lemnos, Cephalonia, and other islands. The conquest of the 
Euboea was marked by base treachery and cruelty on the part of 
the Sultan, and signalised by the pure courage of a Christian 
heroine. The Venetian commander, Paul Erizzo, after a long and 
brave defence, surrendered the citadel on condition of the Sultan 
pledging his word for the safety of all within it. Mahomet signed 
the capitulation; and when the garrison had marched out, and 
laid down their arms, he put all of them, except the Greeks, to 
death with the cruellest tortures. Paul Erizzo was sawn in two 
by his orders. The daughter of the Venetian general, the young 
and fair Anne Erizzo, was dragged to the Sultan’s tent: but the 
Christian maiden preferred death to dishonour; and, unmoved by 
either promise or threat, she was killed by the slaves of the angry 
tyrant. 

Towards the end of Mahomet’s reign, Scanderbeg was completely 
overpowered by the Ottoman forces; and Albania and the district 
of Herzegovinia were united with the Sultan’s dominions. These 
conquests brought the Turkish arms into more extensive contact 


MAHOMET //. A.D. 1451 - 1481 . 91 

with the possessions of Venice along the eastern coasts of the 
Adriatic. In 1477, a powerful Turkish army marched into the 
territory of Friuli at the northern extremity cf that sea, and 
menaced Venice itself. The Venetians formed fortified camps at 
Gradina and Fogliania, and carried a line of entrenchments from 
the mouth of the Isonzo to Geerz. But the Turks in the October 
of that year passed their lines, and defeated their army. Omar 
Pacha, the Ottoman general, next passed the Tagliamento, a stream 
destined to become illustrious in after warfare. The Turkish 
troops spread themselves without resistance over all the rich level 
country as far as the banks of the Piave; and the trembling 
senators of Venice saw from their palace-roofs the northern horizon 
glow with the light of burning towns and villages. The Turks 
retired in November, loaded with booty. Venice eagerly con¬ 
cluded a treaty of peace with the Sultan, which (according to one 
Italian historian) contained a stipulation, by which the republic 
^vas to aid the Sultan, if attacked, with a fleet of 100 galleys, and 
the Sultan was, in case of like necessity, to send 100,000 Turkish 
cavalry against the enemies of Venice. 

The subjugation of Italy was a project which Mahomet, though 
often obliged to delay, had never abandoned. In 1480 he pre¬ 
pared to carry it into execution on a scale of military and naval 
preparation equal to the grandeur of the enterprise; and at the 
same time he resolved to quell the sole formidable enemy that yet 
remained near the heart of his dominions. The strong island of 
Rhodes was still in the possession of the Knights of St. John of 
Jerusalem, who had established themselves there in 1311, and 
gallantly maintained their sovereignty of the island as an inde¬ 
pendent power for upwards of a century and a half. Three rene¬ 
gades from the order had incited the Sultan to attack Rhodes, by 
giving him plans of its fortifications, and promising that it would 
be easily captured by forces 'which the Turks could employ 
against it. Mesih Pacha was sent to capture Rhodes in the April 
of 1480, with a fleet of 160 galleys, a powerful army, and a large 
park of the heaviest artillery. The Ottoman Pacha effected a 
landing on the island; and after capturing some inferior posts, he 
formed his lines of siege against the city itself, which is built on 
the northern extremity of the isle. The Grand Master of the 
Knights, Peter d’Aubusson, defended the city with indomitable 
fortitude and consummate skill; but it must have fallen, had it 
not been for the ill-timed avarice or military rigour of the Turkish 
commander. After a long siege and many severe encounters, the 
Turks made a general assault on the 28th July, 1480. Their 


92 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

artillery had opened a wide rent in the walls; their numbers 
were ample ; their zeal was never more conspicuous. In spite of 
the gallantry of the Christian knights, the attacking columns had 
gained the crest of the breach; and the Ottoman standard was 
actually planted on the walls, when Mesih Pacha ordered a pro¬ 
clamation to be made that pillage was forbidden, and that all the 
plunder of the place must be reserved for the Sultan. This 
announcement filled the Turkish army with disgust and disaffection. 
The soldiery yet outside the town refused to march in to support 
their comrades who had won the breach, and these were borne 
back and driven in disorder from the city by a last desperate 
charge of the chevaliers, who had marked the sudden wavering of 
their assailants. The siege was raised, and Rhodes rescued for 
half a century. 

On the same day that the Turks advanced to their unsuccessful 
assault on Rhodes, the leader of their other great expedition, Ahmed 
Kedfik, the conqueror of the Crimea, effected his disembarkation 
on the southern coast of Italy, where no Ottoman before him had 
placed his foot. He landed on the Apulian shore, and marched 
against Otranto, which was then considered the key of Italy. His 
fleet cast anchor in the roads; and the city was promptly and 
fiercely assailed both by sea and by land. The resistance of 
Otranto, though spirited, was brief. The place w r as stormed on 
the 11th August, 1480. Out of a population of 22,000, the 
greater number were massacred without mercy, and the wretched 
survivors subjected to the worst atrocities of Turkish warfare. 

Mahomet was now master of a strong city and harbour, which 
secured an entrance for his armies into Italy. His arms had met 
reverses at Rhodes when he was absent; but he resolved to con¬ 
duct the next enterprise in person. Early in the spring of 1481 
the horsetails were planted on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, 
as signals for a new campaign ; but no one, save the Sultan him¬ 
self, knew against which quarter the power of Turkey was now to 
be directed. His maxim was that secrecy in design and celerity 
in execution are the great elements of success in war. Once, when 
at the commencement of a campaign one of his chief officers asked 
him what were the main objects of his operations, Mahomet 
answered sharply, “If a hair of my beard knew them, I would 
pluck it out and cast it into the fire.” No one could tell what 
throne was menaced by the host that now gathered at the Sultan’s 
bidding; but while the musters were yet incomplete, the expedi¬ 
tion was arrested by the death of the Sultan, who expired suddenly 
in the midst of his army on the 3rd May, 1481. 


TURKISH GOVERNMENT. 


93 


CHAPTER VI. 

INSTITUTES OF MAIIOMET II.—TURKISH GOVERNMENT—ARMIES— 
TENURES OF LAND—INSTITUTIONS—EDUCATION—THE ULEMA— 
THE RAYAS—SLAVERY—RENEGADES—TURKISH CHARACTER— 
TURKISH WARFARE . 1 

The personal character of Mahomet II. has been already discussed; 
nor would we willingly turn again to a repulsive subject. What 
he accomplished as a conqueror for the advancement of the Otto¬ 
man power has been made apparent in the narrative of his reign, 
but it would be injustice to pass over his political institutions; 
and we may conveniently take this occasion of surveying generally 
the internal organisation of the Turkish Empire. 

From the time when Othman first killed his uncle in full council 
for contradicting his schemes, to the self-imposed limitations of the 
Sultans during the last few years, there is no trace in Turkish his¬ 
tory of any civil constitutional restraint upon the will of the ruling 
sovereign. There is indeed a popular tradition among the Turks 
that the Sultan has a right to put to death seven men, and no 
more, in each day without any cause, save that it is his pleasure 
so to do. 2 But even the limitation of arbitrary homicide which 
this tradition imports, has never been real; and abundant instances 
may be found in the reigns of Selim I., of Amurath IV., Ma¬ 
homet IV., and of Mahomet the Conqueror himself, where far 
greater numbers have been sacrificed without form of trial, at the 

1 See Von Hammer, books 18, 84, and Supplement; D’Ohsson, “Tableau 
General de l’Empire Ottoman Thornton ; Urquhart’s “ Turkey and her 
Resources ;” and Ubicini, “ Lettres sur la Turquie.” 

2 See Von Hammer, book 53, ad. tin. In Thornton, “Account of the 
Turkish Empire” (p. 69), the number that the Sultan is privileged to slay 
is fifteen. Rycaut (cited by Thornton), in his “State of the Ottoman 
Empire,” written at the close of the 17th century, says: “The Grand 
Signior can never be deposed or made accountable to any for his crimes, 
while he destroys causelessly of his subjects under the number of a thou¬ 
sand a day.” The same writer states that death by the Sultan’s hand, or 
by his order, was, if submitted to without resistance or murmur, considered 
to give a title to eternal felicity. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


94 

royal command. The title of “ Hunkiar,” the “ Manslayer,” is (or 
till lately has been) one most commonly used by the subjects of 
the Sultan in speaking of their sovereign, not as conveying any 
censure or imputation of tyranny, but in simple acknowledgment 
of his absolute power of life or death. Only the person of the 
mufti, the chief of the men of law, has been supposed to be in¬ 
violable ; an exception doubtful even in theory, and unimportant 
in practice, as the Sultan could depose a refractory mufti whenever 
he pleased, and the inviolability of the individual must cease with 
the loss of office. The sovereign’s power is absolute over property 
as well as over person; but the Sultans have ever refrained from 
seizing property that has been consecrated to pious uses. Such an 
act would have been regarded as sacrilegious by zealous Mahome¬ 
tans, and have been probably followed by an insurrection. Nor, 
in practice, has private property suffered in Turkey from royal 
rapacity, except in the case of officers in the service of the govern¬ 
ment, whose wealth has always been subject to confiscation. All 
honours, commands, and dignities have been in the Sultan’s abso¬ 
lute disposal to give or to take away as he pleases; and all his 
Mahometan subjects are equal before him, none having any privi¬ 
lege of birth, either from family or from place of nativity, one over 
the other. 

But though free from the barriers of civil law, and unchecked 
by the existence of any privileged aristocracy, no Turkish Sultan 
could openly disregard with impunity the obligations and restraints 
of the religious law of the Mahometans. He combines legislative 
with executive power; but his khatti-cherifs, or imperial edicts, 
are regarded as subordinate to the three primary sources of law, 
which are, the Koran itself the written word of God, the Sounna 
or traditional sayings of the Prophet, and the sentences or de¬ 
cisions of the four first great Imams, or Patriarchs, of the Maho¬ 
metan religion. The edicts of princes are called Ourfi, which 
means supplemental. The collection of the edicts, which successive 
Sultans pronounce on each ecclesiastical or temporal emergency 
not provided for in the first three sources of Mahometan law, is 
called Kanounnam6 (the book or the code of canons) from the 
Greek word Kanon, which has been applied by the Turkish jurists 
to political as well as to ecclesiastical legislation. 

By ancient and long-continued custom, the Sultan, before the 
execution of any important political act, obtains its sanction by a 
solemn declaration, or Fetva, of the chief mufti in its favour. 
Instances occur in Turkish history, where the refusal of the mufti 
has caused the sovereign to abandon his project; and some writers 


TURKISH GOVERNMENT. 


95 

have represented this officer as exercising an effective constitutional 
check on the royal prerogative, and possessing a veto like that of 
the old Boman tribunes, or the Polish nobles. But the fact of the 
mufti being removable from office at the royal will (like our judges 
betore 1714) shows how erroneous are such theories. 1 When a 
resolute and not unpopular Sultan is on the throne, the mufti is a 
mere passive instrument in his hands ; though sagacious rulers in 
Turkey, as elsewhere, have understood the policy of sometimes 
showing a seeming deference to judicial rebuke; and the deep de¬ 
votion of most of the Sultans to their religion must have made 
them to some extent really value the solemn opinions of the 
highest interpreters of their law, which is based upon their religion. 
When indeed the reigning sovereign is feeble and unsuccessful, the 
opposition of the mufti, seconded by “ the hoarse voice of insur¬ 
rection” round the palace walls, may be truly formidable; and his 
declaration that the Sultan is a breaker of the divine law, a 
tyrant, and unfit to govern, forms a sentence of deposition which 
popular violence has often carried into effect. 

In truth, with a martial and high-spirited people, earnestly 
attached to the national religion, and keenly sensitive as to their 
national honour, such as the Ottoman Turks have ever been, the 
worst practices of despotic sovereignty are, and ever must be, 
curbed by the practice of armed resistance and popular vengeance. 
As we proceed in this history, we shall often see the heads of 
the sovereigns’ ministers fall at the people’s bidding, and we shall 
become familiar with scenes of dethronement and regicide. These 
wild and terrible remedies of the evils of absolute monarchy have 
often in Turkey, as elsewhere, been cruelly misapplied. They 
have often degenerated into mere military mutinies, or into the 
sordid and anarchical riotings of a city rabble. But they have pre¬ 
served the Ottoman race from utter prostration; and they are less 
odious than the series of domestic and oligarchical assassinations, 
by which despotism has been tempered in the rival empire of the 
Czar. 

The implicit and religious loyalty of the Ottoman nation to the 
House of Othman (however rouglily they may have dealt with 
individual members of it) has been uniform and undiminished. 
It is from that family alone that the Padishah (the Emperor), the 
Zil-Ullah (the shadow of God as the Sultan is styled), can be 
supplied. Governors of provinces have frequently revolted against 
the sovereign authority. They have made themselves locally in- 

1 See Thornton, p. 94, and note. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


96 

dependent, and carried on wars on their own account, even against 
the sovereign himself. But they have- always professed titular 
allegiance to the royal house; nor has any adventurous seraskier 
or pacha ever attempted to seat a new dynasty on the throne of 
Constantinople. The certain continuity with which Sultans of the 
race of Othman, in lineal male descent from their great founder, 
have for four centuries held that throne, offers a marked contrast 
to the rapid vicissitudes with which imperial families rose and fell 
during the ages of the Greek Empire. Nor can the annals of any 
of the royal houses of Western Christendom show us, like the 
Turkish, an unbroken succession of thirty sovereigns, without the 
sceptre ever lapsing to the spindle, and without the accession of a 
collateral branch. 

The will of the Sultan has been, from the earliest period of 
Turkish history, to the reign of Abdul Medjid, the mainspring of 
the Ottoman Government; and in demonstrating its plenary im¬ 
portance, we have been led far beyond the times of the conqueror 
of Constantinople. In continuing our examination of the Turkish 
institutions as organised by the legislation of that prince, there 
will be less need to deviate from chronological regularity. 

The figurative language of the institutes of Mahomet II., still 
employed by his successors, describes the state under the martial 
metaphor of a tent. 1 The Lofty Gate of the Royal Tent (where 
Oriental rulers of old sate to administer justice) denotes the chief 
seat of government. The Italian translation of the phrase, “ La 
Porta Sublima,” has been adopted by Western nations with slight 
modifications to suit their respective languages ; and by “ The 
Sublime Porte ” we commonly mean the Imperial Ottoman Govern¬ 
ment. The Turkish legists and historians depict the details of 
their government by imagery drawn from the same metaphor of 
a royal tent. The dome of the state is supported by four pillars. 
These are formed by, 1st, the Viziers; 2nd, the Kacliaskers 
(judges); 3rd, the Defterclars (treasurers); and 4th, the Nis- 
chandyis (the secretaries of state). Besides these, there are the 
Outer Agas, that is to say, the military rulers; and the Inner Agas, 
that is to say, the rulers employed in the court. There is also the 
order of the Ulema, or men learned in the law. 

The Viziers 2 were regarded as constituting the most important 
pillar that upheld the fabric of the state. In Mahomet II.’s time 
the Viziers were four in number. Their chief, the Grand Vizier, 

1 See Othman’s dream, pp. 6, 7, siqira, 

2 See p. 12, supra. 


TURKISH GOVERNMENT . 


97 

is the highest of all officers, both of the dignitaries of the sword 
and of the pen. The legal order supplied the second pillar of the 
state. The chiefs of the legal order were, in the time of Ma¬ 
homet II., the two Kadiaskers, who respectively presided over the 
judicial establishments of Europe and Asia. The other high legal 
dignitaries (who were at that time next in rank to the Kadiaskers) 
were, 1st, the Kho-dya, who was the tutor of the Sultan and the 
Princes Royal; 2nd, the Mufti, the authoritative expounder of 
the law; and, 3rdly, the Judge of Constantinople. As has been 
mentioned, the third and fourth state pillars consisted of the 
officers of the Exchequer, who were called Defterdars, and of the 
secretaries, who were termed Nis-chandyis. 

The great council of state was named the Divan ; and, in the 
absence of the Sultan, the Grand Vizier was its president. The 
other Viziers and the Kadiaskers took their stations on his right; 
the Defterdars and the Nis-chandyis on his left. The Teskeredyis 
(Or officers charged to present reports on the condition of each 
department of the state) stood in front of the Grand Vizier. 
The Divan was also attended by the Reis-Effendi, a general 
secretary, whose power afterwards became more important than 
that of the Nis-chandyis; by the Grand Chamberlain, and the 
Grand Marshal, and a train of other officers of the court. The 
Grand Vizier had the power of convoking a special divan at his 
own palace when he judged it necessary; and to him was intrusted 
the custody of the imperial seal. 

Resides the military Agas, who were very numerous, many 
officers in the civil departments held the rank of Aga, which means 
ruler. The administration of the provinces was in the time of 
Mahomet II. principally intrusted to the Beys and Beylerbeys. 
These were the natural chiefs of the class of feudatories, whom 
their tenure of office obliged to serve on horseback in time of war. 
They mustered under the Sanjak, the banner of the chief of 
their district, and the districts themselves were thence called 
Sanjaks, and their rulers Sanjak-beys. The title of Pacha, so 
familiar to us when speaking of a Turkish provincial ruler, is not 
strictly a term implying territorial jurisdiction, or even military 
authority. It is a title of honour, meaning literally the Shah’s or 
Sovereign’s foot, and implying that the person to whom that title 
was given was one whom the sovereign employed. The classical 
reader will remember that among the ancient Persians the King’s 
officers were called the King’s eyes and the King’s hands. 1 The 

1 Xenophon, Cyrop., lib. viii. c. 2; see also Aristoph. Acharn.. 234. 

7 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


9 S 

title of Pacha was not at first applied among the Ottomans exclu¬ 
sively to those officers who commanded armies, or ruled provinces 
or cities. Of the five first Pachas, that are mentioned by Ottoman 
writers, three were literary men. 1 By degrees this honorary title 
was appropriated to those whom the Sultan employed in war, and 
set over districts and important towns; so that the word “Pacha” 
became almost synonymous with the word governor. The title 
“ Padischah,” which the Sultan himself bears, and which the 
Turkish diplomatists have been very jealous in allowing to Christian 
sovereigns, is an entirely different word, and means the great, the 
imperial Schah or Sovereign. 2 

In the time of Mahomet II. the Ottoman Empire contained in 
Europe alone thirty-six Sanjaks or banners, round each of which 
assembled about 400 cavaliers. The entire military horse and 
foot of the empire in both continents was more than 100,000, 
without reckoning the irregular bands of the Akindji and Azabs. 
The ordinary revenues of the state amounted to more than 
2,000,000 ducats. 

The Janissaries were still the main strength of the Turkish 
armies. Mahomet increased their number, yet he had never more 
than 12,000 under arms. But when we remember to how great 
a degree the other nations of that age relied on their cavalry, and 
neglected the composition and equipment of their infantry, we can 
well understand the advantage which the presence of a chosen 
body of perfectly trained foot soldiers in the Turkish armies must 
have given them in pitched battles, and still more in sieges and 
other elaborate operations of warfare. The English and the 
Swiss were the only two Christian nations of that period which 
sent into the field a well-armed infantry, not raised from the mere 
rabble, but from the valuable classes of the population ; and the 
Turkish sabre never clashed with the English bills and bows, or 
with the heavy halberds of Helvetia. 

The pay and the privileges of the Janissaries were largely 

1 See Von Hammer, vol. i. p. 141. 

2 “ Le titre de Padicliah, clu persan pad (protecteur) et chah (roi), est le 
titre exclusif des souverains Ottomans en Orient. Fram^ois ler fut le premier 
et longtemps le seul monarque chretien qui fut qualitie de padicliah par les 
Turcs. . L’Empereur d’AUemagDe n’avait a la Porte que le titre de Aemtchd 
tchacari (Cesar d’Allemagne); les czars de Kussie, celui de Mosgovtchari et 
ensuite de Rouciatchari. Ce ne fut qu’en 1774, dans le traite de Kainardji, 
que rimperatrice Catherine II. obtint Tacldition a son titre des mots ve 
jiadichahi, En decembre 1S05, Napoleon fut reconnu avec la double qualite 
de Imperathor v6 padichah. Depuis, le titre de Padichah a ete etenciu a la 
plupart des souverains de l’Europe, allies de la Porte.”—Ubicini, vol. i. p! o4. 


TURKISH ARMIES . 


99 

augmented by the conqueror of Constantinople: and, as the 
Turkish power was extended in Europe, care was taken to recruit 
that chosen corps from children who were natives of that conti¬ 
nent rather than among the Asiatics. The levies for that purpose 
were generally made in Albania, Bosnia, and Bulgaria. It is said 
that there was seldom need to employ force in collecting the 
requisite number of suitable children, and that the parents were 
eager to obtain the enrolment of their boys in the list of Janissary 
recruits. 1 This, if true, is rather a proof of the moral depravity 
of the Christian population, which the Ottomans subdued, than of 
any mildness of the Ottomans in enforcing the institutions of 
Khalil Tchendereli. It is also stated that no compulsion was used 
to induce the young recruits to leave the Christian and adopt the 
Mahometan faith : but this was a mere pretext of forbearance; as, 
from the early age at which the children were selected, it would 
be absurd to suppose that they were free agents in following the 
new religious rites, and repeating the new prayers, which were 
taught them as soon as they entered the training schools of the 
Janissaries. It is certain that the compulsory enrolment and 
conversion of youths taken in war was often practised ; as in the 
instance of the young Genoese nobles, who became the captives 
of Mahomet at the conquest of Kaffa. 

The attention which the Ottomans paid to their artillery, and 
to the adoption of every improvement in military engineering, 
must have been another great cause of their superiority to the 
nations, whose brave but tumultuous and ill-provided armies they 
encountered. Nor is the care, which their Sultans and Pachas 
bestowed upon what in modern military language would be termed 
the ordnance and commissariat departments, less remarkable. The 
Greek Chalcondylas, the contemporary of Amurath II., in his ac¬ 
count of the Ottoman armies, after describing their number, the 
excellence of their organisation, and the strictness of their disci¬ 
pline, mentions the corps that were especially employed in keep¬ 
ing the roads on the line of march in available condition; he 
speaks of the abundant supply of provisions that was always to 
be found in their well-arranged and symmetrical camps; and he 
notices the large number of beasts of burden which always accom¬ 
panied a Turkish army, and the employment of a special corps to 
ensure the proper transport of provisions and military stores. 
There was certainly no state of Christendom during the fifteenth 

1 D’Olisson, Constitution et Administration de 1 Empire Ottoman, 

vol. viii, . 

2 Lib. v. p. 122, cited by Von Hammer in book v. 

> , > 

, ) ) 

) ) 
i > > 


7-2 


100 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


or sixteenth century, which cared for the well-being of its soldiers, 
on such seemingly generous but truly economical principles. The 
campaigns of Mahomet himself, especially that against Constanti¬ 
nople, and those of his grandson Sultan Selim, furnish many 
instances of the enlightened liberality and forethought, with 
which the mediaeval Turks provided their soldiery with those 
material instruments and adjuncts of warfare, the importance 
of which, in order to enable an army “ to go anywhere and do 
anything,” our own great captain of the present age has so fully 
taught us. 

In examining the political and military institutions of the 
Ottomans, we have been repeatedly led to notice the Ziamets and 
Timars, the lands granted to individual subjects of the Sultan on 
condition of military service. The phraseology of the feudalism 
of mediaeval Christendom has generally been adopted by writers 
who have treated of these parts of the Turkish system; and the 
real resemblance between these institutions of the East and of the 
West is in many respects so remarkable, that the historical in¬ 
quirer may at first feel surprised at feudalism failing to produce in 
Turkey those important effects on the progress of civilisation 1 and 
constitutional development, which he knows to have been wrought 
by it in the west and centre of Christian Europe. The problem 
offered by this variance between the results of apparently like 
causes, is complicated and difficult. It cannot be dealt with so 
fully in these pages as it deserves ; but even the partial investiga¬ 
tion of it, which can be undertaken here, may be of service to¬ 
wards acquiring a clearer discernment of many important points 
in the Turkish laws and usages, and in the national character of 
the Turks themselves. The tenures of land in Turkey will first 
require consideration. 2 

When the Ottomans conquered a country, the territory was 
divided into three portions. Part became ecclesiastical property, 
and was devoted to pious and charitable purposes, to the main¬ 
tenance of the mosques, the public schools, the hospitals, and 
other institutions of a similar character. The lands appropriated 
to these purposes were called Yaks or Vakoufs. A second part 
became full private property, resembling the allodial lands in 
mediaeval Christendom. This property was subject to different 
liabilities, according to the creed of its owner. If held by a 

1 See Guizot’s “Lectures on European Civilisation.” 

2 The account in the text of the Turkish tenures is taken almost entirely 
from Ubicini, vol. i. p, 263, et seq. 


TURKISH TENURES OF LAND, 


ICI 

Mussulman, it was called Aschriie, that is to say, tithable, and 
the holder was obliged to pay a tithe of its produce to the state. 
This was the only burden attached to it. If left in the possession 
of a Christian, its holder paid tribute (kharadj) to the state, which 
consisted of a capitation tax, and also of a tax levied on the estate, 
which was sometimes a fixed sum according to its extent, and was 
sometimes an impost on its proceeds varying from an eighth to 
one half. The remaining part of the conquered country became 
domain-land, including, 1st, those of which the revenues were appro¬ 
priated to the state treasury or miri; 2nd, unoccupied and waste 
lands (of which the amount is large in Turkey); 3rd, the private 
domain of the Sultan; 4th, escheated and forfeited lands; 5th, 
the appanages of the Sultan’s mother, and other members of the 
blood royal; 6th, lands assigned to the offices filled by Viziers; 
7th, lands assigned to Pachas of the second rank; 8th, lands as¬ 
signed to the ministers and officers of the palace; and, 9th, the 
military fiefs, the Ziamets and Timars. These last formed the 
largest class of the domain-lands, and are the objects of most 
interest to the student of comparative history. 

The smallest fief or portion of conquered land granted out to a 
distinguished soldier was called a Timar, and generally contained 
from three to five hundred acres. 1 Each fief was to furnish in 
time of war an armed horseman for each 3000 aspres of its 
revenue ; like the knight’s fee, which was the integer of our own 
feudal array. The larger fiefs or Ziamets comprehended upwards 
of five hundred acres ; 2 and there was a still higher class of fiefs, 
called Beyliks or lordships. The general name for the holders of 
military fiefs was Spahi, a Cavalier, a title which exactly answers 
to those which we find in the feudal countries of Christian 
Europe. The Ziamets and Timars appear to have been generally 
hereditary in the male line. When any became vacant by failure 
of heirs or by forfeiture for misconduct, the Beylerbey of the dis¬ 
trict filled up the vacancy, his nomination being subject to 
approval by the Porte. 3 The higher rank of Bey, and the still 
higher rank of Beylerbey, were not at first hereditary, but were 
conferred by the Sultan on individuals selected by him. It was, 
however, usual to let the rank and estate of a Bey pass from 
father to son, and in later times the custom of hereditary descent 
grew often into a right; there being a considerable difference in 
tins respect among the various provinces of the empire. 

* Thornton’s “Turkey,” 164. 

s Ibid. 

8 Iteport pi'esented to Sultan Ahmed III., cited by Ubicini, vol. i. p. 549. 


102 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

We seem to have here before us the essential elements of 
feudalism; and we might naturally expect to find a feudal aristo¬ 
cracy developing itself in Turkey, and aggrandising itself, as in 
mediaeval Christendom, at the expense both of the monarchy and 
commonalty. We shall, in fact, find such an aristocracy growing 
up in the Ottoman Empire ; but not until we come to the recent 
century and a half of decline and corruption, which preceded the 
reforms of Sultan Mahmoud II. and of the late Sultan Abdul 
Medjid. Such an aristocracy did not exist during the ages of 
Ottoman progress and splendour. The causes of its non-existence 
during that period are, I believe, to be principally found, 1st, in 
the high personal energies and abilities of the Sultans, under 
whom the Turkish conquests were effected, and the Turkish Em¬ 
pire consolidated; 2ndly, in the existence of the Janissary force; 
3rdly, in the effects of the religion of the Turks, both in elevating 
the authority of the sovereign, and in maintaining a feeling of 
equality among all his Mahometan subjects ; 1 and, 4thly, in the 
absence of that habitual aptitude for public assemblies, which is 
the characteristic of nations that contain a considerable element of 
Germanic or Scandinavian race. 

It is to be remembered that the feudal system of mediaeval 
Europe was principally fashioned and matured during the reign 
of feeble and unsuccessful princes, who were engaged in repeated 
and calamitous contests not only with barbarous invaders and 
domestic temporal rebels, but with the bishops and the Popes of 
their church. But let us suppose a succession of princes, such 
as Charlemagne and his father, to have continued among the 
Pranks, and we shall readily understand that the haughty peers 
and insubordinate noblesse of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, 
with their rights of private warfare, of subinfeudation, and terri¬ 
torial jurisdiction, would never have arisen in Prance. We shall 
still more fully realise to our minds the difference; if we suppose 
the Frankish sovereigns to have been, like the Turkish Sultans, 
the heads both of the church and state, and to have combined in 
their own persons the claims of both Pope and Emperor. And if 
we look to the history of our own country, we shall clearly see 
that a feudal system of baronial reforms, as well as of baronial ag¬ 
grandisements, never could have grown up under successive rulers 
of the stamp of our Henry VIII. 

^ The fact is indisputable (to whatever cause we assign it), that 
the Ottoman Empire employed the military spirit of feudalism for 


1 See Ubicini, vol. i. p. 512-516 ; and pp. 62-69. 


TURKISH INSTITUTIONS . 


103 

national defence and for conquest; but kept clear (during its 
flourishing ages) of the social and political influences both for 
good and for bad, which feudalism produced in the west of 
Europe. No feudal nobility existed among the Turks until the 
period of the decline of the empire, when the Dereh Beys, or 
lords of the valleys, as the mutinous feudatories termed them¬ 
selves, made themselves hereditary chiefs; and, fortified in their 
strongholds and surrounded by their armed vassals, defied their 
sovereign, and oppressed their dependents. But except this 
period (which the new reforms have terminated), the Ottomans 
have never had a nobility or noblesse, or a caste or class of any 
kind, that was privileged by reason of birth. All the Mahometan 
subjects of the Sultan (who are not in a state of domestic slavery) 
are on a level beneath him. Equality in the eye of the law 
among the Turks themselves is a social fact, as well as a legal 
theory . 1 Neither law nor popular opinion ever recognised in 
Turkey any superior claim of one part of the nation to the enjoy¬ 
ment of civil or military offices, such as the noblesse of France 
possessed over the roturiers. No surprise or indignation was ever 
felt if the Sultan elevated the poorest Osmanli from the toils of 
a common artisan or labourer to the highest dignity; and, on the 
other hand, the deposed Vizier or Seraskier descends to an in¬ 
ferior employment, or into the mass of the Moslem population, 
without loss of caste, or any change in his future civil rights and 
capabilities. With a few exceptions (such as that of the remark¬ 
able House of the Kiuprilis), family names are unknown in 
Turkey. There could not be a stronger proof of the entire 
absence of aristocracy from her institutions. 

There is another element of European civilisation, the analogue 
of which appears among the Ottomans. This is the municipal, or 
the principle of local self-government in local matters. Each trade 
or craft has its guild (esnaf ) 2 and every village has its munici¬ 
pality. The inhabitants choose their own elders or head-men, who 
assess and collect the amount of public contributions imposed upon 
the community, manage the municipal funds, which are in some 
cases considerable, act as arbitrators in minor disputes, attest 
important contracts, and are the customary organs of remonstrance 
against official oppression. This excellent system is not confined 
to the Ottomans themselves, but it flourishes among the Greeks, 
the Armenians, and the Christian Bulgarians under their sway. 

1 See Ubicini, vol. i. p. 57. 

* Ibid. vol. i. p. 519. 


104 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

It is believed 1 that these nations acquired it from the Turkish 
conquest, and the boon may be thought to outbalance much of tho 
misery that has fallen upon the Rayas from the same quarter. 

The Ulema, the order of men learned in the law, has been men¬ 
tioned as supplying, according to the institutes of Mahomet II., 
one of the four pillars of the Turkish state. The predecessors of 
Mahomet II., especially Orkhan, had been zealous in the founda¬ 
tion of schools and colleges ; but Mahomet surpassed them all, and 
it was by him that the “ Chain of Ulema ” was organised, and 
the regular line of education and promotion for the legists and 
judges of the state was determined. The conqueror of Constanti¬ 
nople knew well that something beyond mere animal courage and 
military skill was requisite in order to maintain as well as to create 
a great empire. Eminent himself for learning and in the acquire¬ 
ments of general science, Mahomet provided liberally for the 
encouragement of learning and science among his people. He knew 
also well that to secure the due administration of justice it is 
necessary that the ministers of justice should be respected ; and 
that in order for them to be respected, it is necessary that they 
should not only have learning and integrity, but rank and honour 
in the state ; and that they should be raised above the temptations 
and anxieties of indigence. Mahomet established and endowed 
numerous public schools of the higher order, or colleges, called 
Medresses, in addition to the elementary schools, the Mektebs, 
that are to be found in every quarter of every town, and in almost 
every large village in Turkey . 2 The students at the Medresses 
went through ten regular courses of grammar, syntax, logic, meta¬ 
physics, philology, the science of tropes, the science of style, 
rhetoric, geometry, and astronomy. This is a curriculum which 
will certainly bear comparison with those of Paris and Oxford in 
the middle of the fifteenth century. The Turkish collegian, wdio 
had mastered these ten subjects, received the title of Danis-chmend 
(gifted with knowledge), and in that capacity, like the Western 
masters of arts, instructed the younger students. A Danis-chmend 
might claim the headship of one of the minor public schools, with¬ 
out further study; but in that case he renounced the prospect of 
becoming a member of the Ulema, and of all the higher educational 
appointments. To become a member of the Ulema, it v r as neces¬ 
sary to commence and complete an elaborate course of study of the 
law, to pass repeated examinations, and to take several successive 

1 See Mr. Urquhart’s work on “Turkey and its Resources, ” and Ubicini. 

2 Von Hammer, book xviii. ; Ubicini, vol. i. pp. 2C0, 201. 


THE TAYAS. 


105 


degrees. While care was thus taken to make the Ulema consist 
of men of the highest learning and abilities, great outward honour, 
liberal endowments, and many important privileges were conferred 
on those who attained that rank. The Ulema supplies all the 
professors in the high schools, who are called Muderris; and from 
this order also are chosen all the ministers of justice, including the 
Cadis, or judges of the smaller towns and rural districts; the 
Mollas, or judges of the principal cities; the Istambol Effendi, the 
judge and inspector-general over the city of Constantinople; the 
Cadiaskers, or supreme judges of Roumelia and Anatolia; and 
the Mufti, the importance of whose office has been already con¬ 
sidered . 1 It is to be carefully remembered that the Ulema is 
not an ecclesiastical body, except so far as law in Mahometan 
countries is based on the Koran. The actual ministers of public 
worship, such as the Imans, who pronounce the public prayers, the 
Scheiks or preachers, and others, form a very subordinate part of 
the Ulema. There is no country in which the clergy , 2 properly so 
called, have less authority than in Turkey, or where the legal pro- 
fession has more. It ought also to be recorded to the honour of 
the Ottomans, that more respect is shown among them than in 
any Christian nation to the schoolmaster, and to all who are 
eminent for possessing intellectual endowments themselves, or for 
their skill in guiding others to acquire them . 3 

Hitherto we have been examining the institutions of the Turkish 
Empire with reference chiefly to the dominant Mahometans. 
They are yet to be regarded with reference to the conquered but 
unconverted races, the Rayas, who have always formed the large 
majority of the population in European Turkey, and a very con¬ 
siderable proportion of the inhabitants of the Asiatic provinces. 
We must also consider the position of the slaves. 

The Koran, while it enjoins war against unbelievers, requires 
the Mahometan to spare the peoples of the Books (a term including 
the Christians and the Jews), on their submission to pay tribute. 
“ The bended head is not to be stricken offsuch is the maxim 
of the Turkish law. It was once asked of the Mufti, “ If eleven 
Mussulmans without just cause kill an infidel, who is a subject of 

1 See Von Hammer, book xviii. and Supplement; D’Ohsson, vol. iv. ; 
Ubicini, vol. i. pp. SI, 202 ; Thornton, p. 111. 

2 The influence exercised over the multitude by the fanatic dervishes, who 
are the monks and friars of Mahometanism, is quite unconnected with any 
state authority. See, on this subject, the fifth letter in Ubicini’s first 
volume. 

8 Ubicini and Von Hammer. 


io5 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

the Padischah and pays tribute, what is to be done 1” The judicial 
reply was, “ Though the Mussulmans should be a thousand and 
one, let them all die.” The Rayas (as the tributary Christians are 
called in Turkey) were entitled to protection for property as well 
as for person, and to the free exercise of their religion. 1 It is 
written in the Koran, “ My mission,” saith the prophet, “ is to 
combat the unbelievers until they say ‘ there is no God but God.’ 
When they have uttered these words, they have preserved their 
blood and their goods from all attack from me. Of their own 
belief, they must give account to God.” 2 The earliest capitulation 
between Mussulmans and Christians, being the capitulation granted 
by the Caliph Omar to the Christians of Jerusalem in 637, A.D., 
and the charter given by Mahomet II. to the Greeks of Constanti¬ 
nople, were alike framed in the spirit of this text. The Christian 
subjects of Mahometan power were bound to pay tribute; they 
were forbidden the use of arms and horses; they were required to 
wear a particular costume to distinguish them from the true 
believers, and to obey other social and political regulations, all 
tending to mark their inferior position. In Turkey, the terrible 
tribute of children was an additional impost on the Rayas. This 
last most cruel liability (which was discontinued two centuries 
ago) must be remembered ; and so must the sufferings and the 
shames caused by the horrible practices, which we have been com¬ 
pelled to notice, when speaking of the reign and character of 
Bajazet Yilderim. Otherwise, it is correctly said that the lot of 
the Christian subjects of the Ottomans was less severe than that 
of the Jews in the various states of mediaeval Christendom. During 
the later ages of corruption and anarchy in the Turkish Empire, 
the Rayas were unquestionably made the victims of numberless 
acts of lawless cruelty and brutal oppression; but these were the 
results of the decay of the Ottoman government, and not the 
effects of its institutions as ordained in the ages of its vigour. 3 

Domestic slavery has always existed among the Turks, as among 
other Oriental nations, but in a milder form, and with brighter 
hopes for those who undergo it, than the history of servitude 
among the various races and in the various ages of the world 
usually exhibits. 4 The Turkish law protects the slave from arbi¬ 
trary cruelty and brutal or excessive chastisement; and the general 

1 Thornton, p. 63 ; Ubicini, vol. ii. p. 17. 

2 See Ubicini, vol. ii. 

8 “ It is not the Turkish laws, but a corrupt administration of them, that 
brings opprobrium on the Empire.”—Sir James Porter. 

4 See Ubicini, voL i. pp. 153-159. 


TURKISH CHARACTER. 


107 


kindness of the Turkish character (when not excited by war or 
religious fanaticism), has been a still more effectual safeguard. 
The Koran inculcates the duty of treating a faithful servant -with 
generosity; and teaches that the man, who sets free his fellow- 
creature from slavery, does much to set himself free from the 
infirmities of human nature and from the torments of hell fire. 
The emancipated slave, if a true believer, becomes at once the 
equal in civil rights of all the other Mahometan subjects of the 
Sultan. Many of the ablest officers, both in war and in peace, of 
the Sublime Porte, have been originally slaves: and a wide field 
has thus ever been open to her rulers for choosing men of tried 
ability and devotion, for the highest and most confidential employ¬ 
ments. 

Another important source, whence the Ottoman ranks have been 
recruited, has been the long stream of voluntary deserters from the 
Cross. The Turkish court and camp, where no heed was taken of 
a man’s pedigree or birth-place, but where distinction, wealth, and 
power were open to all the bold and brave, who would profess 
the creed of the Prophet, presented irresistible attractions to 
many of the Rayas, and also to those strong and daring spirits 
from abroad, for whom, either through their own faults, or the 
fault of their fellow-countrymen, all similar careers in Christendom 
were closed. We may observe the working of this attraction even 
in the recent times of Turkish adversity. It was far more effective 
when the Crescent was the symbol of victory and conquest. If 
we look to the period when the Turkish power was at its height, 
the period of the reign of Solyman I. and Selim II., 1 we shall find 
that out of ten Grand Viziers of this epoch eight were rene¬ 
gades. Of the other high dignitaries of the Porte during the same 
period, we shall find that at least twelve of her best generals, and 
four of the most renowned admirals, were supplied to her by Chris¬ 
tian Croatia, Albania, Bosnia, Greece, Hungary, Calabria, and 
Russia. There was no fear of these apostates from the Christian 
faith ever halting in zeal for their new masters. Their sincerity as 
to their adopted creed might be doubtful, but not so their animosity 
against that faith which they had deserted ; and Christendom for 
ages supplied her foes with the ablest, the most unscrupulous, and 
the most deadly leaders against herself. 

All the circumstances of the settlement of the Turks in Europe 
tended to keep up in them the spirit of war and the capacity as 
well as the zeal for future victories. By enrolling the flower of 

1 See the list in Von Hammer, book xxxvi. 


io3 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS, 

the children of the subjugated European provinces as Janissaries, 
by the impost of tribute money, by the sale of captives, and 
the acquisition of other plunder, by parcelling out the conquered 
lands into fiefs, wherein the best soldiers of the victorious army 
were planted as military colonists—each conquest was made to 
supply the means for further conquests, and Turkish war grew 
by what it fed on. The Moslem occupants of the rich and 
beautiful lands east of the Adriatic felt their pride in their own 
prowess daily confirmed, and their fervour for the faith of the 
Prophet daily rekindled by the sight of the Christian Payas 
around them, on whom fell the chief burdens of taxation and 
manual toil, “ a weaponless herd, whose duty was obedience and 
subjection.” 1 

This long-continued position of unquestionable and unques¬ 
tioned superiority, “ with nothing to provoke the strong to need¬ 
less cruelty,” may have conduced to develop in the Turkish 
character that dignity of manner, that honourable self-respect, 
that truthfulness, honesty, and sense of justice, that gentleness 
and humanity even towards the brute creation, which the bitterest 
enemies of the Ottomans confess, and which is the theme of 
uniform admiration with foreigners who have been dwellers' in 
the Ottoman Empire. 2 Lying and theft are the vices of weakness; 
and a morbid fondness for practising petty tyranny over creatures 
weaker than themselves is the special sin of those who have been 
subject to oppression. But it would be eminently unjust to attri¬ 
bute the characteristic virtues of the Turks solely to the circum¬ 
stance of their having long been a conquering people settled 
among a subject population, though such a fact must have had its 

1 Ranke’s “ Servia,” p. 52. “ The Turks in the country—not only those 

of distinction, but others of lower rank who had gradually assembled 
around them—considered themselves the masters of the Raya. Not only 
did the Turks reserve for themselves the exercise of arms, but also the right 
of carrying on such trades as were in any way connected with war. Like 
our northern ancestors, or their own Oriental forefathers, amongst whom 
the son of a smith once founded a dynasty, many a Turk has been seen to 
turn back his silken sleeve, and shoe a horse : still he regarded himself as 
a kind of gentleman. Other occupations the Mussulmans left with contempt 
to Christian mechanics : for instance, no Turk would have condescended to 
be a furrier. Evei'ything that they thought suitable and becoming—beau¬ 
tiful arms, rich dresses, magnificent hoiises—they claimed exclusively for 
themselves”— Ibid. In Constantinople "and other large cities the propor¬ 
tionate number of Moslems engaged in trade and labour, and the variety of 
their occupations, was far greater than in the country. 

“ D’Ohsson, vol. iv. p. 25 ; Thornton, 2SS, n., citing Bush equina and 
other older writers. More modern evidence will be found in Ubicini, and 
the preface to Murray’s “Handbook.” 


TURKISH CHARACTER. 


109 

influence. Those virtues are found among the Ottoman Turks of 
Asia, where the number of Rayas is far less than westward of the 
Dardanelles, as well as among the sparse Moslems of European 
Turkey: nor have those virtues been found to decay with the 
declining fortunes of their empire. Much is due to the moral 
precepts of their creed, which ensures sobriety and cleanliness, as 
well as benevolence, integrity, and charity, among its true dis¬ 
ciples. But the Turks are also distinguished above other 
Mahometan nations for their high personal qualities, though 
these are alloyed with many evil traits, which, however, are to a 
great extent the peculiar vices of their men in power. Among 
no people are the injurious effects of court intrigue, and of eleva¬ 
tion to high authority and wealth upon individual character, so 
marked as among the Ottomans. Modern observers have been 
repeatedly struck by the metamorphosis of the high-minded and 
generous country gentleman of Anatolia or Roumelia, exemplary 
in all the relations of domestic life, into a sordid grasping tyrant 
and a selfish voluptuary of the worst description, when invested 
with the power and exposed to the temptations of a Pacha. And 
it must be confessed that the renegades from Christendom, of 
whom so large a portion of the Turkish officials has been com¬ 
posed, have generally set the worst example in all respects to the 
rulers of native origin. The ferocious cruelty, which has too 
often marked the Turks in warfare, and their ruthless fanaticism, 
when roused by the cry that their religion is in danger, are seem¬ 
ing contradictions to the general benevolence and gentleness of 
character, which have been ascribed to them as a people; but 
they are seeming contradictions only. The Turk is, in ordinary 
life, calm, mild, and indulgent, not because he is void of the 
fiercer passions, but because he is self-trained to control them. 
When the occasions come, on which it seems to him to be a duty 
to withdraw that strong curb of self-control, all those passions— 
Wrath, Revenge, and 

“ The blind wild beast of force, 

Whose home is in the sinews of a man,” 1 

ctir in him to strike, with a wild unchained delirium such as is 
unknown in bosoms, where no similar restraint has been practised. 
It is like what we often witness in private life, when the man, who 
habitually rules his temper the best, is, if it once gets the mastery 
of him, hurried into excesses, from which others, more frequently 
prone to anger, would have been able to stop short. 


1 Tennvson. 


no HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

The Sultan’s summons to war still meets a ready response from 
the inherent bravery of every Turk: and Europe has of late years 
justly admired the gallantry with which the Ottomans have risen 
to defend their land and their faith from almost overwhelming 
enemies, and amid every circumstance of difficulty and discourage¬ 
ment. If such is the martial spirit of the people, now that they 
advance to the campaign “ with no fear and little hope,” what 
must it have been in the olden time, when almost unvarying 
victory crowned their arms, and when honour and wealth were 
the prompt rewards of distinguished valour'? We may imagine 
the excitement and the exultation, which the announcement of a 
new war and the summons to a fresh enterprise, must have 
created throughout the Moslem world on either side of the Dar- 
danelles, from the Euphrates to the Danube, from the Crimea to 
the Peloponnesus, in the days of Mahomet the Conqueror, or 
Solyman the Magnificent. The feudal chivalry left their Ziamets 
and Timars, and mustered beneath the banner of the neighbouring 
Bey or Pacha, each vying with the other in the condition and mag¬ 
nificence of his horse and accoutrements, and in the display of 
his band of armed and mounted retainers. The Ziam, who 
signalised his prowess, might hope for elevation to the rank of 
Bey; and the Timariot, who brought in ten prisoners, or ten 
enemies’ heads, was entitled to have his minor fief enlarged into a 
Ziamet. 1 The Moslem, who did not yet possess either Ziamet or 
Timar, and was not enrolled in the regular paid troops, still served 
as a zealous volunteer on horse or foot according to his means ; 
and, besides the prospect of enriching himself by the plunder of 
the province that was to be invaded, or the city that was to be 
besieged, he looked forward to win by daring deeds performed 
among the Akindji or Azabs one of the Timars, that at the end of 
the war would be formed out of the newly-conquered territory, or 
which the casualties of the campaign would leave vacant. The 
regular troops, the Janissaries, and the royal horseguards, who 
fought immediately under the Sultan’s eye, and whose trade was 
war, were even more eager for the opportunities of booty and 
promotion. Above all, religious enthusiasm roused the Moslem 
of every class to share in the Holy War against the misbelievers. 
The Koran teaches, indeed, that war is in itself an evil, and pro¬ 
nounces that “ Man is the work of God. Cursed be he who dares 
to destroy God’s workmanship.” 2 But it teaches also that, when 
there is war between the true believers and the enemies of Islam* 

1 See the Report to Sultan Achmet III., already cited from Ubicini. 

2 D’Ohsson, vol. ii. 


TURKISH WARFARE. 


Ill 


it is the duty of every Mussulman to devote to such a war his 
property, his person, and his life. The Koran divides the world 
into two portions, the House of Islam, Dar-ul-Islam, and the 
House of War, Dar-ul-harb. 

It has generally been represented by Western writers on the 
institutes of Mahometanism, and on the habits of Mahometan 
nations, that the Dar-ul-harb , the House of War, comprises all 
lands of the misbelievers; so that there is, or ought to be, per¬ 
petual hostility on the part of the true believers against the 
dwellers in Dar-ul-harb, although actual warfare may be suspended 
by treaty. 1 

There is even a widely-spread idea among superficial talkers 
and writers that the holy hostility, the “ Jehad ” 2 of Mussulmans 
against non-Mussulmans is not limited to warfare between nation 
and nation ; but that “ it is a part of the religion of every Maho¬ 
metan to kill as many Christians as possible, and that by counting 
lip a certain number killed, they think themselves secure of 
heaven.” But careful historical investigators, and statesmen long 
practically conversant with Mahometan populations have exposed 
the fallacy of such charges against those who hold the creed of 
Islam. 3 

“ The craving of the Mahometans, as such, for Christian blood 
is purely a myth.” 4 Their Prophet was certainly a stern icono¬ 
clast, and taught the duty of unremitting warfare against idolaters. 
In the Koran he bids his disciples “ Fight on till there be no 
temptation to idolatry, and the religion becomes God’s alone.” 
But the Prophet also taught them with regard to Jews and Chris¬ 
tians, “ Dispute not except with gentleness; but say unto them, We 
believe in the revelation which has been sent down to us, and also 
in that which hath been sent down to you, and our God and your 
God are one.” 5 A country which is under Christian rulers, but in 
which Mahometans are allowed free profession of their faith, and 
peaceable exercise of their ritual, is not portion of the House of 
War, of the Dar-ul-harb ; and there is no religious duty of warfare, 
no “ Jehad,” on the part of true Mussulmans against such a state. 
This has been of late years formally determined by the chief 
authorities in Mahometan law with respect to British India, and 

1 See the introduction to Ubicini’s second volume, and D’Ohsson. 

2 Sometimes written “Dhihad.” 

3 See particularly Sir George Campbell’s “Handy Book on the Eastern 
Question,” and Bosworth Smith’s “ Mohammed and Mohammedanism.” 

4 Sir G. Campbell, p. 33. 

6 Bosworth Smith, p. 201, 


112 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

the principle is practically acknowledged by our sovereign being 
publicly prayed for in every mosque throughout her Indian 
dominions, which contain a population of not less than 40,000,000 
of Mahometans. 1 

But, unquestionably, Mahometans of all ages have believed and 
have acted on the belief that when there is actual warfare between 
a state that holds the faith of Islam, and enemies who are of a 
different creed, it is a holy war on the part of the Moslems. Certain 
pacific texts of the Koran may be cited, that appear to some 
extent to qualify the fierce spirit of others, but the general tone of 
the Mahometan Sacred Book is eminently warlike, and must in 
the palmy days of Islam have stirred the bold blood of the Turks, 
like the sound of a trumpet, to wrest fresh cities and provinces 
for Allah from the Giaour. The Turkish military code breathes 
the full inspiration of the words of thq Prophet, “ In the shade of 
the crossing scimetars, there is Paradise.” Every Mahometan is 
required to be a soldier. 2 Every soldier killed in battle, for the 
defence of the faith, is styled scheclicl or martyr. 3 And the Moslem 
who deserts his post, or flies before the foe, is held to sin against 
both God and man : his punishment is death in this world, and 

1 “Not long ago, in India, a question was raised and discussed by various 
Moslem lawyers, which might have had a tremendous result for ourselves. 
It was nothing less than the question whether Hindustan was a Dcir-ul- 
liarb or enemies’ country, that is whether the Jehad was in active or 
potential existence there, and consequently whether or no Moslems could, 
consistently with their faith, preserve their allegiance to their Christian 
rulers. The decision was given almost unanimously in favour of peace and 
submission to the existing rulers : and the chief argument adduced in sup¬ 
port of this view is a convincing proof of the truth of Mr. Bosworth Smith’s 
theory that not only is the spirit of Islam favourable to peace and progress, 
but that such spirit really actuates its professors now. The practice of 
Mohammed himself was adduced, namely, that when he laid siege to a 
town, or declared war against a tribe or people, he invariably delayed his 
operations till sunset, that he might ascertain whether the * izan ’ or call to 
prayers was heard amongst them. If it were, he refrained from the attack, 
maintaining that where the practice of his religion was allowed by the 
rulers of the place he had no grievance against them. This one argument, 
and the fact that the name of our most gracious sovereign is now inserted 
in the ‘ Ivhotbah ’ or Friday ‘ bidding-prayer ’ in all mosques throughout 
India, is a sufficient proof that Islam is not antagonistic either to religious or 
political toleration, and that the doctrine of Jehad, a holy war, is not so 
dangerous or barbarous as is generally imagined.”— Quarterly Eevitiv, 
January, 1877, p. 230. 

2 D’Ohsson, 202. 

3 D’Ohsson, 20S. By a somewhat strange limitation the crown of martyr, 
dom is denied to those who die erf the field of battle by the effects of their 
wounds received on it. 


TURKISH WARFARE. 


ii 3 

hell-fire in the next. No enemy with arms in his hands is entitled 
to quarter; and war is held to make all modes of destruction law¬ 
ful. Captives, women, and children, and all that can do Mahome¬ 
tans no harm, are ordered to be spared; but those among the 
enemy, who from their abilities, station, or other causes, may 
hereafter become dangerous to the true believers, may be slain, 
though they have ceased to resist. All cruelty and mutilation are 
forbidden, and all breach of faith. Capitulations must be observed, 
and promises to an enemy kept by whomsoever they were given. 
If the sovereign disapprove of the terms, he must punish his 
Mahometan officer who made them. The Turk is never to make 
a disadvantageous treaty unless when every mode of warfare has 
been tried, and under pressure of the direst necessity. But such 
a treaty, if once made, is to be kept strictly. 1 

In the general view which we have been taking of the Turkish 
institutions, we have lost sight of the individual Mahomet the 
Conqueror. But our attention is forcibly recalled to him when 
we cite one of the canons of the Turkish system of government, 
without notice of which our survey would be incomplete. It is 
the legislation of imperial fratricide. Mahomet II. ordained it by 
the following part of his institutes : “ The majority of my jurists 
have pronounced, that those of my illustrious descendants who 
ascend the throne, may put their brothers to death, in order to 
secure the repose of the world. It will be their duty to act 
accordingly.” 2 

1 D’Ohsson, vol.ii. p. 49, et sej. D’Ohsson collected the Turkish military 
(and other) laws from the great Ottoman Code, that was compiled and pub¬ 
lished by the celebrated Turkish jurist Ibrahim Halebey, who died in 1549. 
See D’Ohsson’s Introduction, p. 23. But now that Turkey is formally ad¬ 
mitted to the public law and system of Europe (see Treaty of Paris, article 
vii.) she must be considered, even more decidedly than before, bound to ob¬ 
serve the laws of war as generally recognised by civilised nations. I have 
discussed these laws in chapter xi. of the “First Platform of International 
Law.” 

* Von Hammer, book xviii. 


8 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


114- 


CHAPTER VII. 

BAJAZET IT.—PRINCE DJEM—CIVIL WAR—ADVENTURES AND 
DEATH OF DJEM IN CHRISTENDOM—FIRST WAR WITH EGYPT 
—BAJAZET DETHRONED BY HIS SON, SELIM . 1 

On the death of Sultan Mahomet II., a struggle for the sovereignty- 
ensued between his two sons, Prince Bajazet and Prince Djem, in 
which success rested with the eldest but not the bravest or ablest 
of the brothers. Both the princes were absent from Constanti¬ 
nople at the time of their father’s decease. Prince Bajazet, then 
aged thirty-five, was at Amassia, the capital of the province which 
he ruled; and Prince Djem, who was twenty-two years old, was 
in Caramania, of which his father had made him governor. 
Bajazet was of a contemplative, melancholy disposition, simple in 
his habits, austere in his devotions, fond of poetry and speculative 
philosophy; whence came the surname of Sofi (the Mystic), which 
is given to him by many of the Ottoman historians. Djem had 
the energy, the ambition, the love of pomp and the voluptuousness, 
which had marked his father the Conqueror; and, without sharing 
his brother’s fondness for metaphysics and abstruse learning, Djem 
was more eminent even than the other members ot his highly- 
gifted family for his love of poetry; and his own poems are ranked 
among the most beautiful in Turkish literature. On the death of 
Sultan Mahomet being known in the camp and capital, the Janis¬ 
saries rose in open anarchy, plundered the houses of the rich Jews 
and other wealthy inhabitants, and put to death the Grand Vizier, 
who had vainly endeavoured to disguise from them the fact of the 
Sultan’s death. As this minister was known to be a supporter of 
the interests of Prince Djem, the Janissaries were easily led by the 
adherents of the elder brother to pronounce in favour of Prince 
Bajazet; and the rest of the army followed their example. Mes¬ 
sengers had been despatched to each prince by their respective 
partisans in the capital; but the bearer of the important tidings 
to Prince Djem was waylaid and slain on the road ; and Bajazet 


1 "S on Hammer, books xix., xx , xxi. 


BAJAZET IE A.D. 1481 - 1512 . 115 

obtained the inestimable advantage over his competitor of first 
learning that the throne was vacant, and first reaching Constanti¬ 
nople to claim it. The Janissaries appeared before him on his 
arrival at the capital, and asked forgiveness for their late acts of 
violence; but these formidable suppliants asked it in battle array, 
and accompanied their petition by a demand for an increase of 
pay, and for a donative on their new sovereign’s accession. Ba- 
jazet obeyed all their requests; and thenceforth the distribution 
of large sums of money at the commencement of each reign among 
these Mahometan praetorians became a regular custom in Turkey, 
alike burdensome to the treasury and disgraceful to the Sultan, 
until it was abolished by the Sultan Abdul-Hamid, during the 
war with Russia, 300 years after the time of the second Bajazet. 

Djem was not of a disposition to resign the sovereignty to his 
brother without a struggle ; and, remembering the bloody law by 
which their father had made imperial fratricide a state maxim, 
the young Ottoman prince may be said to have armed as much 
for life as for empire. A civil war followed, in which the abilities 
of the veteran Ahmed-Kediik, the conqueror of Kaffa and Otranto, 
and the treachery of some of Djem’s principal followers gave the 
victory to Bajazet. A proposition had been made before the 
battle by Djem to his brother to divide the empire, Bajazet 
taking the European and Djem the Asiatic provinces. Bajazet 
refused to listen to such a scheme ; and when the aged Sultana, 
Seldjoukatoun, who was the daughter of Mahomet I., and the 
great aunt of the two rivals, came to his camp and endeavoured 
to move his fraternal feelings in Djem’s favour, Bajazet answered 
with stern brevity, by citing the Arab proverb, “ There is no re¬ 
lationship among princes.” Nevertheless, the Mystic Sultan, 
though resolute to maintain his rights, and to suffer no dismem¬ 
berment of the Ottoman Empire, showed no remorseless eagerness 
for his brother’s death, till after Djem had proved that, so long 
as life was in him, he would strive for a kingly crown at Bajazet’s 
expense. After his first defeat ( 20 th June, 1481), and the dis¬ 
persion of his army, Djem fled to the dominions of the Sultan of 
Egypt and Syria, where he was favourably received and sheltered 
for a year, during which time he visited the holy cities of Medina 
and Mecca. He and a daughter of Mahomet I. are the only 
members of the Turkish royal family that have made that pil¬ 
grimage. In 1482, Djem, assisted by the Egyptian sovereign, 
and some of the malcontent Ottoman commanders in Asia Minor, 
renewed the war, but was again defeated and forced to seek safety 
in foreign lands. He did not return to his former protector, but 


ii6 ' HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


sought the means of passing to the Ottoman dominions in Europe, 
in the hopes of reviving the civil war with effect in that continent, 
though unsuccessful in the Asiatic, as Prince Musa had done 
during the interregnum after the defeat of the first Bajazet. 
With this view, he requested the Grand Master of Khodes to 
grant him a temporary shelter, and the means of passing into 
Europe. 

The Knights of St. John assembled in solemn chapter to discuss 
Prince Djem’s requisition ; and it was finally resolved that it was 
consonant with the dignity and policy of the Order to receive the 
Ottoman prince. 1 Accordingly on the 23rd of July, 1482, Djem, 
with thirty attendants, landed at Rhodes, and entered on a long 
period of captivity most discreditable to the Christian potentates 
by whom he was nominally protected, but who in reality made 
him the subject of barter and sale, of long imprisonment, and 
ultimately of treacherous murder. He was received at Rhodes by 
the Grand Master and his Knights with ostentatious pomp, and 
every semblance of hospitable generosity. But it was soon thought 
desirable to remove him from Rhodes to one of the commanderies 
which the Order possessed in France. It was considered by 
D’Aubusson and his comrades that by removing the Ottoman 
prince from their island they would be better able to evade the 
demands which Sultan Bajazet was sure to make for the surrender 
of his brother to him, and that there would be less risk of losing 
their prisoner by assassination. Before Djem left Rhodes, 
D’Aubusson took the precaution of obtaining his signature to a 
treaty, by which Djem bound himself, in the event of his ever 
becoming Sultan, to conditions highly favourable to the Order. 

D’Aubusson, whose skill as an unscrupulous diplomatist was at 
least equal to his gallantry as a soldier (which we have had occa¬ 
sion to admire while tracing the times of Mahomet II.), next sent 
an embassy to the reigning Sultan, in order to secure all possible 
advantages from having the Pretender in the power of the 
Knights. It was agreed that there should be peace and free 
trade between the Order and the Porte, and that the Sultan 
should pay a yearly sum of 45,000 ducats, ostensibly for the 
maintenance of his brother, but in reality as the price of his com¬ 
pulsory detention in some of the possessions of the Knights. 

Before Djem had thrown himself into the hands of the Chris¬ 
tians, Bajazet had offered him the revenues of the province which 

5 Senatns * consultum, “Begem excipicndum, alendum, fovendum.” — 
Caoursiu, cited in Von Hammer, 


BAJAZET II. A.D. 14 S 1 - 1512 . 117 

he had formerly governed, on condition of his living quietly at 
Jerusalem. Djem refused this offer, and demanded the cession of 
certain provinces to him in full sovereignty. Bajazet replied, 
that “ Empire is a bride whose favours cannot be shared.” On 
Djem’s persisting in his resolution to seek through Christian help 
the means of renewing the civil war, Bajazet endeavoured unre¬ 
mittingly to compass his death, or at least to purchase his im¬ 
prisonment. 

The high-spirited but unhappy prince (whose adventures and 
poetical talents have made him a favourite character in Frankish 
as well as Turkish history) was landed by a galley of the Knights 
at Nice in November, 1482. Djem expressed his gratification 
with the beautiful scenery of the Frankish city, but was urgent to 
commence his journey to Hungary, whence he designed to pass 
into Roumelia. His conductors informed him that as he was on 
French territory, he ought not to depart without the formal per¬ 
mission of the king of the country. Djem accordingly sent one 
of his suite to Paris, and was assured by the chevaliers that his 
messenger might easily travel thither, and return in twelve days. 
But care was taken to arrest the Turkish envoy on the road ; and 
Djem lingered for many months at Nice, closely watched, though 
treated with apparent respect, and in vain expectation of a mes¬ 
senger from the French court. At last the plague broke out in 
that city, which gave the Knights a plausible excuse for convey¬ 
ing their prisoner to a commandery in the interior of the kingdom. 
The greater number of the Ottoman prince’s native followers 
■were now forcibly removed from him; and Djem was confined, 
first at Koussillon, then at Puy, and afterwards at Sassenage, 
where he inspired the fair Phillippine Helena, the daughter of the 
lord of the castle, with an ardent passion, which was not unre¬ 
turned ; and love for a time lightened the weary hours of the cap¬ 
tive prince. At last the Knights took Prince Djem to a tower which 
they had caused to be built expressly for his safe custody. It was 
seven stories high. The kitchens were on the first story; the 
chambers of the domestics on the second and third. N The fourth 
and fifth were for the apartments of the prince; and his jailors, the 
Knights, themselves occupied the two highest. For seven years the 
Ottoman prince was detained in France. The remonstrances 
against such treatment which he addressed to .the Knights, and to 
the Christian princes and chiefs by whom he was visited, and his 
repeated attempts to escape, were fruitless; though he was an 
object of interest to all Christendom ; and many kings negotiated 
with the Grand blaster D’Aubusson, for the purpose of obtaining 


IIS HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

possession of the claimant to the Ottoman throne. D’Aubusson 
purposely protracted the discussion of terms, and was unwilling 
to put an end to a custody, which although little creditable, was 
eminently lucrative to the Knights of St. John. Djem’s family, 
consisting of his mother, his wife, and his infant children, were at 
Cairo. D’Aubusson had the unknightly craft to obtain 20,000 
ducats from the wife and mother of his victim, under pretence 
that the prince was immediately to be set at liberty, and that the 
money was necessary for the expenses of his voyage. This was in 
addition to the 45,000 ducats, which Sultan Bajazet paid annually 
as the price of his brother’s captivity. 

At last Charles VIII. of France interposed, not to set Prince 
Djem free, but to transfer him from the hands of the Knights of 
Rhodes, to the custody of the Pope. A guard of fifty French 
knights was appointed to attend the Turkish prince; and it was 
agreed that in the event of the Pope giving him up to any other 
Christian sovereign without leave from the French court, a sum 
of 10,000 ducats should be paid as forfeit money to Charles. The 
court of Rome undertook to indemnify the Knights of Rhodes; 
and a variety of privileges were accordingly granted to them by 
the sovereign Pontiff; and D’Aubusson himself received the 
honour of being made a Cardinal. 

In 1489, Prince Djem made his entry into Rome, with the 
empty pageantry of honours like those amid which he had eight 
years previously been conducted into Rhodes. He was lodged in 
the Vatican, and formerly presented to Pope Innocent VIII., by 
the Grand Prior of Auvergne and the ambassador of France. It 
was in vain that the chamberlains and other Papal officers urged 
on Djem the necessity of paying the accustomed homage to the 
spritual head of the Church and temporal sovereign of Rome. 
The son of Mahomet the Conqueror would neither vail the 
turban, nor bend the knee ; but walking straight up to the Pope, 
Djem saluted him as the Cardinals do, by a kiss on the shoulder. 
Then in a few words, full of manly feeling and princely spirit, 
Djem asked the Pontiff’s protection, and requested a private 
interview. It was granted; and Djem then narrated the hopes 
deferred, the deceits and the hardships, which he had undergone 
during his captivity. He spoke of the cruelty of his separation 
from his mother, his wife, and his children, and of his earnest 
desire to behold them again, and to sail to Egypt for that purpose. 
The tears flowed fast down the cheeks of the unhappy Turkish 
prince, while he told his wrongs; and even the Pope was moved 
and wept as he listened. But Innocent said that for Djem to 


BAJAZET IT. A.D. 1481 - 1512 . 


119 

sail for Egypt was incompatible, with his project for winning his 
father’s throne ; that the King of Hungary required his presence 
on the frontiers of that kingdom ; and that, above all, he ought 
to think seriously of embracing the Christian faith. Djem replied 
that such an act of apostasy would irretrievably ruin him in the 
opinion of his fellow-countrymen; and he proudly stated that he 
would not be false to his religion for the sake of the Ottoman 
Empire, or for the sake of the empire of the world. Innocent did 
not press the work of conversion further, and closed the interview 
with hollow words of consolation and encouragement. 

At this time there happened to be at Rome an ambassador 
from the Sultan of Egypt; and soon afterwards there arrived an 
ambassador from Sultan Bajazet. The Egyptian ambassador 
sought out Prince Djem, and prostrated himself before him as 
before the lawful sovereign of Turkey. Djem learned from him 
that the Rhodian Grand Master had extorted the 20,000 ducats 
from Djem’s mother and sister, under the false pretence of their 
being required for the voyage from France. Djem and the 
Egyptian envoy complained loudly at the Papal court against 
the Rhodian Knights for this fraud, and demanded the restitution 
of the money. The Pope and Sultan Bajazet’s ambassador inter¬ 
ceded in favour of the Knights, and by their means the Order 
was discharged from the debt for 5000 ducats paid down imme¬ 
diately. The ambassador from the Turkish court was charged 
with the ostensible mission of presenting to the Pope certain 
holy relics of the Crucifixion, but he was also commissioned to 
arrange the price for which Innocent VIII. would pledge himself 
to keep Djem within the Papal States. 40,000 ducats a year was 
the sum agreed on between the rulers of Rome and Constanti¬ 
nople for this purpose; and Djem was accordingly detained at 
the court of Innocent for three years ; and on the death of that 
Pontiff, the Turkish prince was safely guarded in the Vatican 
until the successor to Innocent was elected. The new Pope was 
the infamous Alexander Borgia. He forthwith sent an ambas¬ 
sador to Bajazet, and bargained for the continuation of the pay¬ 
ment of the 40,000 ducats for continuing the detention of Djem. 
But Borgia also stipulated that he was to have the option of 
receiving 300,000 ducats paid down at once, if he took the 
shortest and most effectual means of securing Djem from invading 
Turkey, by putting him to death. Borgia is said to have been 
the only Pope that sent an ambassador to an Ottoman Sultan. 
His envoy was George Bocciardo, his Master of the Ceremonies. 
Bajazet was so pleased with the ambassador, and thought so much 


120 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

of the assurances which were conveyed to him of the Pope’s 
high esteem and friendly regard for him, that he requested 
the Pope, as a personal favour to himself, to make Bocciardo a 
Cardinal. 1 

While the Sultan and the Pope’s ambassador at Constantinople 
were trafficking for Djem’s bondage and blood, Charles VIII. 
invaded Italy, and on the last day of 1495 entered Borne. Pope 
Alexander sought refuge in the Castle of St. Angelo, taking Djem 
with him as one of the most valuable of the Papal treasures. 
Eleven days after the entry of the French army, there was an 
interview between Pope Alexander and King. Charles for the pur¬ 
pose of arranging a treaty of peace. One of the chief conditions 
was the transfer of Prince Djem into Charles’s hands. A meeting 
of the Pope, the King and Djem, subsequently took place, in 
which the Pope gave Djem for the first time the title of Prince, 
and asked him if he "was willing to follow the King of France, who 
desired his presence. Djem answered with dignity, “ I am not 
treated as a prince, but as a prisoner ; and it matters little whether 
the King takes me with him, or whether I remain here in cap¬ 
tivity.” Djem was transferred to the French King, who intrusted 
him to his Grand Mareschal. He accompanied the French army 
from Borne to Naples, and witnessed the slaughters of Monte 
Fortino and Monte San Giovanni. The Pope had now given up 
all chance of making any profit by the custody of Djem ; but there 
yet remained the still more lucrative venture of procuring his 
assassination. This was accordingly done; though the Italian 
and Turkish historians differ as to the mode in which Bor da 

o 

effected the crime. According to the first, Djem was poisoned by 
a bribed attendant, who mixed in the sugar, of which the Turkish 
prince ordinarily partook, some of the white powder, by means of 
which the Pope was wont to rid himself of obnoxious or over- 
wealthy cardinals, and with which he at last accidentally poisoned 
himself. According to the Oriental writers, Djem *3 barber, a 
Greek renegade, named Mustafa, inoculated his master with 
deadly venom, by slightly wounding him with a poisoned razor. 

1 Von Hammer, in his note, says, that about the middle of the last 
century, a Dalmatian monk i*elied on this precedent of Mahometan interest 
with the Holy See, and begged the then reigning Sultan to aid him in 
obtaining a Cardinal’s hat. But, in order to save the officers of the Porte 
the trouble of sending a formal letter of recommendation, he framed him¬ 
self a laconic note, which he addressed in duplicate to both the Sultan and 
the Pope. It was as follows: “Most Holy Father,—The poor friar, 
N. W., is to be made a Cardinal, or all the friars in Jerusalem are to be 
impaled.” 


121 


BAJAZET IT. A.D. 1481 - 1512 . 

They add, that Mustafa, though it was for the sake of the Pope’s 
money that he did the deed, acquired favour afterwards with 
Bajazet for this service, and was raised by degrees to the dignity 
of Grand Vizier. All agree that Djem was murdered by the 
Pope, and that he died by a slowly wasting poison. A letter, 
which his mother had written from Egypt, reached Naples before 
his death, but the unhappy prince was too weak to be able to read 
it. His last prayer was—“ Oh, my God, if the enemies of the 
true faith are to make use of me to further their destructive 
projects against the followers of Islam, let me not outlive this day, 
but take at once my soul unto Thyself.” Djem died in the thirty- 
sixth year of his age, after thirteen years of captivity. Sultan 
Bajazet sent a formal embassy to reclaim his remains from Chris¬ 
tendom, and Prince Djem was buried with royal pomp at Brusa. 

Sultan Bajazet. though victorious in civil war, gained little glory 
in the encounters of the Ottoman power with foreign enemies 
during his reign. Immediately on his accession, the veteran con¬ 
queror Ahmed Kediik was recalled from Otranto to aid Bajazet 
against domestic foes; and Ahmed’s successor, Khaireddin, un¬ 
supported from Turkey, was obliged to capitulate to the Duke of 
Calabria, after a long and gallant defence. Thus, Italy was 
relieved from-the grasp which the dreaded Ottomans hacl laid on 
her ; nor was any lodgement of the Turks within her peninsula 
again effected. Bajazet was engaged in frequent wars against the 
Venetians and the Hungarians, and also against the Poles, which 
brought little increase to the empire, except the acquisition of the 
cities of Lepanto, Modon, and Coron. There is small interest in 
tracing the details of the campaigns of the Ottoman troops in 
Europe during this reign, marked, as they are, by a degree of 
ferocity and cruelty on the Christian as well as on the Turkish 
side, which is repulsively striking, even in the history of mediaeval 
warfare. 1 The epoch of Bajazet II. is brighter in the history of 
the Turkish navy than in that of the Ottoman armies. Kemal- 
Reis, the first great admiral of the Turks, signalised himself under 
this prince, and became the terror of the Christian fleets. He was 
originally a slave, and had been presented to the Sultan by the 

1 One specimen may suffice. The Hungarian commander, Demetrius 
Yaxich (a Servian by birth), had taken prisoner the Turkish general, 
Ghazi Mustafa, and his brother. Yaxich broke all Mustafa’s teeth in his 
head, and then forced him to turn the spit on which his own brother 
was roasted alive at a slow fire. It is not surprising to read that Mus¬ 
tafa, some years afterwards, when Yaxich was sent on an embassy to 
Constantinople, waylaid him and slew him. 


122 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Capitan-Pacha Sinan. His remarkable beauty caused Bajazet to 
name him “ Kemal,” which means “ Perfection/'’ and he was in 
youth one of the royal pages. The first mention of him as a sea- 
captain is in 1483, where he was placed in command of the fleet 
which Bajazet sent to ravage the coasts of Spain, in consequence 
of an earnest entreaty which the Moors of Granada had sent to 
the Sultan of Constantinople, as “ lord of the two seas and the 
two continents,” for succour against the overwhelming power of 
the Spanish Christians. Kemal-Reis afterwards, in 1499, won a 
desperate battle over the Venetians off the island of Sapienza, and 
materially assisted in the reduction of the city of Lepanto. We 
find him also, in 1500, contending skilfully and boldly against the 
far superior fleets of the Pope, of Spain, and of Venice. The 
Ottoman marine had not yet acquired such an ascendency in the 
Mediterranean as it afterwards held under Bajazet’s grandson, 
Sultan Solyman. 

Bajazet’s melancholy and dreamy disposition made him indif¬ 
ferent to the excitements of strife and conquest; and though, as 
a zealous devotee, he looked on warfare against the infidels as 
meritorious; and though sometimes, as an act of religious duty, he 
shared in the campaigns of his troops, his general policy was to seek 
peace at almost any sacrifice. As is usually the case with over¬ 
pacific princes, he was unfortunate enough to be entangled against 
his will in many wars, from which his empire acquired little ad¬ 
vantage, and he himself less credit. Besides his hostilities with 
Christian powers, he was obliged to oppose by armed force the 
encroachments which the Mameluke Sultan of Egypt and Syria 
continually made on the Ottoman territory on the south-eastern 
confines of Asia Minor. The first war between the Ottoman 
sovereigns of Constantinople and the rulers of Egypt began in 
1485, and was eminently disastrous for the Turks. Their armies 
were repeatedly beaten by the Mamelukes; and the spirit of 
revolt which had so long smouldered in Caramania, broke out and 
menaced open war. The Ottoman generals succeeded in reducing 
the Caramanians to subjection ; but Bajazet, after five years of 
defeats by the Egyptians, concluded a peace with them, which left 
in their hands three fortresses which they had conquered. The 
wounded pride of the Sublime Porte was soothed by the pretext 
that the three fortresses were to be considered as given to endow 
the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, of which the Egyptian Sultan 
W'as protector. 

As Bajazet advanced in years, the empire was again troubled 
with domestic dissension and cinl war. He had made his sons 


BAJAZET II. A.D. 1481 - 1512 . 123 

and grandsons governors over provinces ; and as tlie Sultan’s 
infirmities increased, his three surviving sons, Korkoud, Ahmed, 
and Selim, began to intrigue against each other with a view to 
secure the succession. Selim was the youngest of the three, but 
the ablest, and the least likely to be deterred by any scruples of 
remorse from cutting his way to the throne by the readiest path. 
He was governor of Trebisond. His martial habits and bold 
readiness with tongue and hand had made him the favourite of 
the troops ; and he sought to aggrandise his influence by making 
incursions into the Circassian territory on his own account. When 
the old and pacific Sultan remonstrated against these proceedings, 
Selim replied by demanding a Sanjak in Europe, so as to place 
him nearer to the central seat of government. He next asked 
permission to visit his father at Adrianople, to pay his filial 
respects ; and, on this being refused, he crossed the Black Sea, and 
advanced to Adrianople with a retinue so numerous and well 
appointed, that it deserved the name of an army. The old Sultan, 
who was suffering under severe illness, joined the forces which 
some of his faithful followers had collected for his defence; but he 
wept bitterly on seeing the standards of Selim’s troops, and at the 
prospect of encountering his own child in battle. In this mood, 
he was easily persuaded to negotiate by the Beyler-bey of Bou- 
melia, who strove to avert the unnatural conflict, and acted as 
mediator between father and son. Selim received the European 
government of Semendra; and the Sultan promised not to abdi¬ 
cate in favour of his brother Ahmed, who was known to be the 
old man’s favourite child. While these events were passing in 
Europe, Asia Minor was troubled by the machinations of the other 
two princes, Korkoud and Ahmed, and still more by the hordes of 
brigands who, under the feeble sovereignty of Bajazet, long in¬ 
fested the kingdom, and at last formed a regular army in con¬ 
junction with the numerous devotees of the Shia sect, who at that 
time abounded in Asia Minor. They professed unbounded vener¬ 
ation for the great Shia Prince, the Persian ruler, Shah Ismail: 
and the leader of this mixed force of ruffians and fanatics, took 
the name of Schah-Kouli, which means “ Slave of the Schah 
but the Ottomans called him Scheytan-Kouli, which means “Slave 
of the Devil.” He defeated several detachments of the Sultan’s 
troops; and at last it was thought necessary to send the Grand 
Vizier against him. The Devil’s Slave resisted skilfully and 
desperately, and both he and the Vizier at last perished in an 
obstinate battle which was fought near Sarimschaklik in August, 
1511. 


124 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Selim took advantage of these disturbances as pretexts for liis 
keeping an army together, to be ready for any emergencies of the 
State. At last he forcibly entered Adrianople, and assumed the 
rights of an independent sovereign. Some, however, of the Otto¬ 
man soldiery were yet averse to the dethronement of their old 
sovereign, and Bajazet marched upon Adrianople with a true 
though small army. Selim came out with his troops to meet him; 
and the old Sultan was with difficulty persuaded to give the order 
to engage his rebellious son. At length Bajazet raised himself on 
the cushions of his litter, and called out to liis army, “ My slaves, 
you who eat my bread, attack those traitors.” Ten thousand 
loyal soldiers at once raised the battle-cry of “ God is great,” and 
rushed upon the rebel ranks. Selim’s troops were broken by the 
charge, and fled in disorder; and Selim was indebted for his 
safety to the fleetness of his horse, called Karaboulut (the Black 
Cloud), and to the devotion of his friend Ferhad, who threw him¬ 
self in a narrow pass between the flying prince and the foremost 
cavaliers of the pursuers. Selim fled to Akhioli on the Black Sea, 
where he embarked for the Crimea. The Khan of that peninsula 
was his father-in-law, and Selim was soon at the head of a new' 
army of Tartar allies and Turkish malcontents, and in readiness 
to strike another blow for the throne. 

Bajazet anxiously wished to make his second son, Ahmed, his 
successor; but neither this prince nor his elder brother Prince 
Korkoud, was popular with the Janissaries, who looked on Selim 
as the fit Padischah of the warlike House of Othman, and who 
considered the impiety of his attacks upon his own father to be 
far outweighed by the warlike energy and relentless vigour which 
he displayed. Bajazet had secretly encouraged some warlike 
preparations of Ahmed in Asia; but the indignation of the 
soldiery of the capital against that prince compelled the old 
Sultan to disown his acts, and even to send a messenger to the 
Crimea to Selim, requiring him to march to the protection of the 
capital from Ahmed. It was winter when Selim received the 
welcome summons; but he instantly assembled 3000 horsemen, 
half of whom were Tartars, and hastened round the north-western 
coast of the Euxine. Many of his followers perished by the 
severity of the cold, and the length and rapidity of their marches; 
but the indomitable Selim still pressed forward. He crossed the 
Dniester on the ice near Akerman, and, disregarding an injunction 
which the terrified Bajazet sent him to repair to his government 
at Semendra, he continued his progress towards the capital. 
"When he was yet thirty miles from Constantinople, the Aga of 


125 


BAJAZET II. A.D. 1481 * 1512 . 

the Janissaries came to meet him ; ancl he made his entry into the 
capital in almost royal state, with the viziers and other dignitaries 
of state in liis train. The old Sultan had amassed a large 
treasure during his reign; and he now sought to bribe his rebel¬ 
lious son back to obedience by an immediate donation of 300,000 
ducats, and the promise of a yearly payment of 200,000 more. 
Selim regarded the offered treasure as an additional inducement 
to seize the throne, and refused all terms of compromise. Bajazet 
still occupied the royal palace, the Serail; but on the 25th of 
April, 1512, the Janissaries, the Spahis, and the turbulent popula¬ 
tion of Constantinople assembled before the palace-gates, and de¬ 
manded to see the Sultan. The gates of the Serail were thrown 
open; and Bajazet received them, seated on his throne. He 
asked them what it was they desired, and the populace cried with 
one voice, “ Our Padischah is old and sickly, and we will that 
Selim shall be the Sultan.” Twelve thousand Janissaries followed 
up the popular demand by shouting their formidable battle-cry; 
and the old Sultan, seeing the people and the army against him, 
yielded, and uttered the words, “ I abdicate in favour of my son 
Selim. May God grant him a prosperous reign !” Shouts of joy 
pealed round the palace and through the city at this announce¬ 
ment. Selim now came forward and kissed his father’s hand with 
every semblance of respect. The old Sultan laid aside the 
emblems of sovereignty with the calm indifference of a philoso¬ 
pher, and asked his successor the favour of being allowed to retire 
to the city of Demotika, where he had been born. Selim escorted 
him to the gate of the capital, walking on foot by his father’s 
litter, and listening with apparent deference to the counsels which 
the old man gave him. But the dethroned Sultan never reached 
Demotika : he died at a little village on the road on the third day 
of his journey. His age, and his sufferings both of mind and 
body, sufficiently accounted for his death ; but a rumour was 
widely spread that he had been poisoned by an emissary of his 
son. The savage character of Selim may be thought justly to 
have exposed him to suspicion; but there seems to have been no 
clear evidence of the horrible charge. 

Bajazet’s feeble and inglorious reign was clouded by insurrec¬ 
tion and military mutiny at its commencement and at its close. 
Nor were these the only scenes in which the insolent power of the 
soldiery, and the infirmity of Bajazet’s government were dis¬ 
played. At one period during his reign the vice of drunkenness 
had become so common in Constantinople, that Bajazet published 
an edict threatening the punishment of death to all who were 


126 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


detected in using wine, and ordering all the public places, at 
which it had been sold, to be closed. But the Janissaries as¬ 
sembled, and breaking the taverns and wine stores open, forced 
their proprietors to resume their trade; and Bajazet, alarmed at 
the anger and threats of these perilous guardians of his throne, 
withdrew the obnoxious edict four days after it had been pro¬ 
nounced. Had Bajazet been succeeded on the Turkish throne by 
princes of a character like his own, there seems little doubt that 
the decline of the Ottoman power would have been accelerated by 
many years. But the stern energy of Selim I., and the imperial 
genius of the great Solyman, not only gave to the Turkish Empire 
half a century of further conquest and augmented glory, but rein¬ 
vigorated the whole system of government, so as long to delay 
the workings of corruption. 

It is in the reign of Bajazet II. that the ominous name of 
Russia first appears in Turkish history. In 1492 the Czar, Ivan 
III., wrote a letter to Bajazet on the subject of certain exactions 
which had recently been practised on Russian merchants in 
Turkey, and proposing a diplomatic intercourse between the two 
empires. Three years afterwards, Michael Plettscheieff, the first 
Russian ambassador, appeared at Constantinople. He was strictly 
enjoined by his master not to bow the knee to the Sultan, and 
not to allow precedence to any other ambassador at the Ottoman 
court. Plettscheieff appears to have displayed such arrogance as 
justly to offend the Sultan. Bajazet stated in a letter on the 
subject to the Khan of the Crimea (who had exerted himself to 
promote friendship between the empires), “that he was accustomed 
to receive respect from the powers of the East and the West, and 
blushed at the thought of submitting to such rudeness.” Had 
Bajazet’s father or son been on the Turkish throne, the haughty 
Muscovite would probably have received a sharper chastisement 
than the mild mark of offended dignity which Bajazet displayed 
by sending no ambassador to Russia in return. No one at 
Bajazet’s court could foresee that in the rude power of the far 
North, whose emissaries then excited the contemptuous indigna¬ 
tion of the proud and polished Osmanlis, w T as reared the deadliest 
foe that the House of Othman was ever to encounter. 


SELIM I, A.D. 1512 - 1520 . 


127 


CHAPTER VIII. 

SELIM I.—HIS CHARACTER—MASSACRE OF THE SHT1S — WAR 
WITH PERSIA—CONQUESTS IN UPPER ASIA—WAR WITH THE 
MAMELUKES—CONQUEST OF SYRIA AND OF EGYPT—NAVAL 
PREPARATIONS—DEATH OF SELIM—THE MUFTI DJEMALE’S 
INFLUENCE OVER HIM. 1 

Sultan Selim I. was forty-seven years of age when he dethroned 
his father. He reigned only eight years, and in that brief period 
he nearly doubled the extent of the Ottoman Empire. The 
splendour of his conquests, the high abilities which he displayed 
in literature and in politics, as well as in war, and the imperious 
vigour of his character, have found panegyrists among European 
as well as Asiatic writers ; but his unsparing cruelty to those who 
served, as well as to those who opposed him, has justly brought 
down on his memory the indignant reprobation of mankind, as 
expressed by the general sentence of the great majority both of 
Oriental and Western historians. In his own reign the wish 
“ Mayst thou be the vizier of Sultan Selim,” had become a 
common formula of cursing among the Ottomans. Selim’s viziers 
seldom survived their promotion more than a month. They 
whom he raised to this perilous post, knew that they were 
destined for the executioner’s sabre, and carried their last wills 
and testaments with them, whenever they entered the Sultan’s 
presence. One of these officers, the Grand Vizier Piri Pacha, 
ventured to say to Selim, in a tone half in earnest and half 
sportive, “ My Padischah, I know that sooner or later thou wilt 
find some pretext for putting me, thy faithful slave, to death; 
vouchsafe me, therefore, a short interval, during which I may 
arrange my affairs in this world, and make ready for being sent 
by thee to the next.” Selim laughed loud in savage glee at the 
frank request, and answered, “ I have been thinking for some 
time of having thee killed; but I have at present no one fit to 
take thy place; otherwise I would willingly oblige thee.” 


1 See Yon Hammer, books xxii., xxiii., xxiv. 


128 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Unsparing of the blood of his relations, his subjects, and his 
ablest servants, Selim was certain to be fond of war; and his 
reign was one of almost ceaseless carnage. V igorous in body and 
mind, and indifferent to sensual pleasures, he pursued with keen¬ 
ness the martial pastime of the chase. He devoted all his days 
to military duties or to hunting. He slept but little; and 
employed the greater part of the night in literary studies. His 
favourite volumes were books of history, or of Persian poetry. 
He left a collection of odes written by himself in that language, 
for which he showed a marked preference. An Italian writer has 
asserted that Selim, like his grandfather, Mahomet II., loved to 
study the exploits of Csesar and Alexander; but the classical his¬ 
tories of those conquerors were unknown in the East, and the 
Turkish Sultan only possessed the Oriental romances on their 
exploits, which are of the same character with the chivalrous 
legends current in the West respecting Charlemagne and the 
Knights of the Pound Table. Selim showed especial favour and 
honour to men of learning, and promoted many of them to posts 
of high dignity and importance. He intrusted to the historian 
Idris the task of organising the newly-conquered province of Kur¬ 
distan ; and the jurist Kernel Paschazade accompanied him on his 
Egyptian expedition as historiographer. Selim was tall in stature, 
with long body though short limbs. Contrary to the example of 
his predecessors he kept his chin close shaved, but he wore enor¬ 
mously large black moustachios, which, with his dense and dark 
eyebrows, contributed to give him the fierce aspect which im¬ 
pressed with awe all who beheld him. His eyes were large and 
fiery; and his red complexion showed (according to the report of 
the Venetian ambassador Foscolo) a sanguinary disposition. His 
pride met with a sharp trial on the very first day of his reign. 
The Janissaries resolved to force from their new Sultan a dona¬ 
tive, and drew up in double lines along the street through which 
he was expected to pass. They were to clash their arms together 
when he arrived, as an impressive hint of the means which had 
given him the throne, and of the means which might force him 
from it. Selim was apprised of their gathering; and, indignant 
at the prospect of thus passing publicly under the yoke of his own 
soldiers on the first day of his reign, he avoided the humiliation 
by riding round in another direction. He dared not however 
refuse the donative; and a distribution larger than had been 
made on any similar occasion, nearly exhausted the treasury. 
Emboldened by this concession, one of the governors of the 
smaller departments, a Sanjak-bey, approached the Sultan, and 


SELIM /. A.D. 1512 - 1520 . 129 

asked for an increase of revenue. Selim answered by drawing 
his sabre and striking the bold petitioner’s head off on the spot. 

Selim had acquired the throne by successful rebellion against 
his father; and he had good reason to dread the jealousy of his 
brothers, who were in command of some of the best provinces of 
the empire, and were little likely to give up the imperial heritage 
without a struggle. Five of the eight sons of Bajazet had died in 
their father’s lifetime, Abdallah, Mahomet, Schehinshah, Alem- 
shah, and Mahmoud. Schehinshah left a son named Mahomet; 
and Alemshah, one named Osman. Mahmoud left three, Musa, 
Orchan, and Emin. Of the two surviving brothers of Selim, the 
eldest, Prince Korkoud was childless; the second, Prince Ahmed, 
had four sons. Selim himself had but a single son, Prince Soly- 
man. Thus there were twelve princes of the blood of Bajazet 
alive. 

At first, Selim’s brothers appeared willing to acknowledge him 
as Sultan, and accepted the confirmation in their respective govern¬ 
ments which he offered. But Prince Ahmed, who ruled at 
Amassia, soon showed his design of striving for the throne, by 
occupying the great city of Brusa, and levying heavy taxes on 
the inhabitants. Selim marched instantly into Asia Minor at the 
head of a powerful army, and sent a fleet to cruise along the 
coasts. Ahmed fled before him, and despatched two of his sons to 
implore assistance from the Persian prince, Shah Ismail. Selim 
took possession of Brusa, and sent the greater part of his army 
into winter quarters. Encouraged by some of' Selim’s officers, 
whom he had gained over, Ahmed renewed the war, and gained 
several slight advantages. Selim instantly caused his Grand Vizier, 
who was one of the traitors against him, to be strangled; and 
proceeded to further executions of a more atrocious character. 
Five of the young princes, his nephews, were in honourable deten¬ 
tion in the houses of some of the chief men of Brusa, The 
eldest of them, Osman, son of Prince Alemshah, was twenty 
years old ; the youngest, Mahomet, son of Prince Schehinshah, 
was only seven. Selim sent Janissaries to apprehend them, and 
they were shut up by his orders in one apartment of the palace. 
On the next morning the Sultan’s mutes entered to put them to 
death. A fearful scene ensued, which Selim witnessed from an 
adjoining chamber. The youngest of the captive princes fell on 
their knees before the grim executioners, and with tears and 
childish prayers and promises begged hard for mercy. The little 
Prince Mahomet implored that his uncle would spare him, and 
offered to serve him all the days of his life for an aspre (the 

9 


130 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

lowest of all coins) a day. The elder of the victims, Prince 
Osman, who knew that there was no hope of mercy, rushed 
fiercely upon the murderers, and fought hard for a time against 
them. One of the mutes was struck dead, and another had his 
arm broken. Selim ordered his personal attendants to run in and 
assist in the execution; and at length the unhappy princes were 
overpowered by numbers, and strangled. Their bodies were de¬ 
posited with all display of royal pomp near the sepulchre of 
Amurath II. 

At the tidings of this massacre, Prince Korkoud, who had 
hitherto been quiet in his government of Saroukhan, saw clearly 
what doom was designed for himself. He endeavoured to win over 
the Janissaries, and prepared for a struggle for life or death with 
Selim. Selim detected his brother’s plans; and without giving 
any intimation of his discovery or his purpose, he left Brusa, 
under pretence of a great hunting; and then suddenly advanced 
with 10,000 cavalry into Korkoud’s province. Korkoud fled with 
a single attendant of the name of Piale. They were pursued and 
captured. Selim sent an officer named Sinan to announce to his 
brother that he must die. Sinan arrived in the night at the place 
where the royal captive was detained; and, waking Prince Korkoud 
from sleep, he bade him come forth to death. Korkoud demanded a 
respite of an hour, and employed it in writing a letter in verse to 
his brother, in which he reproached him with his cruelty. He 
then gave up his neck to the fatal bowstring. Selim wept abun¬ 
dantly when he read his brother’s elegy. He carried his real or 
pretended grief so far as to order a general mourning for three 
days; and he put to death some Turkomans who had guided the 
pursuers of Korkoud to his hiding-place, and who came to Brusa 
to ask a reward for that service. 

In the meanwhile, Prince Ahmed had collected a considerable 
force; and had gained further advantages over Selim’s forces, 
which, if vigorously followed up, might have given him the 
throne. But Ahmed, though personally brave, was far inferior to 
his brother in energy and perseverance. Selim reinforced his 
army, and on the 24th of April, 1513, a pitched battle was 
fought, in which Ahmed was completely defeated and taken 
prisoner. His doom was the same as that of Korkoud, and was 
executed by the same officer, Sinan. Before death, Ahmed had 
begged to see the Sultan; but the request was refused; and Selim 
remarked that he would give his brother such a domain as fitted 
an Ottoman prince. Ahmed understood the words; and when 
Sinan entered, gave himself up to death without resistance. 


SELIM I. A.D . 1512 - 1520 . 131 

Before he was bowstrung, lie drew from his finger a jewel said 
to equal in value a year’s revenue of Roumelia, and charged 
Sinan to convey it to Selim as his brother’s parting gift, with a 
hope that the Sultan would excuse the smallness of its worth. 
Ahmed was buried with the five murdered young princes at 
Brusa. 

Selim now thought himself secure on the throne; and prepared 
for foreign warfare. Fortunately for Christendom, it was against 
other Mahometan powers that his energies were directed; and he 
willingly arranged or renewed a series of treaties with the different 
states of Europe, which secured tranquillity along the western 
frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. Selim had not fallen off from 
his ancestors in zeal for the faith of Islam. He was indeed the 
most bigoted of all the Turkish Sultans, But it was the very 
vehemence of his bigotry, that made him hate the heretics of 
Islam even more than the Giaours of Christendom. 

The schism of the Sunnites and the Scliiis (the first of whom 
acknowledge, and the last of whom repudiate the three immedi¬ 
ate successors of the Prophet, the Caliphs Abubeker, Omar, and 
Othman) had distracted the Mahometan world from the earliest 
times. The Ottoman Turks have been Sunnites. The contrary 
tenets have prevailed in Persia : and the great founder of the 
Saffide dynasty in that country, Shah Ishmail, was as eminent for 
his zeal for the Schii tenets, as for his ability in the council, and 
his valour in the field. 

The doctrine of the Schiis had begun to spread among the 
subjects of the Sublime Porte before Selim came to the throne; 
and, though the Sultan, the Ulema, and by far the larger portion 
of the Ottomans, held strictly to the orthodoxy of Sunnism, the 
Schiis were numerous in every province, and they seemed to be 
rapidly gaining proselytes. Selim determined to crush heresy at 
home before he went forth to combat it abroad ; and in a delibe¬ 
rate spirit of fanatic cruelty he planned and executed a general 
slaughter of all his subjects, who were supposed to have fallen 
away from what their sovereign considered to be the only true 
faith. This is a deed to which the massacre of St. Bartholomew in 
the same century offers too sad a parallel; and indeed the 
treachery, by which that crime of Christendom was accomplished, 
makes it the more detestable of the two. 

Selim did not allure his victims by false professions of esteem, 
or by profaning the rights of hospitality, but he organised a sys¬ 
tem of secret police throughout his dominions, which contemporary 
writers term admirable; and he thus obtained a complete list of all 

9—2 


132 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

the Mahometans in European and in Asiatic Turkey, who were 
suspected of belonging to the sect of the Schiis. The number of 
the proscribed, including men, women, and children, amounted 
to 70,000. Selim distributed troops throughout the empire, and 
stationed them in each city and district, in strength proportioned 
to the number of Schiis that it contained. He then suddenly 
sent forth the messengers of death, and the whole of those un¬ 
happy beings were arrested. 40,000 of them were slain ; the 
rest were condemned to perpetual imprisonment. The contem¬ 
poraneous Ottoman historians give Selim the title of “ The Just,” 
for this act of atrocity. The modern German historian well 
remarks that it is still more revolting to read that the Christian 
ambassadors at the Sultan’s court adopted the surname, and that 
it is found applied to Selim in the reports of the massacre which 
they sent to their respective countries. Indeed, at a later time, 
and when Selim had shown by many more ferocious deeds, how 
deeply his soul was incarnadined with cruelty, the Venetian 
Mocenigo, who had been accredited to his court, and had known 
him well, declared that he never met a man who was Sultan 
Selim’s equal in virtue, justice, humanity , and greatness of mind. 1 

The slaughter of his co-religionists increased the animosity 
with which Shah Ismail already regarded Selim; and the two 
sovereigns prepared for an encounter with equal rancour and 
resolution. Many grounds of quarrel, besides that of religious 
difference, existed between them. Shah Ismail had humbled the 
Ottoman arms in some encounters with the troops of the governors 
of the Turkish provinces near his frontier in Bajazet’s reign; he 
had also sheltered the fugitive Prince Amurath, son of Selim’s 
brother Ahmed; and he now assembled his troops, with the 
avowed intention of deposing and punishing Selim, and of placing 
young Amurath on the Turkish throne. Selim, on his part, made 
his preparations for an aggressive campaign with his accustomed 
vigour and determination. The renown of the Persian arms, and 
of the skill and good fortune of Shah Ismail, was widely spread 
throughout the East; and when Selim announced his intention 
of attacking Persia, the members of his council were ominously 
mute. Thrice the Sultan told them that he would lead them to 

1 Giovio, in a letter written to Charles V., in 1541. says : “Mi diceva il 
clarissinro Messa Luigi Mocenigo quel fu uno dei ambasciadori di Yenetia 
appresso V. M. in Bologna, che essendo Ini al Cairo ambasciadore appresso 
a Sultan Selim e se havendo molto ben pratticato, nullo huomo era par ed 
essoin virtu, justizia, hvmanita , e grandezza d’ animo.” It is difficult to 
imagine among what human creatures humanity existed in that age. 


• SELIM I, A.D. 1512 - 1520 . 133 

war, and thrice they spake not, till at last a common Janissary, 
named Abdullah, who stood by on guard, broke the silence, and 
throwing himself on his knees before the Sultan, told him that he 
and his comrades would rejoice in marching under him to fight the 
Shah of Persia. Selim made him Bey of the Sanjak of Selnik 
011 the spot. 

The Turkish army mustered in the plain of Yenischeer. Selim 
began his march on the 20th of April, 1514, on a Thursday, a 
day of the week thought fortunate by the Ottomans. On the 
27th a Persian spy was seized in the camp, and Selim sent him 
to Ismail with a letter containing a declaration of war. Yon 
Hammer cites this remarkable document from the contemporary 
Oriental writers ; x and as he truly states, it admirably represents 
the general spirit of the age, and the especial character of Selim 
himself. It is as follows : 

“ The Supreme Being, who is at the same time the Sovereign of 
the destiny of man, and the source of all light and all knowledge, 
announces in His holy scripture that the true religion is the 
religion of the Mussulmans; and that he who professes another 
religion, far from being heard and saved, will be cast out among 
the reprobates at the great day of the last judgment. Again He 
saith, the God of truth, that His designs and His decrees are 
immutable, and all the actions of man ought to have regard to 
Him, and that he who abandons the good path shall be con¬ 
demned to hell fire and eternal punishment. Place us, Lord, in 
the number of the true Believers, of those who walk in the path 
of salvation, and take heed to turn away from vice and unbelief! 
May the purest and most holy blessings be upon Mohammed-oul- 
Mustapha, the master of two worlds, the prince of prophets ; 
and blessed also be his descendants and those who follow his law ! 

“ I, chief and sovereign of the Ottomans ;—I, the master of the 
heroes of the age;—I, who combine the force and power of 
Eeridoon, the majesty of Alexander the Great, the justice and 
the clemency of Keikhosrew;—I, the exterminator of the idola- 
tors, the destroyer of the enemies of the true faith, the terror of 
the tyrants, and of the Pharaohs of the age;—I, before whom 
proud and imperious kings are abased, and the strongest sceptres 
shattered;—I, the glorious Sultan Selim Khan, son of the 
Sultan Bajazet Khan, who was the son of the Sultan Mohammed 
Khan, who was the son of the Sultan Murad Khan;—I gra¬ 
ciously address my words to thee, Emir Ismail, chief of the 


1 It is also cited, at length by D’Ohsson. 


134 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Persian troops, who art like in tyranny to Zoliak and Afrasiab, 
and art destined to perish like the last Dara [Darius], to make 
thee know that the words of the Most High are not the frail pro¬ 
ductions of caprice or foolishness, but that they contain an infinity 
of mysteries impenetrable by the spirit of man. The Lord Him¬ 
self hath said in His holy book, ‘We have not created the heaven 
and earth that they should be a sport.’ Man, who is the noblest 
of the creatures, and a compendium of the marvels of God, is 
consequently the living image of the Creator on earth. It is He 
that hath made ye, oh men, the Caliphs of the earth, because 
man, who unites the faculties of the soul with perfection of body, 
is the only being, that can comprehend the attributes of the 
Divinity, and adore His sublime beauties. But man does not 
possess that rare intelligence, nor does he arrive at that divine 
knowledge except in our religion, and by keeping the command¬ 
ments of the prince of prophets, the caliph of caliphs, the right 
arm of the God of mercy. It is therefore only by the practice of 
the true religion that a man will prosper in this world, and de¬ 
serve eternal life in the world to come. As for thee, Emir Ismail, 
such a reward will never be thy lot; for thou hast deserted 
the path of salvation, and of the holy commandment; thou 
hast defiled the purity of the doctrine of Islam; thou hast dis¬ 
honoured and cast down the altars of the Lord; thou hast by 
unlawful and tyrannical devices usurped a sceptre in the East; 
thou hast by base stratagem alone raised thyself—thou sprung 
from the dust—to a seat of splendour and glory; thou hast opened 
to Mussulmans the gate of tyranny and oppression; thou hast 
joined iniquity, perjury, and blasphemy to impiety, heresy, and 
schism ; thou hast under the cloak of hypocrisy sown in all parts 
the seeds of trouble and sedition; thou hast raised the standard 
of ungodliness; thou hast given way to thy shameful passions, 
and abandoning thyself without restraint to the most disgraceful 
excesses; thou hast untied the band of Mussulman laws, and thou 
hast permitted licentiousness and rape, the massacre of the most 
virtuous and honourable of men, the destruction of shrines and 
temples, the profanation of tombs, the contempt of the Ulema, of 
teachers of the law, and of descendants of the Prophet, and the 
degradation of the Koran, and the cursing of the true and lawful 
Caliphs [Abubeker, Omar, and Othman.] Therefore, as the first 
duty of a Mussulman, and above all of a pious prince, is to obey 
the commandment, ‘ Oh ye faithful, who believe, perform ye the 
decrees of God,’ the Ulema and our teachers of the law have 
pronounced death upon thee, perjurer and blasphemer’ as thou art, 


SELIM /. A.D. 1512-1520. 135 

and have laid upon every good Mussulman the sacred duty of 
taking arms for the defence of religion, and for the destruction of 
heresy and impiety in thy person and the persons of those who 
follow thee. 

“ Animated by the spirit of that Fetva, in conformity with the 
Koran, the code of the divine laws, and wishing both to strengthen 
Islam and to deliver the countries and the peoples who are groan¬ 
ing under thy yoke, we have resolved to lay aside our royal robes 
of state, to put on the cuirass and the coat of mail, to unfurl our 
ever-victorious banner, to assemble our invincible armies, to draw 
the avenging sword from the scabbard of our wrath and indigna¬ 
tion, to march with our soldiers, whose swords deal mortal blows, 
and whose arrows fly to pierce a foe even in the constellation of 
the Sagittary. In fulfilment of that noble resolution we have 
taken the field; we have passed the channel of Constantinople, 
and, guided by the hand of the Most High, we trust soon to put 
down thy arm of tyranny, to dispel those fumes of glory and 
grandeur that now confuse thy head and cause thee deadly 
■wanderings; to rescue from thy despotism thy trembling subjects; 
and finally to smother thee in those same fiery whirlwinds which 
thy infernal spirit raises wherever it passes. So shall we fulfil 
upon thee the saying, ‘ He who sows discord must reap affliction 
and woe.’ Nevertheless, jealous in our obedience to the spirit of 
the law of the Prophet, we propose, before we begin war, to place 
before thee the Koran, instead of the sword, and to exhort thee to 
embrace the true religion: therefore do we address to thee this 
letter. 

“ We differ in our dispositions, one man from another; and the 
human race is like mines of gold and silver. Among some vice is 
deeply rooted; they are incorrigible; and it is as impossible to 
lead them back to virtue as to make a negro white. With others 
vice has not yet become a second nature; they may return from 
their wanderings of the will, by seriously retiring into themselves, 
mortifying their senses, and repressing their passions. The surest 
mode to cure evil is for a man to search deeply his conscience, to 
open his eyes to his own faults, and to ask pardon from the God 
of mercy with a true repentance and a bitter sorrow. We there¬ 
fore invite thee to retire into thyself, to renounce thy errors, and 
walk towards that which is good, with a firm and resolute step. 
We further require of thee that thou give up the lands wrongfully 
detached from our dominions, and that thou replace our lieutenants 
and our officers in possession of them. If thou valuest thy safety 
and thy repose, thou wilt, resolve to do this without delay. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


136 

“ But if, for thy misfortune, thou persist in conduct like thy 
past; if, drunk with the thoughts of thy power and foolish 
bravery, thou wilt pursue the course of thy iniquities, thou shalt 
in a few days see thy plains covered with our tents and flooded 
with our battalions. Then shall be performed prodigies of valour; 
and then shall the world witness the decrees of the Most High, 
who is the God of battles and the Sovereign Judge of the deeds 
of men. For the rest, may he fare well, who walks well in the 
true faith.” 

Much as Selim prided himself on his piety and his literary skill, 
he neglected no means of bringing more substantial weapons to 
bear upon his heretical opponent. In a general review of his 
army at Sivas, Selim ascertained that his available forces amounted 
to 140,000 well-armed men; and 5000 more were employed in 
the commissariat department, which also was provided with 
60,000 camels. He had a reserve force of 40,000 men placed in 
echelon, between Kaissyraia and Sivas. The great difficulty of 
the campaign was to keep up his line of communications and to 
ensure a supply of provisions; as the Persians, instead of en¬ 
countering him on the frontier, retired before him, laying waste 
the whole country, and leaving nothing that could shelter or feed 
a foe. Selim’s chief magazines were at Trebizond, whither his 
fleets brought large supplies, and whence they were carried on 
mules to the army. Selim endeavoured to provoke Ismail to 
change his judicious tactics and risk a battle, by sending him more 
letters, written partly in verse and partly in prose, in which he 
taunted the Persian sovereign with cowardice in not playing out 
the royal part which he had usurped. “ They, who by perjuries 
seize sceptres,” said Selim, “ought not to skulk from danger, but 
their breast ought, like the shield, to be held out to encounter 
peril; they ought, like the helm, to affront the foeman’s blow. 
Dominion is a bride to be wooed and won by him only, whose lip 
blenches not at the biting kiss of the sabre’s edge.” Ismail replied 
to the homilies and rhapsodies of the Sultan by a calm and digni¬ 
fied letter, in which he denied the existence of any reason why 
Selim should make war on him, and expressed his willingness to 
resume peaceful relations. Ismail then regretted that the Sultan 
should have assumed in his correspondence a style so unnatural 
and so unfitting the dignity of the nominal writer; but with 
polished irony Ismail asserted his firm belief that the letters must 
have been the hasty productions of some secretary who had taken 
an overdose of opium. Ismail added, “ that, without doubt, the 
will of God would soon be manifested; but it would be too late 


SELIM I. A.D. 1512-1520. 137 

to repent when that manifestation had commenced. For his part, 
he left the Sultan at liberty to do what he pleased, and was fully 
prepared for war if his amicable letter was ill received.” This 
letter was accompanied by the present of a box of opium, osten¬ 
sibly for the supposed Secretary who had written the letter in 
Selim’s name ; but, as Selim himself was addicted to the use of 
that drug, the satiric stroke was sure to be keenly felt. Enraged 
at the dignified scorn of his adversary, Selim vented his wrath by 
an outrage on the law of nations, and ordered the Persian envoy 
to be torn to pieces. His nephew Amurath, the refugee prince at 
Ismail’s court, had, with Ismail’s sanction, set the example of such 
atrocity, by mutilating and putting to death a Turkish ambassador, 
who had been sent to the Persian court to demand that Amurath 
should be given up to Selim. 

The Ottoman army continued to advance through the north of 
Diarbekir, Ivourdistan, and Azerbijan, upon Tabriz, which was 
then the capital of Persia, and the usual royal residence of Shah 
Ismail. The prudent system of operations, which the Persian 
prince continued to follow, inflicted great hardships upon the ad¬ 
vancing Turks, as wherever they moved they found the country 
entirely desolate, and the difficulty of forwarding supplies in¬ 
creased with each march. The Janissaries murmured; but Selim 
only redoubled his vigilance in preserving strict order, and his 
exertions in providing as far as possible the means of reaching 
Tabriz. One of his generals, Hemdar Pacha, who had been 
brought up with Selim from infancy, was persuaded by the other 
officers to remonstrate with the Sultan against marching farther 
through those desert countries. Selim beheaded him for his 
interference, and still marched on. At Sogma, Selim received an 
embassy from the Prince of Georgia, and a welcome supply of 
provisions. After a short halt he gave orders to resume the march 
upon Tabriz, and the Janissaries broke out into open tumult, and 
loudly demanded to be led back to their homes. Selim had pre¬ 
tended not to observe their murmurs on former occasions during 
the march, but he now rode boldly into the midst of them. “ Is 
this,” he cried, “ your service to your Sultan 1 Does your loyalty 
consist of mere boast and lip-worship 1 Let those among you who 
wish to go home, stand out from the ranks, and depart. As for 
me, I have not advanced thus far merely to double on my track. 
Let the cowards instantly stand aloof from the brave, who have 
devoted themselves with sword and quiver, soul and hand, to our 
enterprise.” He ended by quoting a passage from a Persian 
poem : 


133 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

“ I never flinch, or turn back from the purpose 
Which once has gained dominion o’er my soul.” 

He then gave the word of command to form column and march, 
and not a Janissary dared leave his banner. 

At length the pride of Ismail overcame his prudence ; and, ex¬ 
asperated at the devastation which the war caused to his subjects, 
and at the near approach of his insulting enemy to his capital, the 
Persian prince determined to give battle, and arrayed his forces in 
the valley of Calderan. Selim’s joy was extreme when, on mount¬ 
ing the heights to the westward of that valley, on the 23rd of 
August, 1514, he saw the Persian army before him. He gave 
command for an immediate engagement, and drew up his troops 
in order of battle on the heights, before marching to action in the 
valley. He had about 120,000 troops, of whom 80,000 were 
cavalry. But both men and horses were worn by the fatigues and 
privations of the march, and seemed to be ill-fitted to encounter 
the magnificent cavalry of the Persians, which was perfectly fresh 
and in admirable spirit and equipment. The Persian cavalry was 
equal in numbers to the Turkish horse, but it constituted the 
whole of Shah Ismail’s army. He had neither infantry, nor 
cannons ; while Selim brought a powerful train of artillery into 
action, and a large portion of his Janissaries bore firearms. 

Selim drew up the feudal cavalry of Anatolia on his right wing 
under Sinan Pacha, and the feudal cavalry of Roumelia on the 
left, under Hassan Pacha. He placed his batteries at the ex¬ 
tremity of each wing, masking them by the light troops of liis 
army, the Azabs, who were designed to fiy at the enemy’s first 
charge, and lure the best Persian troops under the muzzles of the 
Turkish guns. The Janissaries were a little in the rear, in the 
centre, protected by a barricade of baggage-waggons. Behind 
them were the Sultan’s horse-guards, and there Selim took his 
own station. On the other side Ismail drew up two chosen 
brigades of cavalry, one on each side of his line, one of which he 
led himself, and the other was intrusted to the command of a 
favourite general, Oustadluogli. Ismail designed to turn his 
enemy’s wings with these two brigades, and, avoiding the Ottoman 
batteries, to take the Janissaries in the rear. He anticipated that 
Selim’s light troops, the Azabs, would, when charged, wheel away 
to the extreme right and left of the Ottoman line, so.as to unmask 
the cannons; and he therefore ordered that his two brigades 
should not endeavour to break through the Azabs, but should 
wheel as they wheeled, so as to keep the Azabs between them and 


SELIM /. A.D. 1512-1520. 139 

the artillery, until they were clear of the guns, and then ride in 
on the flanks and rear of the Ottoman army. This manoeuvre 
seemed the more practicable as Selim’s cannons in each wing were 
chained together, so that it was almost impossible to change their 
position when the battle had once commenced. Full of confidence, 
the Persian cavaliers galloped forward with loud cries of “ The 
Shah ! the Shah 1” and the Turks raised the cry of “ Allah 1” and 
stood firm to meet them. The wing which Ismail led in person 
was completely successful. He outflanked the wheeling Azabs, 
and then, bursting in on the left of the Ottomans, he drove them 
in confusion upon their rear-guard. But, on the other side of the 
field, Sinan Pacha, the commander of the Turkish right wing, out- 
generalled his opponent Oustadluogli. Instead of wheeling his 
retreating Azabs away from the front of the batteries, Sinan called 
them straight back, let them pass over the chains by which the guns 
were fastened together, and then poured in a deadly discharge 
upon the dense column of Persian horse that was galloping for¬ 
ward in close pursuit. Oustadluogli was one of the first that fell, 
and the whole left of the Persians was thrown into disorder, which 
a charge of Sinan’s Spahis soon turned into utter rout. .Victorious 
in this part of the battle, Selim was able to bring succour to his 
defeated troops, who had been broken by Shah Ismail. He led 
his Janissaries into action, and the Shah’s cavalry, already some¬ 
what exhausted and dismayed by their previous efforts, were 
unable to break this veteran infantry, or long to endure their 
fusillade. The Persians had begun to waver, when Shah Ismail 
himself fell from his horse, wounded in the arm and the foot. 
The Turks closed upon him; and he was only saved by the 
devoted gallantry of one of his followers, Mirza Sultan Ali, who 
rushed upon the Ottomans, exclaiming, “ I am the Shah.” While 
the enemy mastered Mirza Ali and examined his person, Ismail 
was raised from the ground. Another of his attendants named 
Khizer, gave up his own horse, on which Ismail was mounted by 
those around him, and hurried from the field. 

The victory of Selim was complete, but it had been dearly pur¬ 
chased. No less than fourteen Ottoman Sanjak Beys (“ Lords 
of Standards ”) lay dead on the field of battle; and an equal 
number of Khans who had fought on the Persian side had also 
perished. 

Selim took possession of his enemy’s camp, in which were his 
treasures and his harem, including the favourite wife of the Shah. 
Selim put all his nrisoners. ^cept the women and children, to 


140 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


death; and then marched upon Tabriz, and entered the Persian 
capital in triumph. 

Selim levied on the conquered city a contribution of 1000 of its 
most skilful artisans. These were sent by him to Constantinople, 
and received houses and the means of carrying on their respective 
manufactures in the Ottoman capital. After a halt of only eight 
days at Tabriz, the Sultan marched northwards towards Karabagh, 
meaning to fix his winter quarters in the plains of Azerbijan, and 
resume his career of conquest in the spring. But the discontent 
of the troops at this prolongation of their hardships, and their 
desire to revisit their homes, broke out into such general and for¬ 
midable munnurings, that Selim was, like Alexander, compelled to 
give way, and return with his victorious, but refractory veterans 
towards Europe. His expedition, however, u T as not barren of 
important augmentation to his empire. The provinces of Diar- 
bekir and Kurdistan, through which he had marched against 
Ismail, "were thoroughly conquered and annexed to his dominions 
by the military skill of the generals whom he detached for that 
purpose, and still more by the high administrative ability of the 
historian Idris, to whom Selim confided the important duty of 
organising the government of the large and populous territories 
which had been thus acquired. The pacific overtures of Shah 
Ismail were haughtily rejected by the Sultan; and throughout 
Selim’s reign there was war between the two great Mahometan 
sovereigns, in which the Persian arms were generally unsuccessful 
against the Turkish, though Shah Ismail maintained the contest 
with spirit, and preserved the greater part of his territories under 
his sway. 

Selim’s hatred against the Schii heretics and his warlike energy 
were unchecked throughout his life; but after the campaign of 
Calderan he did not again bring the whole weight of the Ottoman 
power to bear upon Persia, nor did he himself again lead his 
invading armies against her. Syria and Egypt proved more 
tempting objects to his ambition; and the aggressive strength of 
the Mameluke rulers of those countries made a decisive contest 
between them and the Ottomans almost inevitable. The dominion 
of the Mamelukes is one of the most remarkable phenomena in 
history, especially in the history of slavery. The word Mameluke, ■ 
or Memlook, means slave; and this body of Oriental chivalry, 
which, for nearly six centuries, maintained itself in lordly pride in 
Egypt, which encountered Selim and Napoleon with such valour 
as to extort the admiration of those two great conquerors, and 
which, though often partially broken, was only destroyed by the 


SELIM /. A.D. 1512-1520. 141 

darkest treaeliery in our own age ;—this military aristocracy of the 
East consisted of men, who had been bought and sold and bred as 
slaves, and who recruited their own ranks, not from among the 
natives of the land which became their country, but from the 
slave markets of far distant regions. Malek Salecn, of the Eyoub 
dynasty of the Sultans of Egypt, formed in the beginning of the 
thirteenth century (a hundred years before the institution of the 
Janissaries), an armed corps of twelve thousand slaves, chiefly 
natives of the Caucasian countries. These, from their servile con¬ 
dition, were called Memlooks. Their discipline and military spirit 
soon made them formidable to their masters, and in 1264- they 
killed Touroon Shah, the last prince of the Eyoub dynasty, and 
placed one of their own body on the throne of Egypt. The first 
Mameluke sovereigns of Egypt were called Baharites. They 
conquered Syria; a country which the Pharaohs, the Ptolemies, 
and all the various rulers of Egypt, down to the times of Napoleon 
and Mehemet Ali, have ever regarded as a necessary rampart for 
their dominions along the banks of the Nile. In 1382 Berkouk, a 
Mameluke of Circassian race, overthrew the Baharite sovereign, 
and founded the dynasty of the Circassian Mamelukes, which con¬ 
tinued to reign till the time of Selim’s invasion. At this period 
the military force of the Mamelukes consisted of three classes of 
warriors; all cavalry superbly mounted and armed, but differing 
materially in rank. First, there were the Mamelukes themselves 
—properly so called—all of whom were of pure Circassian blood, 
and who had all been originally slaves. The second corps was 
called the Djelbans, and was formed principally of slaves brought 
from Abyssinia. The third, and lowest in rank, was called the 
Korsans, and was an assemblage of mercenaries of all nations. 
There were twenty-four Beys or heads of the Mamelukes, and they 
elected from among themselves a sultan, who was called also 
Emirol-Kebir, or Chief of Princes. He reigned over Egypt and 
Syria, and was also recognised as supreme sovereign over that 
part of Arabia in which the holy cities of Mecca and Medina are 

situate. • 

The first war between the Mamelukes and the Ottoman Turks 
broke out, as we have seen, during the weak reign of Bajazet II. 
at Constantinople, and terminated to the disadvantage of the 
Sublime Porte. The Mameluke princes saw clearly that under 
Sultan Selim the vast resources of the Turkish Empire would be 
wielded in a far different spirit from that of his father, and they 
watched with anxious attention the conquests of the provinces of 
Diarbekir and Kurdistan, which Selim made from the Persians, 


142 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


and which brought the Ottoman frontiers more extensively in con¬ 
tact with those of the Egyptian possessions in Syria. The Sultan 
of Egypt, Kanssou-Ghawri, assembled a strong army of observation 
in the north of Syria, in 1516. Sinan Pacha, the commander of 
the Ottoman forces in the south-east of Asia Minor, reported this 
to Selim, and stated that he could not with safety obey the 
Sultan’s orders to march towards the Euphrates, while menaced 
by the Mamelukes on flank and rear. Selim assembled his divan 
at Constantinople, and the question of war with Egypt was 
earnestly deliberated. The Secretary Mohammed (who was dis¬ 
tinguished for his scientific attainments, and whom Selim had 
raised to office as a mark of his regard for science) spoke strongly 
in favour of war, and urged that it ought to be a point of honour 
with the Sultan of the Ottomans to acquire by conquest the pro¬ 
tectorate of the Holy Cities. Selim was so delighted with the 
warlike speech of his favourite philosopher, that he gave him the 
rank of Vizier on the spot. Mohammed at first declined the pro¬ 
motion, but Selim took a summary method of curing his scruples. 
With his own royal hands he applied the bastinado to the man 
whom he delighted to honour, till the diffident follower of science 
accepted the proffered dignity. It was resolved to wage war in 
Egypt, but messengers requiring submission were first to be sent 
in obedience to the precepts of the Koran. Selim, however, did 
not delay his preparations for warfare until the result of the mes¬ 
sage was ascertained. He left Constantinople at the same time 
with his ambassadors, and placed himself at the head of the 
intended army of Egypt. 

Kanssou-Ghawri was v at Aleppo when Selim’s ambassadors 
reached him. He committed the folly as well as the crime of 
treating them with insult and personal violence, though on the 
approach of the Turkish army he set them at liberty, and vainly 
endeavoured to open negotiations. The first battle, which de¬ 
termined the fate of Syria, was fought on the 24th August, 1516, 
not far from Aleppo,' in a plain where, according to Mahometan 
tradition, is the tomb of David. The effect of the Turkish 
artillery, and the dissensions among the Mamelukes themselves, 
gave Selim an easy victory; and the aged Sultan Ghawri died 
while endeavouring to escape. The Mamelukes chose as their 
new Sultan, Touman Bey, a chief eminent for his valour and the 
nobility and generosity of his disposition. Their defeat had not 
damped the spirits of the Mamelukes, who remembered their 
victories in the former war, and considered themselves far superior 
to the Ottomans in military skill and personal prowess. During 


SELIM /. A.D. 1512 - 1520 . 143 

the confusion caused by the defeat and death of the Sultan, and 
the retreat of the principal surviving Beys to Cairo for the pur¬ 
pose of electing his successor, Selim had been suffered to occupy 
Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and the other Syrian cities, without 
resistance ; but it was resolved to defend the passage of the Desert 
against him; and an advanced force cf Mamelukes was sent to 
Gaza, while Touman Bey concentrated the mass of the Egyptian 
forces in the vicinity of Cairo. 

Selim prepared for the difficult march from the inhabited 
portion of Syria to the Egyptian frontier with his customary 
forethought and energy. He purchased many thousand camels, 
which were laden with water for the use of his army while cross¬ 
ing the Desert,-and he distributed a liberal donative of money 
among his men. His Grand Vizier, Sinan Pacha, defeated the 
advanced force of the Mamelukes near Gaza, after an obstinate 
fight, which was determined in favour of the Turks by their 
artillery. The Turkish army then crossed the Desert in ten days, 
and marched upon the Egyptian capital, Cairo. Touman Bey’s 
army was at Ridania, a little village on the road leading towards 
that city; and it was there that the decisive battle was fought 
on the 22 nd January, 1517. Two of the Egyptian Sultan’s 
chief officers, Ghazali and Khair Bey, had betrayed him, and 
baffled the skilful tactics by which he hoped to take the Ottoman 
army in flank while on the march. Though compelled to fight at 
disadvantage, the Mameluke chivalry never signalised their valour 
more than on the fatal day of Ridania. At the very commence¬ 
ment of the action, a band of horsemen, armed from head to foot 
in steel, galloped from the Egyptian left in upon the Turkish 
centre, to where the Sultan’s own banner was displayed. Touman 
Bey himself, and two of his best captains, Alan Bey, and Kourt 
Bey, led this daring charge. They had sworn to take the Otto - 
man Sultan dead or alive ; and Selim was only saved by their 
mistaking for him Sinan Pacha, the Grand Vizier, who was at 
that moment in the centre of a group of tile principal officers of 
the Turkish army. Touman Bey speared Sinan through and 
through : Alan Bey, and Kourt Bey, killed each a pacha; and 
then rapidly wheeling their ready chargers, the bold Mamelukes 
rode back to their own army, though Alan Bey received a severe 
wound from a bullet. The other Mamelukes (save those whom 
treachery kept back) charged with valour worthy of such chiefs ; 
but the efforts of this splendid cavalry were as vain against the 
batteries of Selim’s artillery, as were in aftertime the charges of 
their successors against the rolling fire of Napoleon’s squares. 


144 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Touman Bey and a relic of his best cavaliers escaped to Aclviy<$, 
but 25,000 Mamelukes lay heaped on the plain of Kidania. 

Selim sent a detachment of his army to occupy Cairo. They 
entered it without resistance, seven days after the battle ; but the 
indomitable Touman Bey suddenly came upon the intrusive 
garrison, and slew them to a man. Selim sent his best troops to 
retake the city, which had no regular fortifications, but in which 
the Turks now found every street barricaded, and every house a 
fortress. A desperate street battle now ensued, and for three 
days the Mamelukes held Cairo against the assaulting columns of 
the Sultan. At the suggestion of the traitor Khair Bey, Selim 
now proclaimed an amnesty to such Mamelukes as would surrender. 
On the faith of this promise the warfare ceased, and 800 of the 
chief Mamelukes voluntarily became Selim’s prisoners, or were 
given up to him by the citizens. Selim had them all beheaded, 
and then ordered a general massacre of the wretched inhabitants 
of Cairo, 50,000 human beings are said to have perished in this 
atrocious butchery. Ivourt Bey, who was reputed the most 
valiant of the Mamelukes, was for a time concealed in Cairo ; but 
Selim, by promises of safety, induced the champion of the Cir¬ 
cassian race to present himself before him. Selim received him, 
seated on his throne, and with all the dignitaries of his camp 
around him. Selim, looking on him, said, “ Thou wast a hero on 
horseback—where is now thy valour V ’ “ It is always with me,” 

answered Kourt Bey, laconically. “ Knowest thou what thou 
hast done to my army V’ “ Right well.” Selim then expressed 
his astonishment at the attack on his person, which Kourt Bey 
had, in concert with Touman Bey and Alan Bey, dared to make 
at Bidania, and which had proved so fatal to Sinan Pacha. Upon 
this , Kourt Bey, who was as renowned for his eloquence as for 
his courage, poured forth a brilliant eulogy on the valour of the 
Mamelukes, and spoke with contempt and abhorrence of guns, 
which, he said, killed so cowardly and so like an assassin. 1 lie 

1 The reader will remember Hotspur. Old Knolle3, in relating the 
victory of Selim over the Persians, breathes the same spirit. He says that 
the Persian cavalry “had been of the Turks invincible, if it had not been 
overwhelmed by the cruel, cowardly , and murdering artillery, and wonder¬ 
ful multitude of men.” See also Byron’s “Island,” canto 3, and note. 

With respect to the speech of Kourt Bey in the text, it is to be observed 
that it ought not to be considered a mere imaginary composition, like the 
speeches in many of the classical historians, and in many of their modern 
imitators. ’V on Hammer gives this dialogue between Kourt Bey and Selim, 
on the authority of, among others, the Scheik Seinel, who had held an 
appointment at Touman Bey’s court, and who must have been an eye and 


SELIM /. A.D. 1512-1520. 145 

told Selim that the first time that Venetian 1 bullets (so the Mame¬ 
lukes call cannon and musket-balls) were brought into Egypt, 
was in the reign of Eschref-Kanssou, when a Mauritanian offered 
to arm the Mamelukes with them ; but the Sultan and the Beys 
of the army rejected that innovation in warfare as unworthy of 
true valour, and as a departure from the example of the Prophet, 
who had consecrated the sabre and the bow as the fit weapons for 
his followers. Kourt Bey said that the Mauritanian had, on this 
refusal, cried out, “ Some of you shall live to see this empire 
perish by these bullets.” “Alas !” added Kourt Bey, “that pre¬ 
diction is accomplished : but all power is in the hands of God the 
Most High.” “ Plow comes it,” said Selim, “ if ye place all your 
strength in the /word of God, that we have beaten you, and driven 
you from your strong places, and thou thyself standest here a 
prisoner before me ?” “ By Allah,” answered Kourt Bey, “ we 

were not overthrown because ye were braver in battle or better 
horsemen than we ; but because it was our destiny. For, all that 
has a beginning must have an end, and the duration of empires is 
limited. Where are the Caliphs, those champions of Islam ? 
Where are the mightiest empires of the world ? And your time, 
also, ye Ottomans, will come ; and your dominion shall in turn be 
brought to nothing. As for myself, I am not thy prisoner, Sultan 
Selim, but I stand here free and secure by reason of thy promises 
and pledges.” Kourt Bey then turned to the traitor Khair Bey, 
who stood by Selim during this interview, and after heaping the 
most withering invectives on him, he counselled Selim to strike 
the betrayer’s head off, lest he should drag him down to hell. 
Then said Selim, full of wrath, “ I had thought to set thee free, 
and even to make thee one of my Beys. But thou hast loosened 
thy tongue in an unseemly course, and not set respect of my 
presence before thine eyes. He who stands before princes with¬ 
out reverence, is driven from them with shame.” Kourt Bey 
answered with spirit: “ God preserve me from ever being officei 
of thine.” At these words Selim’s rage overflowed, and he called 
for executioners. A hundred swords were ready at his command. 
“ What good will my single head do thee,” continued the fearless 
Mameluke, “when so many brave men are on the watch for thine; 
and Touman Bey still trusts in God V’ Selim signed to one of' his 
headsmen to strike. While the sabre was swung round to slay, 

ear-witness of much related in his narrative of the conquest of Egypt. See 
tlie list of Oriental authorities prefixed to Von Hammer, book xiii. 

1 Bindikia, i.e. Venetian. Von Hammer says that bullets are still called 

so in Egypt. 





J 4 6 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

the doomed hero turned to Khair Bey, “ Take my bloody head, 
traitor, and place it in thy wife’s lap, and may ‘ God make the 
betrayer betrayed.’ ” Such were the last words of Kourt Bey, the 
bravest of the brave Mamelukes. 

Touman Bey, after the final loss of Cairo, had sought to 
strengthen himself by employing Arabs in his army, contrary to 
the former practice of the Mamelukes. He gained some advan¬ 
tages over detachments of Selim’s army: and Selim offered him 
peace on condition of his acknowledging himself to be vassal of 
the Ottoman Sultan. But the treacherous massacre at Cair», and 
the execution of Kourt Bey, had exasperated the Mamelukes; and 
they put Selim’s messenger and the whole of his attendants to 
death: Selim retorted by the slaughter of 3000 prisoners. The 
war continued a little longer; but the Arabs and the Mame¬ 
lukes under Touman Bey quarrelled with each other, and fought 
in the very presence of the Ottoman army, which poured its 
cannonade upon the combatants with impartial destructiveness. 
At length, Touman Bey’s forces were entirely dispersed; and he 
himself was betrayed into the hands of the Turks. When Selim 
was informed of his capture, he exclaimed, “ God be praised; 
Egypt is now conquered.” He at first treated his brave prisoner 
with merited respect; but the traitors Ghazali and Khair Bey 
were determined that their former sovereign should perish, and 
they raised Selim’s suspicions that there was a plot to liberate the 
royal prisoner and restore him to power. Selim, on this, ordered 
him to be put to death; and the last Mameluke Sultan, the brave, 
the chivalrous, the just Touman Bey perished on the 17th of April, 
1517. 

Egypt was now completely subdued by the Turks; but Selim 
remained there some months, engaged in settling the future 
government of the new empire which he had acquired, and in 
visiting the public buildings of its capital. The mysterious monu¬ 
ments of the Pharaohs and the relics of the splendours of the 
Ptolemies had no interest for the Ottoman Sultan. He did not 
even visit the Pyramids; but all his attention was concentrated 
on the mosques and other religious foundations of the early 
Mahometan sovereigns of Egypt. He attended divine worship in 
the chief mosques of Cairo on the first Friday after his conquest, 
and gave to the' assembled people an impressive example of re¬ 
ligious humility and contrition, by causing the rich carpets which 
had been spread for him to be removed, and by prostrating him¬ 
self with his bare forehead on the bare pavement, which he visibly 
moistened with his tears. 

i i 


SELIM I. A.D. 1512- 1 520. 147 

It is throwing no slur on the Mahometan religion to believe 
in the sincerity of Selim’s devotion; though at this very time 
the most cruel exactions were practised on the people of Egypt by 
his orders. Christendom could, during that century, show many 
a crowned tyrant, as earnest in bigotry, and as barbarous and 
unprincipled towards his fellow-creatures as Sultan Selim. Some 
of his principal followers imitated their master in oppression and 
rapacity; but there were also nobler and more generous spirits 
among the Ottoman chiefs. The historian Idris has been already 
mentioned with honour for the justice and skill, with which he 
organised the administrative system of Diarbekir and Kurdistan, 
when set over those newly-conquered countries by Selim. He 
had subsequently attended the Sultan during the Egyptian cam¬ 
paign; and he now risked his life by interceding with his savage 
master in behalf of the oppressed natives. He had been com¬ 
missioned by Selim to translate from the Arabic the work of 
Demiri on natural history; and he added to his translation a 
short poem, which he wrote ill Persian, and in which he gave the 
Sultan severe and salutary advice about the administration of 
Egypt. The Ottoman Viziers in whose hands he placed his book 
(according to the court ceremonial) for presentation to the Sultan, 
dreaded his wrath on receiving such free-spoken counsel; and 
they offered Idris 1000 ducats if he would take his poem of advice 
back, and suffer the “ Treatise on Natural History” to be laid 
before their royal master without it. Idris refused the money, 
and insisted on his treatise and poem being presented to the 
Sultan, threatening the Viziers that unless they did their duty he 
would himself bring his writings to Selim’s notice, and inform him 
of the negligence of his court officers. Thus threatened, the 
Viziers were obliged to comply, and Idris had the noble daring to 
subjoin to his poem a letter, in which he requested the Sultan’s 
permission to leave Egypt, unless the misery and misgovernment, 
which he saw in all directions there, were remedied. 

The heads of Selim’s best generals would have fallen for half 
this boldness; but Selim’s admiration for literary merit was strong 
and sincere, and he only showed the mortification which he ex¬ 
perienced from Idris’s rebuke, by sending the high-minded his¬ 
torian to Constantinople by the Turkish fleet, which at Selim’s 
orders had sailed to the harbour of Alexandria, and which, on its 
return, menaced, but did not attack, the island of Rhode-s. 

Another literary favourite of Selim, Kemal Paschazade, who 
held the high legal station of Cadiasker of Anatolia, ventured with 
imounitv, about the same time, to bring to the knowledge of the 

10—2 


148 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Sultan tlie discontent that was gathering among the ranks of the 
army at their prolonged detention in Egypt. Thus cautioned, 
Selim abandoned the projects which, like Cambyses, he had formed 
of conquering the countries beyond the cataracts of the Kile, and 
prepared for his march back to Europe. He had respected the 
persons of his literary reprovers, and he abstained, as was his 
custom, from punishing the common soldiery for their opposition 
to his wishes ; but he vented his wrath on his Viziers and other 
high officers at every opportunity. The Grand Vizier, Younis- 
Pacha, was one of his victims. As he rode with Selim on the 
march back to Syria, Selim said to him, “ Well, our backs are now 
turned on Egypt, and we shall soon see Gaza.” Younis-Pacha 
(who had always opposed the Egyptian expedition) answered 
hastily, “ And what has been the result of all our trouble and 
anxiety, except that we have left half our army on the battle¬ 
field, or in the sands of the Desert, and have set up a gang of 
traitors as chiefs of Egypt V ’ Selim instantly bade his guards put 
Younis to death, and the Grand Vizier’s head was struck off as he 
sate on horseback by the Sultan’s side. 

The mode of administering the government of Egypt was a 
subject of deep anxiety to Selim, as it had been to all former con¬ 
querors of that wealthy and powerful country. The Persian 
Kings, the Roman Emperors, 1 and the Syrian Caliphs, had ever 

1 “ He would not sow in a foreign soil the seeds of independence, which 
he was intent upon crushing nearer home. Egypt, with the sea in its front, 
and a desert on either hand, was difficult of access to the Roman armies ; 
its overflowing stores of grain might give it the command of the Italian 
markets, and its accumulated treasures might buy the swords of mer¬ 
cenary legions. Octavius made it his own. He appointed a favourite 
officer, Cornelius Callus, whose humble rank as a knight, as well as his 
tried services, seemed to ensure his fidelity, to govern it. In due time he 
persuaded the senate and people to establish it as a principle, that Egypt 
should never be placed under the administration of any man of superior 
rank to the equestrian, and that no senator should be allowed even to visit 
it, without express permission from the supreme authority.' For the 
defence of this cherished province Octavius allotted three legions, besides 
some squadrons of cavalry, and a body of nine cohorts of pure Roman ex¬ 
traction. One legion was quartered in Alexandria, the inhabitants of which, 
though turbulent, were incapable of steady resistance ; a division of three 
cohorts garrisoned Syene on the Nubian frontier, and others were stationed 
in various localities. Under the military commander was a revenue officer, 
whose accounts were delivered to Octavius himself, by whom he was 
directly appointed.” — Merivale’s “ History of the Romans under the 
Empire,” vol. iii. pp. S56, 357. See also the observations of Napoleon on 
Egypt, vol. iv. ; Monthoion’s Memoirs, pp. 210-277. Though not ahvay 3 
accurate in his historical details, Napoleon is the best writer on the subject 


SELIM I. A.D. 1512 * 1520 . 349 

found good cause to dread that their Egyptian province would 
assert its independence. An ambitious Pacha, if of daring genius 
and favoured by circumstances, might have raised up against the 
Ottomans the Arabian nation, of which Egypt (according to its 
last great conqueror, Napoleon) is the natural metropolis. Selim 
even feared that the division of Egypt into several pachalics would 
not be a sufficient guarantee for its subjection to the Porte; and 
he, therefore, resolved to divide authority among the variety of 
races in the country, and so to secure his imperial sovereignty. 
He did not extirpate the Mamelukes; nor did he provide for their 
gradual extinction by forbidding the Beys to recruit their house¬ 
holds with new slaves from Circassia. Twenty-four Beys of the 
Mamelukes, chosen from those who had acted with the invaders, 
continued to preside over the departments of the province, and 
their chief, the arch-traitor Khair Bey, was styled governor of 
Egypt. Selim, however, sent Khair Bey’s wives and children to 
Europe, as securities for his good behaviour. He formed a more 
effectual and lasting safeguard for the Turkish supremacy, by 
placing a permanent force of 5000 Spahis and 500 Janissaries in 
the capital, under the command of the Ottoman Aga Khaireddin, 
who had orders never to leave the fortifications. This force was 
recruited from among the inhabitants of Egypt, and formed gradu¬ 
ally a provincial militia with high privileges and importance. 
Selim placed the greater part of the administrative functions of 
law and religion in the hands of the Arab Scheiks, who possessed 
the greatest influence over the mass of the population, which, like 
themselves, was of Arabic origin. The Scheiks naturally attached 
themselves, through religious spirit and inclination, to Constanti¬ 
nople rather than to the Mamelukes, and drew the feelings of the 
other Arab inhabitants with them. Selim took no heed of the 
Copts, the aboriginal natives of Egypt; but it was from among 
this despised class and the Jews, that the Mameluke Beys gener¬ 
ally selected their agents and tax-gatherers, and the villages were 
commonly under the immediate government of Coptic local officers. * 1 

The Mameluke Sultans of Egypt, whose dynasty Selim cut 
short, had been the recognised suzerains, and protectors of the 
holy cities of Arabia; and Selim now acquired the same titles and 


of Egypt that a general or a statesman can consult. He seems to have 
almost prophesied the rising of Mehemet Ali against the Porte. 

There is a sketch of the history of Egypt under the Mamelukes and under 
the Porte, in the first volume of Hope’s “ Anastasias,” which is worth con¬ 
sulting for other purposes than those of mere amusement. 

1 See Von Hammer, Napoleon, and Hope, tit supra. 




150 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

rights, which were of infinite worth in the eyes of that imperial 
devotee, and which were, and are, of real practical value to an 
Ottoman Sultan, from the influence which they give him over the 
whole Mahometan world. 

Another important dignity, which the Sultan Selim and his 
successors obtained from the conquest of Egypt, was the succes¬ 
sion to the Caliphate, and to the spiritual power and pre-eminence 
of the immediate Vicars of Mahomet himself. After the deaths 
of the four first Caliphs, wdio had been personal companions of 
the Prophet, the spiritual sovereignty of Islam passed succes¬ 
sively to the Ommiade Caliphs and to the Abbassides, whose 
temporal power was overthrown by Houlogou Khan, a grandson 
of Zenghis Khan, in 1258. But though the substantial autho¬ 
rity of the Caliphs as independent princes was then shattered, 
the name was perpetuated three centuries longer in eighteen 
descendants of the House of Abbas, who dwelt in Egypt vfith 
titular pomp, but no real power, in the capital of the Mameluke 
rulers, like the descendants of the Great Mogul in British India. 
They gave their names to the edicts of the Mameluke Sultans 
when required; and we have seen in the case of the Ottoman 
Bajazet I., that Mahometan princes in other countries still re¬ 
garded the Egyptian Caliph as the fountain of honour, and sought 
from him the stamp and sanction of sovereignty. When Selim 
conquered Egypt, he found there Mohammed, the twelfth Caliph 
of the family of Abbas, and he induced him solemnly to transfer 
the Caliphate to the Ottoman Sultan and his successors. At the 
same time Selim took possession of the visible insignia of that 
high office, which the Abbassides had retained—the sacred stan¬ 
dard, the sword, and the mantle of the Prophet. 

In a preceding chapter of this volume, attention has been 
drawn to the importance of the Turkish Sultan being at once the 
spiritual and the temporal chief of his Mahometan subjects—of 
his being both Pope and Emperor. It will readily be imagined 
how much the Sultan’s authority must have been augmented by 
his acquiring the sacred position of Caliph, Vicar of the Prophet 
of God, Commander of the Faithful, and Supreme Imam of 
Islam. It gives the Turkish Sultan dignity and authority 
(and may possibly give him practical inliuence), not only over his 
own Mahometan subjects, but over all who profess the creed of 
Islam, wdiatever be their race, and whatever be their country—ex¬ 
cept the Persians, and the few others who hold the Scliiite tenets. 1 

^ 1 Sir George Campbell (p. 40) speaks contemptuously of the idea of the 
Turkish Sultan having any influence beyond the Turkish dominions over 


SELIM I . A . D . 1512-1520. 151 

In September, 1517, Sultan Selim led back his victorious army 
from Egypt to Syria. A thousand camels, laden with gold and 
silver, carried part of the rich spoils of the war; and a more 
valuable portion had been sent by Selim on board the Ottoman 
fleet to Constantinople. This consisted of the most skilful arti¬ 
sans of Cairo, whom Selim selected, as he had done at Tabriz, and 
removed to the capital city of his empire. Selim halted his army 
for some months, first at Damascus and afterwards at Aleppo. 
During this time he received the submission of several Arabian 
tribes, and arranged the division of Syria into governments, and 
the financial and judicial administration of that province. He re¬ 
turned to Constantinople in August, 1518. He had been absent 
but little more than two years, and in that time had conquered 
three nations, the Syrian, the Egyptian, and the Arabian. 

Selim’s attention was now earnestly directed to the development 
of the maritime resources of his empire. In 1519 he built 150 
new ships of various dimensions, some of 700 tons ; at the same 
time 100 new galleys, that lay ready for launching, were ordered 
to be rigged and fully equipped for sea. A powerful army of 
60,000 men, with a large train of artillery, was collected and kept 
on foot in Asia Minor, ready to enter on a campaign at the first 
word of command. It was supposed by some that Selim designed 
a great attack upon Persia; but it was generally believed that the 
Turkish preparation would make for Rhodes. But Selim was 
resolved not to strike until the blow was sure to be effective; and 


Sunnite Mahometans, because he is Caliph. I do not presume to compare 
my opportunities for observing Mahometan populations with those long 
possessed by Sir George Campbell, nor do I cavil at his ability in using such 
opportunities. But I have had practical occasion to learn much of the habits 
and feelings of the Moormen of Ceylon, a country never under Turkish rule, 
and I have conversed much with those who have long been familiar with 
Mahometans in other parts of the Far East. I know as a fact that on one 
occasion of deep interest to the Mahometan population of Ceylon, when 
their principal mosque at Barberyn had been polluted by some Sinhalese, 
who laid a dead pig in it, on the desk of the reader of the Koran, and 
when there was great difficulty felt among the Moormen as to the lawful¬ 
ness of their religious rites and liturgy being resumed there, a deputation 
was sent to Mecca to seek the advice of the chief doctors of the law in 
the Holy City, and that such advice was obtained and followed. I believe 
that the teachers of the law at Mecca are generally consulted on questions 
of religious duty by Sunnite Mahometans ; and certainly the authority of 
the Sultan, as Caliph, is fully recognised at Mecca. I may add that there 
is full proof in Eastern newspapers at present, that very deep interest in 
the fate of Turkey is felt and expressed by Mahometans far beyond the 
limits of Turkish temporal power. 



152 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

the armaments in the Turkish seaports, and the building of fresh 
dockyards and arsenals, were continued with unremitting industry 
in the succeeding year. From the immense naval force which was 
thus created, it could no longer be doubted that Rhodes was the 
object of attack. Selim had not forgotten the humiliating repulse 
from that stronghold of the Christians, which his grandfather had 
sustained ; and he would not open the campaign until everything 
that could be required during the expedition had been amply 
provided and arranged, even in the minutest details. His Viziers 
were more eager to commence the enterprise, and drew down on 
themselves the rebuke of their stern and thoughtful master. One 
clay when the Sultan, in company with Hasandschan, the father 
of the historian Seaclecldin, was leaving the mosque of Eyoub, he 
saw one of the new first-class galleys, which* he had ordered to be 
fitted out and kept ready for launching, sailing along the port of 
Constantinople. Transported with fury, he demanded by whose 
order the galley had left the stocks; and it was with great diffi¬ 
culty that the Grand Vizier, Piri Pacha, saved the admiral’s head, 
by representing to the Sultan that it bad long been usual to launch 
vessels when they were completely ready. Selim called his Viziers 
round him, and said to them, “ You try to hurry me to the con¬ 
quest of Rhodes; but do you know what such an expedition 
requires % Can you tell me what quantity of gunpowder yon have 
in store ¥* The Viziers, taken by surprise, were unable to answer; 
but the next day they came to the Sultan, and said that they had 
ammunition sufficient for a siege of four months. Selim answered, 
angrily, “ What is the use of ammunition for four months, when 
double the amount would not be enough 1 Do you wish me to 
repeat the shame of Mahomet II. h I will not begin the war, nor 
will I make the voyage to Rhodes, with such scant preparations. 
Besides, I believe that the only voyage, which I have to make, is 
the voyage to the other world.” 

These words were uttered with a true presentiment of approach¬ 
ing death. He left his capital with the intention of going to 
Adrianople; and though symptoms of acute disease had already 
appeared, he rode on horseback, notwithstanding the remon¬ 
strance and entreaties of his physicians: nor could they prevail 
on him to discontinue the use of opium. When he reached the 
little \ llla^e, on the road to Adrianople, where he had formerly 
given battle to his father, and where, according to the Venetian 
narrative of his death, he had received his father’s curse, the agony 
of his disease became so violent that he was compelled to stop. 
On the seventh night after he had left Constantinople, Ilasand- 


SELIM I. A.D. 1512-1520. 153 

schan, who was his inseparable companion, was sitting by the 
dying monarch, and reading to him from the Koran. The move¬ 
ment of Selim’s lips seemed to show that he followed the words 
of the reader; but, suddenly, at the verse “The word of the 
Almighty is salvation,” Selim clenched his hand convulsively, and 
ceased to live (22nd September, 1520). 

This prince died in the fifty-fourth year of his age, and the ninth 
of his reign. The maxim which, in our great dramatist, the evil 
spirit gives to the northern usurper, “Be bloody, bold, and resolute,” 
might seem to have been the ruling principle of Sultan Selim’s life. 
But no one can deny his high administrative and military abilities; 
and in religion, though a bigot of the darkest order, he was un¬ 
questionably sincere. His personal eminence in literature, and his 
enlightened and liberal patronage of intellectual merit in others 
are matters of just'eulogy with the Oriental writers. One of the 
most remarkable legal characters of this reign is the Mufti Djemali. 
If he disgraced himself by the fetva with which he sanctioned, on 
the most frivolous pretexts, the war with Egypt, the honesty and 
the courage with which he often opposed the cruelty of Selim are 
highly honourable to his memory; nor can we refuse our praise 
to the monarch, who repeatedly curbed his haughty will, and ab¬ 
stained from the coveted bloodshedcling at his subject’s rebuke. 
On one occasion Selim had, for some slight cause of wrath, ordered 
150 of the persons employed in his treasury to be put to death. 
Djemali stood before the Sultan, and said to him, “It is the duty 
of the Mufti to have a care for the weal of the Sultan of Islam in 
the life to come. I therefore ask of thee the lives of the 150 men 
unrighteously sentenced by thee to death.” Selim answered, 
“The Ulema have nothing to do with affairs of state. Besides, 
the masses are only to be kept, in order by severity.” 1 Djemali replied, 
“It is not a question of policy of this world, but of the next, 
-where mercy meets with everlasting reward, but unjust severity 
with everlasting punishment.” Selim gave way to the Mufti; and 
not only spared those whom he had sentenced, but restored them 
to their functions. 

At another period in Selim’s reign he had issued an ordinance 
prohibiting the trade in silk with Persia, and he had seized the 
goods of the merchants engaged in the traffic, and ordered the 
merchants themselves, to the number of 400, to be put to death. 
Djemali interceded in their favour as he rode by the Sultan’s side 

1 The German of Von Hammer gives this more pithily : 

“ SOlan bcl;m-fcl)t tie memje nm* nut <£tvcnoe.” 


154 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

on the Adrianople road. Selim cried out, in indignation, “ Is it 
not lawful to slay two-thirds of the inhabitants of the earth for 
the good of the other third 1” “ Yes,” answered the Mufti, “ if 

those two-thirds threaten to bring great wickedness upon earth.” 
“ And can there be greater wickedness,” said Selim, “ than dis¬ 
obedience to a sovereign’s command 1 Every country that 
renounces obedience to its rulers goes headlong to destruction.” 
“ The disobedience is not proved here,” rejoined the intrepid 
Djemali. “ The trade in silk was not previously prohibited.” 
“Keep yourself from meddling with state affairs,” exclaimed 
Selim in fury ; and the Mufti, not seeking to conceal his indigna¬ 
tion, left the Sultan without the customary reverence. Selim’s 
surprise equalled his wrath. He checked his horse, and sate for 
some time absorbed in reflection. But at last he gained the 
victory over himself, and on his return to Constantinople he set 
the condemned merchants at liberty, and restored their mer¬ 
chandise. He then sent a letter to Djemali, in which he announced 
his royal pleasure to confer on him the united highest dignities of 
the law, those of Judge of Boumelia and Judge of Anatolia. 
Djemali declined the proffered rank, but continued to retain the 
Sultan’s esteem and friendship. The most memorable exercise of 
his salutary influence was in preserving the whole Greek popula¬ 
tion of the Ottoman Empire from the destruction with which they 
were menaced by Selim’s bigotry. After the massacre of the 
heretical Schiis, Selim formed the idea of extirpating unbelief and 
misbelief of every kind from his dominions; and he resolved to 
put all the Christians to death, and turn their churches into Ma¬ 
hometan mosques. Without avowing his precise purpose, he laid 
before his Mufti Djemali the general question, “Which is the 
most meritorious—to conquer the whole world, or to convert the 
nations to Islam 1” The Mufti gave an answer that the con¬ 
version of the infidels was incontestably the more meritorious 
work, and the one most pleasing to God. Having obtained this 
fetva, Selim ordered his Grand Vizier forthwith to change all the 
churches into mosques, to forbid the practice of the Christian 
religion, and to put to death all who refused to become Ma¬ 
hometans. The Grand Vizier, alarmed at the sanguinary edict, 
consulted Djemali, who had unconsciously given the fetva, which 
the Sultan used to justify the massacre of this Christians. By 
Djemali’s recommendation the Greek patriarch sought an audience 
of the Sultan; and although with much difficulty, was heard 
before the Divan at Adrianople. He appealed to the pledges 
given by Mahomet II. in favour of the Christians when Constan- 


SELIM /. A.D. 1512-1520. 155 

tinople was conquered; and he eloquently invoked the passages 
of the Koran, which forbid compulsory conversion, and enjoin the 
Mussulmans to practise religious toleration to all the people of 
the Books, who submit to pay tribute. Selim yielded to the 
remonstrances and entreaties of the menaced Greeks, and to the 
urgent advice of his best counsellors, so far as to abstain from the 
slaughter of the Rayas which he had intended. Still he refused 
to suffer the finest churches of Constantinople to be used any 
longer by the Christians :—they were changed into mosques; but 
inferior structures of wood were built in their stead, and the 
ruinous churches were repaired by Selim’s orders, so that apparent 
respect might be paid to the grant of liberties from his great 
ancestor to the Greeks. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 



CHAPTER IX. 

IMPORTANCE OF THE EPOCH OF SOLYMAN’S REIGN—HIS CHA¬ 
RACTER—JOY AT HIS ACCESSION—CONQUEST OF BELGRADE AND 
RHODES—BATTLE OF MOIIACZ—SIEGE OF VIENNA—CRITICAL 
REPULSE OF THE TURKS . 1 

The period comprised within the reign of Solyman I. (1520-1566), 
is one of the most important, not only in Ottoman history, hut in 
the history of the world. The great monarchies of Western 
Christendom had now emerged from the feudal chaos. They had 
consolidated their resources, and matured their strength. They 
stood prepared for contests on a grander scale, for the exhibition 
of more sustained energy, arid for the realisation of more sys- 
. tematic schemes of aggrandisement, than had been witnessed 
during the centuries which we term the ages of mediaeval history. 
At the commencement of this epoch (1520), nearly forty years 
had passed away since the Ottomans had been engaged in earnest 
conflict with the chief powers of central and western Europe. 
The European wars of the feeble Bajazet II. had been coldly 
waged, and were directed against the minor states of Christendom; 
and the fierce energies of his son Selim the Inflexible had been 
devoted to the conquest of Mahometan nations. During these 
two reigns, the great kingdoms of modern Europe had started 
l from childhood into manhood. Spain had swept the last relics 
of her old Moorish conquerors from her soil, and had united the 
sceptres of her various Christian kingdoms under the sway of a 
single dynasty. France, under three warlike kings, Charles VIII., 
Louis XII., and Francis I., had learned to employ in brilliant 
schemes of foreign conquest those long-discordant energies and 
long-divided resources, which Louis XI. had brought beneath the 
sole authority of the crown. In.England, and in the dominions 
of the House of Austria, similar developments of matured and 
concentrated power had taken place. Moreover, while the arts, 
which enrich and adorn nations, had received ill Christendom, 


1 See Von Hammer, books xxv,, xxvi. 


SGLYMAN I. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 157 

towards the close of the fifteenth century, an almost unprecedented 
and unequalled impulse, the art of war had been improved there 
even in a higher degree. Permanent armies, comprising large 
bodies of well-armed and well-trained infantry, were now em¬ 
ployed. The manufacture and the use of firearms, especially of 
artillery, were better understood, and more generally practised; 
and a school of skilful as well as daring commanders had arisen, 
trained in the wars and on the model of the Great Captain Gon- 
salvo of Cordova. Besides the commencement of the struggle 
between France and Austria for the possession of Italy, many 
great events signalised the transition period from mediaeval to 
modern history, at the end of the fifteenth and the commence¬ 
ment of the sixteenth centuries : and those events, though not all 
strictly connected with warfare, were all of a nature calculated 
to waken a more far-reaching, and a more enduring heroism among 
the Christian nations, and to make them more formidable to their 
Mahometan rivals. The great maritime discoveries and the con¬ 
quests effected by the Portuguese and the Spaniards in the East 
Indies and in the New World; the revival of classical learning; 
the splendid dawnings of new literatures; the impulse given 
by the art of printing to enlightenment, discussion, and free 
inquiry; all tended to multiply and to elevate the leading spirits 
of Christendom, to render them daring in aspiration, and patient 
of difficulty and of suffering in performance. There was also 
reason to expect that these new energies of the Franks would find 
their field of action in conquests over Islam; for, religious zeal 
had again become fervent in that age; and the advancement of 
the Cross was the ultimate purpose of the toils of the mariner, 
the philosopher, and the student, as well as of the statesman and 
the soldier. The hope that the treasures to be derived from his 
voyages would serve to rescue the Holy Land from the infidels, 
■was ever present to the mind of Columbus amid his labours and 
his sufferings, and amid the perils of the unknown deep; even as J 
Charles VIII., amid his marches and battle-fields between the 
Alps and Naples, still cherished the thought of proceeding from 
conquered Italy to the rescue of Constantinople from the 
Turks. 

The probability of a marked change in the balance of power ' 
between Christendom and Islamism before the middle of the 
sixteenth century, may seem to have been materially increased by 
the fact that one Christian sovereign combined many of the most 
powerful states under his single rule. The Emperor Charles V. 
reigned over an empire equal to that of Charlemagne in space, 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


15S 

and immeasurably surpassing it in wealth and strength. He had 
inherited the Netherlands, the Austrian states, and the united 
Spanish monarchy, with the fair kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. 
He obtained by election the imperial throne of Germany; and 
Cortes and Pizarro gave him the additional transatlantic empires 
of Mexico and Peru, with their almost countless supplies of silver 
and gold. It might perhaps have been foreseen that the possessor 
of this immense power would be trammelled when employing it 
against the Ottomans, by the ambitious rivalry of France, and by 
the religious dissensions of Germany; but, on the other hand, the 
Ottoman Empire was at least in an equal degree impeded from 
full action against Christendom by the imperial rivalry of Persia, 
by the hatred of Schiite against Sunnite, and by the risk of revolt 
in Syria and Egypt. 

Yet, the House of Othman not only survived this period of 
peril, but was lord of the ascendant throughout the century, and 
saw numerous and fair provinces torn from the Christians, and 
heaped together to increase its already ample dominions. Much, 
unquestionably, of this success was due to the yet unimpaired 
vigour of the Turkish military institutions, to the high national 
spirit of the people, and to the advantageous position of their 
territory. But the principal cause of the Ottoman greatness 
throughout this epoch was the fact that the empire was ruled by 
a great man—great, not merely through his being called on to act 
amid combinations of favouring circumstances—not merely by tact 
in discerning and energy in carrying out the spirit of his age—but 
a man great in himself, an intelligent ordainer of the present, and 
a self-inspired moulder of the future. 

Sultan Solyman I., termed by European writers “ Solyman the 
Great,” and “Solyman the Magnificent,” bears in the histories 
written by his own countrymen the titles of “ Solyman Kanouni ” 
(Solyman the Lawgiver), and “ Solyman Sahibi Kiran ” (Solyman 
the Lord of his Age). That age was remarkably fertile in sove¬ 
reigns of high ability. The Emperor Charles V., King Francis I., 
Pope Leo X., our Henry VIII., Vasili Ivanovitch, who laid the 
foundations of the future greatness of Bussia, Sigismond I. of 
Poland, Andreas Gritti, the sage Doge of Venice, Shah Ismail, 
the restorer and legislator of Persia, and the Indian Akbar, the - 
most illustrious of the dynasty of the Great Moguls, 1 shone in the 
drama of the world at the same time that Solyman appeared 


1 Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 14. 


SOLYMAN /. A.D. 1520-1566. 159 

there. 1 Not one of these great historical characters is clothed with 
superior lustre to that of the Ottoman Sultan. 

Solyman had, while very young, in the time of Bajazet II., been 
intrusted with the command of provinces; and in his father’s 
reign he had, at the age of twenty, been left at Constantinople as 
viceroy of the empire, when Selim marched to attack Persia. He 
governed at Adrianople during the Egyptian war; and during the 
last two years of Selim’s reign he administered the province of 
Saroukhan. Thus, when at the age of twenty-six he became Sultan 
of the Ottoman Empire, he had already gained experience as a 
ruler; and he had displayed not only high abilities, but also a 
noble generosity of disposition, which won for him both affection 
and respect^ The people, weary of the ferocity of Selim the 
Inflexible, rapturously welcomed the accession of a new ruler in the 
prime of youthful manhood, conspicuous by dignity and grace of 
person, and whose prowess, justice, clemency, and wisdom were 
painted by fame and hope in the brightest colours. 

The first acts of Sultan Solyman announced that an earnest love 
of justice and generous magnanimity would be the leading principles 
of his reign. Six hundred Egyptians, whom Selim had forcibly 
transplanted to Constantinople, received permission to return to 
their homes. A large sum of money was distributed to merchants 
who had suffered by Selim’s arbitrary confiscation of their property 
for trafficking with Persia. Several officers, high in rank, including 
the admiral of the fleet, who were accused of cruelty and malversa- 

1 Korner, in his tragedy of “ Zriny,” well makes Solyman say of himself : 

“ 3d) fjab’ getebt, id) ftifyl’S, fur alle 3 eiten, 

Unb an tie ©terne fnupft id) meinen S'iuljm. 

SMe SBelt, tie flammenbe fyd'tt id) bepuungett, 

SBar’ id) ber einjge $elb in meiner 3 ett. 

Sod) grofe banner leblen mein 3al)rl)unbcrt, 

Unb groSe 4 ?etbcn ftanben unber mid). 

3d) barf mid) nid)t bed ©luffed fiiebling fdjelten, 

3d) fab’d mit tfraft bem ©d)icffal abgetro^t, 

SBad ed bem 23 ittenben uevmeigen modte.” 

** I have lived for all time of that I’m conscious— 

And on the immortal stars have knit my fame. 

I had subdued the world, had I been born 
Sole hero of my age. My toil was harder. 

My century was rich in mighty spirits, 

And many and strong were they who strove with me, 

I scorn the name of Fortune’s favourite. 

With resolute force I wrung from destiny 
What had to fond entreaties been denied.” 


i6o HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

tion, were brought to trial, convicted and executed. The report 
of these and similar deeds of the new Sultan spread rapidly through 
the empire; and Solyman’s commands to his viceroys to repress 
every kind of disorder among rich and poor, among Moslems and 
Rayas, and to'make the impartial dispensation of justice the great 
object of their lives, received universal applause and general 
obedience. The people felt that they were under a strong as well 
as a merciful government; and the Sultan was better loved for 
being also feared. It was only in Syria that any troubles followed 
the death of Sultan Selim. There, the double traitor, Ghazali, the 
Mameluke Bey, who had betrayed the Mameluke cause to the 
Turks, and had received the Syrian government as his reward, 
attempted to make himself independent; but Solyman sent an 
army against him without delay ; and the defeat and death of the 
rebel not only restored tranquillity to Syria, but checked the hostile 
designs of Shah Ismail, who had assembled his forces on the fron¬ 
tier, and stood in readiness to avail himself of Ottoman weakness 
as Persia’s opportunit} 7- . 

It was not, however, long before Solyman was called on to 
display his military abilities in foreign warfare ; and it was over 
the Hungarians that his first conquests were achieved. There had 
been disturbances and collisions on the frontiers of Hungary and 
Turkey in the last part of Selim’s reign ; and the weak prince, who 
filled the Magyar throne, Louis II., now imprudently drew the full 
-weight of the Ottoman power against his dominions, by insulting 
and putting to death the ambassador of Solyman. The young 
Sultan instantly placed himself at the head of a powerful army, 
which was provided with a large train of heavy artillery; and 
arrangements were made for the transport and regular delivery of 
stores and supplies, which showed that Solyman possessed the 
forethought and skill, as well as the courage of his father. The 
Ottoman soldiery followed him to battle with peculiar alacrity; 
and their military enthusiasm was augmented by their belief in his 
auspicious destiny, on account of his name, on account of the 
prosperous commencement of his reign, and still more on account 
of the fortunate recurrence of the mystical number Ten in all that 
related to him. The Orientals have ever attached great importance 
to numbers, and they esteem the number Ten the most fortunate 
of all. Solyman was the Tenth Sultan of the House of Othman ; 
he opened the Tenth century of the Hegira; and for these and 
other decimal attributes he was styled by his countrymen “ the 
Perfecter of the Perfect Number.” The firm conviction which his 
soldiers felt that their young Sultan was the favourite of Heaven, 


SOLYMAN /. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 161 

made them march at his bidding as to certain victory in the cause 
of God. They commonly quoted, as prophetic of the fate which 
awaited the enemies of their sovereign, the words of the epistle 
from Solyman (or Solomon) to Balkis, Queen of Sheba, in the 
xxviith chapter of the Koran : “ Thus saith Solyman, ‘ In the 
name of the Most Merciful God, dare not to rise up against me, but 
come and submit yourselves to me, and confess the true faith .’ 1,1 

Such military prophecies do much to work out their own fulfil¬ 
ment. The first campaign of Sultan Solyman against the Giaours 
was eminently successful. Sabacz and other places of minor im¬ 
portance in Hungary were besieged and taken by his generals; but 
Solyman led his main force in person against Belgrade, which long 
had been a bulwark of Christendom against the Turks, and before 
which Mahomet, the captor of Constantinople, had so signally 
failed. Belgrade was now captured (29th of August, 1521), and 
Solyman, after having turned the principal church into a mosque, 
repaired the fortifications, and provided for the maintenance of the 
city as a Turkish stronghold, marched back in triumph to Con¬ 
stantinople, after his first victorious campaign. 

Under his active and skilful superintendence new buildings for 
ornament and use in peace and in war rose rapidly in the principal 
cities of the Empire. The arsenal at Constantinople was enlarged ; 
and thousands of workmen were daily employed in framing and 
fitting out new squadrons, and in the preparation of naval and 
military stores on an unprecedented scale of grandeur. In taking 
Belgrade, Solyman had surmounted one of the two shoals, by 
which the victorious career of Mahomet II. had been checked. He 
now resolved to efface the shame of the other reverse; which his 
renowned ancestor had sustained, and to make himself master of 
the Isle of Bhodes, where the Christian knights of St. John of 
Jerusalem had so long maintained themselves near the heart of the 
Turkish power. Indeed, the possession of Rhodes by the Otto¬ 
mans was indispensable for free communication between Constanti¬ 
nople and her new conquests along the Syrian coasts and in Egypt, 
and for the establishment of that supremacy of the Ottoman navy 
in the east of the Mediterranean, which Solyman was determined 
to effect. On the 18th of June, 1522, the Ottoman fleet of 300 
sail quitted Constantinople for Rhodes. Besides its regular crews 
and immense cargoes of military stores, it carried 8000 chosen 
soldiers and 2000 pioneers. At the same time Solyman led an 
army of 100,000 men along the western coast of Asia Minor. The 
place of rendezvous for fleet and army was the Bay of Marmarice, 

1 Hulme. 

11 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


162 

where, long afterwards, in 1801, the English fleet and army, under 
Sir Ralph Abercromby, were mustered as allies of the Turks for 
the re-conquest of Egypt from the French. 

The Grand Master of Rhodes at the time of Solyman’s attack 
was Yilliers De Lisle Adam, a French knight of proved worth and 
valour. The garrison consisted of 5000 regular troops, 600 of 
whom were knights. Besides these, the seafaring men of the port 
were formed into an effective corps ; the citizens were enrolled and 
armed ; the peasantry, who crowded from the rest of the island 
into the city to escape the Turkish marauders, were disciplined as 
pioneers, and the slaves were made to work on the fortifications. 
The defences of the city had been much increased and improved, 
since the siege by Mahomet II.’s troops; and even if the outer 
walls were breached and carried, there were now inner lines of 
strong walls prepared to check the assailants ; and several quarters 
of the city had their own distinct fortifications, so as to be tenable 
(like the quarters of ancient Syracuse) even after other parts of the 
city were in possession of the besiegers. 

Solyman landed in the island of Rhodes on the 28th of July, 
1522, and the siege began on the 1st of August. It was prolonged 
for nearly five months by the valour of I)e Lisle Adam and his 
garrison, and by the skill of his engineer, Martinego. The war 
was waged almost incessantly underground by mines and counter¬ 
mines, as well as above ground by cannonade and bombardment, 
desperate sallies, and still more furious assaults. A breach was 
effected, and some of the bastions of the city were shattered early 
in September; and four murderous attempts at storming were 
made and repulsed during that month. Three more assaults, one 
on the 12th of October, one on the 23rd, and one on the 30th of 
November, were fiercely given and heroically ■withstood, though 
the effect of the cannonade on the fortifications was more and 
more visible. The Turkish commanders at length resolved to 
lavish no more lives in attempts to storm the city, but to trust to 
their mines and artillery for its gradual destruction. Advancing 
along trenches according to the plan of gradual approach which 
since has been habitually employed, but which was previously un¬ 
known, or, at least, never used so systematically, 1 the Turks 
brought their batteries to bear closer and closer upon the city; 

1 “ Aclimet Bascha delibere de ne dormer plus d’assault mais suyvre ces 
tranehees.” —Ramazan dans Tercier Memoires, xxii. p. 755, cited in Yon 
Hammer. “ It appears that the first regular approaches against a fortress 
were introduced by this people.”—Col. Chesney’s “ Turkey,” p. 367. The 
Turks also used shells for the first time in this siege.—Yon Hammer, ii. 33 


SO LYMAN I. A.D, 1520-15 66. 163 

and at length established themselves within the first defences. 
Solyman now offered terms of capitulation, and the besieged re¬ 
luctantly treated for a surrender. There were yet the means of 
prolonging the defence ; but there were no hopes of succour, and 
the ultimate fall of the city was certain. Honourable terms might 
now be obtained, the Order might be preserved, though forced to 
seek a home elsewhere, and the Rhodians might gain protection 
from the conqueror for person and property. To continue their 
resistance until the exasperated enemy overpowered them, would 
be not only to sacrifice themselves, but to expose the citizens to 
massacre, and their wives and daughters to the worst horrors of 
war. These reasons weighed with De Lisle Adam and his knights, 
as with truly brave men, and they laid down their good swords 
which they had so honourably wielded. That they did their duty 
to Christendom in their surrender, as well as in their previous 
resistance, was proved afterwards by the effectual check which 
their Order gave to Solyman at Malta. How much heroism would 
the world have lost, if the Knights ol St. John had obstinately 
sought in Rhodes the fate of Leonidas ! l 

By the terms of capitulation (Dec. 25, 1522) which Solyman 
granted to the Knights, he did honour to unsuccessful valour; and 
such honour is reflected with double lustre on the generous victor. 
The Knights were to be at liberty to quit the island with their 
arms and property within twelve days in their own galleys, and 
they were to be supplied with transports by the Turks if they 
required them : the Rhodian citizens, on becoming the Sultan’s 
subjects, were to be allowed the free exercise of their religion; 
their churches were not to be profaned; no children were to be 
taken from their parents ; and no tribute was to be required from 
the island for five years. The insubordinate violence of the Janis¬ 
saries caused some infraction of these terms; but the main pro¬ 
visions of the treaty were fairly carried into effect. By Solyman’s 
request, an interview took place between him and the Grand 
Master before the knights left the island. Solyman addressed, 
through his interpreter, words of respectful consolation to the 
Christian veteran ; and, turning to the attendant Vizier, the Sultan 
observed: “ It is not without regret that I force this brave man from 

1 I have been guided in these remarks on the surrender of Rhodes by the 
criticisms made by Marshal Marmont on this siege (Marmont’s “ State of 
the Turkish Empire, &c.,” translated by Sir F. Smith, p. 20S, 2nd ed.). 
While living conclusive military reasons for thinking that the defence 
might have been prolonged, the marshal justly terms it “honourable, and 
even glorious. ” 


i <4 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

Ills home in his old age.” Such indeed was the esteem with which 
the valour of the Knights had inspired the Turks, that they re¬ 
frained from defacing their armorial bearings and inscriptions on 
the buildings. For more than three hundred years the Ottomans 
have treated the memory of their brave foemen with the same re¬ 
spect ; and the escutcheons of the Knights of St. John, who fought 
against Sultan Solyman for Khodes, still decorate the long-captured 
city. 1 

Solyman had experienced the turbulence of the Janissaries at 
Khodes ; and he received three years afterwards a more serious 
proof of the necessity of keeping that formidable body constantly 
engaged in warfare, and under strict, but judicious discipline. 
The years 1523 and 1524 had not been signalised by any foreign 
war. The necessity of quelling a revolt of Ahmed Pacha, who had 
succeeded Khair Bey in the government of Egypt, had occupied 
part of the Ottoman forces; and after the traitor had been de¬ 
feated and killed, Solyman sent his favourite Grand Vizier Ibra¬ 
him, a Greek renegade, into that important province to re-settle 
its administration, and assure its future tranquillity. Solyman’s • 
personal attention for the first eighteen months after the campaign 
of Khodes was earnestly directed to improving the internal govern¬ 
ment of his empire; but, in the autumn of 1525, he relaxed in his 
devotion to the toils of state ; and, quitting his capital, he repaired, 
for the first time, to Adrianople, and followed there with ardour 
the amusement of the chase. The Janissaries began to murmur at 
their Sultan’s forgetfulness of war, and at last they broke out into 
open brigandage, and pillaged the houses of the principal ministers. 
Solyman returned to Constantinople, and strove to quell the storm 
by his presence. He boldly confronted the mutinous troops, and 
cut down two of their ringleaders with his own hand ; but he was 
obliged to pacify them by a donative, though he afterwards partly 
avenged himself by putting to death many of their officers, whom 
he suspected of having instigated or of having neglected to check the 
disorder. He then recalled his Vizier Ibrahim from Egypt; and, 
by his advice, determined to lead his armies into Hungary, with 

1 “ Three hundred and fifteen years have now elapsed since this illus¬ 
trious order was obliged to abandon its conquests, after a possession of two 
hundred and twelve years. The street of the knights is uninjured, and the 
door of each house is still ornamented with the escutcheon of the last in¬ 
habitant. The buildings have been spared, but are unoccupied ; and we 
could almost fancy ourselves surrounded by the shades of departed heroes. 
r J he arms of France, the noble fleur-de-lis, are seen in all directions. I 
observed those of the Clermont-Tonnerres, and of other ancient and illus¬ 
trious families.”—Marshal Marmont, 205. 


SOLYMAN /. A.D. 1520-1566. 165 

Trliicli country he was still at war, though no important operations 
had taken place since the campaign of Belgrade. Solyman was at 
this time vehemently urged to invade Hungary by Francis I. of 
France, who wished to distract the arms of his rival Charles Y. ; l 
and, on the other hand, an ambassador had been sent from Persia, 
the natural foe of Turkey, to the courts of Charles and the King 
of Hungary, to form a defensive and offensive league against the 
Ottomans. 2 

In 1526, the Sultan invaded Hungary with an army more than 
100,000 strong, and 300 pieces of artillery. Like his predecessors 
Selim and Mahomet II., he paid extreme attention to this im¬ 
portant arm of war; and, throughout his reign, the artillery of the 
Ottomans was far superior in number, in weight of metal, in 
equipment, and in the skill of the gunners, to that possessed by 
any other nation. King Louis of Hungary rashly gave battle, 
with a far inferior force, to the invaders. The Hungarian chivalry 
charged with their wonted gallantry; and a chosen band forced 
their way to where Solyman had taken his station at the head of 
his Janissaries. The Sultan owed his life to his cuirass, against 
which the lance of a Magyar knight was shivered. But the fiery 
valour of the “ furious Hun” was vain against superior numbers, 
arms, and discipline. In less than two hours the fate of Hungary 
was decided. King Louis, eight of his bishops, the greater number 
of the Magyar nobles, and 24,000 Hungarians of lower rank had 
perished. Search was made by the victors for the body of King 
Louis, which was found in a stream near the field of battle. Louis 
had been wounded in the head, and was endeavouring to escape, 
but his horse was forced from the bank by the throng of the fliers, 
and the weight of his armour bore him down in the deep water. 
The Sultan felt a generous sorrow on learning the fate of liis rival 
sovereign, who was nearly his equal in years. Solyman exclaimed, 
“May Allah be merciful to him, and punish those who misled his 
inexperience. I came indeed in arms against him ; but it was 
not my wish that he should thus be cut oft, while he had scarcely 
tasted the sweets of life and royalty.” This battle was fought at 
Mohacz, on the 28th August, 1526, and is still known by the 
terribly expressive name of “the Destruction of Mohacz.” 

After this decisive victory, Solyman inarched along the Danube 
to the twin cities of Bucla (or Ofen) and Pesth, on the opposite 
banks of that river, and the capital of Hungary at once submitted 
to him. The Akindji swept the whole country with fire and deso¬ 
lation ; and it seemed as if it was the object of the Ottomans to 
1 Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 45. 2 Ibid. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


166 

make a desert rather than a province of Hungary. At last, at the 
end of September, Solyman began his homeward march. His 
soldiers were laden with the richest plunder ; and they drove 
before them a miserable herd of 100,000 Christians, men, women, 
and little children, destined for sale in the Turkish slave-markets. 

Disturbances in Asia Minor had hastened Solyman’s departure 
from Hungary, but he returned in the third year, still more 
menacing and more formidable. The struggle was now to be with 
Austria; and the next campaign of Solyman, the campaign of the 
first siege of Vienna, is one of the most important in German and 
in Ottoman history. 

Solyman entered Hungary in 1529 under the pretext of placing 
on the throne the rightful successor to King Louis, who fell at 
Mohacz. That prince died without issue; and the Archduke 
Ferdinand of Austria, brother of Charles V., claimed the crown as 
Louis’s brother-in-law, and by virtue of an old treaty. But there 
was an ancient law of Hungary, by which none but a native 
prince could occupy the throne; and a powerful noble, named 
Zapolya, appealed to this in opposition to Ferdinand, and procured 
some of the surviving magnates of the land to elect him as king. 
A civil war ensued, in which the adherents of Ferdinand and his 
Austrian forces defeated Zapolya’s troops, and drove him from the 
kingdom. Zapolya then took the desperate step of applying for 
aid to the Sultan. Ferdinand, alarmed on hearing of this pro¬ 
ceeding of his rival, sent an embassy to Constantinople to negotiate 
for a peace with Solyman, or at least to obtain a truce. His 
envoys had the ill-timed boldness to require, at the same time, the 
restoration of Belgrade and of the chief places which the Turks had 
captured in Hungary. Nothing could exceed the arrogance shown 
by the Ottoman ministers to the rival claimants of the Hungarian 
throne. The Grand Vizier told the Polish Palatine Lasczky, who 
acted as ambassador for Zapolya, that every place where the hoof 
of the Sultan’s horse once trod, became at once, and for ever, part 
of the Sultan’s dominions. “We have slain King Louis of Hun¬ 
gary,” said the Vizier; “his kingdom is now ours, to hold, or to 
give to whom we list. Thy master is no king of Hungary till we 
make him so. It is not the crown that makes the king—it is the 
sword. It is the sword that brings men into subjection; and 
what the sword has won, the sword must keep.” He promised, 
however, that Zapolya should be king, and that the Sultan should 
protect him against Ferdinand of Austria and all his other 
enemies. Solyman himself confirmed his Vizier’s promise; and 
added, “ I will be a true friend to thy master. I will march in 


SO LYMAN /. A.D . 1520 1566. 167 

person to aid him. I swear it, by our Prophet Mahomet, the 
beloved of God, and by my sabre.” Ferdinand’s ambassadors 
were dismissed with indignant scorn. They were ordered to say 
from Solyman to Ferdinand, that hitherto there had been little 
acquaintance or neighbourhood between them ; but that they soon 
should be intimate enough. He would speedily visit Ferdinand, 
and drive him from the kingdom he had stolen. “ Tell him,” said 
Solyman, “ that I will look for him on the field of Moliacz, or 
even in Pesth; and if he fail to meet me there, I will offer him 
battle beneath the walls of Vienna itself.” These were no idle 
menaces from the Lord of the Age; and the forces of the Ottoman 
Empire were speedily mustered for the march from Constantinople 
to Vienna. 

Solyman left Constantinople on the 10th May, 1529, with an 
army of 250,000 men and 300 cannons. A season of almost in¬ 
cessant rain made their march to the Danube laborious and slow; 
and it was the 3rd of September before the Sultan reached Ofen, 
which had been occupied by the troops of Ferdinand during the 
preceding year. Ofen was taken in six days, and Zapolya was 
solemnly installed by the Turkish victors on the ancient throne of 
the dynasty of Arpad. The Sultan then continued his advance to 
Vienna, taking with him his vassal king, and a corps of the Hun¬ 
garians who recognised Zapolya as their sovereign. 

With the storms of the autumnal equinox, the first squadrons of 
the terrible irregular cavalry of the Turks swept round the walls of 
Vienna. These Akinclji, 30,000 strong, called by the French 
“ Faucheurs” and “ Ecorcheurs”—“ mowers” and “ flayers”—by 
the Germans “ Sackmen,” were led by Michael Oglou, the de¬ 
scendant of Michael of the Peaked Beard, who had been the friend 
of the first Othman. 1 These ferocious marauders, who received 
no pay, and whose cruelty exceeded even their rapacity, spread 
devastation and slaughter throughout all Austria, as far as the 
river Ems. On the eve of the feast of St. Wenceslaus (27tli Sep¬ 
tember), Solyman himself arrived with the main Turkish army 
beneath Vienna, and fixed the imperial headquarters on the high 
ground to the west of the village of Simmering. 12,000 Janis¬ 
saries were posted round the Sultan’s tent. Seven encampments 
were raised by the various divisions of the army, forming nearly 
a circle round Vienna: and the whole country west of the 
Danube, far as the eye could range from the highest steeple in 
the city, was white with the Moslem tents. The water-meadows 
and islands of the Danube, and its branches near the city, were 

1 See supra, p. 5. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


1 63 

also strongly occupied ; and a flotilla of 400 Turkish barks, well- 
manned and commanded, watched the city by water, and kept up 
.the communication between the besieging troops. 

The force that defended Vienna amounted to only 16,000 men ; 
and, when the campaign began, the fortifications of the city con¬ 
sisted of little more than a continuous wall, about six feet thick, 
without bastions; the artillery amounted to only seventy-two 
guns. King Ferdinand had exerted himself earnestly to induce 
the other German princes to aid him; but his brother, the 
Emperor Charles, was occupied with his own ambitious schemes 
in Italy ; and the princes of the empire, to whom Ferdinand had 
appealed at the Diet of Spires, thought more of their religious 
differences with each other than of the common danger of their 
fatherland, though warned by Ferdinand that Sultan Solyman 
had declared his determination to carry his arms to the Rhine. 
The Diet voted aid ; but it was inadequate and tardy; and, while 
the princes deliberated, the Turk was in Austria. Ferdinand 
himself dreaded Solyman’s threats, and kept aloof from Vienna. 
But some brave Christian leaders succeeded in forcing their way 
into the city before it was entirely beleaguered; and a body of 
Spanish and German veterans, under the Palgrave Philip, proved 
an invaluable reinforcement to the garrison. But, though the 
Christian defenders of Vienna were few, they were brave and well 
commanded. The Palgrave Philip was the nominal superior, but 
the veteran Count of Salm was the real director of the defence. 
All possible preparations were made while the Turks were yet 
approaching. The suburbs were destroyed. A new earthen ram¬ 
part was raised within the city; the river bank was palisadoed; 
provisions and stores were collected; and the women and children, 
and all the other inhabitants who were unable to do service as 
combatants or as labourers, were compelled to leave the city. 
Providentially for Vienna, the incessant rains, and the consequent 
badness of the roads, had caused the Turks to leave part of their 
heaviest artillery in Hungary. They were obliged to rely chiefly 
on the effect of mines for breaching the walls; but the numbers, 
and the zeal of the besiegers, made the fall of the city apparently 
inevitable. 

Many sallies and partial assaults took place, in which great 
gallantry was displayed on both sides; and infinite skill and 
devotion were shown by the defenders in counteracting the mining 
operations of their enemies. But the Ottoman engineers succeeded 
in springing several mines, which tore open large gaps in the 
defences; and on three consecutive days, the 10 th, 11 th, and 12th 


SO LYMAN L A.D. 1520-1566. 169 

of October, the Turks assaulted the city with desperation, hut 
were repelled with heavy carnage by the steady valour of the 
besieged. The Ottoman forces now began to suffer severely by 
scarcity of provisions, and by the inclemency of the season ; and 
the slaughter which had fallen on their best troops filled the army 
with discouragement. But it was resolved to make one more 
attempt to carry Vienna; and, on the 14th of October, the Turkish 
infantry, in three huge columns, charged up to the breach, which 
their miners and cannoneers had rent for their road to victory 
and plunder. Solyman had endeavoured to stimulate their 
courage and emulation by a liberal distribution of money, and by 
the promise of high rank and wealth to the Moslem who should 
be first on the crest of the breach. The Grand Vizier and the 
highest officers of the army accompanied the stormers : and when 
the Christian cannons and musketry roared forth their deadly 
welcome, and the dispirited Mahometans reeled back from the 
blood-stained ruins, the Turkish chiefs were seen amid the con¬ 
fusion, striving, after the old Oriental custom, to force their men 
on again to the assault by blows with stick and whip and sword. 1 
But even the best veterans now sullenly refused obedience, and 
said that they had rather be killed by the sabres of their own 
officers than by the long muskets of the Spaniards and the 
German spits, as they called the long swords of the lanzkneehts. 2 
About three in the afternoon, the Turkish engineers sprung two 
new mines, which threw down much more of the wall; and under 
cover of a fire from all tlieir batteries, the Sultan’s troops were 
again formed into columns, and brought forward once more up to 
the breach. It was only to heap it again with Turkish dead. 
The hero of the defence, Count Salm, received a wound on the 
last day of the siege that proved ultimately fatal: but though 
other chiefs had fallen;—though the Ottoman shot and shell had 
told severely among the Christian ranks ;—though many brave 
men had perished in sorties, and in hand-to-hand conflict in the 
breaches;—and though many had been swept away by the burst¬ 
ing of the Turkish mines, the courage of the garrison grew higher 
and higher at each encounter with their lately boastful, but now 
despairing foes. Solyman himself felt at last compelled to 

1 See the account in Herodotus (Polymnia, 223), of the last Persian attack 
on Thermopylre. "OTrtaGtv oi yyspoveg tu>v teXeuiv t^ovreg paonyag Ippair^ov 
vavra uvopa aid tg to TTpoaio ivoTpvvovrtg. One of the Assyrian bas-reliefs 
discovered by Mr. Layarcl represents an officer with a whip in his baud, 
directing the passage of a river by the troops. 

2 “ Two Sieges of Vienna by the Turks,” p. 33. 


i ;o 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


abandon the favourite project of his heart, and drew his troops 
finally back from the much-coveted city. The 14th of October, 
the day on which Vienna was saved from the greatest of the 
Sultans, is marked by the German historian as being made 
memorable in his country’s history by many great events. It is 
the day of the fall of Brisach (1639), of the peace of Westphalia 
(1648), of the battle of Hochkirken (1758), of the surrender of 
Ulm (1805), of the battle of Jena (1806), and of the overthrow of 
Napoleon at the Battle of the Nations at Leipsic in 1813. 1 

It was near midnight, after the repulse of Solyman’s last assault 
upon Vienna that its full effect appeared. The Janissaries then, 
by the Sultan’s order, struck their tents; and all the spoil which 
had been swept into the Turkish camp, and which could not be 
carried away, was given to the flames. At the same time, the 
disappointed and savage soldiery commenced a general massacre 
of thousands of Christian captives, whom the deadly activity of 
the Akindji had brought in during the three weeks of the siege. 
The fairest girls and boys were preserved to be led into slavery, 
but the rest were put to the sword, or thrown yet alive into the 
flames without mercy. After this last act of barbarous but im¬ 
potent malignity, the Turkish army retreated from Vienna. 
tSolyman’s courtiers pretended to congratulate him as victorious; 
and he himself assumed the tone of a conqueror, whom the fugitive 
Ferdinand had not dared to meet, and who had magnanimously 
retired after chastising, though not destroying his foes. But the 
reverse, which he had sustained, was felt deeply by him through¬ 
out his life; and it was said that he laid a curse upon any of his 
descendants who should renew the enterprise against Vienna, 
There is no foundation for the charge which later writers have 
brought against the Grand Vizier Ibrahim, of having been bribed 
to betray his master, and to baffle the operations of the besiegers. 2 
The city was saved by the heroism of her defenders, aided, un¬ 
questionably, by the severity of the season, which the Asiatic 
troops in the Ottoman army could ill endure, and by the insub¬ 
ordination of the impatient Janissaries. But, whatever be the 
cause assigned to it, the repulse of Solyman from Vienna is an 
epoch in the history of the world. 

The tide of Turkish conquest in central Europe had now set its 
mark. The wave once again clashed as far; but only to be again 
broken, and then to recede for ever. 

1 Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 73. 


2 Ibid. p. 70. 


SOLYMAN /. A . D . 1520-1566. 


171 


CHAPTER X. 

WARS AND TREATIES WITH AUSTRIA—CONQUESTS OVER PERSIA 
—AUSTRIA TRIBUTARY TO THE PORTE — EXPLOITS OF THE 
TURKISH ADMIRALS—BARBAROSSA—PIRI REIS — SIDI ALI— 
DRAGUT—PIALI2—SOLYMAN’S DOMESTIC TRAGEDIES—DEATHS 
OF PRINCE MUSTAPHA AND PRINCE BAJAZET—SIEGE OF MALTA 
—SIEGE OF SIGETIT—DEATH OF SOLYMAN—EXTENT OF THE 
EMPIRE UNDER HIM—ARMY—NAVY—INTERNAL ADMINISTRA¬ 
TION—LAWS—COMMERCE—BUILDINGS—LITERATURE. 1 

A peace was concluded between the Sultan and Ferdinand in 1533, 
by which Hungary was divided between Ferdinand and Zapolya, 
Solyman had, in the interval, again invaded Germany with forces 
even stronger than those which he led against Vienna; and as 
Charles V., on this occasion (1532), put himself at the head of the 
armies of the empire, which gathered zealously around him, a de¬ 
cisive conflict between the two great potentates of Christendom 
and Islam was anxiously expected. But Solyman was checked 
in his advance by the obstinate defence of the little town of Guns; 
and after honourable terms had been granted to the brave garrison 
of that place (29th August, 1532), Solyman finding that Charles 
did not come forward to meet him, but remained posted near 
Vienna, turned aside from the line of march against that city; 
and, after desolating Styria, returned to his own dominions. 
Each, probably, of these two great sovereigns was unwilling to 
risk life, and empire, and the glorious fruits of so many years of 
toil and care, on the event of a single day; and neither was sorry 
that his adversary’s lukewarmness for battle furnished a creditable 
excuse for his own. The warlike energies of the Ottomans were 
now for some time chiefly employed in the East, where the unre- 
mitted enmity of Persia to Turkey, and the consequent wars be¬ 
tween these two great Mahometan powers, were a cause of relief 
to Christendom, which her diplomatists of that age freely acknow¬ 
ledged. 2 Solyman led his armies against the Persians in several 

1 Von Hammer, books xxvii. to xxxv. 

2 Basbequius, Ferdinand’s ambassador at Solyman’s court, says ; “ ’Tia 


172 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

campaigns (1533, 1534, 1535, 1548, 1553, 1554), during which 
the Turks often suffered severely through the difficult nature of 
the countries through which they traversed, as well as through 
the bravery and activity of the enemy. But the Sultan effected 
many important conquests. He added to the Ottoman Empire 
large territories in Armenia and Mesopotamia, and the strong 
cities of Erivan, Van, Mosul, and, above all, of Bagdad, which the 
Orientals call “ The Mansion of Victory.” 

The modern Turk, who seeks consolation in remembering the 
glories of the Great Solyman, must dwell with peculiar satisfac¬ 
tion on the tokens of respectful fear, which his nation then received 
from the most powerful as well as from the weaker states of 
Christendom. Ana the year 1547 is made a peculiarly proud one 
in the annals of the House of Othman, by the humble concession 
which its rival, the Austrian House of Hapsburg, was then com¬ 
pelled to make to its superior strength and fortune. The war in 
Hungary had been renewed in consequence of the death of John 
Zapolya, in 1539 ; upon which event Ferdinand claimed the whole 
of Hungary, while the widow of Zapolya implored the assistance 
of the Sultan in behalf of her infant son. Solyman poured his 
armies into that country, and in 1541, and the following years, he 
again commanded in person on the banks of the Danube. He 
professed the intention of placing the young Prince Zapolya on 
the throne of Hungary and Transylvania, when he should have 
attained the age of manhood ; but Ofen and the other chief cities 
were now garrisoned with Turkish troops; the country was 
allotted into Sanjaks, over which Turkish governors were ap¬ 
pointed : and the Ottoman provincial system was generally es¬ 
tablished. The strong cities of Gran, Stuhlweissenburg, and 
many others, were taken by the Turks in this war; and though 
their success was not unvaried, the general advantage was so far 
on the side of the Sultan, that as early as 1544 Charles V. and 
Ferdinand made overtures for peace ; and in 1547 a truce for five 
years was concluded, which left the Sultan in possession of nearly 
the whole of Hungary and Transylvania, and which bound Fer¬ 
dinand to pay to the Sublime Porte 30,000 ducats a year—a pay¬ 
ment which the Austrians called a present, but the Ottoman 
historians more correctly term a tribute. 

only the Persian stands between ns and ruin. The Turk would fain be upon 
us, but he keeps him back. This war with him affords us only a respite, not 
a deliverance.” See also the letters of Sir John Masone, our ambassador at 
the French court, given by Mr. Tytler in his “Iteigus of Edward VI, and 
Mary,” vol, i. p. 3U0, vol. ii. p. 352; 



173 


SOLYMAN /. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 

This treaty, to which the Emperor Charles, the Pope, the King 
of France, and the Republic of Venice were parties, may be con¬ 
sidered as a recognition by Christendom of the truth of Solyman’s 
title, “ Sahibi Kiran,” “ Lord of his Age/' Austrian pride, in¬ 
deed, had previously stooped so low before the Sultan, that King 
Ferdinand, when seeking peace in 1533, consented to style himself 
the brother of Ibrahim, Solyman’s favourite minister, and thus to 
place himself on the level of a Turkish Vizier. Francis I. had 
repeatedly sought the aid of Solyman in the most deferential and 
submissive terms. That aid was more than once effectively given 
by the Turkish invasions o / Hungary and Germany, which com¬ 
pelled the Emperor to draw the weight of his arms from off 
France; and, still more directly, by the Turkish fleets which were 
sent into the Mediterranean to attack the enemies of the French 
King. 1 England, during the reign of Solyman, had no need of 
foreign help; but w~e shall see her in the reign of Solyman’s 
grandson, when menaced by the power of Spain, have recourse to 
the Sublime Porte for aid and protection, as respectfully and ear¬ 
nestly as the proudest Follower of the Prophet could desire. 

We have hitherto directed our chief attention to the military 
history of Solyman’s reign; but the awe which the Ottoman 
Empire inspired in this age, was due not only to the successes 
gained by the Turkish armies, but also to the achievements of the 
Turkish navy, which extended the power and the renown of 
Sultan Solyman along all the coast of the Mediterranean, and in 
the more remote waters of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. 
His predecessors had devoted much care and treasure to the 
maritime force of their empire, but they were all surpassed in 
this respect by Solyman ; and the skill and valour of his Admirals 
made the Ottoman flag almost as formidable by sea as it was by 
land. The most celebrated of the Turkish naval commanders in 

1 As early as 1525, while Francis was a prisoner at Madrid, the aid of the 
young Sultan Solyman had been implored and promised in his behalf. 
Hellert, the French translator of Voa Hammer, gives in his notes to the fifth 
volume of his translation (p. 150), a translation of a remarkable letter of 
Solyman to Francis, promising him assistance, which has been discovered in 
the French archives. The letter is couched in the loftiest strain of haughty 
generosity, and bids the French monarch, now that he has laid his petition 
before the throne which is the refuge of the world, fear no longer the enemy 
who has threatened and ravaged his dominions, and made him captive. 
M. Hellert gives another letter of Sultan Solyman’s to Francis, written in 
152S, in answer to requests made by the French King in favour of the 
Christians of the Latin Church at Jerusalem. M Hellert truly says that 
the Sultan’s letter shows a spirit of justice, and religious toleration, as 
honourable as it was rare, especially in the age in which it was written. 


174 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


this reign was Khaireddin Pacha, better known in Europe by the 
surname of Barbarossa. It was principally by his means that the 
piratical states of North Africa placed themselves under the 
sovereignty of the Sultan; and that the naval resources of the 
Sublime Porte were augmented by the commodious havens, the 
strong forts and cities, the well-built and well-found squadrons, 
and the daring and skilful corsairs of Algiers, Tripoli, and 
Tunis. 1 

1 A description of the system of Mediterranean warfare of this age, and 
of the character of the vessels employed in it, may be found useful ; and I 
subjoin one, which I have partly drawn from Fincham’s “Naval History," 
but chiefly from an admirable paper by Mr. Hulme in his “Chapters on 
Turkish History.” 

The names commonly given to vessels of war in the Mediterranean during 
this century, were galley, galleon, and galleas. The two last are names 
familiar to the student of the history of the Spanish Armada. They both 
were applied to vessels of considerable size, and some galleons and galleases 
are said to have been of from 1500 to 2000 tons burthen. They had more 
than one deck, and heavy cannon were used by means of portholes on the 
lower decks, as well as the upper. They were very lofty at both stem and 
stern. Guns were mounted on the elevated poop; and also on the fore¬ 
castle, a term which then was strictly accurate. These large vessels, which 
were also called carracks, had one or more tiers of long oars, each worked 
by several rowers, but they depended principally on their masts and sails 
for locomotion. But though large ships of this description were used in 
war, it was not in them but in the long, low, light galleys, that the principal 
force of contending navies consisted. In order to understand this, we must 
bear in mind the difference between the naval gunnery of those times and 
our own; and how much less the peril was, which small and light craft then 
incurred by exposing themselves to the broadside of those of far superior 
tonnage. 

The galleys with which the sea-captains of Venice, Genoa, Barcelona, 
Carthagena, Malta, Algiers, and Constantinople performed their chief ex¬ 
ploits, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, were essentially row¬ 
boats ; and the oars were usually pulled by slaves or prisonei’s of war. 

The hull lay very low and close to the water, extremely sharp built and 
straight in the run, aud of such extraordinary length in proportion to the 
beam or width, that the Venetian galleys of the largest class, which measured 
165 feet from stem to stern, were only thirty-two feet in total breadth. The 
prow was furnished, as of old, with a long and sharp beak: and from this, as 
well as from the usually black colour of the hull, the epithet of grab (literally 
raven) was popularly applied to these vessels by the Moors. The after-par t was 
occupied by an extensive poop or quarter-deck, which was the station of the 
captain and the soldiers, and which was defended on the quarter by galleries 
and boarding-nettings. From this a descent of two or three steps led to a 
long narrow platform (called in French coursier , and in Spanish cruxici , 
running the whole length of the vessel from the forecastle to the poop, and 
serving both for a gangway and a flush deck ; on this the guns were mounted, 
usually a single long heavy piece pointed forwards in a groove near the bow, 
and two or four others of smaller calibre amidships. The rowing benches 
(to which the galley-slaves were usually chaiued by one foot) were 5 arranged 


SOI.YMAN I. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 175 

Barbarossa was born in the island of Mitylene. His father, a 
Spaili of Roumelia, had settled there when the island was con¬ 
quered by Mahomet II. Of four sons, the eldest, Ishak, traded 
as a merchant in Mitylene; the other three, Elias, Urudsch, and 
Khizr (afterwards called Khaireddin), practised commerce and 
piracy conjointly during the reign of Bajazet II. and Selim. 
Elias fell in a sea-fight with the Knights of Rhodes. Urudsch 
was taken prisoner, but was released through the influence of 
Prince Korkoud, then governor of Caramania. Urudsch and 
Khaireddin next practised as bold and fortunate sea-rovers, under 
Mohammed the Sultan of Tunis. They saw, however, the feeble¬ 
ness of the Mahometan Princes of the North African seaports, 
and they knew the strength of the Ottoman Empire, especially 
under such a ruler as Selim. They paid court therefore to the 
Sublime Porte, by sending one of their richest prizes to Constan¬ 
tinople, and received in return two galleys and robes of honour. 


on a sort of sloping gallery or wide gunwale (in French pont), which pro¬ 
jected over the ship’s side, so that those who rowed in the highest rank were 
immediately below the coursier , and under the eye of their taskmasters, who 
quickened their exertions by the unsparing use of the lash. The galley was 
pulled with twenty-six oars on a side—a number which seems to have been 
nearly invariable in all rates ; but the smaller classes galdres subtiles, or 
legeres, called fergata or frigate, and khirlangitsch by the Turks, and by the 
Moors jafan and thelthi) had only one or two men to each oar ; the largest 
(galeazza of the Venetians, and maona of the Turks) had sometimes even as 
many as five or six ; those of the ordinary rate (galbres bdtardes, whence the 
Turkish bashtarda), which were almost exclusively employed by the Turks, 
had three. 

The galley was provided with a main and foremast, which might be raised 
or struck as required, and which carried large lateen sails ; but a craft of 
the construction just described could only have been trusted under sail in 
lioht winds and smooth seas, as her want of heel, and deficiency in beam, 
must have made her at all times a bad sea-boat; while her great length 
must have exposed her to break her back as?.d founder in a rough sea. But 
th°se disadvantages were compensated by the swiftness with which vessels 
so navigated could be impelled, like the steamboats of modern days, over 
the smooth summer seas of the Mediterranean, and by the facility with 
which they penetrated into creeks, rivers, and inlets, which the intricacy 
or shallowness of their waters rendered impervious to vessels of draught, 
and depending only on sails. With their masts lowered, and their long, 
low hulls undiscernible on the surface of the sea by the sentinels on shore, 
the corsair galleys lay during the day unsuspected in the offing, opposite to 
a town which they had marked for plunder ; at midnight the inhabitants 
were roused by the flames of their dwellings, and the fierce cry of the tecbir, 
and daybreak saw the marauders again far at sea, bearing with them their 
booty and such of their captives as had been spared from the slaughter, 
long ere the ineffectual aid of the neighbouring garrisons could reach the 
scene of devastation. 



HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


176 

They now made themselves masters of some small towns on the 
African coast; and being joined by their brother, Ishak, the 
merchant of Mitylene, they increased their squadron, and suc¬ 
ceeded in taking possession by force or by stratagem of Tennes 
and Telmessan, and also of the strong city of Algiers. Ishak 
and Urudsch soon after this fell in battle with the Spaniards, and 
Khaireddin was left sole master of their conquests. He formally 
recognised the sovereignty of the Turkish Sultan, and received 
from Selim the regular insignia of office, a sabre, a horse, and a 
banner, as Beyler Bey of Algiers. Khaireddin carried on active 
war against the Spaniards, and the independent Arab tribes of 
North Africa. He took from the Spaniards the little island in 
front of the port of Algiers, which had for fourteen years been in 
their occupation; and he defeated and captured a Spanish squadron 
which was sent to succour the garrison. Acting steadily up to 
his policy of professing allegiance to the Sublime Porte, Barba- 
rossa sent regular reports of his operations to Constantinople, and 
desisted, in obedience to orders received thence, from attacking 
the ships or coasts of France, when that country became connected 
by treaty with Turkey. The red-bearded Sea-King of Algiers was 
now required by Sultan Solyman to measure himself with a 
formidable opponent in the Genoese Doria, Charles V.’s favourite 
admiral. Barbarossa repulsed Doria s attack on the island of 
Djerbel; and then joining his galleys with those of the corsair, 
Sinan, he sailed in triumph along the. Genoese coast, which he 
swept with fire and devastation. He next conveyed 70,000 of the 
persecuted Moors of Spain from Andalusia to strengthen his own 
Algerine dominions. In the meanwhile, Doria had captured from 
the Turks the city of Koron, in the Morea; and Solyman, who 
recognised in Barbarossa the only Mahometan admiral that could 
compete with the Genoese hero, sent for Khaireddin to Constan¬ 
tinople to consult with him as to the best mode of carrying on 
the war by sea against the Spaniards. Khaireddin set sail from 
Algiers (1533) in obedience to his Padiscliah’s commands, with 
eighteen vessels, five of which belonged to pirates, who had 
volunteered into the Sultans service; and he captured on the 
voyage two of Doria’s galleys. He was received by the Sublime 
Porte with the highest honours; and under his personal direction 
the arsenals of Constantinople were busy throughout that winter 
with the equipment of a powerful fleet of eighty-four vessels (in¬ 
cluding the Algerine squadron), with which Barbarossa sailed for 
Italy in the spring of 1534, while Solyman was commencing his 
campaign against Persia. Barbarossa (now Khaireddin Pacha), 


SOLYMAN I. A.D. 1520-15 66. 177 

sacked Reggio, Citraro, Sperlonga, and Fondi. His attack on the 
last-mentioned place was made principally in the hope of surprising 
and carrying off the celebrated beauty of the age, Giulia Gonzaga, 
the wife of Vespasian Gonzaga. Barbarossa wished to present 
her as a courtly offering to Solyman, and he designed that the 
flower of the fair of Christendom should shine in his Sultan’s 
harem. Barbarossa’s crews landed stealthily in the night, and 
assailed Fondi so vigorously, that the beautiful Giulia was only 
roused from sleep by the alarm that the Turks were in her palace. 
Evading their hot pursuit with the greatest difficulty and danger, 
she was set on horseback in her night-dress by an Italian cavalier, 
who rescued and rode off with her alone to a place of safety. 
The sensitive beauty afterwards caused her preserver and com¬ 
panion to be assassinated, whether it was, says the German historian, 
that he had dared too much on that night, or that he had only 
seen too much. 1 

After plundering the Neapolitan coasts, Barbarossa stood across 
to Africa, and captured Tunis, which had long been the object of 
his ambition. He did not, however, retain this prize more than 
five months. The Moorish prince, whom he expelled, implored 
the assistance of Charles V., and the Emperor led to Tunis an 
army and fleet of such strength, that Barbarossa, after a brave 
and skilful defence, was obliged to abandon the city. The cold¬ 
blooded and unsparing, cruelty with which, after Barbarossa’s re¬ 
treat, the unresisting and unoffending city was sacked by the 
Christian forces which had come thither as the nominal allies of 
its rightful King, equalled the worst atrocities that have ever been 
imputed to the Turks. 

Though driven from Tunis, Khaireddin was still strong at 
Algiers, and, sailing from that port with seventeen galleys, he 
took revenge on Spain by plundering Minorca, and he then re¬ 
paired to Constantinople, where the Sultan conferred on him the 
highest naval dignity, that of Capitan Pacha. In 1537, he again 
desolated the shores of Italy; and when Venice took part in the 
war against the Sublime Porte, Barbarossa captured from her 
nearly all the islands that she had possessed in th.e Archipelago, 
and the cities of Napoli cli Romania, and Caste! Nuovo. He 
recovered Koron from the Spaniards; and on the 28th September, 
1538, he engaged the combined fleets of the Pope, Venice, and 
the Emperor in a great battle off Prevesa. Barbarossa on this 

1 Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 129. Giulia was the sister of “the divine” 
Joanna of Aragon, whose portraits are to be seen at Borne, Paris, and War¬ 
wick Castle. 

12 


173 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

occasion practised the hold manoeuvre of cutting the line, which 
Rodney, St. Vincent, and Nelson made afterwards so celebrated 
in the English navy. The Turkish admiral’s force was inferior to 
the enemy in number and size of vessels and in weight of metal; 
but by seamanship and daring, Barbarossa gained a complete and 
glorious victory, though the coming on of night enabled the 
defeated Christians to escape without very heavy loss. 

The disastrous reverse which Charles V. sustained when he 
attacked Algiers in 1541, was chiefly the work of the elements. 
Barbarossa commanded the Turkish fleet sent by Solyman to pro¬ 
tect Algiers, but he was detained in harbour by the same tempest 
that shattered the ships of Spain. The last great service in which 
Khaireddin was employed by the Sultan, was in 1543, when he 
was sent with the Turkish fleet to assist Francis I., and acted in 
conjunction with the French squadron in the Mediterranean. He 
captured the city of Nice, though the castle held out against him; 
and he is said to have roughly reproved the French officers for 
their negligence, and for the defective state of their ships as to 
equipment and necessary stores. The allies, whom he came to 
protect, were obliged to listen submissively to his rebukes; and it 
was only by the earnest entreaties and apologies of the French 
admiral, the Due d’Enghien, that the choler of the old Turkish 
veteran was appeased. 

During the latter years of Barbarossa’s life, he was, tvhen not 
employed at sea, a regular attendant, as Capital! Pacha, at the 
Divan of the Sublime Porte, where the counsels of the old admiral 
were always listened to with respect. He died in 1546 ; and his 
tomb on the side of the Bosphorus near Beschiktasch still invites 
attention by the romantic beauty of its site, and by the recollec¬ 
tion of the bold corsair, who sleeps there by the side of the sound¬ 
ing sea, which so long he ruled. His wealth had been principally 
devoted by him to the foundation of a college: a striking tribute 
to the general respect for literature and science which prevailed in 
Solyman’s court, and which exercised its influence over even the 
rugged temper of Barbarossa, who, from the circumstances of his 
early life, could not possibly have been a Turkish Ralegh. 1 

Some, however, of the Ottoman admirals were themselves 

1 The true biography of Barbarossa has been little known in western 
Europe before the German Von Hammer narrated it from the full and 
indisputable authorities which are found in the Ottoman literature. Barba- 
rossa himself had, by Sultan Solyman’s order, dictated an account of his 
life and adventures to a writer named Sinan, which is still extant; and it 
is also epitomised and embodied in the “History of the Naval Wars of the 
Turks,” written by Hadji Khalssa. 


SOLYMAN /. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 179 

eminent for their scientific attainments, and for their contributions 
to the literature of the country. Such were Piri Reis, and Sidi 
Ali, two of the commanders of the squadrons which by Solyman’s 
orders were equipped in the ports of the Red Sea, and which, 
issuing thence, conquered for the Sultan of Constantinople the 
port of Aden, which England now possesses, and justly values tor 
its important position in the line of European commerce with 
India by the Red Sea and Egypt. 1 Many other cities and districts 
on the coasts of Arabia, Persia, and the north-west of India were 
added to the Ottoman Empire; and many gallant contests wore 
sustained with the Portuguese, as well as with the native rulers, 
by the Turkish admirals, the octogenarian Solyman Pacha and 
Mourad, and the two whose names have been already mentioned. 
Piri Reis was the author of two geographical works, one on the 
yEgean, and one on the Mediterranean Sea, in which their currents, 
their soundings, their harbours, and their best landing-places were 
described from personal surveys. Sidi Ali was a poet as well as 
a sailor; and besides his productions in verse, he wrote a descrip¬ 
tion of his travel overland to Constantinople from Goojerat, where 
his fleet had been damaged by tempests so as to be no longer able 
to cope with the Portuguese. Sidi Ali was also the author of 
several mathematical and nautical treatises, and of a work called 
“Mouhit,” on the navigation of the Indian Sea, which he drew 
from the best Arabian and Persian authorities of his time on the 
subject of India. 2 

Two other Turkish admirals of this reign must not be omitted, 
Dragut (more correctly called Torghoud) and Piale. Piale was a 
Croatian by birth, Dragut was born a subject of the Sultan, but 
of Christian parentage. He, early in life, joined the crew of a 
Turkish galley, and was chosen captain of a band of thirty sea 
rovers. He collected a force of thirty vessels, and attacked the 
Island of Corsica, but was defeated by Doria, who took him 
prisoner, and chained him to the bench of liis galley, where 

1 I had the advantage in 1858 of going over the lines round Aden in com¬ 
pany with a distinguished engineer officer in the Indian Military Service. 
The traces and remnants of the old Turkish fortifications were clearly dis¬ 
cernible ; and my companion eulogised highly the scientific skill with which 
they had been designed, and the judicious labour bestowed on them, as well 
as upon the vast reservoirs of water, which have been restored and improved 
since Aden has been a British possession. 

2 Von Hammer states that copies of the work of Piri Peis on the Archi¬ 
pelago and Mediterranean are to be found in the Royal Libraries at Berlin 
and ^Dresden, in the Vatican, and at Bologna. The only known copy of 
Sidi Ali 's “ Mouhit ” is at Naples. 


19_o 

L 4 - Jt 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


i So 

Dragut toiled at the victor’s oar for many a weary month. At 
last Barbarossa rescued him by threatening to lay Genoa waste if 
Dragut was not set free ; and under the patronage of Khaireddin, 
Dragut soon reappeared on the waves, chief of a squadron of 
twenty galleys, that spread terror along the coasts of Italy and 
Spain. He made himself master of Mehdije and Tripoli; and, 
following the example of Barbarossa, he acknowledged himself to 
be the Sultan’s vassal, and received in return high rank and 
substantial aid from Constantinople. The Spaniards took Mehdije 
from him; but Dragut had more than once the advantage of 
Doria in their encounters, and was almost as much dreaded in the 
Mediterranean as Barbarossa himself. His boldness of spirit was 
shown even towards the Sultan. He had on one occasion been 
tempted by the sight of a rich fleet of Venetian argosies, and had 
captured them, though there was peace at that time between the 
Republic of St. Mark and the Porte. Dragut was ordered to 
Constantinople to answer for this outrage, and, as the Grand 
Vizier Roostem was his enemy, his head was in serious peril. 
But Dragut, instead of obeying the order of recall, sailed out of the 
Straits of Gibraltar, and took service under the Emperor of 
Morocco, until Solyman, after Barbarossa’s death, recalled him by 
pledge of pardon and ample promises of promotion. We shall 
soon have occasion to notice his final services and death at the 
siege of Malta. 

Piale Pacha was chiefly signalised during the reign of Solyman 
by the capture of Oran, and by the great defeat which he gave in 
1560 to the combined Christian fleets that were destined for 
Tripoli and the isle of Djerbe. Two hundred vessels were pre¬ 
pared for this expedition by the Pope, and by the rulers of Genoa, 
Florence, Malta, Sicily, and Naples. Doria was high admiral of 
the fleet, and Don Alvaro de Sandi commanded the army which it 
conveyed. The fleet effected the passage to Djerbe in safety; the 
troops were landed, the island nearly subdued, and a fortress 
erected. But before the Christian galleys left the waters of 
Djerbe, Piale had heard of the attack, and had left the Dardanelles 
with a fleet which was reinforced at Modon by the squadrons of 
the governors of Rhodes and Mitylene. On the 14th May, 1560, 
he attacked Doria’s fleet, and completely defeated it. Twenty 
galleys and twenty-seven transports of the Christians were 
destroyed; seven galleys ran for shelter up the channel of Djerbe, 
where they were subsequently captured; the rest fled to Italy, 
leaving their comrades of the land forces to be besieged and 
captured in their new fortress by the troops, whom the ac.tive 


SO LYMAN I. A.D. 1520 - 1560 . 181 

Piale soon brought together against them. On the 27th of Sep¬ 
tember Piale re-entered the harbour of Constantinople in triumph. 
He had previously sent a vessel to announce his victory, which 
appeared in the Golden Horn with the captured high standard of 
Spain trailing in the sea behind her stem. O 11 the day of the 
arrival of Piale, Solyman went to the kiosk of his palace, at the 
water’s edge, to honour with his presence the triumphal procession 
of his Capital! Pacha. Don Alvaro and other Christian prisoners 
of high rank were placed conspicuous on the poop of the Ottoman 
admiral’s galley, and the captured vessels were towed along rudder¬ 
less and dismasted. Those who were near Sultan Solyman 
observed that his aspect on this proud day of triumph bore the 
same grave and severely calm expression, which was its usual 
characteristic. The ambassador of King Ferdinand, who was 
present, attributed this stoical composure to magnanimity, and 
admired “ the great heart of that old sire,” which received un¬ 
moved anything that fortune could bring . 1 The modern German 
historian of the House of Othman points out that this unexulting 
austerity of the great Sultan may have been caused by the 
domestic affliction, which by this time he had sustained, and 
which may have steeled while it saddened his heart . 2 

Glorious, indeed, and prosperous as had been the reign of Soly- 
man the Magnificent, he had, as a man, drunken deeply of sorrow 
and remorse; and the Erinnys of family bloodshed, that for so 
many centuries has haunted the House of Othman, was fatally 
active in his generation. To be friendless is the common penalty 
of despotic power; and Solyman must have felt it the more 
severely, inasmuch as he appears naturally to have had a capacity 
for friendship, and to have sought earnestly for it in the early 
part of his reign. His celebrated Grand Vizier, Ibrahim, was for 
many years not only his most trusted councillor and general, but 
the companion of his pleasures and his studies. Yet his suspi¬ 
cions were at last raised against the overpowerful and incautious 

1 “ Eadem erat frontis severitas et tristitia, ac si nihil ad enm hfec victoria 
pertineret, nihil novum aut inexpectatum contigisset-. Tam capax in illo 
sene quantaevis fortune pectus, tam confidens animus, ut tantani gratu- 
lationem velut immotu3 acciperet.”—Busbequius. Old Ivnolles translates 
this nobly: “I myself saw him with the same countenance that he had 
always ; with the same severity and gravity ; as if the victory had nothing 
concerned him, nor anything chanced strange or unexpected; so capable 
was the great heart of that old sire of any fortune, were it never so great, 
and his mind so settled as to receive so great applause and rejoicing without 
moving.” 

a Von Hammer, vol, ii. p. SS2. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


182 

favourite ; and a Vizier, whom a Sultan begins to dread, has not 
long to live. Ibrahim was married to Solyman’s sister, but not 
even this close affinity could save him. Ibrahim came to the 
palace at Constantinople on the 5th March, 1536, to dine with the 
Sultan, as was his custom; and when on the next morning mes¬ 
sengers from his home came to seek him, they found him strangled. 
The state of his body showed that he had struggled hard for life ; 
and, a hundred years afterwards, the traces of his blood on the 
palace walls were pointed out; fearful warnings of the lot that 
awaited those who sought to win their entrance there as royal 
favourites. Von Hammer gives a long list of other high officers 
whom Solyman once honoured and trusted, but whom he ulti¬ 
mately gave to the fatal bowstring. 1 But these acts of severity 
seem slight, compared with the deaths of the princes of his own 
race, who perished by his orders. Having been an only son, 
Solyman was spared the guilt of fratricide on his accession to the 
throne; but he showed repeatedly in the course of his reign, that 
when state necessity called for blood, the holiest feelings of 
humanity interposed in vain. His cousin, the descendant of the 
unfortunate Prince D.jem, who came into his power when Rhodes 
was taken, was put to death with all his family by Solyman’s 
command, and there was still nearer and dearer blood upon his 
hands. 

While Solyman was still young, a Russian girl in his harem, 
earned Khourrem 2 (which means “ the joyous one ”), had gained 
an almost unbounded influence over him by her beauty and live¬ 
liness ; and such w'as the fascination of her manners—so attractive 
and soothing to the weary spirit of royalty were the animated 
graces of her conversation; her skill was so subtle in reading the 
thoughts of her lord, and in selecting the most favourable times 

• 

1 Von Hammer remarks as an occurrence without parallel in Turkish 
history, the suicide of one of Solyman’s officers, Khosrew Pacha, who starved 
himself to death, on being deprived of the government of Bosnia. The 

S rofound feeling of submission to the Divine Will, which characterises the 
Iussulmans, makes suicide almost unknown in Mahometan countries. 
Another high officer of Solyman’s, Loutfi Pacha, who was cashiered by the 
Sultan about the same time, acted much more wisely than Khosrew. He 
employed his involuntary leisure in writing a history of the Ottoman Empire 
down to his own times, 

2 The French writers erroneously claim Solyman’s favourite Sultana as a 
Frenchwoman. Von Hammer says that Khourrem was frequently spoken 
of by the contemporaneous Imperial and Venetian ambassadors as “La 
Bossa,” i.e., “The Russian woman.” This w’as subsequently euphonised 
into Roxalana, and supposed to have been the personal name of the French 
fair one. The Italians also laid claim to Roxalana. 


SOLYMAN /, A.D. 1520 - 1560 . 183 

for tlie exercise of her power in guiding them, that she preserved 
her ascendancy in his affections long after they both had outlived 
the season of youth, and until the day of her death, in 1558. She 
had persuaded Solyman to enfranchise her, and to make her his 
wife, according to the Mahometan ritual. And the honours paid 
by him to her memory proved the constancy and fervour of his 
passion even after death. Her domed mausoleum was raised by 
him close to the magnificent mosque, the Suliemaniye, which he 
had constructed, and which he appointed as his own place of sepul¬ 
ture. The tomb of the Sultana Khourrem still attests the fatal 
fondness which the Russian beauty inspired in the greatest of the 
Turkish Sultans, and which transferred the succession to the 
throne of Othman from a martial and accomplished hero to a 
ferocious but imbecile drunkard. Solyman had a son, Prince 
Mustapha, born to him by a Circassian, who had been the favourite 
Sultana before the Muscovite slave Khourrem enslaved her master. 
Khourrem also bore children to Solyman; and all her address was 
employed to secure the succession to the throne for her son Prince 
Selim. As a necessary step towards that object, she sought the 
destruction of Prince Mustapha, who, as the elder born, was 
regarded as the natural heir. A daughter of the Sultana Khour¬ 
rem was married to Roostem Pacha, who, by her influence, was 
raised successively to the dignities of Beyler Bey of Diarbekir, 
and of Second Vizier; and, finally, to the highest station in the 
empire below the throne, to the office of Grand Vizier. Roostem 
Pacha employed all his power and influence as his mother-in-law 
directed him; and she thus acquired a ready and efficient instru¬ 
ment for the ruin of the devoted Mustapha. This unhappy 
Prince was distinguished for personal grace and activity, and for 
high spirit and intelligence. In the various governments which 
were intrusted to him by Solyman, as he advanced towards man¬ 
hood, he gave proof of such abilities, both civil and military, that 
he was looked on as likely to surpass his father in glory, and to 
become the most eminent of all the House of Othman. The 
malignant artifices of Khourrem and Roostem awakened in Soly- 
man’s mind, first jealousy, and then dread of his over-popular and 
over-praised son. As Solyman advanced in years, the poisonous 
whisperings of the step-mother grew more and more effective. 
The old Sultan was studiously reminded how his own father, 
Selim, had dethroned Bajazet II.; and the vision was kept before 
him of a renewal of that scene; of a young and vigorous Prince, 
the favourite of the soldiery, seizing the reins of empire, and of an 
aged father retiring to Demotika and death. It was at last, in 


184 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

1553, when Solyman was preparing for the second war with 
Persia, that he was fully wrought up to the conviction that Prince 
Mustapha was plotting against him, and that it was necessary, 
before he marched against the foreign enemy, to crush the germs 
of treason at home. In the autumn of that year, Solyman placed 
himself at the head of the troops which had been collected in Asia 
Minor, and with which it was designed to invade Persia. The 
season was then too far advanced for such military operations, and 
the army was to winter at Aleppo, and to open the campaign in 
the following spring. But Solyman had been persuaded that it 
was not safe for him to tarry at Constantinople. He was told by 
his Grand Vizier that the soldiers in Asia Minor were murmuring, 
and plotting among themselves in favour of Prince Mustapha, and 
that the Prince encouraged their preparations for a military re¬ 
volution against the old Padischah Solyman. He repaired, there¬ 
fore, to the army; and Khourrem’s son, Prince Selim, at his 
mother’s instigation, sought, and obtained, the Sultan’s permission 
to accompany him. When the army reached Eregli (the ancient 
Archelais), Prince Mustapha arrived at head-quarters, and his 
tents were pitched with great pomp in the vicinity of those of the 
Sultan. On the next day, the Viziers paid their visits of compli¬ 
ment to the Prince, and received presents of sumptuous robes of 
honour. On the following morning, Prince Mustapha mounted a 
stately and richly-caparisoned charger, and was conducted by the 
Viziers and Janissaries, amid the loud acclamations of the soldiery, 
to the royal tent, where he dismounted in expectation of having 
an audience of his father. His attendants remained at the en¬ 
trance of the tent; Prince Mustapha passed into the interior; but 
he found there, not the Sultan, not any of the officers of the 
Court, but the seven Mutes, the well-known grim ministers of the 
blood-orders of the Imperial Man-Slayer. They sprang upon him, 
and fastened the fatal bow-string round his throat, while he vainly 
called for mercy to his father, who was in an inner apartment of 
the tent. According to some accounts, Solyman, impatient at the 
long-continued struggle between the Mutes and his victim, looked 
in upon the horrible scene, and with threatening arm and angry 
brow urged his executioners to complete the work of death. 
While the Prince thus perished within the tent, his master of the 
horse, and a favourite Aga, who had accompanied him to the 
entrance, were cut down on the outside. The tidings of this exe¬ 
cution soon spread through the camp; and the troops, especially 
the Janissaries, gathered together in tumultuous indignation, and 
called for the punishment of the Grand Vizier, to whose intrigues 


i8j 


SOLYMAN /. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 

they imputed the death of their favourite Prince. To appease 
their fury, the obnoxious Roostem was deprived of his office, and 
Ahmed Pacha, who had distinguished himself in the Hungarian 
wars, was made Grand Vizier in his stead. But after the lapse of 
two years, the son-in-law of the all-powerful Sultana was restored 
to his former dignity, and Ahmed Pacha was put to death on 
frivolous charges of misconduct and disloyalty. 1 

The tragedy of the death of Prince Bajazet, another son, whom 
Solyman, at a later period of his reign, caused to be put to death, 
was attended with even more melancholy circumstances. After 
the death of the Sultana Khourrem, but while her son-in-law, the 
Vizier Roostem, yet lived, a deadly rivalry arose between her two 
sons, Selim and Bajazet. The tutor of the princes, Lala Mus- 
tapha Pacha, had originally favoured Prince Bajazet; but, finding 
that his prospects of promotion would be greater if he sided with 
Prince Selim, he made himself the unscrupulous partisan of the 
latter, and, by a series of the darkest intrigues, 2 by suggesting 
false hopes, and unreal dangers, by intercepting and suppressing 
some letters, and procuring others to be written and read, he drove 
Bajazet into rebellion against his father, the result of which was 
the overthrow and death of the unhappy Prince. Solyman believed 
that Prince Bajazet was an unnatural son, towards whom his 
fatherly remonstrances and warnings had been vainly employed; 
and Bajazet was led by the arts of the tutor to regard his father 
as a morose tyrant, who rejected his child’s filial submission and 

1 Von Hammer (vol. ii. p. 231) disputes the accuracy of many of the 
pathetic details with which Robertson and others, after Busbeqiuus, have 
narrated the death of Prince Mustapha. But he states that all the Otto¬ 
man historians agree with the Christian writers, in l’epresenting Roostem 
as having caused the Prince’s death, at the instigation of the Sultana, his 
step-mother. In a letter written 23rd Dec., 1553, by Dr. Wotton, our 
English envoy at Paris, he says : “ The Great Turk, going towards Aleppo, 
Bent for his eldest son to come to him ; who, trusting to be well received 
of his father, was most cruelly murdered in his father's presence, and by 
his commandment. Men, that have seen the said son, say that of all the 
Ottoman’s posterity, there was never none so like to attempt great enter¬ 
prises, and to achieve them with honour, as he was. The cause hereof is 
taken to be the favour and love which the Turk beareth to the children he 
hath by another woman, not mother to him that is slain. But his other 
sons are nothing of that towardness and activity that this man was of.”— 
(Ty tier’s “Reigns of Edward VI. and Mary,” vol. ii. p. 275.) When the 
close intimacy which was maintained between the Turkish and French 
courts at this period is remembered, this testimony as to the high expec¬ 
tations that were formed of Prince Mustapha, and also as to the manner of 
his death, is remarkably strong. 

2 Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 264, relates them at length, on the authority of 
the Ottoman writer, Ali, who had been Lala Mustapha’s secretary. 


186 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


entreaties for pardon, and who was resolved to exercise again the 
same cruel severity which he had shown towards Prince Mustapha. 
Bajazet was far more popular with the soldiery and people than 
Prince Selim, whose drunken and dissolute habits made him an 
object of general contempt, and whose unpopularity w T as increased 
by his personal resemblance to his hated mother, the Sultana 
Khourrem. Bajazet’s features and demeanour resembled those of 
his father ; his habits of life were blameless; his intellectual powers 
and literary accomplishments were high ; and his capacity for civil 
government and military command, though not equal to those of 
the lamented Mustapha, were such as to gain favour and command 
respect. Thus, even after his defeat at Koniah (8th May, 1559) 
by his father’s Third Vizier, Sokolli, a considerable force adhered 
to Prince Bajazet in his fallen fortunes, and followed him into 
Persia, where he took refuge, together with his four infant sons, at 
the court of Shah Tahmasp. He was at first treated there with 
princely honours, and the Shah pledged a solemn oath never to 
give the royal refugee up to his father. But Solyman sternly and 
imperatively required the extradition or the execution of the rebel 
and the rebel’s children. Prince Selim also sent letters and mes¬ 
sengers to Persia, to procure the death of his brother and nephews, 
and he gave liberal quotations of misapplied verses of the Koran, 
and copied passages from eminent writers, 1 to overcome the con¬ 
scientious scruples of the Shah, who long hesitated at the treache¬ 
rous breach of hospitality which he was urged to commit. Fear at 
last prevailed over honour. Persia’s “ cicatrice yet looked too raw 
and red after the Turkish sword,” for the “ sovereign process ” of 
the Sultan to be disregarded; and the present death of Bajazet 
and his children was resolved on. Tahmasp thought that he evaded 
the obligation of his oath by giving up his guests, not to the im¬ 
mediate officers of Solyman, but to emissaries sent specially by 
Selim to receive and slay them. It was the period of the solemn 
fast which the Schii Mahometans kept annually, in memory of 
Hossein, when the Turkish princes were delivered up to the 
executioners. Such was the sympathy which their fate inspired 
among the Persians, that they interrupted their lamentations for 
the murdered son of Ali, to sorrow over the royal victims then 
perishing before them ; and instead of the curses on the flayers of 
Hossein which the Schiis are then accustomed to pour forth, 2 impre- 


1 One of these was a sentence from Saadi, worthy to he paralleled with 
the famous epigraph from Publius Syrus, “Judex damnatur,” &c. It is 
this : “ Kindness to the Undeserving is injury to the Good.” 

2 The English reader will remember the vivid description which Lord 


SOLYMAN /. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 187 

cations resounded throughout Tabreez against the executioners of 
the innocent grandchildren of Sultan Solyman. A short elegiac 
poem, written by Prince Bajazet a little before his death, is pre¬ 
served in the work of the Turkish historian, Solakzade, and proves 
to how great an extent that unhappy prince inherited the poetical 
talent which has so remarkably characterised the Ottoman royal 
family. * 1 

Besides the domestic sorrows which clouded the last years of 
Solyman, his military glory and imperial ambition sustained, in the 
year 1565 (the year before his death), the heaviest blow and most 
humiliating disappointment, that had befallen them since the 
memorable retreat from Vienna. This second great check was 
caused by the complete failure of the expedition against Malta, 
which was led by the admirals Mustapha and Piale, and nobly and 
victoriously encountered by the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, 
under their heroic Grand Master, La Valette. After the Knights 
had been driven from Bhodes, on Solyman’s conquest of that island 
in the beginning of his reign, they had established their Order at 
Malta, which, together with the neighbouring island of Goza, was 
given to them by the Emperor Charles V., who compassionated 
their misfortunes, admired their valour, and appreciated the im- 


Macaulay, in liis Essay on Clive, gives of the effect produced on the Schii 
Mahometans by this annual commemoration of the death of Hossein. 

1 Von Hammer’s version of this poem is as follows : 

©oil £efcen§boffnung mir ocrfdngctn nod) fcic ©tttnbcn? 

2CuS mcinem £erjcn ift bei* 2cben§ Cuff uevfcfjmtnben. 

Stun fjciift e§ fort/ tjinunter 311 bc6 9tid:tfev)ns S)teicl;en $ 

S)ie .ftaramanensglocte font ba 5 3 (ufbiud)*jeid)en. 

©ebulb/ 0 ©eeten=a>ogel! bap bein gfug fief) fjebe/ 

Serbrodjen finb beveits be» £ajfid)’s ©ittevjtabe.. 

©cel unb Seifce franf/ ift ©cl)af)i ooll non ©unben. 
uuvb bn) bit*/ 0 greunb/ £) ©ott/ bte ftnben. 

Which may be thus paraphrased in English : 

Why cling’ to hopes of life with fond misgiving ? 

Why lengthen out thine hours, my weary heart ? 

For thee is withered all the joy of living : 

To the void realms below thou summoned art. 

The caravan-bell sounds the sign to part. 

Bird of my soul, the cage that round thee prest, 

Is shattered now :—hence on free pinion dart. 

In mind and body sick, with sin distrest, 

To thee, my Friend, my God, I come for healing rest. 

Sultan Solyman was himself a poet; but, according to Yon Hammer, his 
compositions, though dignified and elegant, are not of the highest rank in 
Turkish poetry. 



iS8 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

portance of the services which they rendered to Christendom, as a 
barrier against the advancing power of the Ottomans. When the 
Knights took possession of Malta, it was little more than a shelter¬ 
less rock ; but they discerned the natural advantages of the place, 
and immediately commenced fortifying the remarkable system of 
harbours on the south-eastern side of the island, where the city of 
Malta now rears its grim ranges of batteries and bastions beneath 
the British flag. The squadrons of the Knights, issuing from the 
Maltese havens, co-operated actively with the fleets of Spain, and 
of every foe of the Crescent; and an incessant warfare was carried 
on under the Maltese Cross against the Turks, in which deeds of 
chivalrous enterprise were often performed, but in which a piratical 
love of plunder and a brutal spirit of cruelty too often disgraced 
the Christian as well as the Mahometan belligerents. The atten¬ 
tion of Solyman was soon fixed on Malta, as the new nest of the 
revived hornets, who intercepted the commerce and assailed the 
coasts of his empire ; and at last the capture by five Maltese 
galleys of a rich Turkish galleon, belonging partly to some of the 
ladies of the seraglio, exasperated the Sultan, who regarded it as 
an insult to his household. He was further urged to an attack 
upon the Order by the Mufti, who represented to him how sacred 
a duty it was to rescue the numerous Moslem slaves who were held 
in cruel bondage by the Knights. Nor can we suppose him to 
have been indifferent to the military and political importance of 
the possession of Malta. If the Ottoman arms had once been 
securely established in that island, it would have served as a basis 
for operations against Sicily and South Italy, which hardly could 
have failed of success. 

Accordingly, a mighty armament was prepared in the port of 
Constantinople, during the winter of 1564. The troops amounted 
to upwards of 30,000, including 4500 Janissaries, and the fleet 
comprised 181 vessels. ' The Fifth Vizier, Mustapha Pacha, was 
appointed Seraskier, or commander-in-chief of the expedition, and 
under him was the renowned Piale, the hero of Djerbe. The 
equally celebrated Dragut was to join them at Malta, with the 
naval and military forces of Tripoli; and all the stores and muni¬ 
tions of war that the skilful engineers and well-stocked arsenals of 
Constantinople could supply, were shipped in liberal provision for 
a difficult siege and long campaign. The fleet sailed from the 
Golden Horn on the 1st of April, 1565. The Grand Vizier, Ali, 
accompanied the Seraskier and ’Capitan Pacha to the place- of 
embarcation; and it was long remembered that, at parting, he 
said laughingly, “ There go two brisk companions, of an exquisite 


SOLYMAN /. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 189 

relish, for coffee and opium, on a voyage of pleasure among the 
islands. Tlieir fleet must be all laden with the Arabian bean and 
essence of henbane.” Yon Hammer recounts this pleasantry, not 
for its humour, but on account of the characteristic comments made 
on it by the principal Ottoman historians. They blame it as un¬ 
worthy of the Grand Vizier’s dignity, and say that such levity from 
such a personage was a bad omen at the commencement of a serious 
and important enterprise. The remarks which they add, that the 
Grand Vizier was on bad terms with the two officers at whom he 
thus jested, and that the Seraskier and admiral were unfriendly to¬ 
wards each other, and both jealous of Dragut, with whom they were 
to co-operate, show better causes for the failure of the expedition, 
than the ill-timed jest which they gravely criticise. 

The Knights knew well what a storm was about to break upon 
Malta, and they exerted themselves to the utmost to improve the 
defences of their island home. The old city, as it then existed, 
occupied the central of the three spits of land which project into 
the Great Harbour on the eastern side. The innermost of these 
projecting peninsulas, called Isle de la Sangle, was also occupied 
and fortified. Mount Sceberras, the ridge of land which runs out 
to the open sea, dividing the great eastern harbour from the 
western harbour, called Port Muscet, and on which the modern 
city of La Valletta stands, was not at this time built upon; ex¬ 
cept at the extremity, where an important castle, called the Fort 
of St. Elmo, had been raised to command the entrances of both 
harbours. On a muster of the forces of the defenders of Malta, 
they were found to consist of 700 Knights, besides serving 
brothers, and about 8500 soldiers, comprising the crews of the 
galleys, hired troops, and the militia of the island. Spain sent a 
small auxiliary force, and promised that her Viceroy of Sicily 
should bring ample succour. The Pope gave a sum of 10,000 
crowns; but from no other Christian power did the Knights re¬ 
ceive aid. Their means of safety consisted in their strong and 
well-armed walls, their own skill and courage, and, above all, the 
genius and heroism of their Grand Master, John de la Vallette, 
who had been elected, providentially for Malta, about seven years 
before its memorable siege. When the approach of the Ottoman 
armament was announced, La Vallette assembled his Knights and 
addressed them :—“ A formidable enemy is coming like a thunder¬ 
storm upon us ; and, if the banner of the Cross must sink before 
the-misbelievers, let us see in this a signal that Heaven demands 
from us those lives which we have solemnly devoted to its service. 
He who dies in this cause, dies a happy death ; and, to render 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


190 

ourselves worthy to meet it, let us renew at the altar those vows, 
which ought to make us not only fearless, but invincible in the 
fight.” The brotherhood devoutly obeyed their Masters exhorta¬ 
tion. They renewed the vows of their religious knighthood; and 
after this solemn ceremonial, and after partaking together of the 
Holy Sacrament, they swore to give up all feuds among them¬ 
selves, to renounce all temporal objects and pleasures until their 
deliverance should be effected, and to stand between the Cross 
and profanation to the last drop of their blood. 

The Ottoman fleet appeared off Malta on the 19th May, 1565. 
Piale wished to wait for the arrival of Dragut before they com¬ 
menced operations; but the Seraskier on the next day disembarked 
the troops and began the attack upon St. Elmo. The rocky nature 
of the ground on Mount Sceberras made it impossible for the 
Turkish engineers to work trenches; and, as substitutes, they 
pushed forward movable breastworks of timber, which were 
thickly coated on the outside with clay and rushes kneaded to¬ 
gether. Five days after the commencement of the siege, the 
Turkish Sea-Captain Ouloudj Ali (called by the Christians Ochiale), 
who was destined to acquire such celebrity in the next reign, 
arrived with six galleys from Alexandria; and at last, on the 2nd 
June, Dragut appeared with the squadron of Tripoli. The old 
admiral disapproved of the attack on St. Elmo, saying that the 
fort must have fallen of itself when the city was taken; but he 
declared that as the operation had been commenced, it ought to be 
persevered with. Fresh batteries were placed by his directions 
against the fort; and in particular he established one upon the 
opposite or western side of Port Muscet—on the cape that still 
bears his name. The Turkish ships plied the seaward defences of 
the fort with their artillery; on the land side thirty-six heavy 
guns battered it in breach, and the balls of Dragut’s battery from 
across Port Muscet swept the ravelin with a raking fire. The little 
garrison did their duty nobly; and aided by occasional reinforce¬ 
ments from the main body of their comrades who held the Bourg 
and the Isle de La Sangle, they repulsed repeated attempts made 
by the Turks to escalade their walls ; and they impeded the ad¬ 
vance of the enemy’s works by bold and frequent sorties. The 
Viceroy of Sicily had. promised La Vallette to send a relieving force 
to the island by the middle of June; and every day that the de¬ 
fence of St. Elmo could be prolonged, was considered by the 
Knights to be of vital importance for the safety of the island. 
When some of the Knights posted in the fort represented to La 
Vallette the ruined state of its defences, and the rapidly increasing 


SOLYMAN /. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 191 

destructiveness of the Ottoman fire, he told them that they must 
die in discharge of their duty; and the noble band of martyrs 
remained in St. Elmo to die accordingly. Dragut ordered a 
general assault on the fort on the 16th of June. The landward 
walls had now been shattered and rent, and the Turkish stormers 
advanced without difficulty through the yawning breaches; but 
behind these the Knights, arrayed in steady phalanx, and armed 
with long pikes, formed a living wall, against which the bravest 
Turks rushed with their scimetars in vain. Meanwhile, the 
Christian cannon from St. Angelo and St. Michael, the forts at 
the extremities of the Bourg and the Isle de la Sangle, played 
with terrible effect on the Hanks of the huge columns of the as¬ 
sailants. After six hours’ conflict the Ottomans retreated, leaving 
two thousand of their comrades slain. Dragut himself received 
his death-wound during the assault. A cannon-ball from the 
Castle of St. Angelo splintered a rock near which he was standing, 
and the fragments of stone struck the old seaman’s head. The 
Seraskier, with whom he had been conversing respecting the con¬ 
struction of a new battery to reply to St. Angelo, ordered a cloak 
to be flung over the corpse, and remained calmly on the spot 
while he completed the requisite instructions to the engineers. 
Seven days afterwards, the death of Dragut was avenged by the 
fall of St. Elmo, after a furious and long-continued assault, in 
which every man of the defenders “ w'as slain in valiant fight .” 1 
I 11 the siege of this outwork, 300 Knights and 1300 soldiers of 
the Order, and 8000 of the Turks, perished. Mustapha Pacha, 
when he looked from the ruins of this small castle across to the 
massive towers of the Bourg, which was now to be attacked, could 
not help exclaiming, “ If the child has cost us so much, what shall 
we have to pay for the father ?” He sent a Christian slave to 
summon the Grand Master to surrender. La Vallette led the 
messenger round the lofty ramparts, and pointing down to the 
deep ditches beneath them, he said, “ Tell the Seraskier that this 
is the only land I can give him. Let him and his Janissaries come 
and take possession.” Mustapha commenced the attack with 
ardour, and both the Bourg and the Isle de la Sangle were closely 
invested and cannonaded from the mainland; while also a row of 
formidable Turkish batteries thundered on them from St. Elmo 
and Mount Sceberras. This great siege was prolonged until the 
11th of September, by the obstinate vehemence of the besiegers, 
and the truly chivalrous gallantry of the besieged. During the con¬ 
tinuance of the operations; the Turks were reinforced by a flotilla 

1 Knolles. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


192 

from Algiers, commanded by the Beyler Bey Hassan, the son of 
the great Barbarossa, and son-in-lavf of Dragut. Hassan demanded 
leave to sustain the honour of these illustrious names by leading 
an assault upon the Isle de la Sangle. The Seraskier placed 5000 
men at his disposal, and with these Hassan attacked the works 
from the mainland, while Candelissa, a Greek renegade, who had 
grown grey in piracy and war, led the Algerine galleys to an attack 
on the inner part of the harbour. Hassan brought back only 500 
men out of his 5000 ; nor was Candelissa more successful. No less 
than ten general assaults were made and repulsed before the siege 
was raised; and innumerable minor engagements took place, in 
which each side showed such valour as to earn its enemy’s praise, 
and each side also unhappily too often stained its glory by the 
exhibition of ferocious cruelty. In one of these encounters, the 
Seraskier had sent a band of able swimmers across part of the 
harbour with axes to destroy a stockade which the Knights had 
erected. La Yallette opposed these assailants by calling for volun¬ 
teer swimmers from among the Maltese. The islanders came for¬ 
ward readily for this service; and stripping themselves naked, 
and armed only with short swords, a band of them swam to the 
stockade, and after a short but desperate struggle in the water, 
they completely routed the Turkish hatchet-men, and saved the 
works. 1 The long repetition of defeat and bootless carnage by 
degrees wore out the energies of the Turks. And at last, at the 
beginning of September, the news arrived that the long-expected 
fleet of the Sicilian Viceroy was on the sea. The succours thus 
tardily sent to La Vallette and his brave comrades amounted 
to less than 8000 men; but rumour magnified their num¬ 
bers, and the weary and dispirited besiegers on the 11th of 
September abandoned their heavy ordnance, and left the island, 
which had been crimsoned with so much slaughter, and had been 
made the theatre of such unrivalled heroism. This memorable 
siege is said to have cost the lives of 25,000 Turks, and of 5000 
of the brave defenders. So reduced, indeed, was the garrison at 
the time of its rescue, that when they marched out to take pos¬ 
session of the guns which the Turks had abandoned, La Vallette 
could only muster six hundred men fit for service. 2 

1 Constable's “ History of the Knights of Malta,” vol. ii. p. 200. 

2 Ibid., vol. ii. p. 227. The writer well quotes Knolles’s eulogy 
on the defenders: “If a man do well consider the-difficulties and 
dangers the besieged passed through in this five months’ siege, the manifold 
labours and perils they endured in so many and terrible assaults, the small 
relief to them sent in so great distress, with the desperate obstinacy of so 


SO LYMAN I . A . D . 1520-15 66. 193 

At the time when the tidings that the siege of Malta was raised, 
reached Constantinople, Solyman was preparing for a new struggle 
with Austria. The disputes between the rival parties in Hungary 
had again brought on hostilities. Maximilian II. (who had suc¬ 
ceeded Ferdinand) had in person attacked and captured Tokay 
and Serencz, and the Turkish Pacha, Mustapha Sokolli, had in¬ 
vaded Croatia. Solyman determined to conduct the campaign 
against the young German Emperor in person; and there can be 
little doubt that this Austrian war saved the Knights of Malta 
from a renewed attack in 1566, which must, in all human proba¬ 
bility, have been fatal. Solyman was now seventy-six years old, 
and so enfeebled by age and illness, that he was no longer able to 
sit on horseback, but was borne in a litter at the head of his army, 
which commenced its march from Constantinople to Hungary oil 
the 1st of May, 1566. Before he left his capital for the last time, 
Solyman had the satisfaction of seeing the great aqueducts com¬ 
pleted, which had been built by his orders for the supply of the 
city. The Sultan arrived at Semlin, in Hungary, the 27th of 
June, and received the solemn homage of young Sigismund Za- 
polya, the titular King of Hungary and Transylvania under 
Ottoman protection. Solyman especially desired to capture in 
this campaign the two strong places of Erlau and Szigeth, which 
had on former occasions baffled the attacks of the Turks. A bold 
exploit of Count Zriny, the Governor of Szigeth, who surprised 
and cut off a detachment of Bosnian troops while on their 
march to reinforce the Sultan’s army, determined Solyman to 
make Szigeth the first object of his arms; and on the 5th of 
August the Ottoman forces encamped round that city. It was 
destined to be the death-place both of the Turkish sovereign and 
the Christian chief. Zriny himself burnt the lower, or new town, 
as indefensible ; but great reliance was placed on the strength of 
the citadel, which was protected by a deep fen, that lay between 
it and the old or upper town. The Turks carried the town in five 
days, though not without severe fighting and heavy loss; and 
Zriny and "his garrison of 3200 men then retired to the citadel, 
where they hoisted the black flag, and took an oath never to sur¬ 
render, but to fight to the last man and the last gasp. The 
Turkish engineers formed causeways across the marsh; and they 
established breastworks near the walls, where the Janissaries were 
posted, who kept down the fire of the artillery of the besieged by 


puissant an enemy, he shall hardly find any place these many years more 
mightily impugned, or with greater valour and resolution defended.” 

13 



HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS 


194 

an incessant discharge of musketry upon the embrasures, and at 
every living object that appeared above the parapet. 1 The heavy 
cannons of the Ottomans were placed in battery, and the walls 
began to crumble beneath their salvoes. Solyman was impatient 
of the delay which the resistance of so small a place as this citadel 
now caused him, and he summoned Zriny to surrender, and sought 
to win him over to the Ottoman service by offering to make him 
ruler of all Croatia. Zriny, whom his countrymen have not un¬ 
worthily named the Leonidas of Hungary, was resolute to die in 
defence of his post, and he inspired all his men with his own spirit 
of unflinching courage. Three assaults were given by the Turks 
in August and September, all of which Zriny repelled with great 
loss to the besiegers. The Turkish engineers now ran a mine 
under the principal bastion, and the attacking columns were kept 
back until the effect of the explosion could he ascertained. The 
mine was fired early in the morning of the 5th of September, and 
the bright streak of fire, that shot up into the sky from the 
shattered bastion, might have been thought to be the death-light 
of the great Sultan, who had died in his tent during the preceding 
night. A few hours before his death, he had written to his Grand 
Vizier complaining that “ the drum of victory had not yet beat.” 
He was not destined to witness Szigeth’s fall : though his army 
continued the siege as if by his command, and all except his 
Grand Vizier, Sokolli, believed that he still lived and reigned. 
Sokolli is said to have killed the Sultan’s physicians lest the im¬ 
portant secret should transpire, and to have issued orders in Soly- 
man’s name, while the messengers conveyed the despatches to 
Prince Selim which summoned him to the throne. The fire of 
the Turkish batteries upon Szigeth was continued for four days 
after the explosion of the great mine, until all the exterior de¬ 
fences of the citadel were destroyed, and of the inner works only 
a single tower was left standing. In that tower were Zriny and 
600 of his men; the rest of the garrison had perished. On the 
8 th of September the Janissaries advanced in a dense column 
along a narrow bridge, that led to this last shelter of the defenders; 

1 Knolles describes these works with his usual graphic, though quaint 
vigour. “ Then might a man have seen all the fields full of camels, horses, 
and of the Turks themselves, like emmets, carrying wood, earth, stone, or 
one thing or another, to fill up the marsh ; so was there with wonderful 
labour two plain ways made through the deep fen from the town to the 
castle, where the Janissaries, defended from the great shot with sacks of 
wool and such like things, did with the multitude of their small shot so 
overwhelm the defenders, that they could not against those places, without 
most manifest danger, show themselves upon the walls.” 


SOLYMAN I. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 195 

and Zriny, feeling that his hour was come, resolved to anticipate 
the charge. The gallant Magyar prepared himself for death as 
for a marriage feast. He wore his most splendid apparel, and a 
diamond of high price glittered in the clasp of his crest of the 
heron’s plumes. He fastened to his girdle a purse containing the 
keys of the tower, and a hundred ducats carefully chosen of Hun¬ 
garian coinage. “ The man who lays me out,” he said, “ shall not 
complain that he found nothing on me for his trouble. These 
keys I keep while this arm can move. When it is stiff, let him 
who pleases take both keys and ducats. But I have sworn never 
to be the living finger-post of Turkish scorn.” Then from among 
four richly-ornamented sabres, which had been presented to him 
at some of the most brilliant epochs of his military career, he 
chose the eldest one. “ With this good sword,” he exclaimed, 
“gained I my first honours, and with this will I pass forth to hear 
my doom before the judgment-seat of God.” He then, with the 
banner of the empire borne before him by his standard-bearer, 
went down into the court of the tower, where his 600 were drawn 
up in readiness to die with him. He addressed them in a few 
words of encouragement, which he ended by thrice invoking the 
name of Jesus. The Turks were now close to the tower gate. 
Zriny had caused a large mortar to be brought down and placed 
in the doorway, and trained point-blank against the entrance. He 
had loaded this with broken iron and musket balls. At the 
instant when the foremost Janissary raised his axe to break in the 
door, it was thrown open. Zriny fired the mortar; the deadly 
shower poured through the mass of the assailants, destroying 
hundreds of them in an instant; and amid the smoke, the din, and 
the terror of this unexpected carnage, Zriny sprang forth sword 
in hand against the Turks, followed by his devoted troop. There 
was not one of those 600 Magyar sabres but drank its fill on that 
day of self-immolation, before the gallant men who wielded them 
were overpowered. 1 Zriny met the death he sought, from two 
musket-balls through the body, and an arrow wound in the head. 
The Ottomans thrice raised the shout of “ Allah” when they saw 
him fall, and they then poured into the citadel, which they fired 
and began to plunder; but Zriny, even after death, smote his 
foes. He had caused all his remaining stores of powder to be 
placed beneath the tower, and, according to some accounts, a slow 
match was applied to it by his orders immediately before the 

^ “ It is said that some were spared in the conflict by the Janissaries, who, 
admiring their courage, placed their own caps on their heads, for the pur¬ 
pose of saving them.”—“ Two Sieges of Vienna,” p. 64. 


196 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Magyars made their sally. Either from this, or from the flames 
which the Turks had themselves kindled, the magazine exploded 
while the tower was filled with Ottoman soldiery; and together 
with the last battlements of Szigeth, 3000 of its destroyers were 
destroyed. 

Solyman the Conqueror lay stark in his tent before the reeking 
and smouldering ruins. The drum of victory beat unheeded by 
him who had so longed for its sound. He was insensible to all the 
roar of the assault, and to the “deadly earthshock” of the fired 
magazine of Szigeth. Nor could the tidings which now reached 
the camp of the surrender of the city of Gyula to Pertaw Pacha 
“soothe the dull cold ear of death.” The secret of the decease of 
the Sultan was long well guarded. For more than seven weeks the 
great Turkish army of 150,000 soldiers, went, and came, and 
fought, and took towns and cities in the name of the dead man. 
The Vizier Sokolli had caused the body to be partly embalmed 
before the royal tent was removed from before Szigeth; and, when 
the camp was struck, the corpse was placed in the covered litter 
in which Solyman had travelled during the campaign, and which was 
now borne along among the troops, surrounded by the customary 
guards, and with all the ceremonies and homage which had been 
shown to the living monarch. Sokolli and the other high officers, 
who knew the truth, after the siege and capture of Babocsa, and 
some other operations which employed the attention of the troops, 
gradually drew them towards the Turkish frontier. Solyman’s 
signature was adroitly counterfeited; written orders were issued 
in his name, and the report was sedulously spread among the 
soldiers, that a severe attack of gout prevented the Sultan from 
appearing in public. At last Sokolli received intelligence that 
Prince Selim had been enthroned at Constantinople; and he then 
took measures for revealing to the soldiery the death of the great 
Padisehah. The army was now (24th of October, 1566) four 
marches distant from Belgrade, and had halted for the night in the 
outskirts of a forest. Sokolli sent for the readers of the Koran, 
who accompanied the troops, and ordered them to assemble round 
the Sultan’s litter in the night, and at the fourth hour before day¬ 
break (the hour at which Solyman had expired forty-eight days 
before), to read the appointed service for the dead from the Koran, 
and call upon the name of God. At the chosen time, amid the 
stillness of the night, the army was roused from sleep by the loud 
clear voices of the Muezzins, that rose in solemn chant from 
around the royal tent, and were echoed back from the sepulchral 
gloom of the forest. Those who stood on the right of the corpse 


SOLYMAN I. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 197 

called aloud, “ All dominion perishes, and the last hour awaits all 
mankind !” Those on the left answered, “ The everliving God 
alone is untouched by time or death.” The soldiers, who heard 
the well-known announcement of death, gathered together in 
tumultuous groups, with wild cries of lamentation. When the 
day began to break, the Grand Vizier went through the camp ad¬ 
dressing the assemblages of troops, and exhorting them to resume 
their ranks and march. He told them how much the Padischah, 
who was now at rest and in the bosom of God, had done for Islam, 
and how he had been the soldier’s friend ; and he exhorted them 
to show their respect for his memory not by lamentations, which 
should be left to the priests, but by loyal obedience to his son, the 
glorious Sultan Selim Khan, who now w r as reigning in his stead. 
Soothed by these addresses, and the promise of a liberal donative 
from the new Sultan, the army returned to military order, and 
escorted the remains of their monarch and general back to Belgrade. 
Solyman’s body was finally deposited in the great mosque at Con¬ 
stantinople, the Soleimaniye, which is the architectural glory of 
his reign. 

Sultan Solyman I. left to his successors an empire, to the extent 
of which few important permanent additions were ever made, 
except the islands of Cyprus and Candia; and which under no 
subsequent Sultan maintained or recovered the wealth, power, and 
prosperity which it enjoyed under the great lawgiver of the House 
of Othman. The Turkish dominions in his time comprised all the 
most celebrated cities of biblical and classical history, except 
"Rome, Syracuse, and Persepolis. The sites of Carthage, Memphis, 
Tyre, N ineveh, Babylon, and Palmyra were Ottoman ground ; and 
the cities of Alexandria, Jerusalem, Damascus, Smyrna., Nice, 
Prusa, Athens, Philippi, and Adrianople, besides many of later but 
scarcely inferior celebrity, such as Algiers, Cairo, Mecca, Medina, 
Bassorali, Bagdad, and Belgrade, obeyed the Sultan of Constan¬ 
tinople. The Nile, the Jordan, the Orontes, the Euphrates, the 
Tigris, the Tanais, the Borysthenes, the Danube, the Hebrus, and 
the Ilyssus, rolled their waters “ within the shadow of the Horse¬ 
tails.” The eastern recess of the Mediterranean, the Propontis, 
the Palus Mceotis, the Euxine, and the Red Sea, were Turkish 
lakes. The Ottoman Crescent touched the Atlas and the Cau¬ 
casus ; it was supreme over Atlios, Sinai, Ararat, Mount Carmel, 
‘Mount Taurus, Ida, Olympus, Pelion, Hoemus, the Carpathian and 
the Acroceraunian heights. An empire of more than forty thou¬ 
sand square miles, embracing many of the richest and most beau¬ 
tiful regions of the world, had been acquired by the descendants 


198 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

of Ertoghrul, in three centuries from the time when their forefather 
wandered a homeless adventurer at the head of less than five 
hundred fighting men. 

Solyman divided this empire into twenty-one governments, 
which were again subdivided into 250 Sanjaks . 1 The govern¬ 
ments were, 1st, Eoumelia, under which term were then comprised 
all the Ottoman continental possessions in Europe south of the 
Danube: these included Ancient Greece, Macedonia, Thrace, 
Epirus, Illyria, Dalmatia, and Moesia; 2 . The islands of the 
Archipelago : this government was vested in the Capitan Pacha; 
3. Algiers and its territory; 4. Tripoli in Africa; 5. Ofen, com¬ 
prising the conquered portions of Western Hungary; 6. Temes- 
war, combining the Bannat, Transylvania, and the eastern part of 
Hungary; 7. Anatolia, a title commonly given to the whole of 
Asia Minor, but here applied to the north-western part of the 
Peninsula, which includes the ancient Paphlagonia, Bithynia, 
Mysia, Lydia, Caria, Lycia, Pisidia, and the greater part of Phrygia 
and Galatia; 8 . Caramania, which contains the residue of the 
last-mentioned ancient countries, and also Lycaonia, Cilicia, and 
the larger part of Cappadocia; 9. Bourn, called also the govern¬ 
ment of Siwas, and sometimes the government of Amasia : it com¬ 
prehended part of Cappadocia, and nearly the whole of the ancient 
Pontus that lay in Asia Minor; 10. Soulkadr : this embraced the 
cities of Malatea, Samosata, Elbostan, and the neighbouring dis¬ 
tricts, and the important passes of the eastern ridges of Mount 
Taurus; 11 .. Trebizond : the governor of this city commanded the 
coasts round the south-eastern extremity of the Black Sea; 12 . Di- 
arbekir, 13. Van : these two governments included the greater 
part of Armenia and Kourdistan; 14. Aleppo, 15. Damascus: 
these two embraced Syria and Palestine; 16. Egypt; 17. Mecca 
and Medina, and the country of Arabia Petraea; 18. Yemen and 
Aden: this government extended over Arabia Felix and a con¬ 
siderable tract along the coast of the Persian Gulf and North¬ 
western India; 19. Bagdad; 20 . Mosul; 21 . Bassorah : these 
three last contained the conquests which Selim and Solyman had 
made from the Persians in Mesopotamia and the adjacent southern 
regions : the Tigris and the Euphrates (after its confluence with 
the other river) formed their eastern limit, and at the same time 

1 The reader may find it useful to compare this list of the divisions 
of the Turkish empire in Solyman’s time, with that given by D’Ohsson, 
whose “Constitution et Administration de l’empire Ottoman” was pub¬ 
lished in 1788, and the list of them given by Ubicini, vol. i., Lettre 
Premiere. 


SOLYMAN I. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 199 

were the boundaries between the Turkish and the Persian 
dominions. 

Besides the countries that were portioned out in these twenty- 
one governments, the Sultan was also sovereign over the vassal 
states of Y\ allachia, Moldavia, Bagusa, and Crim Tartary. They 
paid him tribute, which in the cases of the two former were con¬ 
siderable ; and the last-named feudatories of the Porte, the Crim 
Tartars, furnished large and valuable contingents to the Turkish 
armies. It is not easy to define the territory then belonging to 
the vassal khans of the Crimea beyond that peninsula. They and 
their kinsman, the Tartar khans of Astrakhan, were chiefs of 
numerous and martial tribes that roved amid the steppes to the 
north of the Euxine, and round the Sea of Azof; but the fluctua¬ 
tion of their almost perpetual wars with the Cossacks, the Musco¬ 
vites, and each other, prevents the fixing of any territorial 
boundaries in those regions for any specified epoch. 

At least twenty different races of mankind inhabited the vast 
realms ruled by the great Solyman. The Ottomans themselves, 
who are new calculated to amount to about thirteen millions, 1 are 
believed to have declined in number during the last three 
centuries; and we may take fifteen millions as an approximate 
enumeration of them in the 16th century, distributed then, as 
now, very unequally over the empire; Asia containing four-fifths 
of them, and Asia Minor being especially their chosen home. 
Three millions of Greeks (the name and the language continue, 
whatever we may think as to the predominance of the Sclavonic 
over the Hellenic element in the modern Greek nation), dwelt in 
the southern portion of European Turkey; a million more were in 
Asia Minor. The Armenian race, little extended in Europe, was 
numerous in Asia; and may have formerly amounted, as now, to 
between two and three millions. The Sclavonic part of the 
population was the largest. Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia, Montenegro, 
the Herzegovine, were chiefly peopled by Sclaves ; who were also 
numerous in Moldavia and Wallachia, and there were many 
thousands of them in Transylvania and Albania. They may be 
estimated at six millions and a half at the epoch which we are 
particularly examining. The race called Rumanys, and supposed 
to have sprung from the Roman conquerors of the Dacians, and 
from the conquered Dacians themselves, dwelt principally in 
Wallachia and Moldavia; their number may then, as now, have 
been four millions. The Albanians, who term themselves Skipe- 
tars, and are termed by the Turks Arnauts, were and are a nation 

1 See Ubicini, vol. i. p. 22. 


2 CO 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


of mountaineers—bold, hardy, and unscrupulous ; fond of robbery 
at home, and warfare abroad. Their number is now estimated at 
one million and a half, and is likely to have varied but little. 
The Tartar race formed the population of the Dobruska and of 
the Crimea, and the countries round the coast of the continent 
connected with it, Judging from the amount of soldiery supplied 
by the Crim Tartars to the Ottoman armies, and other circum¬ 
stances, I should reckon a million and a half as their probable 
number in the reign of Solyman. The Arabic race was extensively 
spread through Syria, Arabia, Egypt, and the whole North African 
coast; and the Arabian subjects of Solyman must have been nearly 
six millions. The Maronites, the Chaldeans, and the Druses of 
Syria were together under a million. The Kurds, a race of close 
affinity to the Persians, can be only guessed to have numbered the 
like amount; and the Turkomans of Diarbekir and the neighbour¬ 
hood cannot be numbered at more than 100,000. We have yet to 
add the Magyars of that part of Hungary which obeyed the 
Sultan ; the Germans of Transylvania, the Berbers of Algeria and 
the other African provinces, the Copts of Egypt, the Jews, the 
Tsiganes (who were and are numerous in Moldavia), and the 
remnants of the Mamelukes. In speaking of an age and of nations 
in which the numbering of the people was not practised, it is vain 
to take a retrospective census with any pretensions to minute 
accuracy; but probably our calculation would not be very 
erroneous if we considered that from forty-five to fifty millions of 
subjects obeyed the commands and were guided by the laws of 
Solyman K anounni. 1 

1 In making this estimate, I have used the calculations of Ubicini and 
others, as to the present state of the population of the Turkish empire. I 
have added the probable amounts of those provinces which the Porte has 
lost since Solyinan's time ; and I have generally set off against the natural 
tendency to increase, the checks which war, revolt, and other depopulating 
causes are known to have exercised in the empire during its decline. It 
is certain that the progress of depopulation in the beginning of the seven¬ 
teenth century was very rapid. Sir Thomas Roe, who was ambassador at 
Constantinople for James I., in a letter written by him in 1622, says, “ I 
will tell you a wonder. About sixteen years past, there was a view made 
of all the villages inhabited in the dominion of the Grand Signior, and the 
lists were 553,000, and odd; and now this last year before the war of 
Poland, another being made, they are found to be decreased to 75,000 in 
all, which is a strange depopulation.”—(Sir Thomas Roe’s Embassy, p. 66). 
The first enumeration mentioned by Sir T. Roe would have included the 
provinces conquered from Persia in the reign of Amivath III., but lost 
again before 1622. And the smaller number would exclude all those, and 
also many other former Turkish possessions in Asia, which the Persians 
then occupied. Probably also every “Esnaf,” and rural commune, was 


201 


SO LYMAN I. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 

Of the various races which we have enumerated, the Ottomans, 
the Tartars, the Arabs, the Kurds, the Turkomans, the Mame¬ 
lukes, and the Berbers held the Mahometan creed, which had 
been adopted also by large numbers of the Bosnians, Bulgarians, 
and Albanians. The rest, except the Jews and the Tsigan6s, be¬ 
longed to different branches of the Christian religion, the adherents 
of the Greek Church being by far the most numerous. 

The regular military force of the empire, in the year of the 
capture of Szigeth, the sunset glory of Solyman’s reign, was 
double that which he found at his accession. He raised the 
number of the Janissaries to 20,000; and the whole paid and 
permanent army, including the Royal horseguards and other 
troops, amounted under him to 48,000 men. Solyman bestowed the 
greatest attention upon his Janissaries. He formed from among 
them a corps of invalids, into which only veteran soldiers of high 
merit, who had grown grey in the service, or had been disabled 
by wounds, were admitted. Solyman also complimented these 
formidable troops (and his successors continued the custom) by 
being himself nominally enrolled in their first regiment, and 
coming among them at the pay day, and receiving a soldier’s pay 
from the colonel. He honoured another distinguished regiment 
of the Janissaries by accepting a cup of sherbet from their com¬ 
mander, when he inspected the barrack. This incident also gave 
rise to a custom for each Sultan, on his accession, to receive a cup 
of sherbet from the aga or commander-in-chief of the Janissaries, 
which he returned to that warlike functionary with the words, 
(significant of Ottoman pride and ambition) “We shall see each 
other again at the Red Apple,” the name which the Turks com¬ 
monly give to the city of Rome. The number of the feudatory 
troops, and the irregular levies, at the time of the campaign of 
Szigeth, exceeded 200,000. The park of artillery contained 300 
cannons, and the fleet amounted to 300 sail. 

Notwithstanding the improvement in the armies of Western 
Christendom, to which we have referred when speaking of the 
epoch of the accession of Solyman, the Ottoman troops were still 
far superior to them in discipline, and in general equipment. We 


reckoned separately (see p. 103, supra). Still, after all allowances, I cannot 
help suspecting the accuracy of the figures of either Sir Thomas or his 
printers. If we take the first figures to be correct, they would indicate 
(after allowing for the provinces acquired subsequently to Solyman’s death) 
an aggregate of about five millions of guilds and communes in Solyman’s 
time; and we must then rate the population at more than double the number 
which I have assigned to it. 



202 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

have already mentioned the pre-eminence of the Turks of that age 
in the numerical force and efficiency of irieir artillery; and the 
same remark applies to their skill in fortification, and in all the 
branches of military engineering. The difference between the 
care that was paid to the physical and moral well-being of Soly- 
man’s troops, and the neglect of “ the miserable fate ol the poor 
soldier ” in liis rivals’ camps, is still more striking. There are 
some well-known passages in the writings of Busbequius, the 
Austrian ambassador at the Ottoman court, wdio accompanied the 
Turkish forces in some of their expeditions, in which he contrasts 
the cleanliness, and the good order of a Turkish camp, the ab¬ 
sence of all gambling, and the sobriety and temperance of the 
men, with the tumult, the drunkenness, the licence, the brawling, 
and the offensive pollution that reeked in and around Christian 
tents in that age. It were difficult, even for the most experienced 
commissary-general of modern times, to suggest improvements on 
the arrangements and preparations for the good condition and 
comfort of the Ottoman soldiers, that may be read of in the 
narratives of Solyman’s campaigns. We may mention as one of 
many beneficial regulations, the establishment of a corps of SaJckas, 
or water-carriers, who attended in the field and on the march to 
supply water to the weary and wounded soldiers. 1 Compare this 
with the condition of the Black Bands who followed Bourbon 
under the banner of the Emperor Charles. 

An ample revenue judiciously collected, and prudently though 
liberally employed, was one decisive advantage which Solyman 
possessed over his contemporary monarchs. The crown lands of 
the Sultan at that time produced the large sum of 5,000,000 of 
ducats. The tithe or land-tax, the capitation tax on the rayas, the 
customs, and the other regular taxes raised this to between 
7,000,000 and 8,000,000. The burden of taxation on the subject 
was light, and it was only twice in his reign that Solyman levied 
an additional impost. The necessity caused by the sieges of 
Belgrade and Bliodes, in the beginning of his reign, and the cost 
of armaments in the year of the battle of Mohacz, compelled him 
to impose a poll-tax on all his subjects, without distinction of 
creed or fortune. But the amount was small on each occasion, 
and never was a similar measure again necessary. The victorious 
campaigns of the Sultan were soon made to reimburse their out¬ 
lays, and still further to enrich the Porte. Large contributions 
were drawn from Hungary and Transylvania; and Bagusa, Mol- 


1 See Thornton, p. 185. 


SOLYMAN I . A . D . 1520-1566. 203 

davia, and Wallachia poured tribute into the treasury of the 
Porte. Another less glorious source of revenue was found in the 
confiscated goods of the numerous high officers of state, who were 
executed during this reign. By invariable usage the property of 
those who die thus, is forfeited to the Crown; and the riches of 
the Grand Vizier Ibrahim, and other unhappy statesmen of this 
age were no unimportant accessions to the ways and means of the 
years in which they perished. 

We examined the general principles of the Ottoman govern¬ 
ment when reviewing the institutes of Mahomet the Conqueror. 
Every branch of the administration of the empire received im¬ 
provement from Solyman Kanouni; and, like another great 
conqueror and ruler, he has come down to posterity with his 
legislative works in his hand. He organised with especial care 
the Turkish feudal system of the Ziamets and Timars, reforming 
the abuses which had then already begun to prevail. He ordained 
that n« Timar (small fief), should be allowed to exist if below a 
certain value. A number of the smaller fiefs might be united so 
as to form a Ziamet (a grand fief), but it was never lawful to 
subdivide a Ziamet into Timars, except in the case of a feudatory 
who was killed in battle and left more than one son. By per¬ 
mission of the supreme government several persons might hold a 
fief as joint tenants; but it was still reckoned a single fief; and 
any partition and subdivision not especially authorised by the 
Sublime Porte itself was severely punished. The reader Avho 
is familiar with the workings of the feudal system in Western 
Europe will perceive how admirably these provisions were adapted 
to check the growth of evils, like those, which the practice of 
subinfeudation produced in mediseval Christendom. The Turkish 
fiefs descended from father to son, like our fees in tail male.’ 
There was no power of devise or alienation : and in default of 
male issue of the deceased holder, the Timar or Ziamet reverted 
to the Crown. It had been usual before Solyman’s time to allow 
the Viziers and governors of provinces to make grants of the 
lapsed fiefs within their jurisdiction, but Solyman restricted 
this to the case of the minor fiefs. Hone but the Sultan could 
make a new grant of a lapsed Ziamet, and in no instance did the 
feudatory who received the investiture of a Timar from a subject 
pay any homage, or enter into any relation of feudal duty to 
the person who invested him. There was no mesne lordship. 
The Spahi was the feudal vassal of his ^Sultan and of his Sultan 
alone. 

The number of the larger fiefs, or Ziamets, in Solyman’s time 


204 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


was 3192 ; that of the smaller fiefs, or Timars, was 50.160. 1 It 
will be remembered, that each Spahi (or holder of a military fief) 
was not only bound to render military sendee himself in person, 
but, if the value of his fief exceeded a certain specified amount, he 
was required to furnish and maintain an armed horseman for every 
multiple of that sum; or (to adopt the phraseology of our own 
early institutions), the estate was bound to supply the Crown in 
time of war with a man-at-arms for each knight’s fee. The total 
feudal array of the empire in the reign of Solyman amounted to 
150,000 cavalry, who, w'hen summoned by the Beyler Beys, and 
Sanjak Beys, joined the army at the appointed place of muster, 
and served throughout the campaign without pay. We must not 
only add this number to the 4S.000 regularly paid and permanent 
troops, w hen we estimate the military force of the Turkish empire 
in its meridian, but we must also bear in mind the numerous 
squadrons of Tartar cavalry, which the vassal Khans of the 
Crimea sent to swell the Turkish armies : and we must remember 
the swarms of irregular troops, both horse and foot, the Akindji 
and the Azabs. which the Sultan's own dominions poured forth to 
every campaign.- 

There is no surer proof of the true greatness of Solyman as a 
ruler, than the care, which, at the same time that he reformed the 
Turkish feudal svstem. so as to make it more efficient as an in- 
strument of military force, he bestowed on the condition of those 
Tayas, who, like the serfs of mediaeval Europe, cultivated the lands 
assigned to the Spahis. The “Kanouni Bay a." or ** Code of the 

Bavas." of Solvman. limited and defined the rents and sendees 

• _ • 

which the Baya who occupied the ground was to pay to his feudal 
lord. It is impossible to give any description of this part cf the 
Turkish law which shall apply with uniform correctness to all 
parts of the Sultan's dominions. But the general effect of Soly- 
man’s legislation mav be stated to have been that of recognising 
in the Baya rights of property in the land which he tilled, subject 
to the payment of certain rents and dues, and the performance of 
certain services for his feudal superior. 3 The Englishman, who 

1 See Thornton, p. 164 , and the authorities cited in his notes, dee also 
I) Ohsson and Porter. 

1 See p. 110 , supra. 

5 The reader should consult the third chapter of Banke's “History of 
Serri3,' which gives the “ Outlines of the Turkish institutions in Servian’ 
Tnat learned writer informs ns that in Servia, “ the Spahis received a tithe 
of all that the field, vineyard, or beehive produced ; and also a small tax 
on each head of cattle. Moreover, they had a right to demand for them¬ 
selves a tax, called Glawnitza, of two piastres irom every married couple. 






205 


SOLYMAN I. A.JJ. 1520-1566. 

understands the difference between the position of a modern copy- 
holder and that of a mediaeval villain towards the lord of his 
manor, will well understand the important boon which the en¬ 
lightened wisdom of the Turkish lawgiver secured, if he did not 
originate. And when the difference of creed between the lawgiver 
and the Rayas 1 is remembered, and we also bear in mind the fact 
that Solyman, though not a persecutor like his father, was a very 
sincere and devout Mahometan, we cannot help feeling that the 
great Turkish Sultan of the sixteenth century deserves a degree of 
admiration, which we can accord to none of his crowned contem- 


T<> avoid unpleasant inquiries into the extent of their income, many 
persons added a portion of the tithe to the Glawnitza. In some parts of the 
country the people agreed to pay the Spahis for each married couple, 
whether rich or poor, ten piastres a year in full of all dues. This was at 
once accepted, as it enabled the Spahis to ascertain the amount on which 
they might annually reckon. But the Spahis cannot properly be con¬ 
sidered as a class of nobles. In the villages they had neither estates nor 
dwellings of their own : they had no right to jurisdiction ; they were not 
allowed to eject the tenantry by force, nor could they even forbid them 
from moving and settling elsewhere. What they had to demand, was what 
might be termed a hereditary stipend, in return for which the duty of 
serving in war remained unaltered. No real rights of property were ever 
bestowed on them ; for a specific service a certain revenue was granted to 
them.” 

There would, however, be need of caution in applying this description to 
other parts of the Ottoman Empire ; for instance, to Asia Minor, where the 
number of the Kayas was far less than in Europe, and where the Spahis 
seem to have generally occupied some part, at least, of their fiefs. Pro¬ 
bably the analogy suggested in the text, of our lords of manor and copyhold 
tenants, will give the clearest and least deceptive idea of the relative posi¬ 
tions of the Turkish Spahi and his Raya ; especially as it involves the sup¬ 
position of a great variety of local customs. 

In Egypt, the Ottoman conquerors retained the system which they fouud 
established there by the Mameluke sovereigns ; that of granting, or rather 
of farming out lands to military tenants, who took possession of the lands, 
and paid the State a certain fixed rent for them ; and then they, and tlieir 
sub-tenants, the Fellahs, who tilled the ground, took the residue of the 
profits, in such proportion as the military lords thought fit. Of course, the 
position of an Egyptian Fellah was far worse than that of the Raya of an 
Anatolian or Roumelian Spahi. 

1 There might be Mussulman tenants under the Spahis, but in the im¬ 
mense majority of cases, the tillers of Turkish feudal lands were Chris¬ 
tians. The name of Solyman’s Code on the subject, “Kanouni Raya,” 
itself proves this. And it is observable that the number and value of the 
fiefs in Turkish Europe, where the number of the Ottoman population has 
always been very small in comparison with that of the Christian, exceeded 
the number and value of the fiefs in Asia, where the numerical proportion 
of the followers of the two religions is reversed. See the authorities cited 
in the note to Thornton, p. 165 ; and see D’Ohsson and Porter. 



206 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


poraries in that age of melancholy injustice and persecution 
between Roman Catholic and Protestant throughout the Christian 
world. 

The difference between the lot of the Rayas under their Turkish 
masters and that of the serfs of Christendom, under their fellow- 
Christians and fellow-countrymen, who were their lords, was 
practically shown by the anxiety which the inhabitants of the 
countries near the Turkish frontier showed to escape from their 
homes, and live under that Turkish yoke which is frequently 
represented as having always been so tyrannical. “ I have seen,'’ 
says a writer, who was Solyman’s contemporary, “ multitudes of 
Hungarian rustics set fire to their cottages, and fly with their 
wives and children, their cattle and instruments of labour, to the 
Turkish territories, where they knew that, besides the payment of 
the tenths, they would be subject to no imposts or vexations.” 1 

Besides the important branches of law and government that 
have been mentioned, the ceremonial law (a far more serious sub¬ 
ject in the East than in "Western Europe), the regulations of 
police, and the criminal law, received the personal attention of the 
great Sultan, and were modified and remodelled by his edicts. 
Every subject-matter of legislation is comprised in the great code 
of Ottoman law, compiled by Solyman’s Molla, Ibrahim of Aleppo, 
which has been in authority down to the present age in the 
Turkish Empire. 2 Solyman mitigated the severity of the punish¬ 
ments which had previously been appointed for many offences. 
The extreme slightness of the penalties with which crimes of sen¬ 
suality were visited by him, is justly blamed as a concession to 
the favourite vices of the Turkish nation; 3 but, in general, his 
diminution of the frequency with which the punishments of death 
and mutilation were inflicted, entitles him to the praise of the 
modern jurist. The minuteness of the laws, by which he strove to 
regulate rates of prices and wages, and to prescribe the mode in 
which articles of food should be prepared and sold, may raise a 
smile in our more enlightened age; but we should remember how 

1 Leunclavius, apud Elzevir, cited in Thornton and other writers. At a 
later period, the beginning of the seventeenth century, we learn from Sandys 
that the inhabitants of the Morea sought eagerly to return to the Turkish 
from the Venetian rule. Dr. Clarke’s Travels inform us how bitterly the 
natives of the Crimea regretted the change of masters when the Russians 
succeeded the Turks in the dominion of that country. 

2 Its author fancifully named it “ Multeka-ul-ubhur, the Confluence of 
the Seas,” from its oceanic comprehensiveness of the contents of multitu¬ 
dinous libraries. 

s Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 357. 


207 


SOLYMAN I. A.D. 1520 - 1566 . 

full our own statute book is of similar enactments, and bow far 
our own excise laws still maintain the spirit of vexatious and mis¬ 
chievous interference. Some of the more noticeable laws of Sultan 
Solyman are those by which slanderers and tale-bearers are re¬ 
quired to make compensation for the mischief caused by their evil¬ 
speaking ; false witnesses, forgers, and passers of bad money are 
to have the right hand struck off; interest is not to be taken at a 
higher rate than eleven per cent.; a fine is imposed for three con¬ 
secutive omissions of a Mussulman’s daily prayer, or a breach of 
the solemn fasts; kindness to beasts of burden is enjoined. 

Whatever the political economists of the present time may think 
of the legislation of Solyman Kanouni as to wages, manufactures, 
and retail trade, their highest praises are due to the enlightened 
liberality with which the foreign merchant was welcomed in his 
empire. The earliest of the contracts, called capitulations, which 
guarantee to the foreign merchant in Turkey full protection for 
person and property, the free exercise of his religion, and the safe¬ 
guard of his own laws administered by functionaries of his own 
nation, was granted by Solyman to France in 1535. 1 An ex- 

1 There is a remarkable State paper published by the Ottoman govern¬ 
ment, 1832, in the Moniteur Ottoman , justly claiming credit for their nation 
on this important subject. Mr. Urquhart cites, in his “Turkey and her 
Resources,” the following passages from this official declaration of Turkish 
commercial principles : 

“It has often been repeated, that the Turks are encamped in Europe ; it 
is certainly not their treatment of strangers that has given rise to this idea 
of precarious occupancy ; the hospitality they offer their guest is not that of 
the tent, nor is it that of the Turkish laws ; for the Mussulman code, in its 
double civil and religious character, is inapplicable to those professing 
another religion ; but they have done more, they have granted to the 
stranger the safeguard of his own laws, exercised by functionaries of his 
own nation. In this privilege, so vast in benefits and in consequences, 
shines forth the admirable spirit of true and lofty hospitality. 

“In Turkey, and there alone, does hospitality present itself, great, noble, 
and worthy of its honourable name; not the shelter of a stormy day, but 
that hospitality which, elevating itself from a simple movement of humanity 
to the dignity of a political reception, combines the future with the present. 
When the stranger has placed his foot on the land of the Sultan, he is 
saluted guest {mussafir /). To the children of the West who have confided 
themselves to the care of the Mussulman, hospitality has been granted, with 
those two companions, civil liberty according to the laws, commercial 
liberty according to the laws of nature and of reason. 

“ Good sense, tolerance, and hospitality, have long ago done for the Otto¬ 
man Empire what the other states of Europe are endeavouring to effect by 
more or less happy political combinations. Since the throne of the Sultans 
has been elevated at Constantinople, commercial prohibitions have been un¬ 
known ; they opened all the ports of their empire to the commerce, to the 
manufactures, to the territorial produce of the Occident, or, to say better 


2 oS 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


tremely moderate custom duty was the only impost on foreign 
merchandise; and the costly and vexatious system of prohibitive 
and protective duties has been utterly unknown among the Otto¬ 
mans. No stipulation for reciprocity ever clogged the wise 
liberality of Turkey in her treatment of the foreign merchant who 
became her resident, or in her admission of his ships and his 
goods. 

We have already observed, in referring to the institutes of 
Mahomet II., 1 the authority which the Ulema, or educators and 
men learned in the law, possess in Turkey, and the liberal pro¬ 
visions made there for national education. Solyman was a munifi¬ 
cent founder of schools and colleges; and he introduced many im¬ 
provements into the educational discipline and rank of the Ulema. 
But the great boon conferred by him on this order, and the pe¬ 
culiar homage paid by him to the dignity of learning, consisted in 
establishing, as rules of the Ottoman government, the exemption 
of all the Ulema from taxation, and the secure descent of their 
estates from father to son ; the property of a member of this body 
being in all cases privileged from confiscation. Hence it has 
arisen, that the only class among the Turks in which hereditary 


of tlie whole world. Liberty of commerce has reigned here without limits, 
as large, as extended, as it was possible to be. Never has the Divan 
dreamed, under any pretext of national interest, or even of reciprocity, of 
restricting that facility, which has been exercised, and is to this day in the 
most unlimited sense, by all the nations who wish to furnish a portion of 
the consumption of this vast empire, and to share in the produce of its 
territory. 

“Here every object of exchange is admitted and circulates without meet¬ 
ing other obstacle than the payment of an infinitely small portion of the 
value to the Custom-house. 

“The extreme moderation of the duties is the complement of this regime 
of commercial liberty ; and in no portion of the globe are the officers charged 
with the collection of more confiding facility for the valuations, and of so 
decidedly conciliatory a spirit in every transaction regarding commerce. 

“Away with the supposition that these facilities granted to strangers are 
concessions extorted from weakness ! The dates of the contracts termed 
capitulations, which establish the rights actually enjoyed by foreign mer¬ 
chants, recall periods at which the Mussulman power was altogether predo¬ 
minant in Europe. The first capitulation which France obtained was in 
1535, from Solyman the Canonist (the Magnificent). 

“The dispositions of these contracts have become antiquated, the funda¬ 
mental principles remain. Thus, three hundred years ago, the Sultans, by 
an act of munificence and of reason, anticipated the most ardent desires of 
civilised Europe, and proclaimed unlimited freedom of commerce.” 

The remarks of Ubicini (vol. i. p. 393) on this subject, are also well worth 
consulting. 

1 See p. 104, supra,. 



SO LYMAN /. A.D. 1520-15 65. 209 

wealth is accumulated in families, is furnished by the educational 
and legal professions; and the only aristocracy that can be said 
to exist there, is an aristocracy of the brain. 

The splendour of the buildings, with which Solyman adorned 
Constantinople, suggests a point of comparison between the great 
Turkish legislator and the Roman Emperor who ruled ten cen¬ 
turies before him, in addition to that which their codes naturally 
bring before the mind. It would be dishonouring to Solyman to 
carry the parallel between him and Justinian further than as re¬ 
gards architecture and legislation; nor can there be any balancing 
of the courage and magnanimity of the victor of Mohacz, with the 
cowardice and meanness of the unworthy master of Belisarius and 
personal ringleader of the factions of the Circus. But the long 
list, in which the Oriental historians enumerate the sumptuous 
edifices raised by Solyman in the seven-hilled city of the Bos¬ 
phorus, recalls the similar enumeration which Procopius has made 
of the architectural splendours of Justinian. And it was not only 
in the capital, but at Bagdad, Koniah, Kaffa, Damascus, and other 
cities that the taste and grandeur of Solyman were displayed. 
Besides the numerous mosques which were founded or restored by 
his private liberality, he decorated his empire and provided for 
the temporal welfare of his subjects by numerous works of prac¬ 
tical utility. Among them the great aqueduct of Constantinople, 
the bridge of Tschekmedji, and the restored aqueducts of Mecca 
are mentioned as the most beneficial and magnificent. 

The names of the poets, the historians, the legal and scientific 
writers who flourished under Solyman, would fill an ample page ; 
but it would be one of little interest to us, while Turkish litera¬ 
ture remains so generally unknown in Western Europe, even 
through the medium of translations. 1 But, because unknown, it 
must not be assumed to be unreal; and Solyman was as generous and 
discerning a patron of literary merit, as any of those sovereigns of 
Western Europe who have acquired for their ages and courts the 
much-coveted epithet of “Augustan.” 

Solyman’s own writings are considered to hold an honourable 
station, though not among the highest in his nation’s literature. 
His poems are said to be dignified in sentiment and correct in ex¬ 
pression ; and his journals, in which he noted the chief events of 
each day during his campaigns, are highly serviceable to the in¬ 
vestigator of history. They prove the Sultan’s possession of 

1 Von Hammer’s work on Ottoman literature is an honourable exception; 
and a series of very valuable letters, on the same subject, by Von Hammer, 
appeared in the English “Athenaeum” some years ago. 


210 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


qualities, which are of far more value in a sovereign than are the 
accomplishments of a successful author. They show his sense of 
duty, his industry, and his orderly and unremitting personal atten¬ 
tion to the civil as well as the military affairs of the vast empire 
that had been committed to his charge. Faults, deplorable faults, 
are unquestionably to be traced in his reign. The excessive in¬ 
fluence which he allowed his favourite Sultana to acquire; the 
cruel deaths of his children, and of so many statesmen, whom he 
gave over to the executioner, are heavy stains on his memory. 
His own countrymen have pointed out the defects in his govern¬ 
ment. Kotchi Bey, who wrote in the reign of Amurath IV. 
(1623), and who is termed by Von Hammer the Turkish Montes¬ 
quieu, assigns in his work on the “ Decline of the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire,” which he traces up to the reign of the first Solyman, among 
the causes of that decline—1st, the cessation in Solyman’s time ot 
the regular attendance of the Sultan at the meetings of the Divan; 
2nd, the habit then introduced of appointing men to high stations 
who had not previously passed through a gradation of lower 
offices; 3rd, the venality and corruption first practised by Soly¬ 
man’s son-in-law and Grand Vizier, Koostem, who sold to people 
of the lowest character and capacity the very highest civil 
offices, though the appointment to all military ranks, high or low, 
was still untainted by bribery or other dishonest influence. The 
fourth censure passed by Kotchi Bey on Solyman is for his evil 
example in exceeding the limits of wise liberality by heaping 
wealth upon the same favourite Vizier, and allowing him not only 
to acquire enormous riches, but to make them, by an abuse of the 
Turkish mortmain law, inalienable in his family. This was done 
by transforming his estates into Vaks or Vakoufs; that is to 
say, by settling his property on some mosque or other religious 
foundation, which took from it a small quit-rent, and held the rest 
in trust for the donor and his family. While admitting the justice 
of these charges of the Oriental historian, Von Hammer exposes 
the groundlessness of the censure, which European writers have 
passed upon Solyman, when accusing him of having introduced 
the custom of shutting up the young princes of the House of 
Othman in the seraglio, instead of training them to lead armies 
and govern provinces. He points out that all the sons of Soly¬ 
man, who grew up to manhood, administered pachalics under him, 
and that one of his last acts before his death was to appoint 
Amurath, his grandson, to the government of Magnesia. 

In the same spirit in which Arrian sums up the character of 
Alexander the Great, 1 the German historian rightly warns us, when 

1 Arrian, Yit. Al., lib. vii. 28. 


211 


SOLYMAN /. A.D. 1520 - 1566 , 

estimating that of Solyman the Great, not to fix our attention 
exclusively on the blamable actions of his life, but to remember 
also the bright and noble qualities which adorned him. As a man, 
he was warm-hearted and sincere, and honourably pure from the 
depraved sensuality which has disgraced too many of his nation. 
We must remember his princely courage, his military genius, his 
high and enterprising spirit, his strict observance of the laws of 
his religion without any taint of bigoted persecution, the order and 
economy which he combined with so much grandeur and munifi¬ 
cence, his liberal encouragement of art and literature, his zeal for 
the diffusion of education, the conquests by which he extended his 
empire, and the wise and comprehensive legislation with which he 
provided for the good government of all his subjects; let him be 
thus taken for all in all, and we shall feel his incontestable right 
to the title of a great sovereign, which now for three centuries he 
has maintained. 


212 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


CHAPTER XI. 

SELIM n.—HIS DEGENERACY—PEACE WITH AUSTRIA—FIRST 
CONFLICT BETWEEN TURKS AND RUSSIANS—CONQUEST OF 
CYPRUS—BATTLE OF LEPANTO—OULOUDJ ALl’S ENERGY— 
DEATH OF SELIM . 1 

Solyman the Great, the Magnificent, the Lawgiver, the Lord of 
his Age, was succeeded by a prince to whom his own national 
historians give the epithet of “Selim the Sot.” The ignoble vices 
of this prince (to secure whose accession so much and such clear 
blood had been shed) had attracted the sorrowful notice and drawui 
down the indignant reprimand of the old Sultan in his latter 
years ; but there was now no brother to compete for the throne 
with Selim; and on the 25th of September, 1566, the sabre of 
Othman was girt for the first time on a sovereign, who shrank 
from leading in person the armies of Islam, and wasted in low 
debauchery the hours which his predecessors had consecrated to 
the duties of the state. The effects of this fatal degeneracy were 
not immediately visible. The perfect organisation, civil and mili¬ 
tary, in which Solyman had left the empire, cohered for a time 
after the strong hand, which had fashioned and knit it together 
for nearly half a century, was withdrawn. There was a numerous 
body of statesmen and generals who had been trained under the 
great Sultan : and thus somewhat of his spirit was preserved in 
the realm, until they had passed away, and another generation 
arisen, which knew not Solyman. Foremost of these was the 
Grand Vizier Mohammed Sokolli, who had victoriously concluded 
the campaign of Szigeth after Solyman’s death; and who, fortu¬ 
nately for Selim and his kingdom, acquired and maintained an 
ascendency over the weak mind of the young Sultan, which was 
not indeed always strong enough to prevent the adoption of evil 
measures, or to curb the personal excesses of Selim’s private life, 
but which checked the progress of anarchy, and maintained the 
air of grandeur in enterprise and of vigour in execution, by which 
the Sublime Porte had hitherto been distinguished. 

1 See Von Hammer, books 35, 36. 


SELIM II. A.D. 1566 - 1574 . 213 

An armistice was concluded with the Emperor Maximilian in 
1568, on the terms that each party should retain possession of 
what it then occupied; and there was now for many years an 
unusual pause in the war between the Houses of Hapsburg and 
Othman. The great foreign events of Selim’s reign are the 
attempts to conquer Astrakhan, and unite the Don and the Volga; 
the conquest of Cyprus ; and the naval war of the battle of Le- 
panto. The first of these is peculiarly interesting, because the 
Turks were then for the first time brought into armed collision 
with the Russians. 

In the middle of the sixteenth century, while the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire, then at the meridian of its glory, was the terror and admira¬ 
tion of the world; the Russian was slowly and painfully struggling 
out of the degradation and ruin, with which it had been afflicted 
by two centuries and a half of Tartar conquest. The craft and 
courage of Ivan III. and Vasili Ivanovich had, between 1480 and 
1533, emancipated Moscow from paying tribute to the Khans of 
Kipchakh ; and, by annexing other Russian principalities to that 
of Muscovy, these princes had formed an united Russia, which 
extended from Kief to Kasan, and as far as Siberia and Norwegian 
Lapland. Even thus early the Grand Dukes, or, as they began to 
style themselves, the Czars 1 of Muscovy, seem to have cherished 
ambitious projects of reigning at Constantinople. Ivan III. sought 
out and married Sophia, the last princess of the Greek Imperial 
family, from which the conquering Ottomans had wrested Byzan¬ 
tium. From that time forth, the two-headed eagle, which had 
been the imperial cognisance of the Emperors of Constantinople, 
has been assumed by the Russian sovereigns as their symbol of 
dominion. 2 During the minority of Ivan the Terrible (who suc¬ 
ceeded in 1533) a period of anarchy ensued in Russia, but on that 
Prince assuming the government, the vigour of the state was 

1 “This title is not a corruption of the word Caesar, as many have sup¬ 
posed, but is an old Orieutal word which the Russians acquired through the 
Slavonic translation of the Bible, and which they bestowed at first on the 
Greek Emperors, and afterwards on the Tartar Khans. In Persia it signifies 
throne, supreme authority; and we find it in the termination of the names of 
the kings of Assyria and Babylon, such as Phalassar, Nabonassar;” &c.— 
Kelly, “Ilist. Russia,” p. 125 n., citing Karamsin. Von Hammer, in his 
last note to his 31st book, says, “The title Czar or Tzar, is an ancient title 
of Asiatic sovereigns. We find an instance of it in the title ‘The Schar,’ 
of the sovereign of Gurdistan; and in that of Tzarina (Zaplvij) of the 
Scythians.” 

* “Until after the marriage of Ivan III. with Sophia, the cognisance of 
the grand princes of Moscow had always been a figure of St. George killing 
the dragon,”—Kelly's “ Hist. Russia,” p. 125 n. 


214 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


restored ; the Khanates of Astrakhan and Kasan were conquered 
and finally annexed to Russia; the Don Cossacks were united with 
the empire, and Yermak, one of their chiefs, invaded and acquired 
for Ivan the vast regions of Siberia. The extent of Russia at Ivan’s 
accession, was 37,000 German square miles : at his death, it was 
144,000. But so little was Russia then heeded or known in Western 
Europe, that the charter given by Philip and Mary to the first 
company of English merchants trading thither purports to be 
granted “upon the discovery of the said country;” likening it to 
some region of savages which civilised man might then tread for 
the first time amid the American wilderness. Yet even at that 
period, those who watched the immense extent of the crude 
materials for warlike power, which the Czar of Muscovy possessed, 
the numbers, the rugged hardihood of his people, their implicit 
obedience to their autocrat, their endurance of privations, and the 
nature of the country so difficult for an invader, expressed their 
forebodings of the peril to which the independence of other states 
might be exposed by Muscovite ambition, if once those rude masses 
acquired the arms and the discipline of civilised war. 1 It is melan¬ 
choly to recognise in the fate of Poland and so many other countries 
the truth of the words used by the Polish King, Sigismund, nearly 
three centuries ago, when, in remonstrating with England for sup¬ 
plying the Czar with military engineers and stores, he called him 
“ the Muscovite, the hereditary enemy of all free nations.” 2 

1 .Richard Chancellor, who sailed with Sir Hugh Willoughby in search 
of a North-East Passage, and who travelled from Archangel up to Moscow, 
and afterwards resided at Ivan’s court, in his curious account of the 
Russians (published in “ Hakluyt’s Voyages,” vol. i. p. 239), after mentioning 
the immense number of troops which the Muscovite Duke raised for war, 
and their endurance of hard fare and cold, graphically describes their want 
of discipline. He says : “ They are men without all order in the field, for 
they run hurling on heaps.” He afterwards says : “ Now, what might be 
made of these men, if they were broken to order, and knowledge of civil 
w r arres ? If this prince had within his country such men as could make 
them understand the thing aforesaid, I do believe that tv r o of the best or 
greatest princes in Christendom were not well able to match with him, con¬ 
sidering the greatness of his pow T er, and the hardiness of his people, and 
straite living both of man and horse, and the small charges which his warres 
stand him in.” In another page (240), Chancellor says of the Russians: “If 
they knew their strength, no man w r ere able to make match with them ; nor 
they that dwell near them should have any rest of them. But I think it is 
not God’s will. For I may compare them to a horse, that knoweth not his 
strength, whom a little child ruleth and guideth with a bridle, for all 
his great strength; that if he did [know it] neither man nor child 
could rule him.” 

a “Hostem non modo regni nostri temporarium sed etiam omnium natio- 
jram liberarum hsereditarium Moscum.” The letter of Sigismund to Queen 


SELIM II. A.D. 1566 - 1574 . 215 

The Russians, at the time of Selims accession, had been in¬ 
volved in fierce and frequent wars with the Sultan’s vassals, the 
Crim Tartars ; but the Porte had taken no part in these contests. 
But the bold genius of the Vizier Sokolli now attempted the reali¬ 
sation of a project, which, if successful, would have barred the 
southern progress of Russia, by firmly planting the Ottoman 
power on the banks of the Don and the Volga, and along the 
shores of the Caspian Sea. The Turkish armies, in their invasions 
of Persia, had always suffered severely during their marches along 
the sterile and mountainous regions of Upper Armenia and Mazer- 
bijan. Some disputes with Persia had arisen soon after Selim’s 
accession, which made a war with that kingdom seem probable; 
and Sokolli proposed to unite the rivers Don and Volga by a 
canal, and then send a Turkish armament up the sea of Azoph 
and the Don, thence across by the intended channel to the Volga, 
and then down the latter river into the Caspian; from the 
southern shores of which sea the Ottomans might strike at Tabriz 
and the heart of the Persian power. Those two mighty rivers, the 
Don and the Volga, run towards each other, the one from the 
north-west, the other from the north-east, for many hundred 
leagues, until they are within thirty miles of junction. They 
then diverge; and the Don (the “extremus Tanais” of the 
ancients), pours its waters into the sea of Azoph, near the city of that 
name; the Volga blends with the Caspian, at a little distance 
from the city of Astrakhan, which is built on the principal branch 
of the Delta of that river. The project of uniting them by a 
canal is said to have been one entertained by Seleucus Nicator, 
one of the ablest of the successors of Alexander the Great. It 
was now revived by the Grand Vizier of Selim II. ; and though 
the cloud of hostility with Persia passed over, Sokolli determined 
to persevere with the scheme : the immense commercial and poli¬ 
tical advantages of which, if completed, to the Ottoman Empire, 
were evident to the old statesman of Solyman the Great. Azoph 
already belonged to the Turks, but in order to realise the great 
project entertained, it was necessary to occupy Astrakhan also. 


Elizabeth is cited in the recent work of the Russian Dr. Hamel on “ England 
and Russia.” In another letter of Sigismund’s, translated by Hakluyt (see 
Hamel, p. 1S5), the Polish King says of the Czar : “ We seemed hitherto to 
vanquish him only in this, that he 'was rude of arts and ignorant of policies. 
If so be that this navigation to the Narva continue, what shall be unknowen 
to him ? The Moscovite, made more perfect in warlike affaires with engines 
of warre and shippes, will slay or make bound all that shall withstand him, 
which God defend.” 



2l6 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Accordingly, 3000 Janissaries and 20,000 horse were sent to 
besiege Astrakhan, and a co-operative force of 30,000 Tartars was 
ordered to join them, and to aid in making the canal. 5000 
Janissaries and 3000 pioneers were at the same time sent to 
Azoph to commence and secure the great work at its western 
extremity. But the generals of Ivan the Terrible did their duty 
to their stern master ably in this emergency. The Russian garri¬ 
son of Astrakhan sallied on its besiegers, and repulsed them with 
considerable loss. And a Russian army, 15,000 strong, under 
Prince Serebinoff, came suddenly on the workmen and Janis¬ 
saries near Azoph, and put them to headlong flight. It was upon 
this occasion that the first trophies won from the Turks came into 
Russian hands. An army of Tartars, which marched to succour 
the Turks, was also entirely defeated by Ivan’s forces ; and the 
Ottomans, dispirited by their losses and reverses, withdrew alto¬ 
gether from the enterprise. Their Tartar allies, Avho knew that 
the close neighbourhood of the Turks would ensure their own 
entire subjection to the Sultan, eagerly promoted the distaste, 
which the Ottomans had acquired for Sokolli’s project, by en¬ 
larging on the horrors of the climate of Muscovy, and especially 
on the peril, in which the short summer nights of those northern 
regions placed either the soul or the body of the true believer. 
As the Mahometan law requires the evening prayer to be said two 
hours after sunset, and the morning prayer to be repeated at the 
dawn of day, it was necessary that a Moslem should, in a night of 
only three hours long (according to the Tartars), either lose his 
natural rest, or violate the commands of his Prophet. The Turks 
gladly re-embarked, and left the unpropitious soil; but a tempest 
assailed their flotilla on its homeward voyage, and only 7000 of 
their whole force ever returned to Constantinople. 

Russia was yet far too weak to enter on a war of retaliation 
with the Turks. She had subdued the Tartar Khanates of Kasan 
and Astrakhan; but their kinsmen of the Crimea were still for¬ 
midable enemies to the Russians, even without Turkish aid. It 
was only two years after the Ottoman expedition to the Don and 
Volga, that the Khan of the Crimea made a victorious inroad into 
Russia, took Moscow by storm, and sacked the city (1571). The 
Czar Ivan had, in 1570, sent an ambassador, named Nossolitof, to 
Constantinople, to complain of the Turkish attack on Astrakhan, 
and to propose that there should be peace, friendship, and alli¬ 
ance between the two empires. Nossolitof, in addressing the 
\ iziers, dwelt much on the toleration which his master showed 
to Mahometans in his dominions, as a proof that the Czar was no 


217 


SELIM II, A.D, 1566 - 1574 . 

enemy to the faith of Islam. The Russian ambassador was favour¬ 
ably received at the Sublime Porte, and no further hostilities 
between the Turks and Russians took place for nearly a century. 
But the Ottoman pride and contempt for Russia were shown by 
the Sultan omitting to make the customary inquiry of Nossolitof 
respecting his royal master’s health, and by the Czar’s representa¬ 
tive not receiving the invitation to a dinner before audience, 
which was usually sent to ambassadors. 

Besides his project for uniting the Volga and the Don, the 
Grand Vizier Sokolli had revived the oft-formed project of open¬ 
ing a communication between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. 
Sokolli grandly designed to make such a channel through the 
Isthmus of Suez, as would enable the Ottoman fleets to sail from 
sea to sea. His schemes in this quarter were delayed by a revolt 
which broke out in Arabia, and was not quelled without a diffi¬ 
cult and sanguinary war. And when that important province was 
brought back to submission, the self-willed cupidity and violence 
of Sultan Selim himself involved the Porte in a war with Venice 
and other Christian states, for the sake of acquiring the island of 
Cyprus, which he had coveted while he was governor of Kutahia 
in his father’s lifetime. 1 There was a treaty of peace between 
Venice and the Porte; but Selim obtained from his Mufti 
Ebousououd a Fetva authorising him to attack Cyprus, in open 
violation of the treaty. Cyprus had at one time been under 
Mahometan rulers; and the Turkish authorities now proclaimed 
and acted on the principle, that the sovereign of Islam may at any 
time break a treaty, for the sake of reconquering from the mis¬ 
believers a country, which has formerly belonged to the territory 
of Islam. 2 

The Grand Vizier Sokolli earnestly, but vainly, opposed the 
war with Venice. His influence was counteracted by that of the 
infamous Lala Mustapha, who had in Solyman’s reign been Selim’s 
instrument in the foul practices by which Prince Bajazet and his 
family were destroyed. Lala Mustapha obtained the command of 
the expedition against Cyprus ; and the island was subdued by. 
the Turks (1570-71), though fifty thousand of them perished to 

1 It seems that Selim, like Cassio, found the attraction of Cyprus wine 
irresistible. A Jew, named Joseph Nassy, had been Selim’s boon com¬ 
panion, and persuaded him that he ought to be master of the isle in which the 
juice of the grape was so delicious. See Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 400. 

2 The case laid by Selim before the Mufti, and the answer of that func¬ 
tionary, are given at length by Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 402. The reader 
will observe how utterly opposed this principle is to the doctrine laid down 
in the Turkish military code, cited page 113, svprd. 


218 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


effect its conquest. The conduct of the war of Cyprus was as 
disgracefully treacherous and cruel on the part of the Turks, as 
its inception had been flagrantly unjust. The Venetian commandant, 
Bragadino, who had defended Famagosta, the chief stronghold of 
the island, with heroic valour and constancy, was subjected to the 
grossest indignities, and at last flayed alive, though he had 
surrendered on the faith of a capitulation, by which the garrison 
were to march out with all their arms and property, and to be 
transported in Turkish vessels to Candia. The charges which 
Lala Mustapha made against the Venetian general of personal 
insolence to himself in .an interview after the capitulation, of 
cruelty to the Turkish prisoners during the siege, and of having 
formerly put Mahometan pilgrims to death, could, even if true, be 
no justification for the treacherous and inhuman treatment, of 
which Bragadino was made the victim. But the modern German 
historian, who narrates with just horror and indignation the crime 
of the Turkish commander, observes that such an act was too 
much in the spirit of the age. Selim II. was the contemporary of 
Charles IX. and Ivan the Cruel. The massacre of St. Bartholomew 
took place not a year before the murder of Bragadino; and 
scarcely another year had passed away when, at the capture of the 
fortress of Wittenstein, in Finland, the garrison was cut in pieces 
by the Russians, and the commandant tied to a spear and roasted 
alive. If this took place in France and Finland, what was to be 
expected in Turkey under the government of a young prince who 
had been the murderer of his own brother, and who, in direct 
violation of the law of Mahomet, was an open drunkard, and gave 
free scope to every vice % We might (if crimes could excuse each 
other), in addition to the instances of contemporaneous cruelty 
cited by Von Hammer, refer to the horrors practised by the 
Spaniards under Don Ferdinand of Toledo, at Naarden, in 1572, 
in insolent defiance of the terms of a treaty of surrender. 1 But it 
is both unprofitable and revolting to enter at length on a retro¬ 
spective study of comparative cruelty. Such deeds bring shame, 
not only upon particular nations of mankind, but upon human 
nature in general. 

The fall of Cyprus, the unscrupulous violence with which it had 
been attacked, and the immense preparations in the Turkish sea¬ 
ports and arsenals, now raised anxious alarm, not only at Venice, 
but all along the Christian shores of the Mediterranean. The 
Pope Pius V. succeeded in forming a maritime league, of which 
the Spaniards, the Venetians, and the Knights of Malta were the 

1 See vol. i. p. 195, of Mrs. Davies’s admirable “History of Holland.” 


SELIM II. A.D. 1566 - 1574 . 219 

principal members ; and at the head of it was placed Don John of 
Austria, the natural son of Charles V., and one of the most re¬ 
nowned commanders of the age. 

The confederate fleets mustered at Messina early in the autumn 
of 1571. The force led thither by Don John consisted of seventy 
Spanish galleys, six Maltese, and three of Savoy. The Papal squad¬ 
ron, under Marc Colonna, added twelve galleys. The Venetian 
Admiral Veniero brought 108 galleys, and six huge galeasses, or 
mahons, of a larger size and carrying a heavier weight of metal 
than had yet been known in Mediterranean warfare. Great care 
had been paid by all the confederates to the proper selection of 
their crews and the equipment of their vessels. Nobly born 
volunteers from all parts of Roman Catholic Christendom had 
flocked together to serve under so celebrated a chief as Don John, 
and in such an honourable enterprise: and the Christian fleet 
sailed across to seek its* enemies eastward of the Ionian Gulf, in 
the highest state of efficiency. 

The Turkish naval forces were assembled in the Gulf of Corinth. 
The Capitan Pacha, Mouezinzade Ali, was commander-in-chief; 
and under him were the well-known Ouloudj Ali, Beyler Bey of 
Algiers ; Djaffer Pacha, Beyler Bey of Tripoli; Hassan Pacha, the 
son of Khaireddin Barbarossa, and fifteen other Beys of maritime 
Sanjaks, each of whom was entitled to hoist his banner on his 
galley, as a Prince of the Sea. The troops embarked on board 
the fleet were commanded by Pertew Pacha. The fleet amounted 
to 240 galleys, and sixty vessels of smaller size. Ouloudj Ali and 
Pertew Pacha represented to the commander-in-chief that the fleet 
was hastily and imperfectly manned, and that it was imprudent to 
fight a general battle until it was in a better state of equipment. 
But Mouezinzacle’s courage prevailed over his discretion, and the 
destruction of his fleet was the result. 

On the 7th October, 1571, a little after noon, the Christian 
fleet appeared near the entrance of the Gulf of Patras, off the 
little islands of Curzolari (the ancient Echinades), which lie at the 
mouth of the Aspro Potamo (the Achelous), on the Albanian 
shore. The Ottoman fleet sailed out of the Gulf of Lepanto to 
encounter them, and formed in line of battle, Ouloudj Ali com¬ 
manding the left wing; Mohammed Schaoulah, Bey of Negropont, 
heading the right wing; and the Capitan Pacha, aided by Pertew 
Pacha, being in the centre. Don John drew up his chief force in 
the centre in the form of a crescent. The Prince of Parma (after¬ 
wards so well known in Holland, and the intended conqueror of 
England), the Admiral of Savoy, Caraccioli, the Neapolitan 


220 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


admiral, and other illustrious leaders were in command of it 
The Marquis of Santa Croce commanded a squadron that was 
stationed in the rear of the main line as a reserve. A division of 
fifty-three galleys, under the Venetian proveditor, Barbarigo, 
formed the right wing; and the left wing consisted of fifty-four 
galleys, under Jean Andre Doria, nephew of the great admiral of 
the Emperor Charles. Don John took his own station in advance 
of the centre line, and the other two admirals of the fleet, Colonna 
and Veniero, were at his sides. The Turkish Capitan Pacha 
seeing this, brought forward his own galley and those of Pertew 
Pacha and his treasurer, to answer the challenge of the three 
admiral galleys of the Christians, that thus stood forward between 
the battles, like the Promachi in the conflicts of the Homeric 
heroes. 

Don John showed his gallantry by thus taking the post of 
danger; but he also showed his skill by placing the six great 
Venetian galeasses like redoubts at intervals in front of the con¬ 
federate fleet. The Turks had less fear of these huge vessels than 
might have been justified by the event of the day ; but there was 
a pause before they began the attack, and each fleet lay motionless 
for a time, regarding with admiration and secret awe the strength 
and the splendour of its adversary’s array. At length the Turkish 
admiral fired a gun, charged with powder only, as a challenge to 
begin the action. A ball from one of Don John’s heaviest cannon 
whistled through the Ottoman rigging in answer; the Turks 
rowed forward with loud shouts amid the clangour of their drums 
and fifes to the attack; and the action, commencing on the 
Christian left, soon became general along the line. The large 
Venetian galeasses now proved of the utmost service to the 
Christian fleet. The Turkish galleys in passing them were 
obliged to break their order; and the fire kept up by the Venetian 
artillerymen from the heavy ordnance of the galeasses was more 
destructive than ever yet had been witnessed in naval gunnery. 
Still the Turks pressed forward and engaged the Christian left and 
centre with obstinate courage. The two high admirals of the 
conflicting fleets, Don John and Mouezinzade Ali, encountered 
each other with equal gallantry. Their vessels clashed together, 
and then lay closely locked for upwards of two hours, during which 
time the 300 Janissaries and 100 arquebusiers of the Turk, and the 
400 chosen arquebusiers who served on board Don John’s ship, 
fought with the most determined bravery. The two other admiral 
galleys of the Christians had come to the support of Don John, and 
the Capitan Pacha’s galley was similarly aided by her consorts ; so 


221 


SELIM II. A.D . 1566 - 1574 . 

that these six ships formed a compact mass in the midst of the 
battle, like that which was grouped round Nelson in the Victory, 
by the Temeraire , the Redoubtable, and the Neptune at the battle of 
Trafalgar. The death of Mouezinzade, who fell, shot dead by a 
musket ball, decided the memorable contest. The Turkish 
admiral galley was carried by boarding; and when Santa Croce 
came on to support the first line with the reserve, the whole 
Ottoman centre was broken, and the defeat soon extended to the 
right wing. In their left Ouloudj Ali was more successful. He 
outmanoeuvred Doria; turned his wing; and, attacking liis ships 
when disordered and separated one from another, Ouloudj Ali 
captured fifteen Maltese and Venetian galleys, and with his own 
hand struck off the head of the commandant of Messina. But 
seeing that the day was irreparably lost for Turkey, Ouloudj 
collected* forty of his best galleys, pushed with them through the 
Christian vessels that tried to intercept him, and stood safely out 
to sea. They were the only Turkish vessels that escaped. The 
Ottomans lost in this great battle 260 ships; of which ninety-four 
were sunk, burnt, or run aground and destroyed upon the coast, 
the rest were captured and divided among the allies. Thirty 
thousand Turks were slain; and 15,000 Christians, who had served 
as galley slaves in the Ottoman fleet, were rescued from captivity. 

The confederates lost fifteen galleys and 8000 men. Many 
princely and noble names are recorded in the lists of the killed 
and wounded of that day; but there is none which we read with 
more interest than that of Cervantes. The author of “ Don 
Quixote ” served at Lepanto, as a volunteer in the regiment of 
Moncada, which was distributed among part of the fleet. On the 
day of the battle Cervantes was stationed on board the galley 
Marquesa, and though suffering severely with illness, he distin¬ 
guished himself greatly in the action, during which he received 
two arquebuss wounds, one of which maimed his left hand for 
life. He often referred with just pride to the loss of his hand, 
and ever rejoiced at having been present at the glorious action at 
Lepanto; “ on that day so fortunate to Christendom, when ” (in his 
own words) “ all nations were undeceived of their error in believing 
that the Turks were invincible at sea.” 1 

The glories of the “ Fight of Lepanto ” thrilled Christendom 
with rapture ; and they have for centuries been the favourite 
themes of literature and art. But the modern German historian 
well observes, that we ought to think with sadness of the nullity 
of the results of such a battle. After occupying three weeks in 

1 “Don Quixote,” book iv. c. 12. 


222 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


dividing the spoils of Lepanto, and nearly coming to blows over 
them, the Christian squadrons returned to their respective ports, 
to be thanked, lauded, and dismissed. Meanwhile, the inde¬ 
fatigable Ouloudj Ali, with the squadron which he had saved 
from Lepanto, gleaned together the Turkish galleys that lay in the 
different ports of the Archipelago ; and, at the end of December, 
sailed proudly into the port of Constantinople at the head of a 
fleet of eighty-seven sail. In recompense of his zeal, he received 
the rank of Capitan Pacha; and the Sultan changed his name of 
Ouloudj into Kilidj, which means “ The Sword.” The veteran 
Admiral, Piale, the hero of Djerbe, was yet alive; and under his 
and Kilidj Ali’s vigorous and skilful directions, a new fleet was 
constructed and launched before the winter was past. While the 
rejoicing Christians built churches, the resolute Turks built docks. 
The effect was, that before June, a Turkish fleet of 250 sail, com¬ 
prising eight galeasses or mahons of the largest size, sailed forth 
to assert the dominion of the seas. The confederate Christian 
powers, after long delays, collected a force numerically superior to 
the Ottoman; but, though two indecisive encounters took place, 
they were unable to chase Kilidj Ali from the western coasts of 
Greece, nor could the Duke of Parma undertake the siege of 
Modon, which had been designed as the chief operation for that 
year. It was evident, that though the Christian confederates 
could win a battle, the Turk was still their superior in a war. 1 The 
Venetians sought peace in 1573, and in order to obtain it, con¬ 
sented not only that the Sultan should retain Cyprus, but that 
Venice should pay him his expenses of the conquest. It was not 
unnaturally remarked by those, who heard the terms of the treaty, 
that it sounded as if the Turks had gained the battle of Lepanto. 

After Venice had made peace with the Porte, Don John under¬ 
took an expedition with the Spanish fleet against Tunis, which 
Ouloudj Ali had conquered during the year in which Cyprus was 
attacked. Don John succeeded in capturing the city, which was 
the more easy, inasmuch as the citadel had continued in the power 
of the Spaniards. Don John built a new fortress and left a 
powerful garrison in Tunis; but, eighteen months after his de¬ 
parture, his old enemy Kilidj Ali reappeared there; and after a 

1 The Venetian envoy, Barbaro, endeavoured to open negotiations at 
Constantinople in the winter after the battle of Lepanto. The Vizier, in 
reference to the loss of the Turkish fleet, and the conquest of Cyprus, said 
to him : “ There is a great difference between our loss and yours. You 
have shaved our chin ; but our beard is growing again. We have lopped 
off your arm ; and you can never replace it. ” 


SELIM II. A.D. 1566 - 1574 . 223 

sharp siege, made the Sultan again master of the city and citadel, 
and stormed Don John’s new castle. Tunis now, like Algiers and 
Tripoli, became an Ottoman government. The effectual authority 
which the Porte exercised over these piratical states of North 
Africa (which are often called the Barbaresque Begencies) grew 
weaker in course of time; but the tie of allegiance was not en¬ 
tirely broken: and though the French have in our own time 
seized Algiers, the Sultan is still sovereign of Tripoli and Tunis, 
the scenes of the successful valour of Dragut and Kilidj Ali. 

Selim the Sot died not long after the recovery of Tunis; and 
the manner of his death befitted the manner of his life. He had 
drunk off a bottle of Cyprus wine at a draught, and on entering 
the bath-room with the fumes of his favourite beverage in his 
head, he slipped and fell on the marble floor, receiving an injury 
of the skull which brought on a fatal fever (1574). He showed 
once a spark of the true Othman, by the zeal with which he aided 
his officers in restoring the Turkish navy after Lepanto. He then 
contributed his private treasures liberally, and gave up part of the 
pleasure-gardens of the Serail for the site of the new docks. Ex¬ 
cept this brief flash of patriotism or pride, his whole career, both 
as Prince and Sultan, is unrelieved by a single merit; and it is 
blackened by mean treachery, by gross injustice and cruelty, and 
by grovelling servitude to the coarsest appetites of our nature. 


224 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


CHAPTER XII. 

AMURATH III.—RAPID DECLINE OF THE EMPIRE—CONQUESTS FROM 
PERSIA—PROGRESS OF CORRUPTION AND MILITARY INSUBOR¬ 
DINATION—WAR WITH AUSTRIA—MAHOMET III.—BATTLE OF 
CERESTES—ACHMET I.—PEACE OF SITVATOROK—UNSUCCESSFUL 
WARS WITH PERSIA—REVOLTS—MUSTAPHA I. DEPOSED—OTH- 
MAN I.—VIOLENCE OF THE TROOPS—OTHMAN MURDERED— 
MUSTAPHA RESTORED AND AGAIN DEPOSED—WRETCHED STATE 
OF THE EMPIRE . 1 

There is an Eastern Legend, that when the great King and 
Prophet Solomon died, he was sitting on his lion-throne, clad in 
the royal robes, and with all the insignia of dominion round him. 
The lifeless form remained in the monarch’s usual attitude; and 
the races of men and beasts, of genii and demons, who watched 
at respectful distance, knew not of the change, but long with ac¬ 
customed awe, paid homage, and made obeisance before the form 
that sat upon the throne; until the staff on which Solomon had 
leaned, holding it in both hands towards the mouth, and on which 
the body had continued propped, was gnawed by worms and gave 
way, letting the corpse fall to the ground. Then and not till then 
the truth was known ; and the world was filled with sorrow and 
alarm. 

This fable well images the manner in which the empire of Sul¬ 
tan Solyman remained propped on the staff of the Vizierate, and 
retained its majesty after his death and during the reign of Selim, 
so long as the power of Solyman’s Grand Vizier Sokolli remained 
unimpaired. When Sokolli’s authority was weakened and broken 
by the corrupt influence of favourites and women at the court of 
Selim’s successor, Amurath III., the shock of falling empire was 
felt throughout the Ottoman world f spreading from the court to 
the capital, from the capital to the provinces, and at last becom¬ 
ing sensible even to foreign powers. 

Amurath III. was summoned at the age of twenty-eight from 


1 Von Hammer, books 37-39. 


8 Ibid., vol. ii. p. 439. 


AMURATH III ; A.D. 1574 - 1595 . 225 

his government at Magnesia to succeed his father at Constanti¬ 
nople. He arrived at the capital on the night of the 21st of 
December, 1574, and his first act was to order the execution of 
his five brothers. In the morning the high officers of state were 
assembled to greet their master, and the first words of the new 
Sultan were anxiously watched for, as ominous of the coming 
events of his reign. Amurath, who had retired to rest fatigued 
with his voyage, and literally fasting from all but sin, turned to 
the Aga of the Eunuchs and said, “ I am hungry; bring me some¬ 
thing to eat.” These words were considered to be prophetic of 
scarcity during his reign; and the actual occurrence of a famine 
at Constantinople in the following year did much to confirm the 
popular superstition. 

Sokolli retained the Grand Yizierate until his death in 1578, 
but the effeminate heart of Amurath was ruled by courtiers, who 
amused his listless melancholy; and by four women, one ot whom 
was his mother, the dowager Sultana, or (as the Turks term her) 
the Sultana Valide, Nour JBanou: the next was Amurath’s first 
favourite Sultana, a Venetian lady of the noble House of Baffo, 
who had been captured by a Turkish corsair in her early years. 
The fair Venetian so enchanted Amurath, that he was long strictly 
constant to her, slighting the other varied attractions of his harem, 
and neglecting the polygamous privileges of his creed. The Sul¬ 
tana Valide, alarmed at the ascendency which the Sultana Safiye 
(as the Venetian lady was termed) was acquiring over Amurath, 
succeeded in placing such temptation in her son’s way, as induced 
him to make his Venetian love no longer his only love; and he 
thenceforth rushed into the opposite extreme of licentious indul¬ 
gence even for a Mahometan prince. Such was the demand 
created for the supply of the imperial harem, that it is said to 
have raised the price of beautiful girls in the slave-market of Con¬ 
stantinople. One of this multitude of favoured fair, a Hungarian 
by birth, obtained considerable influence over her lord; but his 
first love, Safiye, though no longer able to monopolise Amurath’s 
affections, never lost her hold on them; and it was her will that 
chiefly directed the Ottoman fleets and armies during his reign; 
fortunately for her native country Venice, which she prevented 
Turkey from attacking, even under circumstances of great provo¬ 
cation, caused by the outrages and insolence of some of the cruisers 
of the Republic of St. Mark. The fourth lady who had sway in 
Amurath’s councils, did not owe it to her own charms, but to the 
adroitness with which she placed before him the charms of others. 
This was Djanfeda, who was Kiaya (or grand mistress) of the 


226 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

harem. These were the chief ladies who interposed and debated 
on all questions how the power bequeathed by the great Solyman 
should be wielded, and with whom the House of Othman should 
have peace or war. 

Generals and admirals trained in the camps and fleets of Soly¬ 
man still survived; and the hostilities, in which the Turkish 
Empire was engaged during the reign of Amuratii III., were 
marked by more than one victory, and were productive of several 
valuable acquisitions of territory. War between Turkey and 
Persia broke out again soon after Amurath’s accession, and was 
continued for several years. The death of the Shah Tahmasp, 
and the tyranny and misgovernment of his successors had thrown 
Persia into a state of anarchy and weakness, which greatly favoured 
the progress of the Ottoman arms ; though the fortune of the war 
was often chequered, and the losses of the Turks by the sword, 
and by fatigue and privation were numerous and severe. In this 
war the Turkish armies attacked and conquered Georgia, which 
had been in alliance with Persia, and they penetrated as far as 
Daghestan and the shores of the Caspian Sea. The Turkish troops 
from the Crimea and their Tartar auxiliaries took an important part 
in those campaigns in the regions of the Caucasus. The Bey of 
Azoph was, in 1578, rewarded for the alacrity with which he had 
led the vanguard of an army round the north of the Euxine, with 
the sounding title of Capitan Pacha of the Caspian Sea. The 
most remarkable episode in the war was the march in 1583 of 
Osman Pacha, surnamed Ozdemir or Osman of the Iron Nerves, 
the commander of the Turkish forces in Georgia, who led an army 
in the depth of winter through the defiles of the Caucasus, through 
Circassia, and across the frozen plains of the Kuban to Azoph, and 
thence to the Crimea, where his unexpected appearance crushed 
an incipient revolt against the Sultan. Osman carried the head 
of the rebel Khan from the Crimea to Constantinople, where he 
was received with rapturous honours by the Sultan, who took the 
jewels from his own turban, and the richly adorned yataghan from 
his own belt to deck the veteran hero, the recital of whose exploits 
and sufferings had excited interest and animated attention in the 
jaded spirit of the imperial voluptuary. A peace was at last made 
between Turkey and Persia in 1590, by which the Ottomans 
obtained Georgia, the city of Tabriz, and also Azerbijan, Schirwan, 
Loristan, and Scherhezol. A clause was inserted in the treaty, 
which required the Persians not to curse any longer the three 
first Caliphs. As this implied the conversion of the Persian 
nation from Schiism to Sunnism, which was impracticable the 


227 


AMURATH III. A.D. 1574 - 1595 . 

stipulation could only be regarded as a mere form to gratify the 
religious pride of the Sultan, or as designed to furnish pretexts for 
renewing the war, when the Porte might judge it convenient. 

Except the collisions, that from time to time took place near 
the boundary line in Hungary between the Turkish Pachas and 
Christian commandants of the respective border countries, the 
Ottoman Empire preserved peace with the powers of Christian 
Europe during the reign of Amurath III. until two years before 
his death, when war was declared against Austria. Commercial 
and diplomatic relations were established under Amurath with the 
greater part of Western Europe ; the Ottomans ever showing the 
same wise liberality in all that relates to international traffic, that 
has been already mentioned. England, which, until the time of 
Amurath III., had been a stranger to Turkey, sent in 1579 three 
merchants, William Harebone, Edward Ellis, and Richard Stapel, 
to Constantinople, who sought and obtained from the Porte the 
same favour to English commerce, and the same privileges tor 
English commercial residents in Turkey, that other foreign nations 
enjoyed. In 1583, William Harebone was accredited to Constan¬ 
tinople as the ambassador of our Queen Elizabeth, who was then 
the especial object of the hatred of Philip II. of Spain, and sought 
anxiously to induce the Sultan to make common cause with her 
against the Spanish King, and his great confederate the Pope of 
Rome. In her state papers to the Ottoman court, the Protestant 
Queen takes advantage of the well-known horror with which the 
Mahometans regard anything approaching to image-worship, and 
styles herself “ The unconquered and most puissant defender of the 
true faith against the idolaters who falsely profess the name of 
Christ ” and there is a letter addressed by her agent at the Porte 
to the Sultan in November, 1587, at the time when Spain was 
threatening England with the Great Armada, in which the Sultan 
is implored to send, if not the whole tremendous force of his 
empire, at least sixty or eighty galleys, “ against that idolater, the 
King of Spain, who, relying on the help of the Pope and all idola¬ 
trous princes, designs to crush the Queen of England, and then to 
turn his whole power to the destruction of the Sultan, and make 
himself universal monarch.” The English advocate urges on the 
Ottoman sovereign, that if he and Elizabeth join promptly and 
vigorously in maritime warfare against Spain, the “proud Spaniard 
and the lying Pope with all their followers will be struck down 
that God will protect His own, and punish the idolaters of the 
earth by the arms of England and Turkey. 1 

1 The letters are given at length by Yon Hammer, in h's notes to his 

15—2 


223 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

The evils, which the general prevalence of venality and the force 
of feminine intrigue at the Sultan’s court had brought upon the 
Ottoman Empire, were not yet apparent to foreigners, who only 
saw its numerous fleets and armies, and only heard of its far- 
extended conquests; but before the close of Amurath’s reign, the 
inevitable fruits of corruption and favouritism were unmistakeably 
manifest. Every appointment, civil, military, judicial, or admin¬ 
istrative, was now determined by court influence or money. The 
Sultan, who squandered large sums on the musicians, the parasites, 
and buffoons, by whom he loved to be surrounded, was often per¬ 
sonally in need of money, and at last stooped to the degradation 
of taking part of the bribes, which petitioners for office gave to 
his courtiers. One of his principal favourites was Schemsi Pacha, 
who traced his pedigree up to a branch of those Seljukian princes, 
whom the House of Othman had superseded in the sovereignty of 
the East. The historian Ali, who afterwards wrote Schemsi Pacha’s 
biography, relates, that one day he himself was in that favourite’s 
apartments, when Schemsi came thither from the Sultan’s presence, 
and said with a joyous air to one of his domestics, “ At last I have 
avenged my house on the House of Othman. For, if the Ottoman 

39th book. They are in Latin. The first is from Elizabeth to the Vizier 
Mohammed dated at Windsor, November 15, 1582. The second letter, 
laid by Elizabeth’s ambassador before the Sultan, is dated November 9, 
1587. There are two more : one, in 1587, requesting the release of some 
English subjects from Algiers ; the other, which is dated on the last day of 
November, 15S8, announces the victory of the English, and still urges the 
Sultan to attack Spain. Henry III. of France had sent an envoy to Con¬ 
stantinople, in April, 1588, for the same purpose ; and to warn the Sultan 
that if Philip conquered England he would soon overpower Turkey. (See 
Mignet’s “Mary Queen of Scots,” vol. ii. p. 392.) The Turks seem to have 
met these applications with fair promises ; but they certainly did no more. 
The English are said to have given considerable sums to the Turkish his¬ 
torian, Seadeddin, to employ in their favour the influence which that learned 
writer possessed, or was supposed to possess with the Sultan, who inherited 
the family fondness for literature. Some of the Ottoman grandees were much 
impressed by the distinction between the Roman Catholic image-wor¬ 
shippers and the Protestant English. Sinan Pacha is reported to have told 
the Austrian Ambassador Pezzen, “That there was nothing needed to 
make the English into genuine Mussulmans, save a lifting of the finger and 
a recital of the Eschdad ” (the formula of confession of faith). But 
Seadeddin does not seem to have been worth his pay. Perhaps, if Sultana 
Safiye, or the matron Djanfeda, had been well bribed by our Virgin Queen, 
the result might have been different. A Turkish squadron in the Channel, 
co-operating with Drake and Raleigh, would have formed a curious episode 
in the great epic of the Spanish Armada. I may add that Professor Ranke 
also, in his recent “History of England” (vol. i. p. 433. Eng. Trans.), 
speaks of “ the advances made by the English Government to the Turks 
in the time of Elizabeth.” 



229 


AMURATH III. A.D. 1574-1595. 

dynasty caused our downfall, I have now made it prepare its own.” 
“ How has that been done 1” cried the old domestic gravely. “ I 
have done it,” said Schemsi, “ by persuading the Sultan to share 
in the sale of his own favours. It is true I placed a tempting bait 
before him; 40,000 ducats make no trifling sum. Henceforth the 
Sultan will himself set the example of corruption; and corruption 
will destroy the empire.” 

The armies and military organisation of the Porte now began to 
show the workings of this taint, not only through the effect of 
incompetent men receiving rank as generals and as officers, but 
through the abuses with which its feudal system was overrun, and 
the sale of Ziamets and Timars to traffickers of every description : 
even to Jews and Jewesses, who either sold them again to the best 
bidders, or received the profits of the feudal lands, in defiance 
both of the spirit and letter of the law. An alarming relaxation 
of discipline among the troops, and increasing turbulence and in¬ 
subordination accompanied those scandals; and at last, in 1589, 
the Janissaries openly attacked the Serail of the Sultan where the 
Divan was assembled, and demanded the head of Mohammed Pacha, 
Beyler Bey of Boumelia, surnamed “the Falcon” for his rapacity. 
Their anger against this royal favourite was not causeless, for it 
was at his instigation that the pay of the troops had been given 
in grossly debased coinage. They now attacked the palace, and 
cried, “ Give us up the Beyler Bey, or we shall know how to find 
our way even to the Sultan.” Amurath ordered that the soldiery 
should receive satisfaction; and accordingly the heads of the guilty 
Pacha, and of an innocent treasurer whom they had involved in 
their angry accusations, were laid before these military sovereigns 
of the sovereign. 

It has been truly said that the government which once has 
bowed the knee to force, must expect that force will thenceforth 
be its master. Within four years the Janissaries revolted twice 
again, and on each occasion compelled the Sultan to depose and 
change his Vizier. In 1591 these haughty Praetorians coerced 
their sovereign into placing on the vassal throne of Moldavia the 
competitor who had obtained their favour by bribes. While these, 
and many other tumults, in some of which the Spahis and 
Janissaries waged a civil war against each other in the streets, 
convulsed the capital, the provinces were afflicted by the rapa¬ 
cious tyranny of their governors and the other officers of state, 
and by its natural results. The garrisons of Pesth and Tabriz 
mutinied on account of their pay being kept back. The warlike 
tribes of the Druses in Lebanon took arms against their provincial 


230 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

oppressors. The revolt of Transylvania, Moldavia, and TV allachia 
was a still more formidable symptom ol the wretched condition 
of the empire. The risings in these provinces were encouraged by 
the war with Austria, which broke out in 1693. And in 1694 the 
war with Persia was renewed, and marked by little success on the 
Turkish side. 

While his realm was in this distracted state, Sultan Amurath 
sickened and died (16th January, 1595). Weak both in mind 
and body, he had long been perplexed by dreams and signs, which 
he believed to be forebodings of death. On the morning of the 
last.day of his life he had gone to a magnificent kiosk lately built 
by Sinan Pacha on the shore of the Bosphorus, which commanded 
an extensive prospect; and he lay there watching the ships that 
sailed to and from the Propontis and the Euxine. His musicians, 
as usual, were in attendance, and they played an air which recalled 
to Amurath’s memory the melancholy words of the song to which 
it belonged. He murmured to himself the first line : 

“ Come and keep watch by me to-night, 0 Death !” 

And it chanced that at that very time two Egyptian galleys 
saluted the Porte, and the concussion caused by the guns’ fire 
shattered the glazed dome of the kiosk. As the fragments fell 
around the Sultan, he exclaimed, “ At another time the salute of 
a whole fleet would not have broken that glass ; and now it is 
shivered by the noise of the cannon of these galleys. I see the 
fate of the kiosk of my life.” Saying so he wept bitterly, and was 
led by his attendants back to his palace, where he expired that 
very night. 

The multitudinous seraglio of Amurath III. had produced to 
him 103 children, of whom twenty sons, and twenty-seven 
daughters, were living at the time of his decease. The eldest son, 
Prince Mahomet, whom his mother, the Venetian Sultana Safiye, 
promptly summoned from his government in Asia Minor, instantly 
put his nineteen brothers to death—the largest sacrifice to the 
Cain-spirit of Mahomet, the Conqueror’s law, that the Ottoman 
histories record. Seven female slaves, who were in a condition 
from which heirs to the empire might be expected, were at the 
same time sewn in sacks and thrown into the sea. Safiye nad 
kept the death of Amurath secret until the successor arrived to 
secure the throne. This was the last time that this precautionary 
measure was needed on a Turkish sovereign’s death ; for Ma¬ 
homet III., who now succeeded to Amurath, was the last heredi¬ 
tary prince who was trusted with liberty and the government of 


MAHOMET III. A.V. 1595 - 1603 . 231 

provinces during his predecessor’s lifetime. Thenceforth the 
Ottoman princes of the blood royal were kept secluded and 
immured in a particular part of the palace called the Kaweh 
(cage), from which they passed to die or to reign, without any of 
the minor employments of the state being placed in their hands. 
The fear lest they should head revolts was the cause of this new 
system; the effect of which on the character and capacity of the 
rulers of Turkey was inevitably debasing and pernicious. 

Mahomet III. was twenty-three years of age when he came to 
the throne. On the eighth day after his accession, he went in 
state to public prayer at the mosque of St. Sophia, a ceremony 
that had not taken place for two years, on account of Amurath’s 
fear of being insulted by the troops as he passed along the streets. 
A donative of unprecedented extravagance was now lavished on 
the soldiery, in order to buy their favour to their new Sultan; and 
anxious exertions were then made to send reinforcements to the 
armies in Hungary, where the war went hard with the Turks. 
While these preparations were being made, two regiments that 
were dissatisfied with the share which they had received of the 
imperial bounty, surrounded the Grand Vizier, Ferhad Pacha, and 
with angry cries demanded that more should be paid to them. 
Ferhad replied by bidding them march to the frontiers, where 
they should receive their due. They redoubled their murmurs 
and menaces at this, and Ferhad then said to them, “ Know you 
not that the men who refuse obedience to their chiefs are infidels, 
and that their wives are barren V’ Indignant at this taunt, the 
mutineers repaired to the Mufti, and repeating to him Ferhad’s 
words, asked him to issue a Fetva condemning the Grand Vizier : 
but the Mufti’s answer to their reply was, “ My friends, let the 
Grand Vizier say all he can, he cannot make you infidels, and he 
cannot make your wives barren.” Being but indifferently satisfied 
with this legal opinion, the mutineers sought their comrades’ aid 
in getting up an insurrection, saying that the Mufti would only 
give his Fetvas for money, and not for justice. The Spahis (the 
horseguards of the capital) took up the supposed grievance of the 
malcontents, and clamoured for the head of Ferhad. A tumult 
ensued, in which several of the high officers of state, who 
vainly endeavoured to pacify the rioters, were wounded; but the 
Janissaries were prevailed on to charge their rivals the Spahis, and 
the mutiny was thus suppressed. 

Safiye, now Sultana Valide, ruled generally in the court and 
councils of her son Mahomet, with even more predominant sway 
than she had exercised in the time of the late Sultan. Mahomet 


232 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


was a weak-minded prince, but capable of occasional outbursts 
of energy, or rather of violence. The disasters which the Turkish 
arms were now experiencing in Wallachia and Hungary, made the 
Sultan’s best statesmen anxious that the sovereign should, after 
the manner of his great ancestors, head his troops in person, and 
endeavour to give an auspicious change to the fortune of the war. 
Safiye, who feared that her son when absent from Constantinople 
would be less submissive to her influence, opposed this project; 
and for a long time detained the Sultan among the inglorious 
pleasures of his seraglio, while the Imperialists, under the Arch¬ 
duke Maximilian and the Hungarian Count Pfalfy, aided by the 
revolted princes of the Danubian Principalities, dealt defeat and 
discouragement among the Ottoman ranks, and wrung numerous 
fortresses and districts from the empire. The cities of Gran, 
Wissgrad, and Babocsa, had fallen ; and messengers in speedy 
succession announced the loss of Ibrail, Varna, Ivilic, Ismail, 
Silistria, Rustchuk, Bucharest, and Akerman. These tidings at 
last roused the monarch in his harem; and he sent for the Mufti, 
who, fortunately for Turkey, was a man of sense and patriotic 
spirit. Adopting a characteristic mode of advising an Ottoman 
Prince, the Mufti took an opportunity of placing in Mahomet’s 
hands a poem of Ali-Tchelabi, one of the most eminent writers of 
the time, in whose verses the misfortunes of the empire, and the 
calamitous progress of the Hungarian war, were painted in the 
strongest colours. The Sultan was sensibly affected by its perusal, 
and ordered that the solemn service of prayer and of humiliation 
should be read, which requires the Mussulman to pray and weep, 
and do acts of contrition and penitence for three days. The 
Sultan and all his officers of state, and all the Mahometan popula¬ 
tion of the city, attended, and humbled themselves at these 
prayers, which were read by the Scheik Mohizedden in the place 
of the Okmeidan, behind the arsenal. Eight daj r s afterwards, an 
earthquake shook Constantinople, and overthrew many towns and 
villages in Anatolia. The consternation and excitement of the 
Ottomans now were excessive. All classes called on the Padischah 
to go forth to the holy war against the unbelievers ; and the 
formidable Janissaries refused to march to the frontier unless the 
Sultan marched with them. The historian Seadeddin, who held 
the high dignity of Khodja, or tutor to Mahomet, the Mufti, and 
the Grand Vizier, urged on their sovereign that the only hope of 
retrieving the prosperity and even of assuring the safety, of the 
empire, lay in his appearing at the head of his armies. Their 
exhortations, aided by the pressure from without, prevailed over 


MAHOMET III. A.D. 1595 - 1603 . 233 

the influence of the Sultana Valide. In her anger and irritation 
at this decision, and hoping perhaps to cause a tumult during 
which the current of popular opinion might be changed, or the 
ministers who opposed her might be killed, the daughter of 
Venice forgot all the ties which had once bound her to Christen¬ 
dom, and proposed that there should be a massacre of all the 
Giaoiys in Constantinople. The fanatics in the Divan approved 
of this proposal of a most atrocious and most useless crime; but 
the authority of wiser statesmen prevailed, and a banishment of 
all unmarried Greeks in the capital was the only result of the in¬ 
furiated Sultana’s design. 

Mahomet III. left his capital for the frontier in the June of 1596, 
with pomp and state which recalled to some spectators the cam¬ 
paigns of the great Solyman. The Sultan’s resolution to head his 
armies had revived the martial spirit of the Ottomans; and the 
display of the sacred standard of the Prophet, which now for the 
first time was unfurled over a Turkish army, excited still more 
the zeal of the True Believers to combat the enemies of Islam. 
This holy relic had been left at Damascus by Sultan Selim I. after 
he obtained it from the last titular Caliph of the Abassides, on his 
conquest of Egypt. 1 During the reign of Amurath III. it was 
conveyed from Damascus to Constantinople; and it has since that 
time been preserved by the Sultans as a treasure for extreme need, 
to be displayed only on great emergencies, when it has become 
necessary to employ some extraordinary means to rouse the mili¬ 
tary spirit of the Ottomans, or to recall them to their religious 
allegiance to their Sultan, as the Caliph, and the successor of the 
Prophet Mahomet, whose holy hands once bore that standard in 
battle. 

The historian Seadeddin accompanied his imperial pupil in this 
campaign; and his presence proved of value for the purpose of 
gaining victories, as well as for that of recording them. The 
Grand Vizier, Ibrahim Pacha, Hassan Sokolli Pacha, and Cicala 
Pacha, were the principal commanders under the Sultan. The 
biography of the last-mentioned Pacha (whom the Oriental writers 
call Dzigalizade) furnishes so striking an example of the career of 
a renegade of that age, that it may claim a short space in these 
pages. Cicala was, as his name denotes, an Italian by birth. His 
father, the Vicomte di Cicala, head of a noble Genoese family that 
had settled in Sicily, commanded a force of privateers (or, as the 
Turks would have termed them, pirates), and he cruised against 
the Mahometan coasts and commerce with as little heed to truce 

1 See p. 150, supra. 


234 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


or treaty as any Algerine Eeis ever showed in his enterprises 
against Christians. The Knights of Malta sought the co-operation 
of this daring maritime partisan in many of their adventures ; and 
his galleys joined those of the Order when they attacked Modon 
in the Morea, in 1531. Though unable to storm the citadel, the 
chevaliers sacked the town, and showed the most savage and 
sordid rapacity for plunder of every description. Among other 
spoils, they carried off 800 Turkish ladies, one of whom, a girl of 
remarkable beauty, fell to the share of Count Cicala ; who was so 
enraptured with his prize, that on his return to Sicily he married 
her, having first had her baptised under the name of Lucretia. 
There were several sons of this marriage. The youngest of them, 
Scipio, at the age of eighteen, accompanied his father in the expe¬ 
dition against Djerbe, which terminated so disastrously for the 
Christian confederates. 1 Both the Cicalas wore among the cap¬ 
tives whom the victorious Turkish Admiral, Piale, led in triumph 
to Constantinople. The elder one died in prison ; but the youth 
and beauty of young Scipio Cicala attracted the pitying notice of 
Sultan Solyman. The boyish sea-rover was half a Turk by birth, 
and he had little scruple about becoming one entirely in religion. 
Sinan Pacha, an old officer high in rank and influence, took the 
juvenile Mahometan under his especial patronage; and Cicala 
entered eagerly on the field of distinction and promotion which 
was opened to him in the Sultan’s service. He rose to the high 
office of Aga of the Janissaries; and though his extreme oppres¬ 
sion of the Christians of Constantinople caused him to be removed 
from that dignity, he obtained an important command in the 
Persian war, where he greatly signalised himself in several en¬ 
gagements, especially in a nocturnal victory gained by the Turks 
in 1583, called the “ Battle of the Torches.” He had married the 
granddaughter of Sultan Solyman, and thus obtained influence in 
the seraglio, which even more than his victories and abilities 
favoured his promotion during the reign of Amurath III., and 
protected him from the effects of prejudice caused by his occasional 
defeats, and the unpopularity into which he brought himself by 
his excessive' severity to his own men, and by his cruelty to the 
Rayas of Turkey as well as to the natives of the foreign countries 
where he commanded. He more than once held the rank of 
Capitan Pacha, and twice he availed himself of his command of 
the Turkish navy for the purpose of sailing to Messina, and de¬ 
manding an interview with his mother and sister, who resided 
there. On the first of these occasions the Spanish Viceroy of 

1 See p. 180, sujprd. 


MAHOMET III. A.D. 1595 - 1603 . 235 

Sicily refused his request, and Cicala revenged himself by ravaging 
the whole coast 01 the island. This had its effect. Cicala re¬ 
turned in a subsequent year and sent a flag of truce to the Viceroy, 
urging that he should at least be allowed to have an interview 
with his mother, whom he had not seen since he was first carried 
to Constantinople. The Viceroy now thought it prudent to send 
the Countess Cicala to her son’s galley, covenanting that she 
should be sent back at sunset. Strange reminiscences must have 
been awakened at that interview between the mother, who in her 
youth had been torn from a Turkish home, and forcibly converted 
into a Christian matron, and the son, who had begun his life and 
career in a Christian court and under the flag of the Cross, but 
now had so long been one of the most dreaded champions of the 
Crescent. Cicala kept his word, and sent his mother back on 
shore at the stipulated time; he then sailed away, leaving for 
once a Christian shore unvisited by fire or slaughter. The con¬ 
clusion of Cicala’s career after many vicissitudes of fortune was 
disastrous. He was routed by Shah Abbas in Persia, and died 
during the hurried retreat of his discontented and mutinous 
troops, of a fever brought on by anxiety and -fatigue. But in 
1596, when Mahomet III. marched into Hungary, Cicala, though 
disliked by the Sultana Valide, was high in favour with the Sultan, 
and his most brilliant exploit was performed during this cam¬ 
paign. 

The Archduke Maximilian, who commanded the Imperialists, 
retired at-first before the superior numbers of the great Ottoman 
army; and the Sultan besieged and captured Erlau. The Im¬ 
perialists now having effected a junction with the Transylvanian 
troops under Prince Sigismund, advanced again, though too late 
to save Erlau; and on October 23rd, 1596, the two armies were 
in presence of each other on the marshy plain of Cerestes, through 
which the waters of the Cincia ooze towards the river Tlieiss. 

There were three days of battle at Cerestes. On the first day 
part of the Turkish force under Djaffer Pacha passed the Cincia, 
and after fighting bravely against superior numbers, was obliged 
to retreat with the loss of 1000 Janissaries, 100 Spahis, and forty- 
three cannon. The Sultan now wished for a general retreat of 
the army, or at least that he should himself retire. A council of 
war was summoned in the Ottoman camp, at which the historian 
Seadeddin was present, and advocated vigorously a more manly 
policy. “ It has never been seen or heard of,” said he, “ that a 
Padischah of the Ottomans turned his back upon the enemy with¬ 
out the direst necessity.” Some of those present recommended 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


236 

that the Pacha Hassan Sokolli should lead the troops against the 
enemy. Seadecldin answered, “This is no affair for Pachas : the 
personal presence of the Padischah is absolutely indispensable here.” 
It was finally resolved to fight; and the Sultan was with difficulty 
persuaded to stay with the troops. On the 24th there was another 
action ; and the Turks secured some passages through the marsh. 
Each side now concentrated its strength, and on the 26th October, 
the decisive encounter took place. At first the Christians seemed 
completely victorious. They drove back the leading divisions of 
the Turks and Tartars; attacked the Ottoman batteries in flank, 
captured the whole of the guns, forced the Janissaries to give 
way, and drove the Asiatic feudal cavalry in headlong rout from 
the field. The Sultan, who beheld the engagement from an ele¬ 
vated seat on a camel’s back, wished to fly, but Seadeddin ex¬ 
horted him to be firm, and quoted the verse of the Koran that 
says, “It is patience that brings victory, and joy succeeds to 
sorrow.” Mahomet clasped the sacred standard, and kept his 
station, protected by his bodyguard and his pages from the vic¬ 
torious Imperialists, who now broke their ranks, and rushed to 
plunder the Ottoman camp. At this critical moment, Cicala, who 
had hitherto sate inactive in command of a large body of irregular 
Turkish cavalry, gave the word to his men, and the spur to his 
steed, and down came the wild horsemen galloping over friend 
and foe, and sweeping the panic-stricken Christians by thousands 
into the swamps of the Cincia. Terror and flight spread through 
every division of the Imperialists ; and in less than half an hour 
from the time when Cicala began his charge, Maximilian and 
Sigismund were flying for their lives, without a single Christian 
regiment keeping their ranks, or making an endeavour to rally and 
cover the retreat. 50,000 Germans and Transylvanians perished 
in the marshes or beneath the Ottoman sabre. Ninety-five 
cannons, of very beautiful workmanship, were captured by the 
Turks, who, at the beginning of the battle, had lost all their own ; 
and the whole camp, and treasure of the Archduke, and all his 
material of war were among the fruits of this victory, one of the 
most remarkable that the Ottomans ever obtained. 

The principal credit of the day was fairly ascribed to Seaded¬ 
din 1 and Cicala. Cicala was promoted after the battle to the rank 
of Grand Vizier; but was speedily deprived of it by the jealous 
interference of the Sultana Validd. He held it, however, long 

1 It is but just to the Turkish historian to remark that his reputation for 
these military services does not rest merely on his own testimony. Naima 
and other writers are his witnesses. 


MAHOMET III. A.D. 1 595 " 1 ^° 3 » • 237 

enough to be the cause of infinite evil to the empire, by his ill- 
judged and excessive severity to the troops, that had given way 
at the beginning of the battle. It was found that 30,000 Otto¬ 
man soldiers, principally belonging to the Asiatic feudal force, had 
fied before the Giaours. Cicala stigmatised them as Firaris, or 
runaways. He ordered that their pay should be stopped, and their 
fiefs forfeited. He publicly beheaded many of these unfortunate 
soldiers who came into his power; but by far the greater number, 
when they heard of the new Vizier’s severity, dispersed, and 
returned to their homes. The attempts made to apprehend and 
punish them there, naturally caused armed resistance; and the 
Firaris of Cerestes were among the foremost and most formidable 
supporters of the rebellion, which soon afterwards broke out in 
Asia Minor, and desolated that country for many years. 

Mahomet III. eagerly returned after the battle to Constanti¬ 
nople, to receive felicitations and adulation for his victory, and to 
resume his usual life of voluptuous indolence. The war in Hun¬ 
gary was prolonged for several years, until the peace of Sitvatorok 
in the reign of Mahomet’s successor. But neither the Imperialists 
nor the Turks carried on operations with any vigour in the in¬ 
termediate campaigns; and the chiefs of the revolted principa¬ 
lities of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania, after disputes 
with each other, sought and obtained terms of reconciliation with 
the Porte. 

During the inglorious remainder of Mahomet III.’s reign, the 
evils of military insubordination, and the tyranny of the provin¬ 
cial rulers, continued to increase. In 1599 a chief of the military 
feudatories in Asia Minor, named Abdoulhamid, but better known 
by the title of Karazaridji, which means “The Black Scribe,” 
availed himself of the universal disorder and discontent to organise 
a wide-spread revolt against the Porte, and to assume the rank of 
an independent prince. He formed an army of Koords, Turcomans, 
and the fugitive Spahis of Cerestes; and, aided by his brother, 
Delhi Housin, the Governor of Bagdad, he gave repeated defeats 
to the Ottoman armies sent against him. In 1601, the Persian 
monarch, Shah Abbas, took advantage of the weakness of the 
ancient enemy of his nation, to make war upon Turkey; and 
began rapidly to recover the provinces which Persia had lost in 
the last reign. In the June of 1603 Sultan Mahomet put to 
death his eldest son, Mahmoud, a prince of high abilities and 
courage, and of whose reign great expectation had been formed. 
Mahmoud had requested his father to give him the command of 
the armies employed against the rebels in Asia Minor. This show 


• HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


233 

of spirit alarmed the weak and jealous mind of Mahomet; and 
on being informed that a holy man had predicted to the prince 
that a new Sultan would soon ascend the throne, he ordered his 
son to be seized and strangled. The Sultana who had borne the 
prince to him, and all Mahmoud’s favourite companions, were at 
the same time thrown into prison, and at the end of a month 
were all put to death. Mahomet III. did not long survive this 
act of cruelty. On the 27th of October a Dervise met him in the 
palace-gate, and prophesied to him that in fifty-five days he would 
meet with some great calamity. The prediction weighed heavily 
on the superstitious mind of the sickly voluptuary; and, like 
many other predictions of the same kind, tended powerfully to 
work its own fulfilment. On the fifty-fifth day (22nd December, 
1C03), Mahomet III. died, and was succeeded by Sultan Achmet 
I., the elder of his two surviving sons. 

Achmet I. was fourteen years of age when he commenced his 
reign. By his humanity, or the humanity of his councillors, his 
brother, Prince Mustapha, was spared from being put to death 
according to established usage. The mental imbecility of Prince 
Mustapha may also have been a reason for saving his life, partly out 
of contempt, and partly out of the superstitious reverence with which 
all lunatics are regarded in the East. In the beginning of young 
Aclnnet’s reign he showed some flashes of imperious decision, 
which might have been thought to be the dawnings of a vigorous 
and successful reign. His Grand Vizier, who was to lead a fresh 
army into Hungary, made some exorbitant demands on the 
treasury, and threatened not to march unless they were complied 
with. Achmet sent him the laconic and effective answer, “ If 
thou valuest thy head thou wilt march at once.” But the promise 
of Achmet’s boyhood was belied by weakness and selfishness as he 
approached maturer years. The Turkish historian, Naima, relates 
a scene which took place in Achmet’s Divan in 1606, when the 
Sultan had attained the age of seventeen, which illustrates his 
character as compared with that of the great sovereign who had 
ruled Turkey only forty years before, and which shows the influ¬ 
ence for good or for bad which the personal example of the 
monarch must exercise. It was May. The horsetails had been 
planted on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, announcing a cam¬ 
paign in that continent, and an army was now being assembled 
at Scutari, which the young Sultan was expected to lead to the 
Persian war. The Divan was assembled at the Grand Vizier’s 
palace, and the Sultan presided there in person. Achmet ad¬ 
dressed his councillors : “ It is now too late for a campaign. 


ACHMET /. A.D. 1603 - 1617 . 239 

Provisions are scarce and dear. Is it not better to put off the 
expedition till next year V y The astonished assembly was silent, 
until the Mufti, who vainly wished that Achmet would follow the 
example of the great Solyman, said, “ Would it, then, be fitting 
to carry back the horsetails, that have been planted in the sight of 
so many foreign ambassadors 'l Let the troops at least be marched 
to Aleppo, to winter there, and to collect stores of provisions.” The 
Sultan interposed, “ What is the use of a march to Aleppo V’ 
“ It is of use,” answered the Mufti, firmly, “ to save the honour of 
our tents that have been pitched. Even so Sultan Solyman in 
the campaign against Nachdshivan wintered at Aleppo, and then 
attacked the enemy at the opening of the following spring.” 
Then said the Sultan, “Let Ferhad Pacha go forward with part 
of the army, so that the camp be not brought back.” “ Will 
he receive the money necessary for the purchase of provisions V’ 
asked the Mufti. The Sultan replied, “ The public treasury is 
empty. Whence am I to draw the money V* “ From the treasury 
of Egypt.” “That,” said the Sultan, “belongs to my private 
purse.” “Sire,” was the rejoinder, “your great ancestor, Sultan 
Solyman, before the campaign of Szigeth, sent all his own trea¬ 
sures of gold and silver to the public mint.” Sultan Achmet knit 
his brows, and said, “ Effendi, thou understandest not. Times 
are changed. What was fitting then is not convenient now.” So 
saying, he dismissed the council. The result was, that Ferhad 
Pacha, who seems to have been rightly called Delhi Ferhad, or 
Ferhad the Foolhardy, did set forth with a part of the army 
without pay or supplies. The troops mutinied on their march, 
and were routed by the first bands of rebels whom they en¬ 
countered in Asia Minor. 

Negotiations for a peace between Austria and the Porte had 
long been pending, and a treaty was finally concluded on the 11th 
November, 1606, at Sitvatorok. No change of importance was 
made in the territorial possessions of either party, except that the 
Prince of Transylvania was admitted as party to the treaty, and 
that province became to some extent, though not entirely inde¬ 
pendent of the Ottoman Empire. But the peace of Sitvatorok is 
important as marking an era in the diplomatic relations of Turkey 
with the states of Christendom. Hitherto the Ottoman Sultans, 
in their pacifications with Christian princes, had affected to grant 
short truces as favours from a superior to inferiors. They 
generally exacted annual contributions of money, which Oriental 
pride considered to be tributes; and they displayed, both in the 
style of their state papers, and by the low rank of the persons 


240 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


employed by them to conduct the negotiations, the most haughty 
and offensive arrogance. But at Sitvatorok the Turks acknow¬ 
ledged and observed the general principles and courtesies of 
international law. Their commissioners had full powers signed 
by the Sultan and the Grand Vizier ; and they gave the Austrian 
sovereign the title of Padischah, or Emperor, instead of terming 
him, as had been usual with their predecessors, merely “ the 
King of Vienna.” The peace was to be a permanent one; the 
annual payment of the 30,000 ducats by Austria to the Porte was 
abolished; presents were to be made by the Turks to the 
Imperialists, as well as by the Imperialists to the Turks; and in 
future, all ambassadors sent by the Sultan to Vienna were not to 
be as formerly, chosen from among the menial officers of his court 
or camp, but were to be at least of the rank of Sanjak Bey. 

It was fortunate for the Ottoman power that the religious dis¬ 
sensions in Germany soon after this period caused the outbreak of 
the great war which devastated that country for thirty years, and 
kept the House of Austria fully occupied in struggling for empire 
and safety against Bohemians, Saxons, Danes, Swedes, and French, 
instead of availing itself of the weakness of the Turks, and enter¬ 
ing upon a career of conquest along the Saave and the Danube. 
The Spanish monarchy, the other great enemy of the Porte, after 
the death of Philip II. decayed even more rapidly and uniformly 
than the Turkish Empire after the death of Solyman. France 
and England were friendly towards the Turks ; and even if they 
had been hostile, were too much engaged each with its own 
domestic dissensions during the first half of the seventeenth century 
for any formidable projects of conquest in the East. Russia had 
declined during the last years of the reign of Ivan the Terrible ; 
and she was, long after his death, rent by revolts and civil wars, 
which were terminated by the accession of the House of Romanoff 
(1613); but the reign of the first Czar of that dynasty (1613-1645) 
was fully occupied with endeavours to restore the Russian nation 
from the misery and anarchy into which it had fallen, and in- re¬ 
covering provinces which had been seized by the Swedes and 
Poles. No first-class European power was in a condition to attack 
Turkey during that crisis of her extreme misery and feebleness, 
which lasted through the first thirty years of the seventeenth 
century, which was checked by the stern hand of Amurath IV. 
during the last seven years of his reign, but was renewed under 
the reigns of his imbecile successors, until the ministry of the first 
Kiuprili in 1656. The Poles and the Venetians were the chief 
European foes of Turkey throughout this time. Poland was too 


ACHMET /. A.D. 1603 - 1617 . 241 

rrmch torn by domestic faction to accomplish aught worthy of the 
chivalrous valour of her armies; and Venice, never a sufficient 
adversary to cope single-handed with a great empire, was in a 
state of skilfully disguised, but incurable, and increasing decrepi¬ 
tude. Persia was the most dangerous foreign enemy of Turkey 
during the first half of the seventeenth century ; but though the 
Asiatic possessions of the Porte beyond the Taurus were often in 
imminent peril, there was little risk of Persian armies advancing 
so far westward as to strike at the vital parts of the Ottoman 
dominions. 

Achmet I. reigned for eleven years after the peace of Sitvatorok. 
During this time, his Grand Vizier, Mourad, gained advantages 
over the rebels in Asia Minor, which partially suppressed the 
spirit of revolt in that quarter. The war with Persia was con¬ 
tinued, but almost uniformly to the disadvantage of the Turks; 
and the weakness of the empire was signally proved by the 
ravages which the fleets of the Cossacks perpetrated with impunity 
along the southern coasts of the Black Sea. In 1613, a flotilla of 
these marauders surprised the city of Sinope, which is described 
as having been then one of the richest and best fortified ports of 
Asia Minor. The Cossacks of the seventeeth century subjected 
Sinope to the same rapacious and cruel devastation, which it was 
to experience from their descendants under Russian guidance in 
1853. In both cases the city was taken by surprise ; and in both 
cases, the fleets, which should have encountered the attacking 
squadron, or at least have taken vengeance on it while retiring 
with its plunder, were absent from the proper scene of operations. 

Sultan Achmet died 2-2nd November, 1617. 1 He left seven 
sons, three of whom, in course of time, ascended the throne, but 
his immediate successor was his brother Mustapha. Hitherto 
there had been an uninterrupted transmission of the empire from 
father to son for fourteen generations. According to Von Hammer, 
the law of succession, which gives the throne to the elder surviving 

1 The second year of the reign of Achmet I. is marked by the Turkish 
writers as the date of the introduction of tobacco into the empire. The 
Ottomans became such enthusiastic and inveterate smokers that within fifty 
years a pipe was looked on as the national emblem of a Turk. The use of 
coffee had been introduced into Constantinople in the reign of the great Soly- 
man. The severer expounders of the Mahometan law censure the use of 
these luxuries. On the other hand the Oriental poets say, that coffee, 
tobacco, opium, and wine are “the four cushions of the sofa of pleasure,” 
and “ the four elements of the world of enjoyment.” But the strict legists 
call them “the four pillars of the tent of debauchery,” and “the foiy 
ministers of the devil. ” 


16 


242 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

male relation of the deceased sovereign, had been adopted by the 
House of Othman from the House of Zenghis Khan ; but so long 
as the practice of royal fratricide continued, it was impossible for 
any dispute to arise between the son of a Sultan and that son’s 
uncle. In consequence of the life of his brother Mustapha having 
been spared by Achmet I., that prince now became Sultan, to the 
temporary exclusion of his young nephew Prince Othman. But 
the idiocy of Mustapha, as soon as he was drawn from his place of 
confinement and enthroned, was so apparent, that in less than 
three months the high officers of state concurred in deposing him, 
and summoning Prince Othman, then aged fourteen, to reign in 
his stead (26th February, 1618). The soldiery acquiesced in this 
measure the more willingly, that it brought them a new donative. 
The public treasury was drained of 6,000,000 ducats by this 
renewed claim of the military within a quarter of a year. 

The short and unhappy reign of Othman II. was marked by the 
signature of a peace with Persia, on conditions agreed to during 
the preceding reign, and rendered necessary by the repeated 
defeats of the Turks. The Ottomans restored all the conquests 
that had been made during the reigns of Amurath III. and Ma¬ 
homet III., and the eastern boundary of the empire receded to its 
line in the reign of Selim II. Eelieved from the burden of the 
Persian war, Othman devoted all his thoughts to the overthrow of 
his domestic enemies, the Janissaries and Spahis, whom he not 
unjustly regarded as the chief curses of the empire, of which they 
had formerly been the chief support. The Janissaries, in par¬ 
ticular, were now regarded as the tyrants over both sovereign and 
people ; and the long feud between the throne and the barrack of 
the troops of Hadji Bektasch now commenced, which was only 
terminated in our own century by the ruthless energy of Mah¬ 
moud II. Othman II. had sufficient hardness of heart for the task 
which he undertook. A prince, who kept himself in practice as 
an archer by using prisoners of war as his marks, or, if they were 
not at hand, by putting one of his own pages up as a living target, 
was not likely to be deterred by the scruples of humanity from 
using the most efficacious measures against military malignants. 
Othman made war on Poland in 1621, chiefly with the view of 
weakening the Janissary regiments by loss in battle and the hard¬ 
ships of the campaign. The losses which the whole army sus¬ 
tained in that war, and the calamitous retreat with which the 
operations of the Sultan (though partially victorious) were con¬ 
cluded, made Othman unpopular with all ranks. And by ill- 
considered changes in laws and customs, by personal affronts to 


OTHMAN //. A.D. 1618 - 1622 . 


243 


leading statesmen, and by the exercise of vexatious severity in 
trifling regulations of police he alienated all classes of his subjects 
from his throne. In the spring of 1622, he announced an inten¬ 
tion of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca. It was well known 
that his real design was to proceed to Damascus, and place himself at 
the head of an army of Koords and other troops, which his favourite 
Grand Vizier, Dilawer Pacha, was to collect near that city. With 
this army, when disciplined on a new model, the Sultan was to 
march upon Constantinople, destroy the Janissaries and Spahis, 
and completely re-organise the government. Sir Thomas Roe, our 
ambassador, then resident at the Turkish capital, whose letters 
graphically describe the tragical career of Othman, says of this 
scheme, that, “ Certainly this was a brave and well-grounded 
design, and of great consequence for the recovery of this decayed 
empire, languishing under the insolence of lazy slaves, if God had 
not destroyed it.” But, in truth, Othman utterly lacked the 
secrecy and the vigour, with which alone actions of such depth and 
danger can be performed. When the Janissaries rose in furious 
tumult (May, 1622) to forbid the pilgrimage to Mecca, and to 
demand the heads of Othman’s ministers, the Sultan had neither 
troops ready to defend him, nor was there any party in his favour 
among the people, to which he could appeal. Instigated by the 
traitor Daoucl Pacha, who hated Othman for having raised a rival 
to the Grand Vizierate, and by the mother of Sultan Mustapha, 
who knew that, if this revolt were quelled, Othman would seek to 
secure himself by putting all his kin to death, the insurgent 
soldiery proceeded from violence against the ministers to an attack 
upon the person of the Sultan, which had hitherto been held sacred 
amidst the wildest commotions. Othman was dragged off to the 
Seven Towers, while the lunatic Mustapha was a second time 
carried from his cell, and installed on the throne. Daoud Pacha, 
now Grand Vizier, was determined not to leave his traitorous 
enterprise incomplete ; and with three comrades he proceeded to 
Othman’s prison, and strangled him, with circumstances of gross 
and insolent cruelty. 1 

The atrocity of this murder before long caused remorse among 
the Janissaries themselves. Among the few glimmerings of intel¬ 
lect which Sultan Mustapha showed during his second reign, were 
an expression of grief for the death of Othman, and a hatti- 
scherif, commanding that his murderers should be punished. 

1 Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 808, gives a painfully curious parallel between 
the death of Othman and that of Andronicus, who built the grand reservoir 
“ Pyrgus ” or “ Burgas ” at Constantinople, which Othman restored. 

16—2 


244 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Generally, Mustapha continued to be as incapable of governing an 
empire, or of common self-government, as he had been found at 
his first accession. His mother, the Sultana Valide, exercised the 
principal power in his name; and the high offices of state were 
intrigued, or fought for, by competitors, who relied on the bought 
swords of the Janissaries and Spahis, as their best means of pro¬ 
motion. So fearful at length became the anarchy and misery at 
Constantinople, that even the very soldiers were touched by it. 
Some instinctive spirit of military discipline still survived among 
them ; and their proud attachment to the Ottoman Empire, which 
the valour of their predecessors had raised to such power and 
splendour, had not become wholly inoperative. They assented to 
the urgent entreaties of the chief ministers that they would forego 
their customary donative if a new Sultan was invested with 
power; and in August, 1623, the lunatic Mustapha was a second 
time deposed ; and Prince Amurath, the elder surviving brother 
of Sultan Othman, a child of only eleven years of age, was placed 
on the throne. Mustapha’s second reign had lasted little more 
than a year, but it had been productive of infinite misery to the 
empire. The Persian war had been renewed. Bagdad and Bas- 
sorah fell into the hands of enemies. All Asia Minor was desolated 
by the revolt of Abaza, who had been governor of Merasch, and 
who was said to have aided the Sultan Othman in concerting that 
sovereign’s project for destroying the Janissaries. It is certain, 
that after Othman’s murder, Abaza proclaimed himself as that 
Prince’s avenger, and the sworn foe of the Janissaries, whom he 
pursued with implacable ferocity. In the general dissolution of 
all bonds of government, and in the absence of all protection to 
industry or property, the empire seemed to be sinking into the 
mere state of a wilderness of beasts of prey. Nothing can exceed 
the strength of the expressions which an eye-witness, Sir Thomas 
Boe, employs in his correspondence with our King James I. and 
other persons in England, respecting the misery of the inhabitants 
of the Turkish dominions, and the symptoms of decay and ruin 
which he witnessed all around him. 1 And it is to be remembered, 
that there was no wish among Englishmen for the downfall of 
Turkey. This country sympathised strongly with James’s son-in- 
law, the Prince Palatine, and the other Protestant antagonists of 
the House of Austria in Germany ; and any prospect of the arms 
of Austria being disturbed by a Turkish war, would have been 
gladly hailed by our statesmen. But the graphic despatches of 
Boe describe vividly and repeatedly a state of fallen grandeur, 

1 “ Sir Thomas Roe’s Embassy,” p. 22. 


MUSTAPHO /. A.D. 1622 - 1623 . 245 

•which he regarded as irretrievable. He employs almost the same 
metaphor which, in our time, has been applied to the Turkish 
power by one “ whose wish was father to the thought,” and who 
has spoken of it “ as a sick man about to die upon one’s hands.” 
Boe says : “ It has become, like an old body, crazed through many 
vices, which remain when the youth and strength is decayed.” He 
gives in a letter, written in the year of Sultan Othman’s death, 
some calculations as to the extent to which depopulation had lately 
taken place, which may possibly be exaggerated ; l but his testi¬ 
mony as to the general nature of what he actually beheld, is un¬ 
impeachable. He says: ‘‘The ruined houses in many places 
remain; but the injustice and cruelty of the government hath 
made all the people abandon them. All the territory of the 
Grand Seignior is dispeopled for want of justice, or rather, by 
reason of violent oppression ; so much so, that in his best parts 
of Greece and Natolia, a man may ride three, four, and some¬ 
times six days, and not find a village able to feed him and his 
horse; whereby the revenue is so lessened, that there is not 
wherewithal to pay the soldiers, and to maintain the court. It 
may be patched up for a while out of the treasury, and by exac¬ 
tions, which now are grievous upon the merchant and labouring 
man, to satisfy the harpies; but when those means fail, which 
cannot long endure, either the soldiery must want their pay, or the 
number must be reduced ; neither of which will they sutler : and 
whosoever shall attempt either remedy, shall follow Othman to 
his grave. This is the true estate of this so much feared great¬ 
ness ; and the wisest men in the country foresee it, and re tyre 
their estates as fast as they can, fearing that no haste can prevent 
their danger.” 2 

These seemingly well-founded prognostications of the speedy 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire were written in 1622. Since 
then, that empire has endured already for two centuries and a 
half. Our attention will now be directed to one of those rulers, 
who have been mainly instrumental in falsifying these and similar 
predictions. 

1 See note, supra at p. 200. n. 

2 “SirT. Roe's Embassy,” pp. 63, 67. 


24<3 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


CHAPTER XIII. 

MISERY OF THE EMPIRE AT THE ACCESSION OF AMURATH IV.—■ 
MILITARY REVOLTS—AMURATH TAKES POWER INTO HIS OWN 
HANDS AND RESTORES ORDER—HIS SEVERITY AND CRUELTY 
—RECONQUERS BAGDAD—HIS DEATH . 1 

AMURATH IV., at the time of his accession (10th September, 1623), 
was under twelve years of age. But even thus early, he gave in¬ 
dications of a resolute and vengeful character, and showed that a 
prince, animated by the spirit of the first Selim, was once more 
on the Ottoman throne. The Turkish historian, Evliya, relates 
of him : “ When Sultan Amurath entered the treasury after his 
accession, my father, Dervish Mohammed, was with him. There 
were no gold or silver vessels remaining—only 30,000 piastres in 
money, and some coral and porcelain in chests. ‘ Inshallah’ 
(please God), said the Sultan, after prostrating himself in prayer, 

‘ I will replenish this treasury fifty-fold with the property of those 
who have plundered it.’ ” 2 

The young Sultan, during the first year of his reign, acted prin¬ 
cipally under the directions of his mother, the Sultana Mahpeiker, 
who, providentially for the Ottoman Empire, was a woman of 
remarkable talent and energy, which were taxed to the uttermost 
to meet the dangers and disasters that clouded round the dawn of 
her child’s sovereignty. From every part of the empire messen¬ 
gers arrived with evil tidings. The Persians were victorious on 
the frontier. The rebel Abaza was lord and tyrant over Asia 
Minor. The tribes of the Lebanon were in open insurrection. 
The governors of Egypt and other provinces were wavering in 
their allegiance. The Barbaresque regencies assumed the station 
of independent powers, and made treaties with European nations 
on their own account. The fleets of the Cossack marauders not 
only continued their depredations along the Black Sea, but even 
appeared in the Bosphorus, and plundered the immediate vicinity 
of the capital. In Constantinople itself there was an empty trea¬ 
sury, a dismantled arsenal, a debased coinage, exhausted maga- 

1 See Von Hammer, books 46—52. 2 Hulme. 


AMURATH IV. A.D. 1623-1640. 247 

zincs, a starving population, and a licentious soldiery. Yet the 
semblance of authority was preserved, and by degrees some of its 
substance was recovered by those who ruled in the young prince’s 
name ; and, though amid tumult and bloodshed, and daily peril to 
both throne and life, young Amurath, observing all things, forget¬ 
ting nothing, and forgiving nothing, grew up towards man’s 
estate. 

There is a wearisome monotony in the oft-repeated tale of 
military insurrections; but the formidable mutiny of the Spahis, 
which convulsed Constantinople in the ninth year of Amurath’s 
reign, deserves notice on account of the traits of the Turkish 
character, which its chief hero and victim remarkably displayed ; 
and also because it explains and partly palliates the hard-hearted¬ 
ness which grew upon Amurath, and the almost wolfish appetite 
for bloodshed, which was shown by him in the remainder of his 
reign. In the beginning of that year, a large number of mutinous 
Spahis, who had disgraced themselves by gross misconduct in the 
late unsuccessful campaign against Bagdad, had straggled to Con¬ 
stantinople, and joined the European Spahis, already collected in 
that capital. They were secretly instigated by Redjib Pacha, w r ho 
wished by their means to effect the ruin of the Grand Vizier Hafiz, 
a gallant though not fortunate general, to whom the young Sultan 
was much attached, and who had interchanged poetical communi¬ 
cations 1 with his sovereign, when employed against the Persians. 
The Spahis gathered together in the hippodrome, on three succes¬ 
sive days (February, 1632) and called for the heads of the Grand 
Vizier Hafiz, the Mufti Jahia, the Defterdar Mustapha, and other 
favourites of the Sultan, seventeen in all. The shops "were closed, 
and the city and the Serail were in terror. On the second day 
the mutineers came to the gate of the Palace, but withdrew on being 
promised that they should have redress on the morrow. On the 
third day, when the morning broke, the outer court of the Seraglio 
was filled with raging rebels. As the Grand Vizier Hafiz was on 
his way thither to attend the divan, he received a message from a 
friend, who warned him to conceal himself until the crowd had 
dispersed. Hafiz answered with a smile, “ I have already this day 
seen my fate in a dream: I am not afraid to die.” As he rode 
into the Seraglio, the multitude made a lane for him, as if out of 
respect, but as he passed along they cast stones at him: he was 
struck from his horse, and borne by his attendants into the inner 

1 The poems or Gazelles of the Sultan and Vizier are given in German 
by Von Hammer in his note to his 47th book. They are full of fanciful 
imagery drawn from the game of chess. 


243 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

part of the Palace. One of his followers was murdered, and one 
grievously wounded by the Spahis. The Sultan ordered Hafiz to 
make his escape, and the Grand Vizier took a boat at the water- 
gate of the Serail, and crossed over to Scutari. Meanwhile the 
rebels forced their way into the second court of the Seraglio, which 
was the usual hall of the divan, and they clamoured for the Sultan 
to come forth and hold a divan among them. The Sultan ap¬ 
peared and held a divan standing. He spoke to the mutineers, 
“ What is your will, my servants %” Loudly and insolently they 
answered, “ Give us the seventeen heads. Give these men up to 
us, that we may tear them in pieces, or it shall fare worse with 
thee.” They pressed close upon the Sultan, and were near upon 
laying hands on him. “You give no hearing to my words; 
why have you called me hither 1” said Amurath. He drew back, 
surrounded" by his pages, into the inner court. The rebels came 
after him like a raging flood. Fortunately the pages barred the 
gate. But the alarm and the outcry became the greater. They 
shouted aloud, “ The seventeen heads, or abdicate.” 

Bedjib Pacha, the secret promoter of the whole tumult, now 
approached the young Sultan, and urged on him that it was 
necessary to still the tumult by granting what was demanded. 
He said that it had become a custom for the chiefs to be given up 
to the soldiery. “ The Unchained Slave must take what he 
pleases ; better the head of the Vizier than that of the Sultan.” 
Amurath sorrowfully gave way, and sent a summons to Hafiz to 
return and die. The Vizier hesitated not; and, as he came back, 
the Sultan met him at the water-gate. The gate of the inner 
court was then opened. The Sultan ascended the throne of state; 
and four deputies from the insurgents, two Spahis and two Janis¬ 
saries, came before him. He implored them not to profane the 
honour of the Caliphate; but he pleaded in vain; the cry was 
still “ The Seventeen Heads.” Meanwhile Hafiz Pacha had made 
the ablution preparatory to death, which the Mahometan law re¬ 
quires, and he now stood forth and addressed Amurath. “ My 
Padischah,” said he, “ let a thousand slaves, such as Hafiz, perish 
for thy sake. I only entreat that thou do not thyself put me to 
death, but give me up to these men, that I may die a martyr, and 
that my innocent blood may come upon their heads. Let my 
body be buried at Scutari.” He then kissed the earth, and ex¬ 
claimed, “ In the name of God, the All-merciful, the All-good. 
There is no power or might save with God, the most High, the 
Almighty. His we are, and unto Him we return.” Hafiz then 
strode forth a hero into the fatal court. The Sultan sobbed aloud, 


AMURATH IV. A.D. 1623-1640. 249 

the pages wept bitterly, the Viziers gazed with tearful eyes. The 
rebels rushed to meet him as he advanced. To sell his life as a 
martyr, he struck the foremost to the ground with a well-aimed 
buffet, on which the rest sprang on him with their daggers, and 
pierced him with seventeen mortal wounds. A Janissary knelt 
on his breast, and struck off his head. The pages of the Seraglio 
came forward and spread a robe over the corpse. Then said the 
Sultan, “ God’s will be done ! But in His appointed time ye shall 
meet with vengeance, ye men of blood, who have neither the fear 
of God before your eyes, nor respect for the law of the Prophet.” 
The threat was little heeded at the time, but it was uttered by 
one who never menaced in vain. 

Within two months after this scene fresh victims had fallen 
before the bloodthirsty rabble that now disgraced the name of 
Turkish troops. The deposition of Amurath was openly discussed 
in their barracks; and the young Sultan saw that the terrible 
alternative, “ Kill, or be killed,” was no longer to be evaded. 
Some better spirits in the army, shamed and heart-sick at the 
spirit of brigandage that was so insolently dominant over court 
and camp, placed their swords at their sovereign’s disposal; and a 
small but brave force, that could be relied on in the hour of need, 
was gradually and quietly organised. The dissensions also among 
the mutinous troops themselves, and especially the ancient 
jealousy between the Spahis and the Janissaries, offered means for 
repressing them all, of which Amurath availed himself with bold¬ 
ness and skill. His first act was to put the archtraitor, Recljib 
Pacha, suddenly and secretly to death. He then proceeded to the 
more difficult one of reducing the army to submission. This was 
done on the 29th day of May, 1632, the day on which the Sultan 
emancipated himself from his military tyrants, and commenced 
also his own reign of terror. Amurath held a public divan on the 
shore of the sea near the Kiosch of Sinan. The Mufti, the Viziers, 
the chief members of the Ulema were there, and the two military 
chiefs, who had devoted themselves to the cause of the Sultan 
against the mutinous troops, Koese Mohammed and Roum Mo¬ 
hammed. Six squadrons of horseguards, whose loyalty could be 
trusted, were also in attendance, and ready for immediate action. 
Amurath seated himself on the throne, and sent a message to the 
Spahis, wiio were assembled in the hippodrome, requiring the 
attendance of a deputation of their officers. Amurath then sum¬ 
moned the Janissaries before him and addressed them as faithful 
troops who were enemies to the rebels in the other corps. The 
Janissaries shouted out that the Padischah’s enemies were their 


250 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


enemies also, and took with zealous readiness an oath of implicit 
obedience, which was suggested at the moment. Copies of the 
Koran were ready, and were handed through the ranks. The 
Janissaries swore on the sacred book, “ By God, with God, and 
through God.” Their oath was formally registered ; and Amurath 
then turned to the deputies of the Spahis, who had by this time 
arrived, and had witnessed the loyal fervour of the Janissaries. 
The Sultan reproached them for the rapacity and lawlessness of 
their body. They answered humbly that the Sultan’s charges were 
true, but that they were personally loyal, though unable to make 
their men obey them. “ If ye are loyal,” said Amurath, “ take 
the oath which your brethren the Janissaries have taken, and 
deliver up to me the ringleaders of rebellion from your ranks.” 
Surrounded by the royal horseguards and Janissaries, the Spahi 
officers obeyed in fear and trembling. Amurath then ordered the 
judges to stand forward. He said to them, “Ye are accused of 
selling your judgments for gold, and of destroying my people. 
What answer have you to give V’ “ God is our witness,” said 
they, “ that we seek not to make a traffic of justice, or to oppress 
the poor; but we have no freedom or independence; and if we 
protect thy subjects against the violence of the Spahis and the 
itaxgatherers, we are accused of corruption, our tribunals are 
assailed by armed men, and our houses are pillaged.” “I have 
heard of these things,” said the Sultan. Then arose in the Divan 
a valiant judge of Asia, an Arab by birth, and he drew his sabre, 
and cried “ My Padischah, the only cure for all these things is 
the edge of the sword.” At these words the Sultan and the whole 
assembly fixed their eyes on the Arabian judge, who stood before 
them with flashing eyes and weapon, but said no more. The 
declaration of the judge was registered ; and then all present, the 
Sultan, the Viziers, the Mufti, and the chief officers, signed a 
written manifesto, by which they bound themselves to suppress 
abuses and maintain public order, under the penalty of bringing 
on their heads the curses of God, of the Prophet, of all angels, and 
of all true believers. 

Amurath had need of acts as well as of words ; and the work of 
death speedily began. Energetic and trusty emissaries were sent 
through Constantinople, who slew the leaders of the late insurrec¬ 
tion, and all whom Amurath marked for destruction. The troops, 
deprived of their chiefs, and suspicious of each other, trembled 
and obeyed. The same measures were taken in the provinces, and 
for many months the sword and the bowstring were incessantly 
active. But it was in the capital, and under Amurath’s own eye, 


251 


- AMURATH IV. A.D. 1623-1640. 

that the revenge of royalty for its long humiliation reaped the 
bloodiest harvest. Every morning the Bosphorus threw up on its 
shores the corpses of those who had been executed during the 
preceding night; and in them the anxious spectators recognised 
Janissaries and Spahis, whom they had lately seen parading the 
streets in all the haughtiness of military licence. The personal 
appearance and courage of Amurath, his bold and martial de¬ 
meanour, confirmed the respect and awe which this strenuous 
ferocity inspired. He was in the twentieth year of his age ; and 
though but little above the middle stature, his bodily frame united 
strength and activity in a remarkable degree. His features were 
regular and handsome. His aquiline nose, and the jet-black 
beard which had begun to grace his chin, gave dignity to his 
aspect: but the imperious lustre of his full dark eyes was marred 
by an habitual frown; which, however, suited well the sternness 
of his character. Every day he displayed his horsemanship in the 
hippodrome; and he won the involuntary admiration of the 
soldiery by his strength and skill as a cavalier and swordsman, 
and by his unrivalled force and dexterity in the use of the bow. 
He patrolled the streets in disguise at night; and often, with 
his own hand, struck dead the offenders against his numerous 
edicts in matters of police. If any menacing assemblage began 
to form in any of the streets, the Sultan received speedy tidings 
from his numerous spies; and, before revolt could be matured, 
Amurath was on the spot, well armed, and with a trusty guard of 
choice troops. He rode fearlessly in among the groups of Spahis 
or Janissaries, who slunk in savage silence from before their 
Sultan, each dreading lest that keen eye should recognise and 
mark him, and that unforgiving lip pronounce his doom. 

The insurrection in Asia Minor had been quelled in 1630, by 
the defeat and submission of Abaza, whom Amurath had spared, 
principally out of sympathy with his hatred towards the Janis¬ 
saries, and had made Pacha of Bosnia. He now employed that 
able and ruthless chief in Constantinople, and appointed him Aga 
of his old enemies the Janissaries. Abaza served his stern master 
well in that perilous station; but he at last incurred the dis¬ 
pleasure of Amurath, and was executed in 1634. The habit of 
bloodshedding had now grown into a second nature with the 
Sultan. All faults, small or great, were visited by him with the 
same short, sharp, and final sentence; and the least shade of 
suspicion that crossed his restless mind was sufficient to ensure its 
victim’s doom. He struck before he censured: and, at last, the 
terror with which he was regarded was so general and profound, 


252 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

that men who were summoned to the Sultan’s presence, commonly 
made the death-ablution before they entered the palace. The 
career of Amurath is a memorable proof of how perilously the 
possession of unlimited power tempts, first to excessive severity 
for real wrongs—next to ruthless haste in punishing for imaginary 
offences—and, finally, to the practice of inhuman cruelty on the 
slightest suspicion or vexation. The earliest executions which 
Amurath ordered, when he assumed independent power, were 
those of traitors and mutineers, whose guilt was as heinous as it 
was unquestionable. His slaughters grew more sweeping; but 
still, for a long time, his cruelty was seldom or never awakened 
out of mere wantonness or caprice. It was against real or sus¬ 
pected state offenders that the Imperial Manslayer exercised his 
terrible prerogative during the first two years of his actual 
sovereignty. But by degrees his temper grew more moody, and 
human life became as nothing in his eyes. When he rode forth, 
any unfortunate wretch who displeased him by crossing or im¬ 
peding the road, was instantly put to death, and frequently fell 
pierced by an arrow from the gloomy despot’s own bow. He 
once caused a party of women, whom he saw dancing in a meadow, 
to be seized and drowned, because their noisy merriment disturbed 
him. At another time, a boat, with many females on board, 
passed along the Bosphorus nearer to the walls of the Seraglio 
than he thought proper. He ordered the batteries to open on 
them, and they were sent to the bottom before his eyes. He 
beheaded his chief musician for singing a Persian air, which he 
said was doing honour to the enemies of the empire. Many other 
acts of equal atrocity are recorded of him; and the number of 
those who died by his command is reckoned at 100,000. Among 
them were three of his brothers, and, as was generally believed, 
his deposed uncle Mustapha. One of his sayings is preserved by 
an Italian writer, who asserts that Amurath’s favourite book was 
“The Prince” of Machiavelli, which had been translated into 
Turkish. The Sultan’s own maxim is certainly worthy of such 
inspiration. It is this : “ Vengeance never grows decrepit, though 
she may grow grey.” In the last years of Amurath’s life, his 
ferocity of temper was fearfully aggravated by the habits of 
intoxication which he acquired. In one of his nocturnal per¬ 
ambulations of the capital, he met a drunkard, named Mustapha 
Bekir, who entered into conversation with him, and boasted 
that he possessed that which would purchase all Constantinople, 
and “ the son of a slave ” himself. (“ The son of a slave ” is a 
term by which the Turkish people often speak of the Sultan.) 


AMURATH IV. A.D. 1623-1640. 253 

In the morning, Amurath sent for the man, and reminded him of 
his words. Nothing daunted, Bekir drew a flask of wine from his 
robe, and held it out to the Sultan, saying, “ Here is the liquid 
gold, which outweighs all the treasures of the universe, which 
makes a beggar more glorious than a king, and turns the mendi¬ 
cant Fakir into a horned Alexander.” 1 Struck with the confidence 
and joyous spirit of the bold bacchanal, Amurath drained the 
flask, and thenceforth Mustapha Bekir and the Sultan were boon 
companions. When the plague was in 1637 carrying off 500 
victims daily at Constantinople Amurath often passed his nights 
in revels with his favourite. “ This summer,” he said, “ God is 
punishing the rogues. Perhaps by winter He will come to the 
honest men.” 

Never, however, did Amurath wholly lose in habits of in¬ 
dulgence the vigour of either mind or body. When civil or 
military duty required his vigilance, none could surpass him in 
austere abstemiousness, or in the capacity for labour. And, with 
all his misdeeds, he saved his country. He tolerated no crimes 
but his own. The worst of evils, the sway of petty local tyrants, 
ceased under his dominion. He was unremittingly and un¬ 
relentingly watchful in visiting the offences of all who were in 
authority under him, as well as those of the mass of his subjects; 
and the worst tyranny of the single despot was a far less grievous 
curse to the empire than had been the military anarchy which he 
quelled. Order and subordination were restored under his iron 
sway. There was discipline in the camps ; there was pure justice 
on the tribunals. The revenues were fairly raised, and honestly 
administered. The abuses of the feudal system of the Ziamets 
and Timars were extirpated; and, if Amurath was dreaded at 
home, he made himself still more feared by the foe abroad. 

It was at first highly perilous for him to leave the central seat 
of empire. He commenced an expedition into the troubled parts 
of his Asiatic dominions in the end of the year 1633 ; but when 
he had marched a little beyond Nicomedia, he hanged the chief 
judge of that city, because he found the roads in bad repair. This 
excited great indignation among the Ulema, and the leaders of 
that formidable body in the capital began to hold language little 
favourable to the Sultan’s authority. Warned by his mother, the 
Sultana Yalide, of these discontents, Amurath returned suddenly 
to Constantinople, and put the chief Mufti to death. This is said 
to be a solitary instance of the death of a Mufti by a Sultan’s 

1 So Horace says to the wine-flask : 

“Addis cornua pauperi.” 


254 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

order. It effectually curbed the tongues and pens of the men of 
the law during the remainder of Amurath’s reign. In the spring 
of 1635, he again marched forth from his capital with the avowed 
intention of not only inspecting his Asiatic provinces, but of 
expelling the Persian heretics from the cities within the ancient 
limits of the Ottoman Empire, which they still occupied. In the 
campaign of this year he conquered the city of Eriwan, and 
showed the true spirit of the ancient Ottoman Sultans in the care 
with which his troops were provided for, as well as in the strict 
discipline which he maintained, and the personal valour and 
generalship which he displayed. When it was necessary to 
undergo privations, the Sultan shared them with his men ; and 
the English writer, Rycaut, says of him, that “ for several months 
he made use of no other pillow for his head than his saddle, no 
other blanket or quilt than the covering or foot-clotli of his horse. 1 ’ 
The recovery of the city and territory of Eriwan was an important 
exploit; but the march of Amurath through Asia Minor and back, 
was also a royal visitation of terrible severity to all the provincial 
governors, whom he convicted or suspected of the slightest dis¬ 
affection or neglect. In 1638 he made his final and greatest 
expedition against the Persians, to re-annex to the Ottoman 
Empire the great city of Bagdad, which had been in the power of 
those enemies of the House of Othman and of the Sunnite creed 
for fifteen years, and had been repeatedly besieged in vain by 
Turkish armies. There is a tradition in the East that Bagdad, 
the ancient city of the Caliphate, can only be taken by a 
sovereign in person. The Great Solyman had first won it for 
Turkey; and now, at the end of a century after that conquest, 
Amurath IV. prepared his armies for its recovery. The imperial 
standard of the Seven Horsetails was planted on the heights of 
Scutari on the 9th March, 1638, and a week afterwards Amurath 
joined the army. A proclamation was made by which the march 
from Scutari to Bagdad was divided into 110 days’ journey, 
with fixed periods for halts; and on the 8th of May the vast 
host moved steadily forward in unmurmuring obedience to its 
leader’s will. Throughout this second progress of Amurath (the 
last ever made by an Ottoman sovereign in person through any of 
the Asiatic provinces not immediately adjacent to Constanti- - 
nople) 1 he showed the same inquisitorial strictness and merci¬ 
less severity in examining the conduct of all the provincial 
authorities, that had been felt on his former march to Eriwan. 
Pashas, judges, Imams, and tax-collectors thronged to kiss the 

1 Hulrae, 


AMURATH IV. A.D. 1623 - 1640 . 255 

Sultan’s stirrup; and, if there was the slightest taint of suspicion 
on the character of any functionary for probity, activity, or loyalty, 
the head of the unhappy homager rolled in the dust beneath the 
imperial charger’s hoofs. 

On the 15th November, 1638, after the pre-appointed 110 days 
of march, and eighty-six days of halt, the Ottoman standards 
appeared before Bagdad, and the last siege of this great city com¬ 
menced. The fortifications were strong; the garrison amounted to 
30,000 men, 1200 of whom were regularly trained musketeers ; 
and the Persian Governor, Bektish Khan, was an officer of proved 
ability and bravery. A desperate resistance was expected, and 
was encountered by the Turks : but their numbers, their disci¬ 
pline, and the resolute skill of their Sultan, prevailed over all. 
Amurath gave his men an example of patient toil, as well as 
active courage. He laboured in the trenches, and pointed the 
cannon with his own hands. And, when (in one of the numerous 
sorties made by the garrison, j a Persian soldier, of gigantic size 
and strength, challenged the best and boldest Turk to single 
combat, Amurath stood forth in person, and after a long and 
doubtful conflict clove his foe from skull to chin with a sabre 
stroke. On the 22nd December, the Turkish artillery had made 
a breach of 80 yards, along which the defences were so com¬ 
pletely levelled, that, in the words of an Ottoman writer, “ a 
blind man might have galloped over them with loose bridle with¬ 
out his horse stumbling.” 1 The ditch had been heaped up with 
fascines; and the Turks rushed forward to an assault, which was 
for two days baffled by the number and valour of the besieged. 
On the evening of the second day Amurath bitterly reproached 
his Grand Vizier, Tayar Mohammed Pacha, for the repulse of the 
troops, and accused him of want of courage. The Vizier replied, 
“ Would to God, my Padischah, that it were half as easy to 
ensure for thee the winning of Bagdad, as it will be for me to lay 
down my life in the breach to-morrow in thy service.” On the 
third day (Christmas Eve, 1638) Tayar Mohammed led the forlorn 
hope in person, and was shot dead through the throat by a volley 
from the Persian musketeers. But the Turks poured on with 
unremitted impetuosity, and at length the city was carried. Part 
of the garrison, which had retired to some inner defences, asked 
for quarter, which was at first granted; but a conflict having acci¬ 
dentally recommenced in the streets between some Persian 
musketeers and a Turkish detachment, Amurath ordered a general 
slaughter of the Persians, and after a whole day of butchery, 

1 Cited by Hulme. 


256 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

scarcely 300 out of the garrison, which had originally consisted 
of 30,000 men, were left alive. A few days afterwards, Amurath 
was exasperated by the accidental or designed explosion of a 
powder magazine, by which 800 Janissaries were killed and 
wounded; and he commanded a massacre of the inhabitants of 
the city, in which 30,000 are computed by the Ottoman historian 
to have perished. In February Amurath commenced his home¬ 
ward march, after having repaired the city walls, and left one of 
his best generals with 12,000 troops to occupy Bagdad, which has 
never since been wrested from the Turks. The Sultan reached 
Constantinople on the 10th June, 1638, and made a triumphal 
entry into his capital; which is memorable, not only on account 
of its splendour, and of the importance of the conquest which it 
celebrated, but because it was then that Constantinople beheld 
for the last time the once familiar spectacle of the return of her 
monarch victorious from a campaign, which he had conducted in 
person. The Ottoman writer, 1 who witnessed and described the 
scene, says that the Sultan “ repaired to his palace with splendour 
aud magnificence which no tongue can tell, and no pen adequately 
illustrate. The balconies and roofs of the houses were everywhere 
thronged with people, who exclaimed with enthusiasm, ‘ The 
blessing of God be on thee, O Conqueror ! Welcome, Amurath ! 
May thy victories be fortunate f The Sultan was sheathed in 
resplendent armour of polished steel, with a leopard-skin over his 
shoulders, and wore in his turban a triple aigrette, placed obliquely, 
in the Persian mode. He rode a Nogai charger, and was followed 
by seven led Arab horses with jewelled caparisons, while trumpets 
and cymbals resounded before him, and twenty-two Persian 
Khans were led captives at the imperial stirrups. As he passed 
along he looked proudly on each side, like a lion who has seized 
his prey, and saluted the people, who shouted ‘ Bank-Allah /’ and 
threw themselves on the ground. All the vessels of war fired 
constant salutes, so that the sea seemed in a blaze; and seven days 
and nights were devoted to constant rejoicings.” 

A peace with Persia, on the basis of that which Solyman the 
Great had granted in 1555, was the speedy result of Amurath’s 
victories (15th September, 1639). Eriwan was restored by the 
Porte; but the possession of Bagdad, and the adjacent territory 
by the Ottomans, was solemnly sanctioned and confirmed. Eighty 
years passed away before Turkey was again obliged to struggle 
against her old and obstinate enemy on the line of the Euphrates. 
For this long cessation of exhausting hostilities, and this enduring 

1 Cited by Hulme, 


w 


AMURATH IV. A.D. 1623-1640. 


257 


acknowledgment of superiority by Persia, Turkey owes a deep debt 
of gratitude to the memory of Amurath IV. 

Amurath died at the age of twenty-eight, on the 9th of Feb¬ 
ruary, 1640. In the interval between his return from Bagdad and 
his last illness, he had endeavoured to restore the fallen naval power 
of his empire, he had quelled the spirit of insurrection that had 
been rife in Albania and the neighbouring districts during his 
absence in Asia, and he was believed to be preparing for a war 
with Venice. A fever, aggravated by his habits of intemperance, 
and by his superstitious alarm at an eclipse of the sun, proved 
fatal to him after an illness of fifteen days. One of his last acts 
was to command the execution of his sole surviving brother 
Ibrahim. It may be doubted whether this mark of “ the ruling 
spirit strong in death ” was caused by the delirium of fever, or 
from a desire that his favourite the Silihdar Pacha should succeed 
to the throne on the extinction of the race of Othman, or 
whether Amurath IV. wished for the gloomy satisfaction of 
knowing that his House and Dynasty would descend to the grave 
with him. The Sultana Valide preserved Ibrahim’s life, and used 
the pious fraud of a false message to the Sultan that his command 
had been fulfilled. Amurath, then almost in the pangs of death, 
“ grinned horrible a ghastly smile ” in the belief that his brother 
was slain, and tried to rise from his bed to behold the supposed 
dead body. His attendants, who trembled for their own lives 
should the deception be detected, forcibly held him back on the 
couch. The Iman, who had been waiting in an adjoining room, but 
had hitherto feared to approach the terrible dying man, was now 
brought forward by the pages; and, while the priest commenced 
his words of prayer, the “ efiera vis animi ” of Amurath IV. de¬ 
parted from the world. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

CHARACTER OF THE LATTER PORTION OF TURKISH HISTORY—- 
ACCESSION OF SULTAN IBRAHIM—FOLLY AND WICKEDNESS OF 
IIIS GOVERNMENT—REVOLUTION—IBRAHIM DEPOSED AND PUT 
TO DEATH—FOREIGN EVENTS DURING IBRAHIM’S REIGN—WAR 
WITH THE COSSACKS—BEGINNING OF THE WAR OF CANDIA— 
MAHOMET IV., AT THE AGE OF SEVEN, RAISED TO THE THRONE- 
CONTINUED TUMULT AND MISERY—THE FIRST KIUPRILI MADE 
VIZIER . 1 

We have now traced the fortunes of the House of Othman during 
a period of nearly four hundred years. A further space of rather 
more than two centuries remains to be examined, which com¬ 
prises the reigns of fifteen princes. But, with the exception of 
the great though unsuccessful Mahmoud II., perhaps with the 
exceptions also of Mustapha II. and Selim III., the Turkish 
princes whom we are proceeding to contemplate form figures cf 
but languid interest on the historic page. The decay of the State 
accords with the degeneracy of its rulers ; and minute descriptions 
of the troubles and calamities of declining empire are generally 
monotonous and unattractive. We shall indeed still have our 
attention drawn to fierce and eventful wars; and we shall still 
meet with names, that must ever live high in martial renown; 
but they are wars in which the Crescent has generally, though 
not invariably, gone back; they are principally the names of com¬ 
manders, who have grown great, not in the advancement, but at 
the expense of the House of Othman : such names as Montecuculi, 
Sobieski, Eugene, and Suwarrow. Yet gleams of glory and 
success on the Turkish side will not be found altogether wanting, 
and there have been truly great men in the councils and the armies 
of Turkey. She has had her Kiuprilis, and others, whose names 
have long deserved and commanded more than merely Oriental 
celebrity. We may remark, also, that these last two centuries of 
Ottoman history, though less picturesque and spirit-stirring than 
its earlier periods, are more practically instructive and valuable 

1 See Yon Hammer, books 49-51. 


IBRAHIM. A.D. 1640-1648. 259 

for us to study, with reference to the great problems which the 
states of Central and Western Europe are now called on to solve 

When Sultan Amurath IV. expired, his brother Ibrahim, 
whom he had vainly doomed with his own dying breath to die, 
was the sole surviving representative in male descent of the 
House of Othman. Ibrahim had during Amurath’s reign been a 
prisoner in the royal palace; and for the last eight years had 
trembled in the daily expectation of death. When the grandees 
of the empire hastened to his apartment with the tidings that 
Sultan Amurath was no more, and with congratulations to their 
new sovereign, Ibrahim in his terror thought that the executioners 
were approaching, and barred the door against them. He long 
refused to believe their assurances of Amurath’s decease ; and was 
only convinced when the Sultana-mother ordered the body of her 
dead son to be carried within sight of the living one. Then 
Ibrahim came forth, and mounted the Turkish throne, which 
received in him a selfish voluptuary, in whom long imprisonment 
and protracted terror had debased whatever spirit nature might 
have originally bestowed, and who was as rapacious and blood¬ 
thirsty, as he was cowardly and mean. Under Ibrahim the worst 
evils that had prevailed in the time of Amurath’s weakest prede¬ 
cessors were speedily revived; while the spirit of cruelty, in 
which Amurath had governed, continued to rage with even greater 
enormity. 

For a short period Ibrahim’s first Grand Vizier, Kara-Moustafa, 
laboured to check the excesses and supply the deficiencies of his 
sovereign. The Christian subjects of the Porte received from 
Kara-Moustafa impartial justice; and he attempted with some 
degree of temporary success to keep down the growth of 
abuses in the financial administration of the empire. He had the 
perilous honesty to speak with frankness to the dissolute tyrant 
whom he served, to oppose Ibrahim’s mad caprices, and to strive 
against the pernicious influence of the favourite sultanas and 
buffoons, who trafficked in the sale of posts and dignities. The 
offence which the Vizier thus gave, and the reputation of having 
amassed much wealth, were sure causes of ruin to one who served 
a moody and avaricious master like Ibrahim. At the same time 
the Vizier’s character was far from faultless; and his errors and 
his merits co-operated to effect his destruction. Moustafa was 
violent and implacable in his enmity towards all who rivalled or 
seeemed likely to rival him in power; and he was unscrupulous 
as to the means which he employed in order to overthrow an 
adversary. But his deadliest foes were those whose inferiority of 


26 o 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


sex and station screened them from reprisals; and the immediate 
cause of the Grand Vizier’s fall was an affront which he gave to 
the lady who held the office of governess of the harem. This 
female functionary of Ibrahim’s State, the Kiaya-Khatoum, had 
sent a requisition to the Grand Vizier for an instant supply of 500 
carts of wood for the use of the harem. At this very time grave 
tidings of troubles in the provinces and on the frontiers had 
reached Constantinople. Intent on these matters, Kara-Moustafa 
neglected to send the faggots for the ladies. A few days after¬ 
wards, while he was presiding in the Divan, he received, two 
hours before the usual time of the council’s rising, a message from 
Ibrahim commanding him immediately to dismiss the Divan and 
appear before the Sultan. The Vizier obeyed, and hastened 
before his royal master. Ibrahim instantly demanded of him, 
“ Why have not the 500 loads of wood for the harem been 
supplied]” “They shall be sent,” replied the Vizier. Then, 
with more courage than prudence, he added, “ My Padischah, is 
it wise or proper for thee to call on me to break up the Divan, 
and to confuse and delay the weightiest affairs of State, for the 
sake of attending to 500 loads of wood, the whole value of which 
does not amount to 500 aspres ? Why, when I am before thee, 
dost thou question me about firewood, but sayest not a wmrd 
about the petitions of thy subjects, the state of the frontier, and 
of the finances V’ The Mufti Yahya, who was informed of this 
conversation by Husein Effendi, who was present, advised the 
Grand Vizier to be more guarded in his words, and to treat 
nothing as of trifling importance in which the Sultan took an 
interest. Kara-Moustafa replied, “ Is it not doing the Sultan 
good service to tell him the truth 1 Am I to turn flatterer ? I 
had rather speak freely and die, than live in servile falsehood.” 1 

Kesolved, however, not to die without an effort to overthrow 
his enemies, Kara-Moustafa formed a device to ruin Youssouf 
Pacha, who had lately risen rapidly in favour with the Sultan, 
and who was the Vizier’s mortal foe. Kara-Moustafa caused 
money to be distributed among the Janissaries of the capital, to 
induce them to refuse their rations, and to allege the undue in¬ 
fluence of Youssouf Pacha as the cause of their discontent. But 
the scheme w'as soon disclosed to the Sultan, who summoned Kara- 
Moustafa before him, and ordered his instant execution. Kara- 
Moustafa escaped from the royal presence to his own house ; and, 
when pursued thither by the executioners, instead of exhibiting the 

1 The Turkish historian, Naima, who narrates this speech, states that he 
heard it related by Husein Effendi. Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 234 , n. 


26 i 


IBRAHIM . A.D. 1640-1643. 

passive submission, which Oriental statesmen have generally shown 
in such circumstances, he drew his sabre and fought desperately, 
till he was overpowered by numbers, disarmed, and strangled. 1 

The successor of Kara-Moustafa in the Grand Vizierate was 
Sultanzade Pacha. He was determined not to incur his prede¬ 
cessor’s fate by uncourtly frankness towards his sovereign. He 
flattered every caprice, and was the ready instrument of every 
passion of the Sultan, whose immoderate appetite for sensual 
pleasures, and savage fondness of ordering and of witnessing acts 
of cruelty now raged without stint or shame. Ibrahim, who re¬ 
membered the check which Kara-Moustafa used to impose on him, 
could not help feeling some degree of surprise at the universal 
obsequiousness of his new Grand Vizier; and asked one day of 
Sultanzade, “ How is it that thou art able always to approve of 
my actions, whether good or evil 1” “ My Padischah,” replied the 

shameless minister of despotism, “thou art Caliph; thou art God’s 
shadow upon earth. Every idea, which thy spirit entertains, is a 
revelation from Heaven. Thy orders, even when they appear un¬ 
reasonable, have an innate reasonableness, which thy slave ever 
reveres, though he may not always understand.” Ibrahim accepted 
these assurances of infallibility and impeccability; and thenceforth 
spoke of himself as a divinely inspired agent in the midst of the 
most disgraceful scenes of folly, vice, and crime. So gross were 
these, that the very inmates of his harem sometimes murmured; 
and the Sultan’s mother remonstrated with him against the cor¬ 
ruption and frivolity of his conduct; but in vain. Ibrahim replied 
by quoting the words of his Grand Vizier; and let loose his 
absolute power in the gratification of every frivolous vanity and 
caprice, of every depraved appetite, of every feverish fit of irritable 
passion, and every gloomy desire of suspicious malignity. 

The treasures, which the stern prudence of Amurath had ac¬ 
cumulated, were soon squandered by the effeminate prodigality of 
his successor. In order to obtain fresh supplies of gold for his 

1 When Kara-Moustafa’s palace was searched by the Sultan’s officers, five 
pictures, being portraits of Kara-Moustafa and four other ministers of state, 
were found in a place of concealment. It was supposed that the late Vizier 
had used them in magical rites ; and a Moor, who was said to have been his 
tutor in sorcery, was burnt alive. Von Hammer remarks that probably 
Kara-Moustafa was fond of paintings, but kept them as forbidden treasures 
in a secret part of his house. The strict followers of the Mahometan law 
consider all representations of the human form, either in statuary or paint¬ 
ing, to be impious : both as encoui’agements to idolatry and as profanations 
of God’s chief workmanship. They say, that at the Last Day pictures and 
statues will rise round the artists who produced them, and call on the un¬ 
happy makers to supply their creatures with souls. 


z 62 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


worthless favourites, and for the realisation of his wild fancies, 
Ibrahim sold every office of state, and every step in the honours 
both of Pen and Sword, to the highest bidder. The burdens of 
the old taxes were inordinately increased, and new imposts were 
added ; the very names of which showed the frivolous causes for 
which the Sultan drained the resources of his subjects, thus add¬ 
ing the sense of insult to that of oppression. One of Ibrahim’s 
passions was a morbid craving for perfumes, especially for amber. 
Another was an excessive fondness, not only of wearing, but of 
seeing around him, furs of the most rare and costly description. 
To meet these desires, Ibrahim created two new taxes ; one called 
the Fur Tax, and the other called the Amber Tax. The madness 
of the Sultan’s love for furs was worked up to the utmost by hear¬ 
ing a legend told by an old woman, who used to amuse the ladies 
of the harem by narrating stories to them at night. This legend 
described a certain king of the olden time, who w r as dressed in 
sable-skins, whose sofas and couches were covered, and whose 
palace was carpeted and tapestried also with the fur of the sable. 
Ibrahim instantly set his heart on being similarly arrayed, and on 
decking the Serail in like manner. He dreamed all night of 
sables ; and in the morning he commanded in the Divan that 
letters should be sent to all the governors and great men of the 
empire, enjoining each of them to collect and forward to Con¬ 
stantinople a certain number of sable-skins. A similar requisition 
was made on all the Ulema, and all the civil and military officers 
in the capital. Some of them were driven to desperation by this 
mad tyranny, and openly gave vent to the indignation which it 
inspired. Mohammed Tchelibi, the judge of Galata, appeared 
before the Grand Vizier clad in the gown of a common dervise, 
and reproached him bitterly for the folly and wickedness of the 
government. He demanded an audience of the Sultan, and 
added, “ There can but happen to me one of three things. You 
may kill me ; and, in that case, I shall think myself fortunate in 
being made a martyr. Or, you may banish me from Constanti¬ 
nople ; which will not be unpleasant, as there have been several 
shocks of earthquake here lately. Or, perhaps, you will deprive 
me of my employments. But in that I have saved you the 
trouble. I have appointed my deputy, and have changed my 
judge’s robe and turban for the dervise’s gown and cap.” The 
Vizier, alarmed at such boldness, heard him in silence, and con¬ 
cealed his resentment. A colonel of the Janissaries, named Black 
Mourad, to whom the 500 men of his regiment were devotedly 
attached, at this time returned from the Candian wars, and was 


IBRAHIM. A.D. 1640-1648. 263 

met- on landing by a treasury officer, who, in conformity with the 
resolution of the Divan, demanded of him so many sable-skins, so 
many ounces of amber, and a certain sum of money. Rolling his 
eyes, bloodshot with wrath, on the tax-gatherer, Black Mourad 
growled out, “ I have brought nothing back from Candia but gun¬ 
powder and lead. Sables and amber are things that I know only 
by name. Money I have none ; and, if I am to give it you, I 
must first beg or borrow it.” Not satisfied with the produce of 
these exactions, the Sultan arbitrarily confiscated and sold a large 
mass of heritable property. The capricious fancies of his favourite 
ladies were as costly to the empire as his own. Ibrahim per¬ 
mitted them to take what they pleased from the shops and bazaars 
without payment. One of these fair plunderers complained to the 
sovereign that she disliked shopping by daylight; and forthwith 
appeared a mandate from the Sultan requiring all the merchants 
and shop-keepers of the capital to keep their establishments open 
all night, and to provide sufficient torchlight for their wares to be 
seen clearly. Another lady told Ibrahim that she wished to see 
him with his beard adorned with jewels. Ibrahim decked him¬ 
self accordingly, and appeared in public thus bedizened. The 
Turks looked on this as an evil omen; because, according to 
Oriental traditions, the only sovereign who had adopted such 
embellishment was King Pharaoh of the Red Sea. Enormous 
treasures were squandered on the construction of a chariot, in- 
crusted with precious stones, for the use of another Celoeno of 
the harem; and 25,000 piastres were expended, that an equally 
splendid skiff should bear the Sultan along the Bosphorus. The 
disasters of the Venetian wars during the year 1648 irritated 
more and more the Ottoman nation against their imbecile but op¬ 
pressive ruler; and a formidable conspiracy was organised to 
deprive him of the power which he abused. 

Foremost among the conspirators were the chief officers of the 
Janissaries ; and the most active of these was Black Mourad, the 
colonel who had spoken with such rough frankness of the royal 
requisition for amber and sable. He knew that his head was in 
hourly peril; and it was indeed only by a timely warning from a 
private friend in the seraglio that he escaped death. The Sultan 
and his Vizier celebrated with great splendour on the 6th of 
August, 1648, the marriage cf one of Ibrahim’s daughters, a child 
of eight years old, with the Vizier’s son. Mourad and three other 
Janissary colonels, named Moussliheddin, Begtasch, and Kara- 
Tschaoush, were bidden to the royal marriage feast, at which it 
was intended to secure and slay them. But the doomed men 


264. HISTORY CF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

avoided their sovereign’s snare, and summoned, the same night, 
their comrades to the mosque of the Janissaries. It was there 
resolved to depose the Grand Vizier. This was the first avowed 
object of the conspirators, but they were fully prepared to strike 
further. The birth of several princes since Ibrahim’s accession, 
the eldest of whom, named Mahomet, was now seven years old, 
had deprived the Sultan of the protection, which, in the early part 
of his reign, he derived from being the sole representative of the 
House of Othman. The whole body of the Ulema co-operated 
with the soldiery; and no one was more active or determined in 
promoting the revolution than the chief Mufci, whose deadly 
enmity Ibrahim had earned by a gross insult offered to his 
daughter. Ibrahim heard the demand of the insurgents respect¬ 
ing his Vizier, and took away from him the seals of office; but 
with a gleam of friendship and humanity, feelings of which at 
other times he seemed destitute, he strove to protect his fallen 
favourite’s life. The soldiery and the Ulema made Sofi Mo¬ 
hammed Grand Vizier, and sent him to the Sultan to make known 
their will that the evil minister should be given up to them for 
punishment. Ibrahim had the imprudence to strike the chosen 
Vizier of the army and the people, and to threaten him that his 
own turn for punishment should soon arrive. The insurgents 
now surrounded the palace, and their words greiv more and more 
menacing. The Sultan sent his master of the horse to bid them 
disperse. The veteran Moussliheddin harangued him in the hear¬ 
ing of the Janissaries, the Spahis, and the civil officers, who w 7 ere 
now 7 all joined in the revolt, saying, “ The Padischah has ruined the 
Ottoman w*orld by pillage and tyranny. Women wield the sove¬ 
reignty. The treasury cannot satiate their caprices. The subjects 
are ruined. The armies of the infidels are winning towns on the 
frontiers : their fleets blockade the Dardanelles. Hast thou not 
been an eye-witness of the state of affairs % and why hast thou not 
told the Padischah the truth T “ The Padischah,” answered the 
envoy, “ knows nought of this. The guilt is mine : for I feared 
to speak the truth to the Padischah in the presence of the late 
Vizier. But now 7 tell me what ye desire, and I will faithfully re¬ 
peat your words before the throne.” Moussliheddin, in the name 
of the assembly, demanded three things : first, the abolition of 
the sale of offices ; secondly, the banishment of the favourite Sul¬ 
tanas from the court; thirdly, the death of the Grand Vizier. 
The master of the horse took back this message to the Sultan, 
who made feeble preparations for resistance by arming the gar¬ 
deners and pages of the palace. It was now night, and the chiefs 


IBRAHIM , A.D. 1640-1648. 265 

of the Ulema among the insurgents wished to retire to their 
homes. But the men of the sword were wiser than the men of 
the law ; and the colonels of the Janissaries said to their judicial 
comrades, “ If we separate to-night, we may be unable to assemble 
again in the morning. Let us keep together till we have re¬ 
established order in the world; and let us in a mass pass this 
night in the mosque.” The Ulema obeyed, and in the morning 
the united revolutionists began their work of vengeance. The 
obnoxious Vizier was discovered in his hiding-place and slain, as 
was the grand judge of Boumelia, who was hated by the people 
for his debauchery and venality. A message was now sent into 
the Serail, requiring the Sultan to come forth to the troops. As 
Ibrahim complied not with this desire, two of the chief Ulema 
Avere commissioned to wait upon Ibrahim’s mother, the Sultana 
Valide, and to inform her that it was resolved to depose the 
Sultan, and to enthrone her grandson Mahomet in his stead. It 
has been mentioned that this princess had vainly expostulated 
with Ibrahim respecting his career of insane profligacy and 
tyranny. The only effect of her remonstrances had been to draw 
on her the Sultan’s hatred ; and Ibrahim had treated her and the 
princesses, his sisters, with gross indignity, and was justly sus¬ 
pected of meditating their destruction. But the aged Sultana 
now strove hard to avert the wrath of the people from her un¬ 
worthy son. It was known that the force of armed attendants in 
the Serail was utterly inadequate to protect Ibrahim against an 
assault by the insurgents; and this slight guard was evidently 
indisposed to peril their lives for an odious and despised master. 
The Sultana Valide consented to receive a deputation from the 
army and people, consisting of the Mufti, the Cadiaskers, and of 
Moussliheddin, Begtasch, and Black Mourad, the Janissary 
colonels. They found her apparelled in the deepest mourning, 
and only a negro eunuch attended to fan her. They stood before 
her in respectful silence, and she said to them, “ Is it a just thing 
thus to raise revolts 1 Are ye not all slaves, whom the bounty of 
this House has fedThe old veteran, Moussliheddin, moved to 
tears by these words, replied, “ Gracious mistress, thou art right. 
We have all known the benefactions of this House ; no one more 
than myself for these eighty years. It is because we are not 
thankless men, that we can no longer stand idly by, and witness 
the ruin of this illustrious House and of this realm. Oh, would 
that I had not lived on to see these days ! What is there that I 
can covet further for myself] Neither gold nor rank could profit 
me. But oh, most gracious lady, the foolishness and the wicked- 


266 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


ness of the Padischah are bringing irreparable ruin upon the land. 
The unbelievers have captured forty strong places on the Bosnian 
frontier, and eighty of their ships cruise before the Dardanelles, 
while the Padischah thinks of nothing but of his lusts and his 
sports, of squandering and of corruption. Your wise men, learned 
in the law, have met together, and have issued a Fetva for a 
change in the occupation of the throne. Until this be accom¬ 
plished, ruin cannot be averted. Be gracious, oh lady ! oppose 
this not. You would not strive against us, but against the holy 
law.” The Sultana begged hard that they would leave her sen in 
possession of the sovereignty, under the guardianship of the 
Ulema and the Grand Vizier. Some of the deputies seemed 
disposed to yield; but the aged grand judge of Anatolia, Hane¬ 
fizade, took up the discourse, and said: “ Oh, royal lady, we have 
come hither, fully relying on your grace, and on your compassionate 
solicitude for the servants of God. You are not only the mother 
of the"Sultan ; you are the mother also of all true believers. Put 
an end to this state of trouble ; the sooner the better. The 
enemy has the upper hand in battle. At home, the traffic in 
places and ranks has no bounds. The Padischah, absorbed in 
satisfying his passions, removes himself farther and farther from 
the path of the laws. The call to prayers from the minarets of 
the Mosque of Aya Sofia is drowned in the noise of fifes, and 
flutes, and cymbals from the palace. No one can speak counsel 
without peril to the speaker : you have yourself proved it. The 
markets are plundered. The innocent are put to death. Favourite 
slaves govern the World.” 

• The Valide made one more effort, and said, “All this is the 
doing of wicked ministers. They shall be removed; and only 
good and wise men shall be set in their stead.” “ What will that 
avail V’ replied Hanefizade. “ Has not the Sultan put to death 
good and gallant men who served him, such as were Kara- 
Moustafa Pacha, and Youssouf Pacha, the conqueror of CaneaU 
“ But how,” urged the Sultana, “is it possible to place a child of 
seven years upon the throne U Hanefizade answered: “In the 
opinion of our wise men of the law a madman ought not to reign, 
whatever be his age ; but rather let a child, that is gifted with 
reason be upon the throne. If the sovereign be a rational being, 
though an infant, a wise Vizier may restore order to the world ; 
but a grown-up Sultan, who is without sense, ruins all things by 
murder, by abomination, by corruption, and prodigality.” “ So 
be it, then,” said the Sultana; “I will fetch my grandson, Ma¬ 
homet, and place the turban on his head.” The little prince was 


IBRAHIM. A.D. 1640-1648. 267 

led forth amid the enthusiastic acclamations of the military and 
legal chiefs. All the attendants of Ibrahim had now abandoned 
him. A throne was raised near the Gate of Happiness of the 
Serail; and three hours before sunset, on the 8th of August, 1648, 
the principal dignitaries of the empire paid homage to Sultan 
Mahomet IY. Only a few were admitted at a time, lest a crowd 
should frighten the child. The Sultana Valide placed her grand¬ 
son in charge of a trusty guard; and the Viziers and the Ulema 
proceeded to announce to Ibrahim the sentence of deposition. 
“ My Padischah,” said Abdul-aziz-Effendi, “ according to the 
judgment of the Ulema, and the chief dignitaries of the empire, 
you must retire from the throne.” “ Traitor,” cried Ibrahim, 
“ Am I not your Padischah 'l What means this V’ “ No,” an¬ 

swered Abdul-aziz-Effendi, “ thou art not Padischah, for as much 
as thou hast set justice and holiness at nought, and hast ruined 
the world. Thou hast squandered thy years in folly and de¬ 
bauchery ; the treasures of the realm in vanities : and corruption 
and cruelty have governed the world in thy place.” Ibrahim still 
remonstrated with the Mufti, saying repeatedly, “ Am I not Padi¬ 
schah 1 What means all this V’ A Janissary colonel said to 
him, “ Yes, you are Padischah; you are only required to repose 
yourself for a few days.” “ But why then,” said Ibrahim, “ must 
I descend from the throne V* “ Because,” answered Aziz Effendi, 
“ you have made yourself unworthy of it, by leaving the path in 
which your ancestors walked.” Ibrahim reviled them bitterly as 
traitors ; and then, lowering his hand towards the ground, he 
said, “Is it a child so high, that you are going to make Padi¬ 
schah h How can such a child reign 1 And is it not my child, my 
own son V* At last the fallen Sultan yielded to his destiny, and 
suffered them to lead him to prison, repeating, as he went, 
“This was written on my forehead; God has ordered it.” He 
was kept in sure, but not rigorous captivity for ten days, when a 
tumult among the Spahis—some of whom raised a cry in his 
favour, decided his fate. The chiefs of the late revolution re¬ 
solved to secure themselves against a reaction in behalf of Ibra¬ 
him, by putting him to death. They laid a formal case before the 
Mufti, and demanded his opinion on the following question : “ Is 
it lawful to depose and put to death a sovereign, who confers the 
dignities of the pen and of the sword not on those who are worthy 
of them, but on those who buy them for money '1” The laconic 
answer of the Mufti was, “Yes.” The ministers of death were 
accordingly sent to Ibrahim’s prison, whither the Mufti, the new 
Grand Vizier Soli Mohammed, and their principal colleagues also 


263 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


repaired, to witness and to ensure the fulfilment of the sentence. 
Ibrahim was reading the Koran when they entered. Seeing them 
accompanied by the executioners, whom he himself had so often 
employed to do their deadly work in his presence, he knew his 
hour was come; and he exclaimed, “ Is there no one of all those 
who have eaten my bread, that will pity and protect me % These 
men of blood have come to kill me ! Oh, mercy ! mercy !” The 
trembling executioners were sternly commanded by the Mufti and 
the Vizier to do their duty. Seized in their fatal grasp, the 
wretched Ibrahim broke out into blasphemies and curses ; and 
died, invoking the vengeance of God upon the Turkish nation for 
their disloyalty to their sovereigns. 

The Mufti justified his regicidal Fetva by the authority of the 
sentence in the law, which says : “If there are two caliphs, let 
one of them be put to death.” A sentence which Von Hammer 
terms “a proposition to shudder at in the law of Islam. A 
proposition, which, arbitrarily applied and extended, sanctions the 
execution not only of all deposed sovereigns, but also of all princes 
whose existence seems to menace the master of the throne with 
rivalry. It is the bloody authorisation of the state-maxim of the 
Ottomans for the murder of kings’ brothers, sons, and fathers.” 1 

The principal foreign events of the reign of Ibrahim, were the 
siege of Azoph, and the commencement of the long war with the 
Venetians, called the war of Canclia. The important city of Azoph, 
which commands the navigation of the sea of that name, and gives 
to its occupiers great advantages for warlike operations in the 
Crimea, and along all the coasts of the Euxine, had, at the time of 
Ibrahim’s accession, been for four years in the possession of the 
Cossacks of the vicinity, who were nominal subjects of the Russian 
Czar. Ibrahim’s first Vizier, Kara-Moustafa, was w T ell aware of 
the necessity of maintaining the Turkish power northward of 
the Black Sea; and in 1641, a strong army and fleet left Con¬ 
stantinople for the recovery of Azoph. This expedition was aided 
by a Tartar force, under the Khan of the Crimea. The Cossacks 
defended the place bravely; and after a siege of three months, the 
Turks were obliged to retire with a loss of 7000 Janissaries, and 
of a multitude of auxiliary Wallachians, Moldavians, and Tartars, 
whom the Ottoman historians do not enumerate. A fresh expedi¬ 
tion was sent in the next year; and on this occasion Mohammed 
Ghirai, the Crimean Khan, led no less than 100,000 Tartars to 
Azoph, to co-operate with the regular Turkish troops. The Cos¬ 
sacks found themselves unable to resist such a iorce. The Czar 

1 Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 321. 


IBRAHIM. A.D. 1640-1648. 269 

refused to aid them ; and sent an embassy from Moscow to 
Ibrahim, renouncing all concern with Azoph, and desiring to renew 
the old amity between Russia and the Porte. 1 In this emergency 
the Cossack garrison, with the same ferocious energy which their 
race has often displayed, set fire to the city which they could no 
longer defend, and left a heap of ruins for the Turks and Tartars 
to occupy. The Ottoman general rebuilt the city and fortified it 
anew with care commensurate with the importance of the post. 
A garrison of 26,000 men, including twenty companies of Janis¬ 
saries, with a numerous train of artillery, was left under Islam 
Pacha, to protect the Turkish interest in these regions. 

The incessant attacks of the Cossacks on the Turkish, and of 
the Tartars on the Russian territories, were the subjects of fre¬ 
quent complaints between the courts of Moscow and Constanti¬ 
nople during Ibrahim’s reign. Each sovereign required the other 
to keep his lawless vassals in check. The Czar Alexis Michaelo- 
wicz protested against being held responsible for the acts of the 
Cossacks, whom, in a letter to the Sultan, he termed “a horde of 
malefactors who had withdrawn as far as possible from the reach 
of their sovereign’s power, in order to escape the punishment due 
to their crimes.” 2 The Sultan and the Vizier, 3 on the other hand, 
required that no one on the side of Russia should do the least 
damage to aught that belonged to a subject of the Sublime Porte, 
either on the Sea of Azoph or the Black Sea. The pretext of shift¬ 
ing the blame on the Cossacks, and, in general, all excuses were 
to be inadmissible. On condition of this being done, and of the 
Czar paying the ancient tribute to the Khan of the Crimea, the 
Sultan promised not to aid the Tartars against Moscow. But, 
whatever the sovereigns might write or desire, still the system of 
border war between Cossack and Tartar was carried on; and the 
Turkish and Russian troops more than once came into collision 
north of the Euxine in Ibrahim’s time, while protecting their 
irregular confederates, or seeking redress for themselves. In 1646 
the Tartars pursued the Cossacks into the southern provinces of 
Russia; and brought away thence 3000 prisoners, whom they sold 
for slaves at Perekop. A Russian army advanced against Azoph, 
to avenge that affront, but was beaten in several actions by Mousa 
Pacha and the Turkish garrison, who sent 400 prisoners, and 800 
Muscovites’ heads to Constantinople, as trophies of their success. 

1 Rycaut, book ii. p. 52 . 

2 See his letter in the Appendix to Von Hammer’s 4 Sth book. Pesth 
Edition. 

3 See their letters, ibid. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


270 

The Crimean Khan, Islam Ghirai, was more bitter against the 
Russians than was his master the Sultan; and boldly refused to 
obey orders from Constantinople not to molest those whom he 
regarded as the natural enemies of the Turkish Empire. He had 
early in 1648 made an incursion into Poland and Russia, and car¬ 
ried off 40,000 subjects of those realms into slavery. The Polish 
and Russian sovereigns sent ambassadors to the Sublime Porte to 
ask redress: and Ibrahim despatched two of his officers to the 
Crimea with a letter to the Khan, in which he was commanded to 
collect the Christian prisoners whom he had seized in violation of 
all treaties, and to send them to Constantinople, that they might 
be given up to the representatives of their governments. Khan 
Ghirai read the letter, and coldly replied—“ I and all here are the 
Sultan’s servants. But the Russians only desire peace in appear¬ 
ance ; they only ask for it while they feel the weight of our 
victorious arms. If we give them breathing time, they ravage the 
coasts of Anatolia with their squadrons. I have more than once 
represented to the Divan that there were two neglected strong 
places in this neighbourhood, which it would be prudent for us to 
occupy. Now, the Russians have made themselves masters of 
them; and they have raised more than twenty little fortified posts. 
If we are to remain inactive this year, they will seize Akkermann, 
and conquer all Moldavia.” With this answer the Sultan’s mes¬ 
sengers were obliged to return to Constantinople. 

The immediate occasion of the war of Candia was the offence 
given in 1644 to the Sultan by the capture of a rich fleet of mer¬ 
chant vessels, which was voyaging from Constantinople to Egypt. 
The captors were Maltese, not Venetian galleys: but they anchored 
with their prizes in the roads of Kalismene on the south coast of 
Candia, which had now been in the possession of the Venetians 
since the time of the fourth crusade, when, on partitioning the 
conquered Greek Empire, they purchased that important island 
from their fellow-crusader the Marquis of Montserrat, to whom it 
had first been allotted as his portion of the sacred spoil. Sultan 
Ibrahim was maddened with rage, when he heard of the capture 
of the Turkish ships, some of which were the property of one of 
the chief eunuchs of the imperial household. He threatened de¬ 
struction to the whole Christian name, and ordered armaments to 
be instantly despatched against the Maltese knights; but his 
officers persuaded him not to renew the enterprise, in which the 
great Solyman had failed so signally, against the barren and 
strongly fortified rock of Malta; and rather to turn his arms to 
the acquisition of the rich and valuable Isle of Candia. They 


271 


IBRAHIM. A.D. 1640 - 1648 . 

pointed out to him that Candia was most advantageously situated 
for incorporation with the Ottoman dominions, and that it might 
be easily wrested by surprise from its Venetian masters, who had 
given just cause for hostilities by allowing the piratical Maltese to 
secure their booty on the Cretan coasts. It was resolved accord¬ 
ingly by the Porte to attack Candia. There was at that time 
peace between Turkey and Venice. Ibrahim and his ministers 
determined to aid force by fraud; and they pretended to receive 
most graciously the excuses which the republic of St. Mark offered 
for the accidental reception of the Maltese galleys at Kalism6ne. 
A large fleet and army left the Dardanelles, on the 30th April, 1645, 
with the declared object of assailing Malta; but, after the expe¬ 
dition had paused for a time on the south coast of the Morea, the 
generalissimo Youssouf Pacha put to sea again, read to his assem¬ 
bled captains the Sultan’s orders, which had previously been kept 
secret; and instead of sailing westward for Malta, stood to the 
south with a favourable wind, which brought the Turkish 
squadron to Canea, at the western extremity of the Isle of 
Candia, on the 24th of June. The suspicions of the Venetian 
government as to the real object of the expedition, had not been 
wholly quieted by the protestations of the Sultan’s ministers. 
Orders had been sent from Venice to put the fortresses of the 
island in a state of defence, and to collect the militia; and rein¬ 
forcements had been sent to the garrison. But the native popula¬ 
tion hated the rule of the Venetian oligarchy; and the troops and 
galleys under the governor’s command were inadequate for the 
defence of so long a line of sea-board as Crete presents to an 
invader. The Turks landed without opposition ; and Canea, the 
principal city of the western part of the island, was besieged and 
captured by them before the end of August. In the following 
year they took Ketino, and in the spring of 1648 they began the 
siege of Candia, the capital of the island. This memorable siege 
was prolonged for twenty years by the desperate exertions of the 
Venetians, who strained their utmost res urces to rescue Candia. 
They frequently inflicted severe and humiliating defeats on the 
Turkish squadrons; they even captured the islands of Lemnos and 
Tenedos from the Ottomans, and more than once ravaged the 
coasts near Constantinople; but they were never able to drive 
away the besieging army from before Candia ; though the opera¬ 
tions of the Turks were retarded and often paralysed by the im¬ 
becility and corruption of the Sublime Porte throughout the reign 
of Ibrahim, and the first part of that of his son Mahomet IV., 
whose elevation to the throne at the age of seven years, when his 


272 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


father was deposed and murdered, has been already narrated. It 
would be useless to dwell on the internal history of Turkey during 
Mahomet IV.’s minority, and to recapitulate the ever-recurring 
incidents of court intrigue, military insubordination and violence, 
judicial venality, local oppression and provincial revolt. The 
strife of factions was aggravated by the deadly rivalry that sprang 
up between the old Sultana Valide, the Sultan’s grandmother, and 
his mother the young Sultana Valide, whose name was Tarkhan—a 
rivalry which led to the murder of the elder princess. As no 
stronger foe than Venice attacked the Ottoman Empire, it lingered 
on through this period of renewed misery and weakness, until at 
length, in 1656, through the influence of the Sultana Tarkhan, 
the Grand Vizierate was given to an aged statesman named 
Mohammed Kiuprili, who deserves to be honoured as the founder 
of a dynasty of ministers that raised Turkey, in spite of the de¬ 
ficiency of her princes, once more to comparative power, and pros¬ 
perity, and glory, and who long retarded, if they could not avert, 
the ultimate decline of the Ottoman Empire. 


MAHOMET IK A,D. 164S-16S7. 


2/3 


CHAPTER XV. 

MOHAMMED KIUPRILI—RIGOUR AND SUCCESS OF HIS MINISTRY— 
HIS SON AHMED KIUPRILI SUCCEEDS HIM IN THE VIZIERATE 
—GREAT QUALITIES OF AHMED KIUPRILI—WEAKNESS OF SUL¬ 
TAN MAHOMET IV.—WAR WITH AUSTRIA—GREAT DEFEAT OF 
THE TURKS BY MONTECUCULI AT ST. GOTHARD—TRUCE WITH 
AUSTRIA—AHMED KIUPRILI TAKES CANDIA—WAR WITH RUSSIA 
AND POLAND—SOBIESKI DEFEATS THE TURKS AT KHOCZIM AND 
LEMBERG—PEACE OF ZURAUNA—DEATH AND CHARACTER OF 
AHMED KIUPRILI . 1 

The court astronomer at Constantinople, on September 15th, 1656, 
determined that the most favourable time for the investiture of 
Mohammed Kiuprili with the Grand Vizierate, was the hour of the 
midday prayer, at the instant when the cry of “ God is Great ” 
resounds from the heights of the minarets. 

According to a prescribed rule of Islam, the noontide prayer is 
repeated, not at the exact moment when the sun is on the meridian, 
but a few seconds afterwards ; because the tradition of the proj)hets 
teaches that at the astronomical noon the devil is wont to take 
the sun between his two horns, so that he may wear it as the crown 
of the world’s dominion ; and the fiend then rears himself as Lord of 
the Earth, but he lets the sun go directly he hears the words, 
“ God is Great,” repeated on high in the summons of the true 
believers to prayer. “ Thus,” says the Turkish historian, “ the 
demons of cruelty, debauchery, and sedition, who had reached the 
meridian in the reigns of Amurath and Ibrahim, and during the 
minority of Mahomet, were obliged to yield up their crown of 
domination, when the voice was heard, that proclaimed Kiuprili 
Grand Vizier of the empire.” 2 

Mohammed Kiuprili was the grandson of an Albanian, who had 
migrated to Asia Minor, and settled in the town of Kiupri, near 
the mouth of the river Halys. The ruler of the councils of the 

1 See Von Hammer, books 52-56. 

2 Ibid., vol. iii. p. 4G2. 

18 


274 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Ottoman Empire had been, in early youth, a kitchen-boy, from 
which situation he rose to that of a cook. After twenty-five years 
of service he became the steward of the Grand Vizier Khosrew; 
and under Khosrew’s successor he was made Master of the Horse. 
That successor favoured Kiuprili, as being a native of the same 
province as himself; and by his influence Kiuprili was made 
Governor of Damascus, Tripoli, and Jerusalem, and one of the 
Viziers of state. Afterwards he accepted the inferior post of 
Sanjak Bey of Giuztendil in Albania, where he led an armed force 
against some of the numerous insurgents of that region, but was 
defeated and taken prisoner. After he was redeemed from cap¬ 
tivity, he retired to his native town; but was persuaded by a 
Pacha, called Mohammed with the Wry Neck, to follow him to 
Constantinople. His new patron became Grand Vizier, but soon 
began to regard Kiuprili as a dangerous rival for court favour. It 
does not, however, appear that Kiuprili used any unfair intrigues 
to obtain the Grand Vizierate. Friends, who knew the firmness 
of his character, his activity, and his keen common sense, recom¬ 
mended him to the Sultana Valide, as a man who might possibly 
restore some degree of tranquillity to the suffering empire; and the 
Grand Vizierate was offered to Kiuprili, then in the seventieth 
year of his age. He refused to accept it, save upon certain condi¬ 
tions. He required that all his measures should be ratified without 
examination or discussion ; that he should have free hands in the 
distribution of all offices and preferments, and in dealing out 
rewards and punishments, without attending to recommendations 
from any quarter, and without any responsibility; that he should 
have authority superior to all influence of great men or favourites; 
that exclusive confidence should be placed in him, and all accusa¬ 
tions and insinuations against him should be instantly rejected. 
The Sultana Valide, in behalf of her son, swore solemnly that all 
these conditions should be fulfilled, and Mohammed Kiuprili be¬ 
came Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire. 

His former patron, Mohammed the Wry-Necked, had been dis¬ 
missed to make room for him; and the court had ordered that 
the deposed minister should be put to death, and that his goods 
should be confiscated in the usual manner. Kiuprili interceded, 
and saved his life, and gave him the revenues of the government 
of Kanisclia. This was the first, and it was almost the last act of 
humanity that marked Kiuprili’s administration. A stern correc¬ 
tion of abuses was required; and Kiuprili applied it, not indeed 
with the ostentatious cruelty of Sultan Amurath IV., but with the 
same searching and unsparing severity, which had marked that 


I r - 


mm. immihr. 


- j 



public order. A ir 

- 17 J . • T - 

Ji'CO.rl t_oas rar r—? ;■~ _e :> v 


<_C*m Ai. C. • r ~ ^ - 1 

antidpatfon all the Grand 
nen employed the most em melons 
ci &ii who aiscirwcL or mreiterLed 

i Dervishes. who 
r lawless violence 

st m who >i*i rot c imply wiki their dogmas, were seired 

iti banished. One of mem. mo murmured ami net me Vif ;r. 

mm who did great hmuence with the populace. was strangled, and 

thrown into me 5 ostiums. Khiprili intercepted a letter mom the 

Greek Patriarch to me VaiYode of WjJIuehia* cottmim a ore- 

diction very similar to those which are free nen t in our own time. 

The Patriarch smi. “ The power of Ishtm is drawing to an endL 

v. —, 


t n 



ire Christian hum wdi soon :e supreme. Ail their lands m 
sneedilv be in the possession of the Christians . and the Loris of 
rite Cross and the Church-bell will be the Lords of the empire." 
Krupril; read in this an encouragement to revolt, and hanged the 
Greek Patriarch over one of the city gates, ho d iingiency past 
or present, no preparation for plot or ninthly, escaped the 'Vdmer's 
vigilance. He planted his spits in every province and town, and 
secured ti e agency of trust and unquestioning executioners of his 
ccmmaadsw The impress of a re solute will was felt throughout me 
empire : and men obeyed, without hesitation me man. whom they 
perceived never to ksetite never to neglect or abandon 

this- who served him. and never to forgive those who thwarted 
or disobeyed him, deah his Wows against every race, 

class, profession, and station, where he saw or suspected oftc : 
He never vented his wrath in threat- His blows oatsped his 
words ’ and. while he was biding his time to strike, he was of 
unrivalled skill in his preparations. The Turkish hb- 

tort.m Mum rentes. on me ant tort; of Meo.scm a " a . teen 
one of m Grand Timers eoimdential servants, that Mohammed 
Kiunrili had a that wrath and reproach are always super- 



Thirty-six thousand persons are said to have been put to dead 
by Mohammed Kiupnlm command, during the five vears of his 
Grand Virierate. The chief 1 ort w wr w Constantinople SouP 
fikar. comass afterwards that he himself h&c. t.itgied more 
than 4000, and thrown them into the Bosphorus. Ton Hammer, 
who repeats and accredits these numbers, states that tho aged 
despot, who thus marked every month of 


uu. 

uK 


muustrv c-v mo 


V - 









2 76 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

sacrifice of more than 500 lives, had acquired a reputation for 
mildness and humanity when he was a provincial governor. It is 
fair to suppose that he lavished human life when Grand Vizier, 
not out of any natural cruelty in his disposition, but from the 
belief that he could not otherwise suppress revolt and anarchy, and 
maintain complete obedience to his authority. 1 -The price at which 
the restoration of order was bought under Mohammed Kiuprili, 
was indeed fearful; but, though excessive, it was not paid in vain. 
The revolts which had raged in Transylvania and Asia Minor were 
quelled; the naval strength of the empire was revived; the Dar¬ 
danelles were fortified ; the Ottoman power beyond the Black Sea 
was strengthened by the erection of castles on the Dnieper and 
the Don; and, though the war in Candia still lingered, the islands 
of Lemnos and Tenedos were recovered from the Venetians. His 
own authority in the empire was unshaken until the last hour of 
his life ; and he obtained for his still more celebrated son, Ahmed 
Kiuprili, the succession to the Grand Vizierate. It is said that old 
Kiuprili, when on his death-bed (31st October, 1661), after recom¬ 
mending his son as the future Vizier, gave the young Sultan four 
especial rules to follow. One was, never to listen to the advice of 
women : another was, never to let a subject grow over-rich : the 

1 Our English traveller, Wheeler, who visited Turkey a few years after 
Mohammed Kiuprili’s death, re’ates a legend which he heard respecting him, 
which proves how terrible his severities must have been, and the impression 
left by them on the public mind. Wheeler, in describing one of the streets 
of Constantinople, says of it: “This street is adorned with several of the 
monuments of the Viziers and Bashas, who have highly merited of the Em¬ 
peror either in the wars or government. Among which we observed one 
with the Cuppalo covered only with a grate of wire ; of which we had this 
account, ‘ That it was the monument of Mahomet Cupriuli, father to the 
present Vizier, who settled the government, which during the minority of 
the present Emperor was very near destruction through the discontents and 
faction of the principal Hagaes, and the mutinies of the Janissaries. Con¬ 
cerning whom, after his decease, being buried here and having this stately 
monument of white marble covered with lead erected over his body, the 
Grand Signior and the Grand Vizier had this dream both in the same night; 
to wit that Cupriuli came to them and earnestly begged a little water to 
refresh him, being in a burning heat. Of this the Grand Signior and the 
Vizier told each other in the morning, and thereupon thought fit to consult 
the Mufti what to do concerning it: who, according to their gross super¬ 
stition, advised that he should have the roof of his Sepulchre uncovered 
that the rain might descend on his body, thereby to quench the flames 
tormenting his soul. And this remedy, the people who smarted under his 
oppression, think he had great need of, supposing him to be tormented in 
the other world for his tyrannies and cruelties committed by him in this.” 
Wheeler’s Travels, p. 133; see also supra , Knoiles’s account of the Sepul¬ 
chre of Sultan Amurath L 


2 77 


MAHOMET IV. A.D. 1648-16S7. 

third was, to keep the public treasury full by all possible means : 
and the last, to be continually on horseback, and keep his armies 
in constant action. 

Sultan Mahomet IV. was now advancing towards manhood ; 
but he was of far too weak a character to govern for himself. 

• His great delight was the chase; and to this he devoted all his 
energies and all his time. Fortunately for his empire, he placed 
the most implicit confidence in Ahmed Kiuprili, the new Vizier, 
and maintained his favourite minister in power against all the 
numerous intrigues that were directed against him. Ahmed 
Kiuprili was the real ruler of Turkey from 1661 to his death in 
1676 ; and he is justly eulogised both by Ottoman and Christian 
historians as the greatest statesman of his country. He was only 
twenty-six years of age when he was called on to govern the 
empire ; but his naturally high abilities had been improved by the 
best education that the Muderris of Constantinople could supply; 
and he had learned practical statesmanship as a provincial governor 
and general, during the ministry of his father. Ahmed Kiuprili 
could be as stern as his sire, when duty to the state required 
severity; and he was equally tenacious in not permitting the least 
encroachment on his authority. But he was usually humane and 
generous; and his most earnest endeavours were directed to 
mitigate the burdens of imperial taxation, and to protect the 
people from the feudal exactions of the Spahis, and from the 
arbitrary violence of the Pachas and other local functionaries. 

Like his father, Ahmed Kiuprili commenced his administration 
by securing himself against any cabals of the Ulema; and he gave 
at the same time a noble rebuke to the chief of that order, who 
spoke in the divan against the memory of the late Grand Vizier. 
Ahmed Kiuprili said to him, “ Mufti, if my father sentenced men 
to death, he did so by the sanction of thy Fetva.” The Mufti 
answered, “ If I gave him my Fetva, it was because I feared lest 
I should myself suffer under his cruelty.” “ Effendi,” rejoined the 
Grand Vizier, “ is it for thee, who art a teacher of the law of the 
Prophet, to fear God less than His creature V } The Mufti was 
silent. In a few days afterwards he was deposed and banished to 
Rhodes ; and his important station given to Sanizade, a friend on 
whom Ahmed Kiuprili could rely. 

It was in the civil administration of the Turkish Empire that 
the genius of Ahmed Kiuprili found its best field of exercise ; but 
he was soon called on to fulfil the military duties of the Grand 
Vizierate, and to head the Ottoman armies in the war with 
Austria, which broke out in 1663. This, like most of the other 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


273 

wars between the two empires, originated in the troubles and 
dissensions which were chronic for a century and a half in Hungary 
and Transylvania. After several conflicts of minor importance 
during 1661 and 1662, between the respective partisans of Austria 
and the Porte in these provinces, who were aided against each 
other by the neighbouring Pachas and commandants, an Ottoman 
army was collected by the Grand Vizier on a scale of grandeur 
worthy of the victorious days of Solyman Kanouni: and Kiuprili 
resolved not only to complete the ascendency of the Turks in Hun¬ 
gary and Transylvania, but to crush entirely and finally the power 
of Austria. Mahomet IV. marched with his troops from Constan¬ 
tinople to Adrianople; but there he remained behind to resume 
his favourite hunting while his Grand Vizier led the army against 
the enemy. The Sultan placed the sacred standard of the Prophet 
in Kiuprili’s hands at parting; and on the 8th June, 1663, that 
formidable ensign of Turkish war was displayed at Belgrade. 
Kiuprili had under his command 121,000 men, 123 field-pieces, 
12 heavy battering cannon, 60,000 camels, and 10,000 mules. 
With this imposing force, he overran the open country of Hungary 
and Transylvania, almost without opposition; and besieged and 
captured the strong city of Neuhausel in the September of that 
year, which was the most brilliant achievement that the Turks 
had effected in Europe, since the battle of Cerestes, more than 
fifty years before. The Vizier, after this siege, did not recom¬ 
mence active operations with his main army until the spring of 
the following year, but his light troops spread devastation far and 
wide through Austria. 1 In May, 1664, Kiuprili advanced and 
crossed the river Mur ; and he besieged and captured the fortress 
of Serivar, which the Turks dismantled and set fire to, on the 7th 
July, as a mark of contempt for the reigning Emperor of Austria, 
by whom it had been founded. From the ruins of Serivar the 
Ottoman army marched northward, passing by the western ex¬ 
tremity of Lake Balaton. They captured Egervar, Kipornak, and 
other strong places; and on the 26th July, the Turks reached 
( the right bank of the river Baab, near to the town of Ivcermend. 

‘ Could they cross that river the remainder of the march against 
Vienna seemed easy; the Imperialist army which opposed them 
in this campaign was inferior to them in numbers; but happily 

1 Sir Paul Rycaut says, “ The Tartars, every one after the manner of his 
country leading one or more spare horses, made inroads within five miles of 
Vienna ; destroying and laying waste all places before them. Things there 
resembling Doomsday, covered with fire ; and not as much left as made an 
appearance of habitation.” 


MAHOMET IV. A.D. 1648 - 1687 . 279 

for Austria, that army was commanded by one of the ablest 
generals of the age, who was destined to gain the first great 
victory of Christendom in a pitched battle in open field against the 
full force of the Turkish arms. 

Count Raymond de Montecuculi was, like many other of the 
greatest generals known in modern history, an Italian. He was 
born at Modena, of a noble family of that duchy, in 1608. He 
entered into the Austrian service; and acquired distinction in 
the latter part of the Thirty Years’ War; and afterwards in 
hostilities against Poland. In 1664 he was named generalissimo 
of the Imperial forces, and sent to check the menacing progress of 
the Turks. The Austrian and Hungarian army, which was placed 
under Montecuculi’s command, was weak in numbers; and at the 
opening of the campaign he was unable to prevent the Vizier 
Kiuprili from crossing the Mur, and reducing the Christian cities 
that lay between that river and the Raab. But, while the Turks 
were engaged in these operations, Montecuculi effected a junction 
with the auxiliary troops of the states of the empire, and also 
with a valuable force of French troops, which had voluntarily 
marched under the Count of Coligny and other noblemen, to serve 
in the Hungarian war. With his army thus strengthened, Monte¬ 
cuculi took up a position near Ksermend on the Raab, covering 
the road to Vienna; and, from the breadth and rapidity of the 
river in that place, the attempts made by the Ottoman vanguard 
to force a passage were easily repulsed. Kiuprili now marched up 
the Raab, along the right bank towards Styria, closely followed 
along the left bank by Montecuculi, who thus turned the enemy 
farther away from the Austrian capital, and also from the Turkish 
reserves which were concentrating at Ofen and Stuhweissenburg. 
Several efforts of the Turks to cross the river were checked by the 
Imperialists ; but at last the armies marched past the point where 
the Laufritz flows into the Raab, in the vicinity of the village of 
St. Gothard; and then, the single stream of the Raab wanted 
depth and breadth sufficient to present a serious obstacle to the 
Turks. Both armies, therefore, haded and prepared for the 
battle, which appeared to be inevitable. Some overtures for 
negotiation first took place, in which the Turkish officers behaved 
with the utmost arrogance. When Reningen, the Austrian envoy, 
spoke of the restoration of Neuhausel to the Emperor, the Vizier 
and his Pachas laughed at him, and asked whether any one had 
ever heard of the Ottomans voluntarily giving up a conquest to the 
Christians. They refused to admit the terms of the old treaty of 
Sitvatorok as a basis for a peace; and said that peace must be 


28 o 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


granted, if at all, on principles created by the recent successes of 
the Sublime Porte. Montecuculi continued his preparations for 
battle: he issued careful directions to his troops, particularising 
the order of their array, the relative positions of each corps, the 
depth of the lines, and the disposal of the baggage and stores. 
The 1st of August, 1664, saw the result of Montecuculi’s sage 
dispositions, and the first great proof that the balance of supe¬ 
riority between the Ottoman and Christian arms had at last been 
changed. 

The convent of St. Gothard, which has given name to this 
memorable battle, is on the right bank of the Raab, at a little 
distance above its confluence with the Laufritz. A space of level 
ground extends along the right bank of the Raab westward from 
the convent and village of St. Gothard to the village of Windisch- 
dorf, also on the right bank of the river. These two villages 
formed the extreme wings of the Turkish position before the 
battle. Along the left bank of the river there is an extent of 
level ground of equal length with that on the right side, but of 
much greater breadth ; and it was here, on the left side, that the 
conflict took place. In the centre of the plain, on the left side 
(that is to say in the centre of the Imperialist position'), stands the 
village of Moggersdorf; and immediately opposite to Moggers- 
dorf the river bends in and describes an arc towards the southern 
or Turkish side. This greatly facilitated the passage of the river 
by the Vizier, as he was enabled to place guns in battery on each 
side of the convex of the stream, and sweep away any troops that 
disputed the landing place on the other bank, in the centre of the 
bend of the river. Montecuculi placed the auxiliary German 
troops of the empire in the centre of his line, in and near to the 
village of Moggersdorf. The Austrians and Hungarians were in 
his right wing; the French auxiliaries formed his left. The 
Turks had a large superiority in numbers, and in personal courage 
they were inferior to no possible antagonists. But the military 
discipline of the Turkish soldiers had become lamentably impaired 
since the days of Solyman, when it commanded the envious 
admiration of its Christian foes. It had even declined rapidly 
since the time when the last great battle between Turk and 
German was fought at Cerestes (1596). The deterioration in the 
intelligence and skill of the Ottoman officers was still more con¬ 
spicuous. On the opposite side, the German and the other armies 
ot Western Christendom, had acquired many improvements in 
their weapons, their tactics, and their general military organisa¬ 
tion, during the Thirty Years’ War, which had called into action 


MAHOMET IV. A.D. 164S-16S7. 2S1 

tlie genius of such commanders as Tilly, Wallenstein, Gustavus 
Adolphus, Bernhard, Torstenston, Turenne, and Montecuculi him¬ 
self. The Turkish artillery, though numerous, was now cumbrous 
and ill-served, compared with the German. The Janissaries had 
given up the use of the pike (which seems to have been one of 
their weapons in Solyman’s time 1 ), and the Ottoman army was 
entirely deficient in foot brigades of steady spearmen, and also in 
heavily-armed regular cavalry. The German infantry was now 
formed of pikemen and of musqueteers; and part of their horse 
consisted of heavy cuirassier regiments, which, in Montecuculi’s 
judgment, were sure, if a fair opportunity of charging were given 
them, to ride down Turkish infantry or cavalry, without it being 
possible for any serious resistance to be offered to them. In that 
great general’s opinion, the want of the pike, which he calls “the 
queen of weapons,” 2 was the fatal defect in the Turkish military 
system. We shall find the Chevalier Folard, half a century after¬ 
wards, expressing a similar judgment with reference to the negli¬ 
gence of the Turks in not adopting the invention of the bayonet. 

Montecuculi’s criticisms on the defects in the Turkish armies 
were written by him after the battle of St. Gothard; but his 
military sagacity must have divined them, as soon as he observed 
the Vizier’s troops, and made trial of their tactics and prowess in 
the early operations of the campaign. But the Turks themselves, 
before they fought at St. Gothard, knew not their own deficiencies; 
they were flushed with triumph at the advantages which they had. 
hitherto gained under Ahmed Kiuprili; and with full confidence 
in their chief and themselves, they advanced, about nine in the 
morning of the 1st of August, 1664, to the Baab, and began the 
passage of the eventful stream. Kiuprili had placed his batteries 
along the sides of the arc of the stream, which has already been 
described ; and his Janissaries, who were drawn up in the Turkish 
centre, crossed the river without much loss, and attacked and 
carried the village of Moggersdorf. The centre of the Christians 
was thus completely broken, and the Ottomans appeared to be 
certain of victory, when Montecuculi brought succour from the 
right wing. Prince Charles of Lorraine, who in this battle gave 
the prelude of his long and brilliant career, led his regiment of 
Austrian heavy cavalry to the charge in person, and killed with 
his own hand the commander of the Grand Vizier’s guards. The 
advanced troops of the Turkish centre, thus taken in flank by the 

1 See Von Hammer, vol. ii. p. 185. 

2 “ A1 Tnrco manca la picca, ehe e la regina delle armi a piedi.”—Mon¬ 
tecuculi Opere, voL ii. p. 124. 


282 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Austrian cavalry, were driven back to the Raab; Moggersdorf 
was then attacked by the Imperialists, and set on fire; but the 
Janissaries, who had intrenched themselves in the village, refused 
to retreat or surrender, and kept their post till they perished in 
the flames, with obstinacy (says Montecuculi) worthy to be 
reflected on and admired. Kiuprili brought large reinforcements 
over from the right bank, and Montecuculi now sent word to the 
Count of Coligny and the French in his left wing, that it was 
time for them to aid him with all their might. Coligny sent him 
instantly 1000 infantry and two squadrons of cavalry, under the 
Due de la Feuillacle and Beauveze. When Kiuprili saw the 
French coming forward with their shaven chins and cheeks, and 
powdered perruques, he asked scornfully of one of his attendants, 
“ Who are these young girls V But the young girls, as he termed 
them, without regarding the formidable Turkish battle-cry of 
“ Allah !” rushed upon the Turks and cut them down, shouting 
out on their part, “ Allons ! Allons ! Tue ! Tue !” Those Janis¬ 
saries who escaped that carnage remembered long afterwards the 
French cry of “Allons ! Tue!” and the Due de la Feuillade was 
for many years talked of in their barracks as “ Fouladi,” which 
means “ The man of steel.” 

Kiuprili’s first attack had failed, though he still retained some 
ground on the left bank of the Raab. He now (towards noon) 
prepared for a combined attack (such as he ought to have made in 
the first instance) upon both the Christian wings, while he, at the 
same time, assailed their centre with greater forces. Four large- 
masses of irregular Ottoman cavalry dashed across the Raab at 
Montecuculi’s right wing: three similar bodies attacked the 
French on the left; Kiuprili led a force of cavalry and infantry 
upon the centre; and, at the same time, detached squadrons were 
ordered to pass the river at points a little distant from the field of 
battle, and gain the flanks and rear of the Imperialists. An obsti¬ 
nate conflict now took place all along the line. Some parts of the 
Christian army gave ground, and several of its generals advised a 
retreat; but Montecuculi told them that their only chance of 
safety, as well as of victory, was to take the offensive with a mass 
of the best troops, and make a desperate charge on the Ottoman 
centre. A strong force of the Christian cavalry was now concen¬ 
trated for this purpose ; and the word was passed along the ranks 
that they must break the Turks or perish. John Spork, the 
Imperialist general of cavalry, who was called the Austrian Ajax, 
prostrated himself bareheaded on the ground in front of his men, 
and prayed aloud : “Oh, mighty Generalissimo, who art on high, 


MAHOMET IV. A.D. 1648*1687. 283 

if thou wilt not this day help thy children the Christians, at least 
do not help these dogs the Turks, and thou shalt soon see some¬ 
thing that will please thee.” 1 

Having arranged his lines for the decisive charge, Montecuculi 
gave the word, and the Imperialists rushed forward with a loud 
shout, which disconcerted the Turks, who, accustomed themselves 
to terrify their enemy by their battle-cry, and to give the attack, 
recoiled before the unexpected assault of their opponents. 
Thrown into utter confusion by the irresistible shock of Monte- 
cuculi’s cuirassiers, which was supported vigorously by the Chris¬ 
tian musketeers and pikemen, the Ottomans were driven into the 
Baab; Janissary, Spahi, Albanian, Tartar, going down alike 
beneath the impetuous rush of the Christian centre, or flying in 
panic rout before it. The Ottoman cavalry in the wings lost 
courage at seeing the defeat of their centre, where the Vizier and 
all their best troops were stationed, and they rode off the field 
without an effort to retrieve the fortune of the day. More than 
10,000 Turks perished in the battle ; and the triumph of Monte¬ 
cuculi was graced by the capture of fifteen pieces of cannon and 
forty standards. On the morrow, the victor caused a solemn 
service of thanksgiving to be celebrated on the field of battle. 
A chapel was founded there, and still attests the scene of this 
memorable battle, which commenced the compensation for the 
300 years of defeat which European Christendom had sustained 
from Turkey, ever since the day when the confederate forces 
of Servia and Hungary were crushed by Sultan Amurath I. at 
Kossova. 

It is because the battle of St. Gothard presents thus to our 
notice a turning point in the military history of Turkey, that it 
has been described with a particularity of detail, such as can be 
given to none of the long list of battles, which yet will come 
before our notice, while tracing the declining fortunes of the 
Ottoman Empire. The advantage also of possessing the com- 

1 This may remind some readers of the wish of Miltiades before Marathon, 
not for favour, but merely for fair play, from the gods. Qtuv 711 loa 
vi}.i6vt(i)v, oloi re elfiBv 7repiy kveodat tjj cvixfioXy. Herodotus, lib. vi. sect. 116. 
The well-known prayer of the American backwoodsman when about to attack 
the bear, is still more like Spork’s devotions. This Austrian Ajax could 
ill have comprehended the sublime spirit in which his assumed prototype 
the Homeric Ajax prayed in battle (Iliad, book xvii. verse 645). Most pro¬ 
bably he had never heard of it. Spork was made a Count by the Austrian 
Emperor in reward for his services, but he always wrote his name (which 
he did with great difficulty) “ Spork, Count,” and not “ Count Spork.” He 
said he was a Spork, before he was a Count. 


2S4 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

merits of Montecuculi himself on this campaign, and on Turkish 
warfare generally, has been an additional reason for giving promi¬ 
nence to his victory at St. Gothard. The defects which he points 
out in the Turkish military system, have continued to exist, or 
rather have existed with aggravation, until the reign of the late 
Sultan Mahmoud. They may be summed up as consisting in the 
neglect of the Turks to keep pace with the improvements made 
by other nations in the weapons and in the art of war; and in 
the appointment of incompetent officers through bribery and 
other corrupt influences. The pernicious effects of these vices of 
the Ottoman war department have been partly counteracted by 
the remarkable personal valour of the common soldiers among 
the Turks, their sobriety, and the vigour of their constitutions ; 
and also by the care taken to provide them with good and 
sufficient provisions both when in barracks and when employed 
on active duty. These are favourable points in the Otto¬ 
man service, which every military critic from Count Monte¬ 
cuculi down to Marshal Marmont has observed; and the more 
important of them, those which regard the natural soldierly 
qualities of the Ottoman population, show that Turkey has never 
lost that element of military greatness, which no artificial means 
can create or revive, but to which the skill of great statesmen 
and great generals (if the Sultan’s empire should be blessed with 
them) may superadd all that has for nearly two centuries been 
deficient. 

The immediate result of the battle of St. Gothard was a truce 
for twenty years on the footing of the treaty of Sitvatorok, 
which the Turks before their defeat had so arrogantly refused. 
But Neuhausel remained in the possession of the Ottomans; so 
that Ahmed Kiuprili, notwithstanding his great overthrow by 
Montecuculi, was able to re-enter Constantinople as a conqueror. 
His influence over the Sultan was undiminished; and the next 
great military enterprise, that Kiuprili undertook, was one of 
unchequered success and glory. This was the reduction of the 
city of Candia, which had now for nearly twenty years been 
vainly besieged or blockaded by the Turks. Mahomet IV. at 
first proposed to lead in person the great armament which 
Kiuprili collected at Adrianople for this expedition. The impe¬ 
rial tent was raised in the camp; and the Sultan caused those 
parts of the Turkish historians to be read before him, which 
narrate the capture of Constantinople by Mahomet II., the battle of 
Calderan under Selim I., and the sieges of Ithodes and Belgrade 
by Solyman. But Mahomet IY. appeased the martial ardour, 


MAHOMET IV. A.D. 1648-16S7. 285 

which those recitals produced in him by hunting with redoubled 
energy. It was only in the chase that he was enterprising and 
bold : he shrank from the battle-field; and he was not even a 
hero in his harem, where a Greek slave-girl of Retino tyrannised 
with capricious violence over the over-fond and over-constant 
Padischah. This favourite Sultana was zealously devoted to the 
interests of Kiuprili, who was thereby rendered so secure in his 
authority, that he ventured to remain in the island of Candia 
from the time of his landing there in 1666 to the surrender of 
the long-besieged capital in 1669. During these three last years 
of the siege, every possible effort of bravery and all the then 
available resources of the military art were employed both by 
assailants and defenders. Morosini (afterwards renowned as the 
conqueror of the Morea, and surnamed the Peloponnesian) com¬ 
manded in the city; ably seconded by the Due de la Feuillade, 
the hero of St. Gothard, and many other high-born and high- 
spirited volunteers, who flocked from every country of Christen¬ 
dom to Candia, as the great theatre of military glory. On the 
Turkish side, Kiuprili and his generals and admirals urged on the 
operations of the besiegers by sea and by land with indomitable 
obstinacy, and with a degree of engineering skill, from which the 
Turks of more recent times have far degenerated. 1 It is com¬ 
puted that during the final thirty-four months of the siege, during 
which Kiuprili commanded, 30,000 Turks and 12,000 Venetians 
were killed. There were fifty-six assaults, and ninety-six sorties; 
and the number of mines exploded on both sides was 1364. 
Several attempts were made by the Venetians to purchase peace 
without ceding Candia. But to their offers of large sums of 
money, Kiuprili replied : “ We are not money-dealers; we make 
war to win Candia, and at no price will we abandon it.” The 
Ottomans persevered in their enterprise, until Morosini, on the 
6th September, 1669, surrendered on honourable terms the city 
which the incessant mining had converted into a confused mass 
of gigantic mole-heaps. A peace was made between Venice and 
the Porte, by which the city and island of Candia became the 
property of the Sultan. Kiuprili remained there several months 
after the conquest was completed, during which time he was well 

1 Juchereau says of the Turks of this century, “It is only since the estab¬ 
lishment of the school for engineers at Sulitzi, that they have learned under 
Frank officers, in consulting their military archives and the plans of their 
ancient engineers, those ways and parallels of trenches, of which they were 
the inventors, and which so distinguished the siege of Candia.” 


236 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURNS. 

and wisely employed in organising the local government of Crete 
under its new sovereign. 

The next scene of warlike operations, on which Ahmed Kiuprili 
entered, deserves especial attention, because it brings us to the 
rival claims of Poland, Russia, and Turkey to dominion over the 
Cossacks, and is intimately connected with the long and still en¬ 
during chain of hostilities between the Russian and Turkish 
Empires. The Cossacks of the Don had become subjects of Ivan 
the Terrible, Czar of Muscovy, in 1549; but the Cossacks of the 
Dnieper and the Ukraine were long independent; and their first 
connection was with Poland. The Poles affected to consider them 
as vassals, but the wisest Polish rulers were cautious in the 
amount of authority which they attempted to exercise over these 
bold and hardy tribes. The imperious tyranny of other less pru¬ 
dent sovereigns of Poland was met by fierce opposition on the 
part of the Cossacks, who called in their former constant enemies, 
the Tartars, to aid them against their new Polish oppressors. 
Deserted, after some years of warfare, by the Tartars, the Cossacks 
of the Ukraine appealed to the Russian Czar Alexis. Many years 
of chequered and sanguinary hostilities followed, and at last the 
Cossack territory was nominally divided between Russia and 
Poland at the truce of Anclrossan, in 1667. But the Cossacks 
who dwelt near the mouths of the rivers Boug and Dnieper, and 
who were called the Zaporofskian Cossacks, refused to be included 
in the Polish dominions by virtue of that arrangement, and placed 
themselves under the protection of the Czar. In 1670, the 
Cossacks of that part of the Ukraine which had been left under 
Poland, petitioned the Polish Diet for certain privileges, which 
were refused; and a Polish army under Sobieski was sent into 
the Ukraine to coerce the Cossack malcontents. The Cossacks, 
under their Hetman Dorescensko, resisted bravely; but at last 
they determined to seek the protection of the Sublime Porte; and 
Dorescensko, in 1672, presented himself at Constantinople, and 
received a banner with two horse-tails, 1 as Sanjak Bey of the 
Ukraine, which was immediately enrolled among the Ottoman 
provinces. At the same time, the Khan of the Crimea was 
ordered to support the Cossacks, and 6000 Turkish troops were 
marched to the Ukraine. The Poles protested loudly against 

1 Since the time of Amurath III. the governors of the large provinces, or 
Eyalets, received the rank of Vizier, and were Pachas with three horse¬ 
tails. The Sanjak Beys, or governors of the smaller districts, were Pachas 
with two horse-tml3. 


MAHOMET IV. A.D. 1648-1687. 2S7 

these measures. The Czar added his remonstrances, and threatened 
to join Poland in a war against Turkey. The Grand Vizier 
haughtily replied that such threats were empty words and out of 
place, and that the Porte would preserve its determination with 
regard to Poland. A short time previously, another Turkish 
minister had answered similar warnings by boasting, “ God be 
praised, such is the strength of Islam, that the union of Russians 
and Poles matters not to us. Our empire has increased in might 
since its origin; nor have all the Christian kings, that have 
leagued against us, been able to pluck a hair from our beard. 
With God’s grace it shall ever be so, and our empire shall endure 
to the day of judgment.” Kiuprili himself, when the Polish am¬ 
bassador reproached the Turks with injustice in aiding the 
revolted subjects of Poland, replied in a remarkable letter, written 
with his own hand ; in which he states that “ the Cossacks, a free 
people, placed themselves under the Poles, but being unable to 
endure Polish oppression any longer, they have sought protection 
elsewhere, and they are now under the Turkish banner and the 
horse-tails. If the inhabitants of an oppressed country, in order 
to obtain deliverance, implore the aid of a mighty emperor, is it 
prudent to pursue them in such an asylum 1 When the most 
mighty and most glorious of all emperors is seen to deliver and 
succour from their enemies those who are oppressed, and who ask 
him for protection, a wise man will know on which side the blame 
of breaking peace ought to rest. If, in order to quench the fire 
of discord, negotiation is wished for, so let it be. But if the 
solution of differences is referred to that keen and decisive judge, 
called ‘ The Sword,’ the issue of the strife must be pronounced by 
the God, who hath poised upon nothing heaven and earth, and by 
whose aid Islam has for 1000 years triumphed oA^er its foes.” 
This avowal of the principle of intervention in behalf of an 
oppressed people was a bold measure for the prime minister of a 
nation, like the Turkish, which kept so many other nations in 
severe bondage ; it was especially bold in Kiuprili, who at that 
very time was directing the construction of fortresses in the Morea 
to curb the reviving spirit of independence, of which the Greeks 
had given some signs during the recent Venetian war. 

In the Polish campaign of 1672, Sultan Mahomet IV. -was per¬ 
suaded to accompany the powerful army which Kiuprili led to the 
siege of the important city of Kaminiec, in Podolia. Kaminiec 
fell after nine days’ siege (26th August, 1672), and Lemberg 
shared its fate on the 9th of September. The imbecile King of 
Poland, Michael, then made the peace of Bucsacs with the Turks, 


233 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


by which Poland was to cede Podolia and the Ukraine, and pay 
an annual tribute to the Porte of 220,000 ducats. The Sultan 
returned in triumph to Adrianople; but the congratulations which 
were lavished on him as conqueror of the Poles were premature. 
Sobieski and the other chiefs of the Polish nobility determined to 
break the treaty which their King had made. They refused to pay 
the stipulated tribute; and, in 1673, the Grand Vizier made prepara¬ 
tions for renewing the war upon the Poles, and also for attacking 
the Czar of Russia, from whom they had received assistance. The 
Turks marched again into Podolia ; but, on the 11th of November, 
1673, Sobieski, who now led the Poles, surprised the Turkish 
camp near Khoczim, and routed Kiuprili with immense slaughter. 
The Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia had deserted from the 
Turkish to the Polish side with all their contingents; a transfer 
of strength which aided materially in obtaining Sobieski’s victory. 
But Kiuprili’s administrative skill had so re-invigorated the re¬ 
sources of Turkey, that she readily sent fresh forces into the 
Ukraine in the following year. Sobieski with his Poles and the 
Russians (who now took an active part in the war) had the advan¬ 
tage in the campaign of 1674 ; and, in 1675, Sobieski gained one 
of the most brilliant victories of the age over the Turks at Lem¬ 
berg. But the superior strength and steadiness of the Porte and 
Kiuprili in maintaining the war against the discordant govern¬ 
ment of Poland, were felt year after year; and, in 1676, the 
Turkish commander in Podolia, Ibrahim, surnamed Scheitan, that 
is, “Ibrahim the Devil,” made himself completely master of 
Podolia, and attacked Galicia. Sobieski (who was now King of 
Poland) fought gallantly with far inferior forces against Ibrahim 
atZurawna; but was glad to conclude a peace (27th October, 
1676), by which the Turks were to retain Kaminiec and Podolia; 
and by which the Ukraine, with the exception of a few specified 
places, was to be under the sovereignty of the Sultan. 

Three days after the peace of Zurawna, Ahmed Kiuprili died. 
Though his defeats at St. Gothard and Khoczim had fairly given 
rise to an opinion among the Ottoman ranks that their Vizier was 
not born to be a general, his military services to the empire, for 
which he won Candia, Neuhausel, and Kaminiec, were consider¬ 
able ; and no minister ever did more than he accomplished in re¬ 
pressing insurrection and disorder, in maintaining justice and good 
government, and in restoring the financial and military strength 
of his country. He did all this without oppression or cruelty. He 
protected all ranks of the Sultan’s subjects; he was a liberal 
patron of literature and art; he was a warm friend, and a not im- 


MAHOMET IV. A.D L 1648-1687. 2S9 

placable enemy; lie was honourably true to his plighted word 
towards friend or foe, towards small or great: and there is far less 
than the usual amount of Oriental exaggeration in the praises, 
which the Turkish historians bestow upon him, as “ The light and 
splendour of the nation; the conservator and governor of good 
laws; the vicar of the shadow of God; the thrice learned and all- 
accomplished Grand Vizier.” 


19 


290 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


CHAPTER XYI. 

KARA MUSTAPHA VIZIER—UNSUCCESSFUL WAR WITH RUSSIA— 
WAR WITH AUSTRIA—SIEGE OF VIENNA—RESCUE OF THE CITY 
AND COMPLETE OVERTHROW OF THE TURKS BY SOBIESKI— 
HEAVY LOSSES OF THE OTTOMANS—MAHOMET IV. DEPOSED— 
HIS CHARACTER—CHANGE OF THE JANISSARY FORCE—THE 
BARBARESQUE REGENCIES — THE PRETENDED MESSIAH SAB¬ 
BATH AI—MAHOMET IV.’S PATRONAGE OF LITERATURE . 1 

The value of such a minister as Ahmed Kiuprili to Turkey was 
soon proved by the rapid deterioration in her fortunes under his 
successor in the Vizierate, Kara Mustapha, or Black Mustapha: a 
man whose character was in every respect the opposite of Kiuprili’s; 
and who to slender abilities united the wildest ambition and 
almost boundless presumption. He was son-in-law to the Sultan ; 
and by the influence which that marriage gave him, he obtained 
the high office, which he abused to the ruin of his master, and the 
deep disaster of his country. Kara Mustapha’s favourite project 
was a new war against Austria, in which he hoped to Capture 
Vienna, and to make himself the nominal viceroy, but real sove¬ 
reign of ample provinces between the Danube and the Rhine. 
But the first years of his Vizierate were occupied in an inglorious 
war with Russia. That empire had been no party to the late 
peace of Zurawna; and it supported Dorescensko against the Porte, 
when that fickle Cossack grew discontented with the Sultan’s 
authority. Kara Mustapha led a large army into the Ukraine, 
and besieged Cehzrym, but was beaten by the Russians, and flecl 
with ignominy across the Danube. In the following year he re¬ 
sumed the war with fresh forces; and after several alternatives of 
fortune, he stormed Cehzrym on the 21st of August, 1678. But 
the losses which the Turks sustained both from the Russian sword 
and the climate, were severe; and it is said, that even at this 
early period of the wars between the two nations, the Turks 
entertained an instinctive apprehension of the power of the Mus- 

1 Von Hammer, books 57-58. 


MAHOMET IV. A.D. 1648-1687. 291 

covites. 1 A peace was made in 16S1, by which the Porte gave up 
the disputed territory to Russia; and it was stipulated that neither 
power should raise fortifications between the rivers Boug and 
Dniester. Five years afterwards, a territorial arrangement was 
concluded between Poland and Russia, which recognised the 
sovereignty of the Czar over the whole of the Ukraine. 

In 1682, Kara Mustapha commenced his fatal enterprise against 
Vienna. A revolt of the Hungarians under Count Tekeli, against 
Austria, which had been caused by the bigoted tyranny of the 
Emperor Leopold, now laid the heart of that empire open to 
attack; and a force was collected by the Grand Vizier, which, if 
ably handled, might have given the House of Hapsburg its death¬ 
blow. Throughout the autumn of 1682 and the spring of 1683, 
regular and irregular troops, both horse, foot, artillery, and all 
kinds of munitions of war, were collected in the camp at Adria- 
nople on a scale of grandeur that attested and almost exhausted 
the copiousness, which the administration of Kiuprili had given to 
the Turkish resources. The strength of the regular forces, which 
Kara Mustapha led to Vienna, is known from the muster-roll 
which was found in his tent after the siege. It amounted to 
275,000 men. The attendants and camp-followers cannot be 
reckoned; nor can any but an approximate speculation be made 
as to the number of the Tartar and other irregular troops that 
joined the Vizier. It is probable that not less than half a million 
of men were set in motion in this last great aggressive effort of 
the Ottomans against Christendom. The Emperor Leopold had 
neither men nor money sufficient to enable him to confront such 
a deluge of invasion; and, after many abject entreaties, he ob¬ 
tained a promise of help from King Sobieski of Poland, whom he 
had previously treated with contumely and neglect. Poland was 
at peace with Turkey, nor had the Porte in any way failed in 
observance of the recent treaty. But neither Sobieski nor other 
Christian adversaries of the Turks were very scrupulous as to such 
obligations; and the Polish King promised to aid the Austrian 
Emperor with 58,000 men. The Turkish army proceeded along 
the western side of the Danube from Belgrade, and reached Vienna 
without experiencing any serious check, though a gallant resistance 
was made by some of the strong places which it besieged during 
its advance. The city of Vienna was garrisoned by 11,000 men 
under Count' Stahremberg, who proved himself a worthy successor 

1 Thornton, p. 73, citing Spon, whose travels were published in 1678. 

Spon says, ‘ Of all the princes of Christendom, there was none whom the 
Turks so much feared as the Czar of Muscovy.’ ” 

19—2 


2Q2 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


of tlie Count Salm, who had fulfilled the same duty when the city 
was besieged by Sultan Solyman. The second siege of Vienna 
lasted from the 15th July to the 12th September, 1683, during 
which the most devoted heroism was displayed by both the garrison 
and the inhabitants. The numerous artillery of the Turks 
shattered the walls and bastions, and the indefatigable labours of 
their miners were still more effective. The garrison was gradu¬ 
ally wasted by the numerous assaults which it was called on to 
repulse, and in the frequent sorties, by which the Austrian com¬ 
mander sought to impede the progress of the besiegers. Kara 
Mustapha, at the end of August, had it in his power to carry the 
city by storm, if he had thought fit to employ his vast forces in a 
general assault, and to continue it from day to day, as Amurath 
IV. had done when Bagdad fell. But the Vizier kept the Turkish 
troops back out of avarice, in the hope that the city would come 
into his power by capitulation ; in which case he would himself be 
enriched by the wealth of Vienna, which, if the city were taken 
by storm, would become the booty of the soldiery. The Turkish 
army murmured loudly at the mcompetency, the selfishness, and 
the vain confidence of their chief, who took no measures for 
checking the approach of the relieving army that was known to 
be on its march; though the passage of the Danube might easily 
have been guarded against Sobieski by a detachment from the 
immense forces which w T ere at the Grand Vizier’s command. 

Sobieski had been unable to assemble his troops before the end 
of August; and, even then, they only amounted to 20,000 men. 
But he was joined by the Duke of Lorraine and some of the Ger¬ 
man commanders, who were at the head of a considerable armv, 
and the Polish King crossed the Danube at Tulm, above Vienna, 
with about 70,000 men. He then wheeled round behind the 
Ivalemberg Mountains to the north-west of Vienna, with the design 
of taking the besiegers in the rear. The Vizier took no heed of 
him; nor was any opposition made to the progress of the relieving 
army through the difficult country which it was obliged to traverse. 
On the 11th of September the Poles were on the summit of the 
Mount Kalemberg; and “ from this hill,” says the biographer of 
Sobieski, “ the Christians w^ere presented with one of the finest 
and most dreadful prospects of the greatness of human power; an 
immense plain and all the islands of the Danube covered with 
pavilions, whose magnificence seemed rather calculated for an 
encampment of pleasure than the hardships of war; an innumer¬ 
able multitude of horses, camels, and buffaloes ; 2,000,000 men all 
in motion, swarms of Tartars dispersed along the foot of the 


MAHOMET IV . A.D. 1648-1687. 293 

mountain in their usual confusion; the fire of the besiegers in¬ 
cessant and terrible, and that of the besieged such as they could 
contrive to make ; in fine, a great city, distinguishable only by the 
tops of the steeples and the fire and smoke that covered it.” 1 

But Sobieski was well accustomed to the menacing aspect of 
Turkish armies; his eagle glance saw instantly the Viziers want 
of military skill, and the exposure of the long lines of the Ottoman 
camp to a sudden and fatal attack. “This man,” said he, “is 
badly encamped : he knows nothing of war; we shall certainly 
beat him.” And in a letter, sent by him to the Queen of Poland 
on the night before the battle, he wrote these words : “We can 
easily see that the general of an army, who has neither thought of 
intrenching himself nor concentrating his forces, but lies encamped 
as if we were 100 miles from him, is predestined to be beaten.” 

The ground through which Sobieski had to move down from 
the Kalemberg, was broken by ravines; and was so difficult for 
the passage of the troops, that Kara Mustapha might, by an able 
disposition of part of his forces, have long kept the Poles in check, 
especially as Sobieski, in his hasty march, had brought but a small 
part of his artillery to the scene of action. But the Vizier dis¬ 
played the same infatuation and imbecility that had marked 
his conduct throughout the campaign. He at first refused to 
believe that Sobieski and any considerable number of Polish 
troops were on the Kalemberg; and, when at last convinced 
that an attack would be made upon his lines, he long delayed 
the necessary order for the occupation of the hollow ways, through 
which alone the Poles could debouch from the slopes of the high 
ground which they had gained. Unwilling to resign Vienna, 
Mustapha left the chief part of his Janissary force in the trenches 
before the city, and led the rest of his army towards the 
hills, down which Sobieski and his troops were advancing. 
In some parts of the field, where the Turks had partially in¬ 
trenched the roads, their resistance to the Christians was ob¬ 
stinate; but Sobieski led on his best troops in person in a 
direct line for the Ottoman centre, where the Vizier’s tent was 
conspicuous; and the terrible presence of the victor of Khoczim 
was soon recognised. “ By Allah ! the King is really among us,” 
exclaimed the Khan of the Crimea, Selim Ghirai; and turned his 
horse’s head for flight. The mass of the Ottoman army broke and 
fled in hopeless rout, hurrying Kara Mustapha with them from 
the field. The Janissaries, who had been left in the trenches 
before the city, were now attacked both by the garrison and the 

1 Coyer, “Memoir of Sobieski.” 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


294 

Poles, and were cut to pieces. The camp, the whole artillery, and 
the military stores of the Ottomans became the spoil of the con¬ 
querors ; and never was there a victory more complete, or signal¬ 
ised by more splendid trophies. The Turks continued their panic 
flight as far as Raab. There Kara Mustapha collected round him 
some of the wrecks of the magnificent army which had followed 
him to Vienna. He sought to vent his fury by executing some of 
the best Turkish officers, who had differed from him during the 
campaign. His own fate, when he was executed by the Sultan’s 
orders a few weeks afterwards at Belgrade, excited neither surprise 
nor pity. 

The great destruction of the Turks before Vienna was raptur¬ 
ously hailed throughout Christendom as the announcement of the 
approaching downfall of the Mahometan Empire in Europe. The 
Russians and the Venetians declared war against the Porte ; and 
Turkey was now assailed on almost every point of her European 
frontiers. The new Grand Vizier Ibrahim strove hard to recruit 
the armies, and supply the deficiency in the magazines, which the 
fatal campaign ol his predecessor had occasioned. But city after 
city was now rent rapidly away from Islam by the exulting and 
advancing Christians. The Imperialist armies, led by the Duke 
of Lorraine, captured Gran, Neuhausel, Ofen, Szegedin, and nearly 
all the strong places which the Turks had held in Hungary. The 
Venetians were almost equally successful on the Dalmatian 
frontier ; and the Republic of St. Mark now landed its troops in 
Greece, under Morosini, who rapidly made himself master of 
Coron, Navarino, Nauplia, Corinth, Athens, and other chief cities 
of that important part of the Turkish Empire. In Poland the war 
was waged less vigorously; nor did the Turks yet relinquish their 
hold on Kaminiec. But a great defeat which the main Ottoman 
army sustained on the 12th August, 1687, at Mohacz (on the very 
scene ot Solyman’s ancient glory), excited the discontents of the 
soldiery into insurrection against the Sultan, and on the 8th of 
November, in that year, Mahomet IV. was deposed, in the forty- 
sixth year of his age, and thirty-eighth of his reign. 

It had been the good fortune of this prince to have able Grand 
Viziers during a considerable part of his reign; but he chose his 
ministers from female influence or personal favouritism, not from 
discernment of merit, as was proved when he intrusted power to 
Kara Mustapha, who did more to ruin the Ottoman Empire than 
any other individual that is mentioned in its history. Mahomet 
IV. reigned without ruling. His mind was entirely absorbed by 
bis infatuation for the chase ; and the common people believed 


MAHOMET IV. A.D. 1648-1687. 295 

that lie was under a curse, laid on him by his father, Sultan 
Ibrahim, who had been put to death when Mahomet was placed 
on the throne, and who was said to have prayed in his last 
moments that his son might lead the wandering life of a beast of 
prey. Though not personally cruel, Mahomet IV. as soon as 
heirs were born to him, sought anxiously to secure himself on the 
throne by the customary murder of his brothers. They were 
saved from him by the exertions of the Sultana Valide and his 
ministers; but he often resumed the unnatural design. His 
mother, the Sultana Valide Tarkhan, was determined at even the 
risk of her own life to shelter her two younger sons from being 
slaughtered for the further security of the elder ; and she took at 
last the precaution of placing the two young princes in an inner 
room of the palace, which could only be reached by passing 
through her own apartments. Even there one night the Sultan 
himself entered with a dagger in his hand, and was gliding through 
to the chamber where his brothers lay. Two pages watched near 
the Sultana Valide; they dared not speak in the presence of the 
imperial man-slayer, but one of them touched her and awakened 
her. The mother sprang from sleep, and, clinging round the 
Sultan, implored him to strike her dead before he raised his hand 
to shed his brothers’ blood. Mahomet, accustomed to yield to 
the superior spirit of the Valide, renounced for the time his 
scheme of fratricide, and retired to his apartment; but on the 
morrow he put to death the two slaves who had hindered him 
from effecting the murderous project which he wished to have 
accomplished, but which he wanted nerve to renew. Timidly 
vindictive, and selfishly rather than constitutionally cruel, Ma¬ 
homet continued to long for the death of his brothers, though he 
hesitated to strike. And when he was at last deposed to make 
room for his brother Solyman on the throne, he may have re¬ 
gretted that his infirmity of purpose had spared the fated rival, 
whom an adherence to the old fratricidal canon of the House of 
Othman would have removed for ever from his path. 

In the reign of Mahomet IV. another innovation on the ancient 
stern institutions of the empire was completed, which also was 
probably caused as much by weakness as by humanity. It was in 
1675, in the last year of the Vizierate of Ahmed Kiuprili, that the 
final levy of 3000 boys for the recruiting of the Turkish army 
was made on the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire in 
Europe. The old system of filling the ranks of the Janissaries 
exclusively with compulsory conscripts and converts from among 
the children of the Rayas, had been less and less rigidly enforced 


296 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

since the time of Amurath IV . 1 Admission into the corps of 
Janissaries now conferred many civil as well as military advan¬ 
tages ; so that it was eagerly sought by men who were of Turkish 
origin, and born to the Mahometan faith. The first measure of 
relaxation of the old rule was to treat those, who were the children 
of Janissaries, as eligible candidates for enrolment. Other Mussul¬ 
man volunteers were soon received ; and the levies of the tribute 
of children from the Christians grew less frequent and less severe; 
though they were still occasionally resorted to in order to supply 
the thousands of pages, who were required to people the vast 
chambers of the Serail, and who were in case of emergency drafted 
into the army of the state. But ever since the year 1675, the 
Rayas of the empire have been entirely free from the terrible tax 
of flesh and blood, by which the Ottoman military force was sus¬ 
tained during its early centuries of conquest. With this change 
in the constitution of the corps of Janissaries, the numbers of that 
force were greatly increased : large bodies of them were now 
settled with their families in the chief cities of the empire, where 
they engaged in different trades and occupations. 

Though still able to contend at sea with such an enemy as 
Venice, the Sublime Porte had seen a still greater decline take 
place in its naval power than in its military, compared with the 
state of its fleets and armies in the days of the great Solyman. 
This was principally caused by the progress of carelessness and 
corruption in the navy-boards and arsenals at Constantinople ; but 
much of it was due to the Sultan’s losing that firm hold on the 
resources of the Mahometan powers of North Africa, which his 
great ancestor possessed, when Barbarossa and Dragut executed 
his bidding with the fleets of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers. 

The Barbaresque Regencies had in the middle of the seventeenth 
century become practically independent states. They sometimes 
sent naval succour to the Porte in its wars; but this was done 
rather in a spirit of voluntary goodwill and recognition of com¬ 
munity of creed and origin, similar to that which formerly made 
Carthage give occasional aid to Tyre, than out of the obedient 
subordination of provincial governments to central authority. 
The strength and audacity of these piratical states, especially of 
Algiers, had so increased, that not only did their squadrons ravage 
the Christian coasts of the Mediterranean, but their cruisers 

1 There is some difficulty in reconciling the various dates assigned to the 
discontinuance of the recruiting the Janissaries by enrolments of Christian 
children. The change was most probably gradual. See Von Hammer, vol. i. 
p. SS; vol. iii. pp. 6GS, 680. 


MAHOMET IV. A.D. 1648 - 1687 . 297 

carried on their depredations beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, both 
northward and southward in the Atlantic. They pillaged the 
island of Madeira; they infested the western parts of the English 
Channel and the Irish Sea for many years; and the Algerine 
rovers more than once landed in Ireland, and sacked towns and 
villages, and carried off captives into slavery . 1 They even ventured 
as far as Iceland and Scandinavia, as if in retaliation for the 
exploits of the old Norse Sea-Kings in the Mediterranean seven 
centuries before. Algiers had a marine force comprising, besides 
light galleys, more than forty well-built and well-equipped ships, 
each manned by from 300 to 400 corsairs, and mounting from 
forty to fifty guns. The number of Christians who toiled in 
slavery in the dockyards and arsenals at Algiers or at the oar in 
her fleets, fluctuated from between 10,000 to 20 , 000 . Tunis and 
Tripoli had their fleets and their slaves, though on a smaller scale. 
Our Admiral Blake tamed the savage pride of these barbarians 
in 1655. He awed the Dey of Algiers into the surrender of all 
his English prisoners; and when the Dey of Tunis refused to do 
the same, Blake burnt the pirate fleet under the guns of the towm. 
destroyed the forts, and compelled obedience to his demands. 
The Dutch admiral De Buyter, and the French admiral De Beau¬ 
fort also at different times punished the insolence of the Barbary 
corsairs; but their outrages and cruelties were never entirely 
quelled till Lord Exmouth’s bombardment of Algiers in the pre¬ 
sent century. In 1663 England concluded a treaty with Algiers 
and the Porte, by which she was to be at liberty to chastise the 
Algerines, when they broke their engagements, without its being 
considered a breach of amity between England and Turkey. The 
rulers of the Barbaresque States styled themselves Dahis or Deys. 
According to some authorities, the Algerine chiefs termed them¬ 
selves Deys as delegates of the Sultan. According to others, the 
title came from the old Asiatic word Dahi, which signified a supe¬ 
rior, even at the time of the ancient republic of Mecca, and after¬ 
wards among the Ishmaelites. They were elected by the military 
body, consisting of the descendants of the Janissaries and others 
of Turkish race. They used to apply to the Sultan for his firman 
appointing them Pachas, and confirming their election; but this 
Boon became a mere formality. 

The contests between the Greeks and the Christians of the 

1 See the Autobiographical Memoir of Robert Boyle; and see Sir 
John Eliot’s letters cited in Forster’s “Life of Eliot,” vol. i. p. 317. A 
tradition of these scenes was versified in the fine ballad in the “Songs of 
the Nation,” of “ Hackett of Dungarvan who steered the Algerine.” 


298 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Latin Church in Jerusalem raged furiously during Mahomet IV. ’s 
reign. But the Ottomans of that age watched with far stronger 
interest the agitation caused among the Jewish nation by the 
celebrated Sabbathai Levi, who in 1666 came forward at Jeru¬ 
salem, and asserted that he was the Messiah. Under that title he 
sent circular letters to all the Jewish synagogues of the Ottoman 
Empire; and such was his dexterous audacity in imposition, so 
eagerly were the legends respecting his miraculous powers received, 
that thousands of his countrymen flocked together at his bidding, 
not only from Constantinople, Smyrna, and other Turkish cities, 
but from Germany, Leghorn, Venice, and Amsterdam. Some of 
the Babbis opposed him; and the most violent tumults were 
raised at Jerusalem, Cairo, Smyrna, and other cities of the East, 
where Sabbathai proclaimed his pretended mission. The Otto¬ 
mans observed his progress with religious anxiety; not from any 
belief in his alleged character, but on the contrary, from the fear 
that he was the Dedjal or Antichrist, who, according to the 
Mahometan creed, is to appear among mankind in the last days of 
the world. They believe also that the speedy advent of the Day 
of Judgment is to be announced by the reappearance on earth of 
the prophet Mehdi. And, as at the same time at which Sabbathai 
came forward in Palestine, another religious impostor arose in 
Kurdistan, who called himself the prophet Mehdi, and excited 
thousands of Kurds to follow him, the alarm of many orthodox 
Moslems at these combined signs of the end of the world was 
extreme. The Vizier Ahmed Kiuprili, in order to check the 
troubles caused by Sabbathai, seized and imprisoned him: but his 
fanatic followers only saw in this the certain prelude to their 
Messiah’s triumph. They said that according to an ancient pro¬ 
phecy Messiah was to disappear for nine months, and was then to 
return mounted on a lioness, which he was to guide with a bridle 
made of seven-headed serpents; and then he was to be lord of the 
world. But one of Sabbathai’s countrymen, who was jealous of 
his influence, denounced him before the Sultan’s ministers as 
endeavouring to raise a revolt among the people. Sabbathai was 
brought before the Sultan for examination; and Mahomet then 
made him the characteristic offer of an opportunity of proving by 
a miracle his right to be acknowledged the Messiah. One of the 
Sultan’s best archers was called forward, and Sabbathai was 
invited to stand steady as a mark for the arrows, which of course 
could do no harm to a personage gifted with miraculous powers; 
only the Sultan wished to see them bound back from off his body. 
At these words, and the sight of the bended bow, Sabbathai’s 


•» s 


299 


MAHOMET IV. A.D. 1648 - 1687 . 

courage failed him. He fell prostrate, and owned that he was 
nothing but a poor Rabbi, and no whit different from other men. 
The Sultan then offered to allow him to embrace the Mahometan 
faith, and so make some amends for the scandal which he had caused, 
and for the crime of high treason which he had committed by 
assuming the title of Messiah of Palestine, which was one of the San- 
jaks of the Sublime Porte. Sabbathai eagerly accepted the pro¬ 
posal. He became a Moslem ; and instead of being worshipped as 
Messiah or dreaded as Antichrist, he filled for ten years the 
respectable but prosaic station of a doorkeeper in the Sultan’s 
palace. He, however, still made himself conspicuous by his reli¬ 
gious zeal; but that zeal was now directed to winning converts 
from Judaism to Mahometanism, in which he was singularly suc¬ 
cessful. He was ultimately banished to the Morea, where he died. 1 
The Kurdish spiritual pretender, the self-styled Mehdi, was cap¬ 
tured by the Governor of Moussul and sent before the Sultan, a 
few months after Sabbathai had owned his imposture in the royal 
presence. The young Kurd abandoned the character of Precursor 
of the Last Judgment, as soon as he was led before his sovereign. 
He answered his interrogators with sense and spirit; and his life 
also was spared. The Jewish Antichrist was serving the Sultan 
as a doorkeeper, and the Kurdish Mehdi was made his fellow- 
servant, in the capacity of one of the pages of the treasure- 
chamber of the palace. 

Although his immoderate fondness for hunting made Ma¬ 
homet IV. habitually neglect the duties of government, he was 
never indifferent to literary pursuits; and he showed an heredi¬ 
tary fondness for the society of learned men. His patronage of 
the chase and his patronage of letters were sometimes strangely 
blended. Pie was liberal in his encouragement of historical 
writers, especially of such as professed to record the current 
history of his own reign. He loved to see them at his court; he 
corrected their works with his own pen ; but he expected that 
each royal hunting should be chronicled by them with sportsman¬ 
like minuteness, and that the death of each wild beast, which was 
slain by the Sultan’s hand, should be portrayed with poetic 
fervour. A despotic patron is dangerous to the life of the author, 
as well as to the vitality of his works. The Turkish historian 
Abdi -was one whom Sultan Mahomet IY. delighted to honour. 

1 According to the graphic sketch of the career of Sabbathai by the late 
Dean of St. Paul’s, some of the Jews continued to believe in him notwith¬ 
standing his apostasy and death, and “ Sabbathaism still exists as a sect of 
Judaism.”—Milman’s “ History of the Jews,” vol. hi. p. 203. 


300 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

The Sultan kept him always near his person, and charged him 
with the special duty of writing the annals of his reign. One 
evening Mahomet asked of him, “ What hast thou written 
to-day V* Abdi incautiously answered that nothing sufficiently 
remarkable to write about had happened that day. The Sultan 
darted a hunting-spear at the unobservant companion of royalty, 
wounded him sharply, and exclaimed, 11 Now thou hast something 
to write about.” 1 


1 Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 571 , cites this from Abdi’s own book. 


SOLYMAN II. A.D . 1687-1691,' 


301 

* • • . -■ 


CHAPTER XVII. 

SOLYMAN IT.—INSURRECTIONS AND DEFEATS—SUCCESSES AGAINST 
RUSSIA—KIUPRILI-ZADE MUSTAPHA MADE GRAND VIZIER—HIS 
CHARACTER AND MEASURES—WISE POLICY TO THE RAYAS— 
SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN—DEATH OF SOLYMAN II.—AHMED II. 
SULTAN—KIUPRILI DEFEATED AND KILLED AT SALANKEMAN 
—DISASTROUS REIGN OF AHMED II.—MUSTAPHA II. SUCCEEDS, 
AND HEADS THE ARMIES—VICTORIOUS AT FIRST, BUT DE¬ 
FEATED BY EUGENE AT ZENTA — HUSEIN KIUPRILI GRAND 
VIZIER—CONQUESTS OF PETER THE GREAT OF RUSSIA OVER 
THE TURKS—AZOPH TAKEN—NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE—TREATY 
OF CARLOWITZ . 1 

Solyman II. when raised to the throne of the Ottoman Empire in 
1687, had lived for forty-five years in compulsory seclusion, and in 
almost daily peril of death. Yet, as sovereign, he showed more 
capacity and courage than the brother whom he succeeded ; and, 
perhaps, if he had been made Sultan at an earlier period, Turkey 
might have escaped that shipwreck of her state, which came on 
her after the death of her great minister Ahmed Kiuprili, through 
the weakness of Sultan Mahomet IV. and the misconduct of his 
favourite Vizier Kara Mustapha, the originator of the fatal march 
upon Vienna. Solyman despised the idle sports and debasing 
sensuality of his predecessors, and earnestly devoted himself to 
the task of re-organising the military power of his empire, and of 
stemming, if possible, the progress of defeat and disaster. But 
he was unable to control the excesses of the mutinous Janissaries, 
who, throughout the winter which followed Solyman’s accession, 
filled Constantinople with riot and slaughter, and compelled the 
appointment and displacement of ministers according to their 
lawless will. At length this savage soldiery resolved to pillage 
the palaces of the Grand Vizier and the other chief dignitaries. 
The Vizier, Siavoush Pacha, defended his bouse bravely against 
the brigands, who were joined by the worst rabble of the capital, 

1 See Von Hammer, books 58, et eeq> 



HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


302 

Jewish and Christian, as well as Mahometan. On the second day 
of the insurrection they forced the gate of the house, and rushed 
in, slaying and spoiling all that they met with. Siavoush Pacha, 
with a few of his surviving servants round him, made a last 
attempt to defend the entrance to the harem, that sanctuary of 
Moslems, which the rebels now assailed, regardless alike of every 
restraint of law, of creed, of national and of private honour. 
More than a hundred of the wretches were slain before the re¬ 
sistance of the brave man of the house was overcome, and 
Siavoush fell dead on the threshold of his harem, fighting bravely 
to the last gasp. The worst outrages and abominations were now 
practised by the rebels ; and the sister of the slain Vizier, and his 
wife (the daughter of Mohammed Kiuprili), were cruelly muti¬ 
lated and dragged naked through the streets of Constantinople. 
The horror and indignation which these atrocities inspired, and 
the instinct of self-preservation, roused the mass of the inhabi¬ 
tants to resist the brigands, who were proceeding to the sack of 
other mansions, and to the plunder of the shops and bazaars. 
The chief Preacher of the Mosque of the Great Solyman, and 
other members of the Ulema, exerted themselves with energy 
and success to animate the well-affected citizens, and to raise a 
feeling of shame among the ranks of the Janissaries; many of 
whom had been led away by temporary excitement and the evil 
example of the ruffians, who had joined them from out of the 
very dregs of the populace. The Sacred Standard of the Prophet 
was displayed over the centre gate of the Sultan’s palace, and the 
true believers hastened to rally round the holy symbol of loyalty 
to their Prophet’s Vicar on earth. The chief pillagers and 
assassins in the late riot were seized and executed. The Mufti 
and three other principal Ulema, who had shown a disposition to 
obey the mutinous Janissaries, were deposed; and men of more 
integrity and spirit were appointed in their places. Some degree 
of order was thus restored to the capital; but the spirit of in¬ 
subordination and violence was ever ready to break out; and the 
provinces were convulsed with revolt and tumult. It was not 
until the end of June, 1688, that the Sultan was able to complete 
the equipment of an army, which then marched towards the 
Hungarian frontier. 

The Austrians and their allies had profited vigorously by the 
disorders of the Turkish state, and had continued to deal blow 
after blow with fatal effect. Three generals of the highest mili¬ 
tary renown, Charles of Lorraine, Louis of Baden, and Prince 
Eugene, now directed the Imperialist armies against the dis- 


SOLYMAN II. A.D. 1687-1691. 303 

couraged and discordant Ottomans. The important city of Erlau 
in Hungary surrendered on the 14th of December, 1687, and came 
again into the dominion of its ancient rulers, after having been 
for a century under Mahometan sway. Gradiska, on the Bosnian 
frontier, was captured by Prince Louis of Baden. Stuhweissen- 
berg was invested ; and, as the Turks had abandoned Block and 
Peterwaradin, the route to Belgrade lay open to the Austrian 
armies. A Turkish general named Yegen Osman was ordered to 
protect Belgrade ; but he was cowardly or treacherous ; and, as the 
Imperialists advanced, he retreated from Belgrade, after setting 
lire to the city. The Austrian troops, following close upon the 
retiring Turks, extinguished the flames, and laid siege to the 
citadel, which surrendered after a bombardment of twenty-one 
days, on the 20th of August, 1688. Stuhweissenberg was stormed 
on the 6th of September; and Yegen Osman fired Semendra, 
and abandoned it to the advancing Christians. Prince Louis 
destroyed a Turkish army in Bosnia; and city after city yielded 
to the various Austrian generals who commanded in that province 
and in Transylvania, and to the Venetian leaders in Dalmatia. 
The campaign of the next year in these regions was almost 
equally disastrous to Turkey. The Sultan announced his inten¬ 
tion of leading the Ottoman armies in person; and proceeded as 
far as the city of Sofia. Part of the Turkish forces were posted 
in advance at the city of Nissa, and were attacked there and 
utterly defeated by the Imperialists under Prince Louis of Baden. 
Nissa, evacuated by the Turks, was occupied by the conquerors. 
On the tidings of this defeat reaching the Turkish head-quarters 
at Sofia, the Sultan, in alarm, retreated within the mountain range 
of the Balkan to the city of Philippopolis. Florentin, Fethislam, 
and Widdin, next fell into the power of the Imperialists; and 
before the close of the year 1689, Great Waradein and Temeswar 
were all that the Ottomans retained of their late extensive pro¬ 
vinces north of the Danube; while even to the south of that 
river the best portions of Bosnia and Servia were occupied by the 
victorious Austrians. 

In the southern parts of European Turkey, the fortune of the 
war was equally unfavourable to Sultan Solyman. Morosini, one 
of the greatest generals that the Republic of St. Mark ever pro¬ 
duced, completed the conquest of the Morea, which he divided 
into four Venetian provinces. It was only against the Poles and 
the Russians that the Turks and their Tartar allies obtained any 
advantages. A large Tartar force from the Crimea, led by Azmet 
Ghirai, overran part of Poland in 1688 3 reinforced the Tartar 


504 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

garrison in Kaminiec, and defeated the Poles on the Sireth. The 
Russian general Galitzin attempted to invade the Crimea. He 
obtained some advantages over part of the Tartar forces, but when 
he advanced towards the Isthmus of Perekop, in the autumn 
of 1688, he found that the retreating Tartars had set fire to the 
dry grass of the steppes, and reduced the country to a desert, 
from which he was obliged to retire. And, in 1689, -when the 
Russians again advanced to the Isthmus, they were completely 
defeated by the Ottoman troops, that had taken post there to 
guard the Crimea. But these gleams of success could not dissi¬ 
pate the terror which the disasters in Hungary and Greece had 
spread among the Turkish nation. Only seven years had passed 
away since their magnificent host, under the fatal guidance of 
Kara Mustapha, had marched forth across the then far-extended 
north-western frontier, with the proud boast that it would sack 
Vienna and blot out Austria from among the kingdoms of the 
earth. Now, the Austrians, and their confederates the lately 
despised Venetians, the conquered of Candia, held victorious pos¬ 
session of half the European Empire of the House of Otliman. 
For the first time since the days of Hunyades, the Balkan was 
menaced by Christian invaders ; and at sea the Turkish flag, the 
flag of Khaireddin, Piale, and Kilidj Ali, was now swept from the 
Mediterranean. Seldom had there been a war, in which the effect 
that can be produced on the destinies of nations by the appearance 
or the absence of individual great men, was more signally proved. 
On the Christian side, Sobieski, Eugene, Louis of Baden, the 
Prince of Lorraine, and Morosini had commanded fortune ; while 
among the Turks, no single man of mark had either headed 
armies, or directed councils. Yet the Ottoman nation was not 
exhausted of brave and able spirits: and at length adversity 
cleared the path of dignity for merit. 

In the November of 1689, the Sultan convened an extraordinary 
Divan at Adrianople, and besought his councillors to advise him 
as to what hands he should intrust with the management of the 
state. In the hour of extreme peril the jealous spirit of intrigue 
and self-advancement was silent; and all around Solyman II. 
advised him to send for Kiuprili-Zade-Mustapha, brother of the 
great Ahmed Kiuprili, and to give the seals of office to him as 
Grand Vizier of the Empire. 

Kiuprili-Zade-Mustapha, at the time when he assumed this high 
dignity, was fifty-two years of age. He had been trained in 
statesmanship during the vizierates of his father and brother, 
Mohammed and Ahmed Kiuprili: and it was expected and hoped, 


SOLYMAN II. A.D. 1687 - 1691 . 305 

on the death of Ahmed in 1676, that Sultan Mahomet IY. would 
place the seals in the hands of Kiuprili-Zacle. Unhappily for the 
Ottoman nation, that Sultan’s partiality for his own son-in-law 
prevailed ; nor was it until after thirteen years of misgovernment 
and calamity had nearly destroyed the empire, that the third 
Kiuprili succeeded his father and brother, as director of the 
councils, and leader of the armies of Turkey. 

His authority was greatly increased by the deserved reputation 
which he enjoyed of being a strict observer of the Mahometan 
law, and an uncompromising enemy to profligacy and corruption. 
After having paid homage to the Sultan on his appointment, he 
summoned to the Divan all the great dignitaries of the empire, and 
addressed them on the state of the country. He reminded them 
in severe terms of their duties as Moslems, of their sins; and he 
told them that they were now undergoing the deserved chastise¬ 
ment of God. He described to them the extreme peril in which 
the empire was placed. “ If we go on thus,” said he, “ another 
campaign will see the enemy encamped beneath the walls of Con¬ 
stantinople.” He then pointed out to them how they ought to 
act as true believers ; and bade them take heart, and be courageous 
in the defence of their country, however hardly they might find 
themselves pressed. Kiuprili abolished some imposts introduced 
by his predecessor, which produced little to the state, while they 
were peculiarly vexatious to the subject; but he sought to fill the 
exhausted treasury by exacting heavy contributions from all the 
late officials who had enriched themselves at the public expense. 
All the superfluous gold and silver vessels of the palace were sent 
to the mint to be coined into money for the military chest. And 
Kiuprili set the example to the other chief men of the state of 
aiding the public cause by similar contributions. He gave up the 
whole of his plate; and the Grand Vizier’s table was served 
thenceforth with vessels of copper. Funds for the immediate 
prosecution of the war were thus obtained ; and the belief of the 
Turks in the ability and in the holiness of the new Vizier brought 
recruits rapidly to the army, which was collected near the capital. 
Kiuprili called out all the veterans who had been discharged and 
pensioned, and he distributed them among the new levies. He 
plac’ed governors, on whom he could rely, in the most important 
pachalics. He sought also fit men and measures for the revival of 
the Turkish marine. Mizirli-Zade-Ibrahim, who had distinguished 
himself in the defence of Negropont against the Venetians, was 
raised to the chief naval command in the Mediterranean; and 

20 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


306 

another bold and skilful officer, Mezzomorto, was commissioned 
to form and lead a flotilla on the Danube. 

But the highest merit of Kiuprili-Zade-Mustapha is, that he had 
the wisdom to recognise the necessity of the Sublime Porte 
strengthening itself by winning the loyal affections of its Christian 
subjects. Although he was so earnest a believer in Islam, and so 
exemplary in his obedience to its precepts, that he was venerated 
by his contemporaries as a saint, he did not suffer bigotry to 
blind him to the fact, that cruelty to the Rayas must hasten the 
downfall of the Ottoman Empire. He saw that the Christian 
invaders of Turkey found everywhere sympathy and recruits 
among the populations of the land. The Christian Albanians 
were enrolling themselves under the banner of Venice; the Ser¬ 
vians were rising to aid the Emperor of Austria; and in Greece 
the victorious progress of Morosini had been aided by the readi¬ 
ness with which the village municipalities and the mountain tribes 
placed themselves under his authority, and by the strenuous sup¬ 
port which bands of Christian volunteers gave him, in beleaguering 
the fortresses held by the Turks. 1 Kiuprili-Zade was not content 
with judging correctly : he took prompt practical measures to 
check the evils which he was swift to discern. One of the first 
acts of his vizierate was to despatch the most explicit and impera¬ 
tive orders to all the Pachas, that no Turkish officer should exer¬ 
cise or permit any kind of oppression towards the Rayas ; and that 
no payment should be required of them except the Capitation Tax. 
For the purposes of this tax, Kiuprili divided the Rayas into three 
classes, according to their incomes. The first or wealthiest paid 
four ducats, the middle class two ducats, and the lowest one ducat 
a head. This institution was called the Nizami Djiclid, the New 
Order. Kiuprili also took the bold and sagacious step of making 
a Mainote Greek Bey of Maina. This was Liberius Geratschari, 
who had passed seven years as a Turkish galley-slave. lie was 
now set at liberty, and sent to the Morea to support the Turkish 
interest among his countrymen against that of the Venetians, who 
had begun to alienate the Greek Rayas from their side by impolitic 
government. Von Hammer remarks that Kiuprili-Zade showed 
himself in this measure to be superior as a politician, both to his 
brother Ahmed, who had sought, in the former Venetian war, to 
curb the rising disaffection in the Morea by fortified posts and 
garrisons; and also to the subsequent Grand Viziers, who, when 
it was proposed to make the Morea a principality like Moldavia 

1 Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 841. Emerson Tennant’s “Greece,” vol. i. p. 
218 et seq. 


SO LYMAN II. A.D. 1687-1691. 307 

and Wallachia, and govern it by native Christians, rejected the 
scheme as derogatory to the dignity of the Sublime Porte. 1 Kiu- 
prili had even the enlightened spirit to despise the old dogmas of 
Turkish Muftis and judges, according to which the Rayas were 
allowed only such churches as they already possessed, but were 
strictly forbidden to enlarge them, or to build new places of wor¬ 
ship. Kiuprili sanctioned the foundation of a Greek Church 
wherever it was desired; and thereby became the founder of 
thriving villages, which sprang up in districts where there had 
been previously only scanty bands of suffering and disaffected out¬ 
casts. Once, in passing through part of Servia, Kiuprili halted 
for the night in a wretched hamlet of Rayas, who had neither 
edifice nor minister of religion. Kiuprili ordered that a church 
should be built there, and that a Christian priest should be sent 
for to serve it. In return for this boon, which filled the poor 
peasants with rapturous gratitude, Kiuprili required of them, that 
each head of a family should bring him a fowl, whenever he passed 
through the village. Fifty-three fowls were immediately brought 
to him; that being the number of families. In the next (and, 
unhappily for the Rayas, the last) year of his vizierate, Kiuprili 
passed through the sane place. He received a hundred and 
twenty-five fowls from the heads of the happy population, which 
flocked together with their Greek priest at their head to welcome 
the benevolent Vizier. “ Look,” said Kiuprili to the staff of 
Turkish officers round him, “ Look at the fruits of toleration. I 
have increased the Sultan’s power; and I have brought blessings 
on his government from those who were wont to curse it.” 2 The 
Greeks of the empire used to say that Kiuprili founded more 
churches than Justinian. Had subsequent Turkish ministers 
imitated Kiuprili-Zade Mustafa in their policy towards the Chris¬ 
tian population of Turkey, the Ottoman Empire would now com¬ 
mand far ampler resources, than it can derive from the unaided 
valour and loyalty of its Moslem inhabitants; and the most 
serious sources of its internal weakness would long ago have been 
removed. 

Besides the glory of having, while sincerely religious, practised 
religious toleration, the third Kiuprili deserves honourable mention 
for his recognition of the great principle of political economy, that 
(with very few and very peculiar exceptions) trade between man 
and man ought to be free from all state interference. When 
pressed by one of his advisers to frame regulations for purchases 

1 Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. S41. 

2 Ubicini, vol. ii. p. 55, citing Cantemir. 


308 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

and sales, Kiuprili-Zade replied, “ The Koran prescribes nothing 
on the subject. Purchase and sale ought to be left to the free 
will of the contracting parties .” 1 

Kiuprili-Zade Mustapha is termed by Ottoman historians Kim 
prili Fazyl, which means “ Kiuprili the Virtuous.” They say of 
him, as his higln s’; praise, that he never committed a crime, and 
that he never used an unnecessary word. They record as an 
instance of his eminence in taciturnity, that once, while Grand 
Vizier, he received a ceremonial visit from three of the Ulema, who 
had formerly held the offices of army judges. Kiuprili let them 
depart without having addressed a syllable to them. His old 
Master of Requests, Nigahi Effendi, said to him, “ My gracious 
lord, you should have spoken something to them.” “ I am not a 
hypocrite,” answered Kiuprili. He was austerely simple in all 
his habits. In his campaigns he generally marched on foot, like 
the rank and file of the infantry. He disliked military music. He 
seldom moved his quarters before sunset. Amid the pomp and 
splendour of the Turkish court and camp the Grand Vizier was 
distinguishable by the plainness of his dress. He was an inde¬ 
fatigable student, and read diligently in his tent, when on active 
service, as well as in his palace when at Constantinople. 

Such are some of the praises by which his country’s historians 
signalise Kiuprili-Zade Mustapha. The renown for statesmanship 
acquired by him, and which Christian writers have concurred with 
Mahometan in bestowing, is the more remarkable, by reason of 
the shortness of the period permitted to him for the display of his 
administrative genius. He was killed in battle within two years 
from the time when the seals of office were placed in his hands. 
His contemporaries judged of him, as of his brother Ahmed, that 
he shone more in the council than in the field. But the military 
career of Kiuprili-Zade was highly honourable to his abilities as 
well as to his courage; and, though ultimately defeated, he gained 
a respite of infinite importance for the Ottoman Empire, by the 
successes which he at first obtained. When he was made Grand 
Vizier, one of the invading armies of the enemy had advanced as 
far as Ouskoup, in northern Macedonia, where it was actively 
aided by the Christian Albanians and their Patriarch. A chief¬ 
tain of those regions, named Karpos, had accepted a diploma of 
investiture from the Austrian Emperor, and, assuming the old title 
of Krai, had fortified himself in Egri-Palanka. It was indispens¬ 
able to relieve Turkey at once from the foes, who thus struck at 
the very heart of her power in Europe. Kiuprili held a council 

1 Von Hammer, vol. iii. p. 819. 


SOLYMAN II. A.D. 1687-1691. 309 

of war at Adrianople, at which Selim Ghirai, the Khan of the 
Crimea, and Tekeli, the Hungarian refugee, were present. Khodja 
Khalid Pacha, the Seraskier of the Morea, a native of Ouskoup, 
was sent with all the regular Turkish troops that could be col¬ 
lected, against that place. The Crimean Khan, at the head of a 
large Tartar force, co-operated with him. They gained two vic¬ 
tories over the combined bodies of Germans, Hungarians, and 
Albanians, who had assumed the old mediaeval badge of the cross. 
The chieftain Karpos was seized by the Tartars and executed on 
the bridge of Ouskoup. Nearly all the important posts which the 
invaders and their insurgent confederates had occupied in those 
districts, were recovered by the Sultan’s troops, and the pressure 
on this vital part of the empire was almost entirely removed. 
Encouraged by these successes, Kiuprili pushed forward with the 
greatest vigour his armaments for the next campaign. Louis XIV., 
who was at war with the German Empire, sent in the winter of 
1680 a new ambassador, the Marquis de Chateunef, to Constanti¬ 
nople, to encourage the Turks to persevere in hostilities against 
Austria. Chateunef was also ordered to negotiate, if possible, a 
peace between Turkey and Poland, to prevent the recognition of 
William of Orange as King of England by the Sublime Porte, 
and to regain for the Catholics in Palestine the custody of the 
Holy Sepulchre, which the Greek Patriarch had lately* won from 
them. Chateunef obtained the last object, and he found in the new 
Vizier a zealous ally against Austria. But the Turks refused to 
suspend hostilities with Poland ; and with regard to the Prince of 
Orange and the English crown, Kiuprili answered that he should 
recognise the king whom the English people had proclaimed. He 
added that it would ill become the Turks, who had so often de¬ 
throned their own sovereigns, to dispute the rights of other nations 
to change their masters. 

In August, 1690 , Kiuprili-Zade Mustapha took in person the 
command of the Ottoman armies that advanced from Bulgaria 
and Upper Albania through Servia, against the Imperialists. 
After a murderous fight of two days, Kiuprili drove the Austrian 
general, Schenkenclorf, from his lines at Dragoman, between the 
cities of Sofia and Nissa. The Vizier then formed the siege of 
Nissa, which capitulated in three weeks. The Austrian generals 
were prevented from concentrating their forces for its relief, by a 
■well-planned irruption into Transylvania, by the Hungarian re¬ 
fugee Tekeli at the head of a Turkish army. Tekeli defeated the 
Imperialists in that province, and proclaimed the Sultan as sove¬ 
reign lord, and himself as Prince of Transylvania. After the cap- 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


310 

ture of Nissa, the Grand Vizier marched upon Semendra, which 
was stormed after resisting desperately for four days. Widdin 
was also regained; and Kiuprili then undertook the recovery of 
Belgrade. On the twelfth day of the siege a shell from the 
Turkish batteries pierced the roof of the principal powder maga¬ 
zine of the city; and a destructive explosion ensued, which gave 
the Turks an easy conquest. Having placed a strong garrison in 
this important city, and completed the expulsion of the Austrians 
from Servia, Kiuprili returned to Constantinople. He was re¬ 
ceived there with deserved honours after his short, but brilliant 
campaign, in which he had compelled the invading Giaours to recede 
from the banks of the Morava and the Nissa to those of the Danube 
and the Saave. 

O11 the 10th of May, 1691 , Kiuprili the Virtuous received a 
second time the Sacred Standard from the hands of his sovereign, 
Sultan Solyman, who died before the campaign was opened. Soly- 
man II. was succeeded by his brother Achmet II., who was girt 
with the sabre of Othman on the 13 th July, 1691 . The new 
Sultan confirmed Kiuprili in his dignity; and the Vizier pro¬ 
ceeded to concentrate his forces at Belgrade, and to throw a bridge 
over the Saave. He then marched up the right bank of the 
Danube to. encounter the Imperialists, who, under the command 
of Louis of Baden, descended from Petenvaradin. The two hosts 
approached each other on the 19 th of August, near Salankeman. 
At the same time, the Christian and Mussulman flotillas, which 
accompanied their respective armies along the Danube, encoun¬ 
tered on the river. The Turkish flotilla was victorious; but, on 
the land, the day proved a disastrous one for the House of 
Kiuprili and for the House of Othman. Contrary to the advice 
of the oldest Pachas in the army, the Vizier refused to await be¬ 
hind the lines the attack of the Imperialists. The veteran warrior 
Khodja Khalid censured this impetuosity. Kiuprili said to him, 
“ I invited thee to follow me that thou miglitest figure as a man, 
and not as a phantom.” Khalid, touching the thin hairs of his 
grey beard, replied, “ I have but a few days to live. It matters 
little whether I die to-day, or to-morrow ; but I would fain not 
have been present at a scene in which the empire can meet with 
nought but calamity and shame.” “ Advance the cannon !” cried 
Kiuprili; and himself formed the Spahis for the fight. Kcman- 
kesh Pacha began the battle by rushing, with 6000 Kurdish and 
Turcoman irregular cavalry, upon the Christian lines. “ Courage, 
my heroes,” cried Kemankesh, “ the Houris are waiting for you !” 
They galloped forward with shouts of “ Allah !” but were received 


ACHMET II . A . D . 1691-1695. 311 

by the Christians with a steady fire, which drove them back in 
discomfited and diminished masses. Again they charged impetu¬ 
ously ; again they broke, fell or fled. The Austrians now pressed 
forward to where the Sacred Standard was reared in the Maho¬ 
metan ranks. Ismael, the Pacha of Caramania, dashed against 
them with the troops of Asia. His squadrons were entangled in 
an abattis of felled trees, by which the Prince of Baden had pro¬ 
tected his right wing. The Asiatics wavered and were repulsed. 
Kiuprili saw his best men shot down round him by the superior 
musketry of the Imperialists. “ What is to be done 1” he cried 
to the officers of his guards. They answered, “ Let us close, and 
fight sword in hand.” Kiuprili, arrayed in a black vest, invoked 
the name of God, and threw himself, with drawn sabre, against 
the enemy. His guards rushed onward with him. An obstinate 
and sanguinary struggle followed, which was decided against Tur¬ 
key by the bullet that struck Kiuprili, while cleaving his way 
desperately through the Austrian ranks. His guards lost courage 
when they saw him fall; and the fatal tidings that their great 
Vizier was slain, soon spread disorder and panic throughout the 
Ottoman army. The Prince of Baden’s triumph was complete; 
and the Turkish camp with 150 cannon fell into the conqueror’s 
power. But the victory was dearly purchased, and the Austrian 
loss in men and officers was almost equal to that of the Turks. 
The battle of Salankeman drove the Ottomans again from Hun- 
gary; Tekeli was defeated by the Imperialists and expelled from 
Transylvania; and throughout the four years of the disastrous 
reign of Achmet II. the current of defeat was unabated. Besides 
the curse of the victorious sword of the foreigners, and the usual 
miseries of domestic insurrection, the fearful visitations of pesti¬ 
lence and famine came upon the devoted empire. A great earth¬ 
quake threw down part of Smyrna; and a still more destructive 
conflagration ravaged Constantinople in September, 1693. Heart¬ 
broken at the sufferings and shame of the State, and worn by 
disease, Achmet II. expired on the 6th February, 1695. 

Mustapha II., the son of the deposed Mahomet IV., now came 
to the throne, and showed himself worthy of having reigned in 
happier times. On the third day after his accession, he issued a 
Hatti-Scherif, in which he threw the blame of the recent misfortunes 
upon the Sultans, and announced his intention of restoring the 
ancient usages, and of heading his armies in person. As the 
German historian observes, 1 this document is too remarkable not 


1 Von Hammer, vol. iii. 


312 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


to deserve citation. Sultan Mustapha II. thus announced his 
royal will. 

“ God, the supreme distributor of all good, has granted unto us, 
miserable sinner, the Caliphate of the entire world. Under 
monarchs, who are the slaves of pleasure, or who resign them¬ 
selves to indolent slumber, never do the servants of God enjoy 
peace or repose. Henceforth, voluptuousness, idle pastime, and 
sloth are banished from this court. While the Padischas, who 
have ruled since the death of our sublime father Mahomet, have 
heeded nought but their fondness for pleasure and for ease, the 
Unbelievers, the unclean beings, have invaded with their armies 
the four frontiers of Islam. They have subdued our provinces. 
They have pillaged the goods of the people of Mahomet. They 
have dragged away into slavery the faithful, with their wives and 
little ones. This is known to all, as it is known to us. . I there¬ 
fore have resolved, with the help of the Lord, to take a signal 
revenge upon the Unbelievers, that brood of Hell; and I will 
myself begin the holy war against them. Our noble ancestor the 
Sultan Solyman (May his tomb exhale unceasingly the odour of 
incense !) during the forty-eight years of his reign, not only sent 
his Viziers against the unclean Christians, but placed himself at 
the head of the Champions of the Holy War, and so took upon 
the infidels the vengeance which God commands. I also, I, have 
resolved to combat them in person. Do thou, my Grand Vizier, 
and ye others, my Viziers, my Ulema, my Lieutenants and Agas 
of my armies, do ye all of you assemble round my person, and 
meditate well on this my imperial Hatti-Scherif. Take counsel; 
and inform me if I ought to open hostilities in person against the 
Emperor, or to remain at Adrianople. Of these two measures 
choose that which will be most profitable to the Faith, to the 
empire, and to the servants of God. Let your answer be the 
truth; and let it be submitted to me before the imperial stirrup. 
I wish vou Health.” 

The deliberation of the Divan on this summons lasted for three 
days. Many thought that the presence of the Sultan in the camp 
was undesirable. Others feared that he had only addressed them 
with a view of learning their thoughts. Finally, they all resolved 
that the departure of the Padischah to assume the command-in¬ 
chief of the army, would not only expose the sacred person to too 
much risk and fatigue, but would involve excessive expense. Con¬ 
sequently, the Divan represented to the Sultan that liis Majesty 
ought not to commit his imperial person to the chances of a cam¬ 
paign, but ought to leave the care of war to the Grand Vizier. 


MUSTAPHA If, A.D. 1695 - 1703 . 313 

To this address the Sultan returned a laconic Hatti-Scherif, “ I 
persist in marching.” The most active measures then were taken 
to hasten the preparations for the campaign ; and the gallantry of 
the young Sultan was at first rewarded by important success. He 
advanced in the summer of 1695, from Belgrade to Temesvar, 
and recaptured the important fortresses of Karansebes, Lipna, and 
Lugos. On the 22nd of September, he encountered near Lugos 
the Austrian army under general Veterani. Sultan Mustapha 
gained a complete victory, and Veterani and half his troops were 
left dead on the field. 

During the winter, which followed this victory, Mustapha and 
his councillors toiled unremittingly to repair the finances of the 
empire, and to increase the number and improve the discipline of 
the troops. Heavy taxes were laid on tobacco, on black eunuchs, 
and other articles of luxury. Many of the chief men of the 
empire seconded their sovereign’s zeal, and raised bodies of troops 
at their own expense, of which they took the command. Mus¬ 
tapha had formed a corps of 3000 infantry from the royal gar¬ 
deners, or Bostandjis, of Adrianople and Constantinople. He 
now divided those into three regiments, which were equipped in 
peculiar uniform, and trained with especial care. The Sultan 
opened the campaign of 1696 at the head of a numerous and well- 
appointed army. He defeated the Austrians under the Duke de 
Saxe near Temesvar, and raised the siege of that place. Mus¬ 
tapha strengthened the garrisons of the fortresses which the 
Turks still held in Hungary, and then returned to Adrianople, 
not unjustly proud of his achievements ; though the great Soly- 
man, whom he chose as his model, would probably have pushed 
his advantages further. The hopes and pride of Turkey now 
began to revive ; but in 1697, Prince Eugene took the command 
of the Imperialist armies in Hungary; and the Crescent soon 
■went down before him. Sultan Mustapha collected his army for 
this fatal campaign at Sofia, and marched thence to Belgrade, where 
he halted and held repeated councils of war. Some enterprises of 
minor importance, the sending forward a detachment to reinforce 
the garrison of Temesvar, and the occupation of several posts 
along the Danube were successfully attempted ; but there was dis¬ 
cord among the Ottoman officers, and there was oscillation in the 
Sultan’s will as to the main line of operations that ought to be 
followed. The Grand Vizier, Elwas Mohammed, was unpopular 
with the other Pachas, who leagued together to oppose his pro¬ 
jects, and thwart his tactics. The Vizier himself was depressed 
fiy a dream, which he saddened his equally credulous comrades 


314 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS ,. 


also by narrating. He dreamed that the late Grand Vizier, Iviu- 
prili-Zade Mustapha, the martyr of Salankeman, had entered his 
tent and given him a cup of sherbet, which the Apparition had 
first tasted. “ God knows,” cried the Grand Vizier, when he told 
his dream, “that this was the cup of martyrdom, which I, top, 
am destined to drink in this campaign.” He wished to keep 
the army on the right bank of the Danube, and crossing the Saave 
to march upon Peterwaradin, and attempt the recovery of that 
important fortress. The other officers proposed to cross the 
Danube and the Theiss, and to endeavour to surprise Eugene’s 
army, which was camped on the banks of the Bacska. After 
much angry discussion this last project was adopted. The army 
crossed the Danube and the Theiss; but it was found that all 
hope of surprising Eugene was idle, and the Austrians and Turks 
both endeavoured to gain the fort of Zitel, which is situate at the 
junction of the Theiss with the Danube. The Ottomans obtained 
some advantage over a detachment of Eugene’s army, and sacked 
Zitel. They then reverted to the scheme of besieging Peterwara¬ 
din, and marched to Valova; where they began to construct 
bridges to enable them to pass to the right bank of the Danube 
and attack Peterwaradin ; the old bridges having been occupied or 
destroyed by the Austrians. Finding that Eugene had secured 
Peterwaradin against attack, they held another council of war, 
and resolved to march northwards up the right or eastern bank of 
the Theiss and attack Szegedin. The activity of Eugene discon¬ 
certed this project also. He threw a strong division into Szege¬ 
din ; and with the rest of his army followed the Turks, watching 
for a favourable opportunity of attacking them. This was soon 
obtained. The Austrian hussars captured one of the Pachas, 
named Djafer; who, finding his life threatened, confessed to the 
Austrians that the Sultan had given up his project of attacking 
Szegedin, and now designed to cross the Theiss near Zenta, with 
the intention of marching upon upper Hungary and Transylvania. 
Eugene instantly moved with all possible speed towards Zenta, 
in the hopes of assailing the Ottoman army while in the act of 
passing the river. 

It was on the 11th of September, about two in the afternoon, 
that the Sultan saw his great enemy approach. The Turks had 
formed a temporary bridge across the river; and the Sultan, the 
cavalry, and' the greater part of the artillery of his army, had 
passed over to the left or eastern bank ; but the infantry was still 
on the western side. The Sultan and his officers had taken the 
precaution of forming a strong entrenchment to protect their rear 


MUSI'APHA II. A.D. 1695-1703. 315 

during the passage of the bridge, and seventy guns had been kept 
in position on the right bank for that purpose. Undaunted by 
these preparations, Eugene formed his columns, as they came up, 
into line for the attack; and although at this critical time a 
courier arrived from Vienna with peremptory orders to Eugene 
not to risk a battle, he determined to disobey his Emperor’s 
orders, and continued his preparations for a decisive engagement. 1 
If the Ottomans had anticipated him by a resolute advance against 
the Austrian centre, before Eugene’s troops had all arrived, and 
before his artillery had been brought into position, it is probable 
that they would have crushed the Imperialists. But discord and 
disorder were rife in the Sultan’s camp. The Grand Vizier sum¬ 
moned the Pachas and Spahis, most of whom had passed over to 
the eastern bank, back to the menaced side ; but he did not move 
beyond his entrenchments, and the Sultan himself did not re 
cross the river to share in and conduct the conflict. Only t\vo 
hours of daylight were left when Eugene had completed his 
dispositions for action. He formed his army into a half-moon, so 
as to assail the whole semicircle of the Turkish entrenchments, 
and he posted his cannon where they commanded the bridge. 
He then made a simultaneous attack on every part of the Turkish 
lines, which was everywhere successful. The Turks fought with¬ 
out concert or confidence; and a large body of Janissaries 
mutinied, and began to massacre their own officers in the very 
heat of the action. The Christians gave no quarter ; more than 
20,000 Turks were slain, including the Grand Vizier and a large 
number of Pachas; and more than 10,000 were drowned in 
endeavouring to pass the river. The battle was lost and won 
before the close of the day; and in the words of Eugene in his 
despatch to Vienna: “ The sun seemed to linger on the 

horizon to gild with his last rays the victorious standards of 
Austria.” 

The Sultan, from the eastern bank of the Theiss, witnessed the 
destruction of his host, and fled with the remnants of his cavalry 
in dismay to Temesvar. Thence he retired to Constantinople, and 
never appeared again at the head of an army. In the extreme 
distress to which the defeat at Zenta had once more reduced the 
Ottoman Empire, resort was again had to the House of Kiuprili, 
and again that illustrious family supplied a minister who could 
prop, if he could not restore, the falling state. 

Housein Kiuprili had in the time of the vizierate of Ahmed 

1 Code’s “History of the House of Austria,” vol. ii. p. 456 . 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


316 

Kiuprili, received the name of Amoucl-schah-zade, which means 
“ Son of the Uncle.” He was so called because he was the son of 
Hassan, who was the younger brother of Mohammed Kiuprili, and 
the uncle of Ahmed Kiuprili. Amoud-schah-zade Housein Kiu¬ 
prili had in early life been an idle voluptuary; but the disasters 
which befell Turkey after the expedition against Vienna roused 
him to a sense of what he owed to the honour of his House and 
to his country. He filled many important offices with zeal and 
ability; and when raised to the Grand Vizierate in 1697, he gave 
proofs-of his possessing in ample degree that genius for finance 
and for administrative reform, which was the eminent characteristic 
of his family. Every possible effort was made by him to collect 
the means of opposing further resistance to the enemies of the 
empire. A tax was laid upon coffee : a contribution in the nature 
of an income tax was required from all the principal officers of the 
state : and Housein Kiuprili even ventured to appropriate to the 
urgent necessities of the country a large sum from the revenues of 
the religious foundations. He succeeded in collecting and equip¬ 
ping an army of 50,000 foot and 48,000 horse for the defence of 
the European provinces. A Turkish fleet was sent into the Black 
Sea, and another into the Mediterranean. 1 But while the Vizier 
thus prepared war, it was with the wish for peace. He knew too 
well the exhaustion of the empire, and felt the impossibility of 
preventing further disasters if hostilities were continued. It was 
not only in the Danubian provinces that the war went hard with 
Turkey. The Venetians were making further progress in Dal¬ 
matia ; and in Greece they were advancing beyond the isthmus of 
Corinth; though Negropont had been bravely and successfully 
defended against them, and seasonable relief had been obtained 
for the Ottoman forces that were employed along the coasts and in 
the islands of the Archipelago, through the gallantry of the Turkish 
Admiral Mezzomorto, who gained two victories over the Venetian 
fleets. Poland was an inactive antagonist; but Russia had 
become a truly formidable enemy. Peter the Great was now 
sovereign of that vast empire, and was teaching the lately rude 
and barbarous Muscovy to know her own gigantic strength, and 
also to use it like a giant. He had already drawn around him 
skilful officers and engineers from Western Europe ; and he had 
formed a body of troops on the models of the Imperialist and 

1 Von Hammer cites, in a note to his 60 th hook, an official list, which a 
Turkish writer gives of the Ottoman forces on land and sea, as augmented 
by Housein Kiuprili. It specifies the number of troops supplied by each 
province, and their character. 


MUSTAPHA II. A.D. 1695 - 1703 . 317 

French armies. But ships, harbours, and maritime power were 
the dearest objects of his heart; and one of the earliest marks of 
his ambition (never lost sight of by himself or any of his suc¬ 
cessors) was to obtain the mastery of the Black Sea. With this 
view he prosecuted the war against Turkey with a vigour and 
skill very different from the conduct of Galitzin and other former 
Russian commanders. Peter resolved first to conquer the strong 
city of Azoph, which, as has been mentioned, had been fortified by 
the Turks with peculiar care, and was justly regarded as a position 
of the greatest importance. He led an army of 60,000 men (in¬ 
cluding his new-modelled regiments) against Azoph, in 1695. He 
also formed a large flotilla of vessels, drawing but little water, 
which co-operated with his army in the siege. His first attempt 
was unsuccessful; and he sustained a repulse, which was severe 
enough to discourage a spirit of ordinary firmness. The Russians 
were driven back from Azoph, in 1695, with a loss of 30,000 men. 
But in the following spring the Czar renewed the siege with fresh 
forces. His flotilla defeated a squadron of light Turkish vessels, 
that attempted to relieve the city; and he kept in check the 
Ottoman Pachas, who advanced from the Crimea with troops along 
the coast as far as the village of Akkoumin. Azoph surrendered to 
the Czar on the 28th July, 1696 ; and he immediately began to 
improve the fortifications and harbour, and to fit out vessels of 
war, on a scale, which showed for what important ulterior projects 
the possession of Azoph had been sought by Russia. 

Thus menaced from many quarters, the Ottoman court listened 
willingly to the English ambassador, Lord Paget, who urged on 
the Turkish statesmen the necessity of peace, and offered the 
mediation of England to obtain it. Similar proposals had been 
made by the representatives of Holland and England at earlier 
periods of the war, and negotiations had once been opened at 
Vienna, but no salutary result had followed. But now both 
Turkey and her chief antagonist Austria were sincerely desirous 
of peace. The Emperor Leopold had indeed seen his armies 
obtain triumphs, which might have filled many monarchs with 
ambitious visions of ampler conquests, and might have led to a 
march upon Constantinople, as the fit retribution for the repeated 
siege of Vienna. But Leopold was of a wiser or a colder spirit. 
He was anxious for sure and peaceful possession of the valuable 
provinces that had already been re-conquered from the Turks in 
the war; and, though Austria had been generally victorious, she 
had suffered severely in men and in treasure. Above all, the 
prospect that the succession to the Spanish throne would soon 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


313 

become vacant, made the German Emperor anxious to terminate 
hostilities in Eastern Europe, and prepare for the great struggle in 
the West, which was already foreseen as inevitable. 

Lord Paget proposed to the Porte that England should inter¬ 
vene to effect a pacification on the footing of the “ Uti Possidetis;” 
that is to say, on the principle that each of the contending parties 
should keep what it possessed at the time of commencing nego¬ 
tiations. Sultan Mustapha could ill brook the cession of such 
broad and fair territories, as a treaty, framed on this rule, would 
assign to his adversaries; and he endeavoured to introduce some 
important modifications. He placed before Lord Paget a counter- 
project, written in his own hand (an unprecedented act for a 
Turkish Sultan), and which was accompanied by a letter from the 
Grand Vizier to the King of England. The mediation of England 
was requested, in order that a peace might be concluded generally 
on the foundation of the “Uti Possidetis/’ but with stipulations that 
the Austrians should abandon Transylvania, that the city of Peter- 
waradin should be razed, that the Austrians should evacuate all the 
fortified places on the Turkish side of the river Unna, and with other 
exceptions of a similar nature. Lord Paget’s secretary was sent by 
him with the Grand Vizier’s letter to Vienna; and the Austrian 
Government was informed of the readiness of England to mediate 
between the belligerents. In reply to this, a communication was 
made to the Porte that the Emperor Leopold was willing to treat for 
peace, but on condition that each party was to keep all that it then 
possessed, and on condition also that Russia was comprised in the 
treaty. Venice and Poland were added ; and Holland co-operated 
with England as a mediating power. The Czar Peter, though not 
desirous of continuing the war, single-handed, against Turkey, 
was disinclined for peace, and dissatisfied with the proposed prin¬ 
ciple for negotiation. He passed through Vienna in 1698 ; and, 
while in that capital, he had an interview with the Emperor 
Leopold on the subject of the treaty with the Ottoman. Peter 
questioned the Austrian sovereign about the causes of his desire 
for peace with Turkey. Leopold replied that he had not sought 
for peace, but that England had, in the first instance, offered her 
mediation; and that each of the allied Christian sovereigns was 
to keep the conquests which he had made. But the Russian was 
anxious, not only to secure Azoph, but to obtain the important city 
of Kertch in the Crimea ; and he insisted that the cession of this 
place should be made a term of the treaty, and that in the event 
of Turkey declining to give it up, Russia and Austria should form 
a fresh league against her. He was answered by a promise to 


MUSTAPHA II. A.D. 1695 - 1703 . 319 

endeavour to obtain Kertch for him; but he was told that it was 
not fit to renew an offensive alliance on the eve of assembling a 
congress for pacification. In another conversation, which Peter 
had with the Austrian minister, Count Kinsky, he asked what 
power it was that insisted on a peace. The Austrian replied, 
“Our Holy Roman Empire insists on it; Spain insists on it; it is 
required by England and Holland ; and, in a word, by all Christen¬ 
dom.'’ “Beware !” replied the Czar, “how you trust to what the 
Butch and the English say. They are looking only to the benefit 
of their commerce ; they care nothing about the interests of their 
allies.” The Polish sovereign also objected to recognise the “ Uti 
Possidetis” principle. He complained that a treaty on this footing 
would leave the Ottomans in possession of Kaminiec, which was 
the key to Poland. At length, after many difficulties and delays, 
the five belligerent, and the two mediating powers sent their 
plenipotentiaries to the place appointed for that congress, which 
was the town of Carlowitz, on the right bank of the Danube, a 
little below Peterwaradin (24th October, 1698). 

The German historian, Von Hammer, says truly of the Peace of 
Carlowitz, 1 that it is one of those treaties which ought to be con¬ 
sidered with particular care, even as there are certain battles which 
demand and receive the special attention of the historical student. 
The treaty of Carlowitz is memorable, not only on account of the 
magnitude of the territorial change which it ratified; not only 
because it marks the period when men ceased to dread the Otto¬ 
man Empire as an aggressive power; but, also, because it was 
then that the Porte and Russia took part, for the first time, in a 
general European Congress; and because, by admitting to that 
congress the representatives of England and Holland, neither of 
which states was a party to the war, both the Sultan and the 
Czar thus admitted the principle of intervention of the European 
powers, one with another, for the sake of the general good. 

The negotiations at Carlowitz were long; and the representa¬ 
tives of the mediating powers had, more than once, great difficulty 
in preventing an angry rupture. Besides disputes as to ceremonials 
and titles, the congress was required to arrange many serious 
claims and objections, and each of the belligerents, except Austria 
and Venice, desired some deviations in its own favour from the 
general principle of “ Uti Possidetis.” The Russian envoy long 
and fiercely insisted on the cession of Kertch. The Ottomans 
wished Austria to give up Transylvania, or to pay an annual sum 


1 Vol. iii. p. 913. 


320 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


for retaining it. They also desired Venice to restore many of her 
conquests beyond the Morea, and that the Russians should 
evacuate Azoph. The Poles asked for the restoration of Kaminiec, 
and the Imperialists, though generally loyal to the fundamental 
principle of the congress, introduced new matters of dissension, by 
demanding that the custody of the Holy Sepulchre should be 
restored to the Franciscans, that the Jesuits should be confirmed 
in their possessions in the Isle of Chios, and that the Porte should 
grant certain privileges to the Trinitarians, a society instituted for 
the purpose of ransoming Christian captives from slavery. The 
Greek Mavrocordato, who was the principal diplomatist on behalf 
of the Sultan at the congress, replied to these claims of Austria, 
that the Sublime Porte knew nothing of Trinitarians, of Fran¬ 
ciscans, or of Jesuits. It was, however, agreed that certain articles' 
should be drawn up, by which the Sultan promised to continue 
his protection to the Christians according to the ancient capitula¬ 
tions and Hatti-Scherifs. On another point the Ottomans were 
characteristically and honourably firm. Austria required that 
Count Tekeli, the Hungarian chief, who had taken shelter in 
Turkey, should be given up as a rebel to the Emperor. This was 
refused; and nothing could be exacted, beyond a promise on the 
Sultan’s part, that Tekeli and his partisans should be kept at 
such a distance from the frontier, as not to be able to foment dis¬ 
turbances in any part of the Emperor’s dominions. Austria, on 
the other hand, consented that the confiscated dowry of Helen 
Zriny, Tekeli’s wife, should be restored to her, and that she should 
be allowed to join her husband. 1 

At length, after many weeks of arguments, bickerings, threats 
and intrigues, the terms of pacification were arranged. Austria 
and Turkey concluded a treaty for twenty-five years; by which 

1 In a former negotiation in 1GS9 between the Turkish and Imperialist 
envoys, under the mediation of the Dutch ambassador at Vienna (which 
proved abortive), the Austrians had peremptorily insisted on Tekeli being 
given up to them to be punished for his treasons. The Turkish envoy, 
Soulfikar, observed that he himself looked on Tekeli as an enemy to the 
Porte, and the author of the war. He said that Tekeli was no more than 
the Sultan’s dog, and that it mattered little to the Padischah whether such 
a creature lived or died, but that he himself had not travelled so far on that 
embassy to become Tekeli’s assassin. The Dutch ambassador observed oil 
this, that the Turks could not make a serious matter about giving up Tekeli, 
now that they had themselves treated him as a mere dog. Soulfikar replied, 
“Ay, Tekeli is indeed a dog ; a dog that lies down or rises, that barks or 
is quiet, according to the Sultan’s bidding. But this dog is the dog of the 
Padischah of the Ottomans ; and at a sign from him the "dog may be meta¬ 
morphosed into a terrible lion.” 


321 


MUSTAPHA //. A.D. 1695 - 1703 . 

llio Emperor was acknowledged sovereign of Transylvania, all 
Hungary north of the Marosch and west of the Theiss, and of 
Sclavonia, except a small part between the Danube and the Saave. 
With Venice and Poland treaties without limitation of time were 
effected. Poland recovered Poclolia and Kaminiec. Venice re¬ 
tained her conquests in Dalmatia and the Morea ; but restored to 
the Turks those which she had made to the north of the Isthmus 
of Corinth. Russia refused to consent to anything more than an 
armistice for two years, which was afterwards enlarged into a 
peace for thirty years; as the Czar’s attention was, in the com¬ 
mencement of the eighteenth century, principally directed to 
schemes of aggrandisement at the expense of Sweden. By this 
armistice the Russians kept possession of Azoph, and of the districts 
which they had conquered to the north of the sea of that name. 

It was on the 26th of January, 1699, that the pacification of 
Carlowitz was completed. It left the two feebler Christian powers, 
Venice and Poland, restored to temporary importance ; the one by 
the acquisition of the Morea, the other by the recovery of 
Kaminiec. But it was in the altered state of the three greater 
belligerents, compared with what they had been in 1682, that 
men recognised the momentous effects of the seventeen years’ war, 
which was terminated at Carlowitz. Russia had now stretched 
her arms southward, and grasped the coasts of the Mseotis and the 
Euxine. At the beginning of the war Austria trembled for the 
fate of her capital, and saw her very national existence seriously 
menaced: at the end of the conflict the empire of the House of 
Hapsburg was left not merely in security, but enlarged: not 
merely enlarged, but permanently strengthened and consolidated : 
while the House of Othman saw many of its fairest dominions 
rent away, and was indebted for the preservation of the remainder 
from conquest by the invading Christians, to the intervention of 
two other Christian states. From that time forth all serious 
dread of the military power of Turkey has ceased in Europe. 
“ Her importance has become diplomatic. Other nations have 
from time to time sought to use her as a political machine against 
Austria, or the growing power of Russia; and this diplomatic im¬ 
portance of Turkey has grown proportionably greater as the 
sovereigns of Russia became desirous of possessing the Black Sea 
for the carrying out of their plans.” 1 Another, and that a more 
general and enduring cause why the affairs of Turkey have con- 

1 See Schlosser’s Introduction to the “History of tha Eighteenth Cen¬ 
tury. ” I have modified some of his expressions. 


21 


322 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


tinned to inspire interest and anxiety, has been the consideration 
of the formidable increase of aggressive power which must be 
acquired by the conquering state that makes the Ottoman 
territories integral portions of its own dominions. The empire, 
which, while possessed by the Turks, is effete for purposes of 
attack, might, under the lordship of others, supply the means for 
crushing the liberties of the world. 


ACIIMET III . A.D. 1703 - 1730 . 


3^3 


CHAPTER XVIII. 

DEATH OE KIUPRILI HOUSEIN—ABDICATION OF MUSTAPHA n.— 
ACCESSION OF ACHMET III.—CHARLES XII. IN TURKEY—WAR 
WITH RUSSIA—SUCCESS OF THE TURKS AND TREATY OF THE 
PRUTH—WAR WITH VENICE—THE MOREA RECOVERED—WAR 
WITH AUSTRIA—DISASTERS OF THE TURKS—PEACE OF PAS- 
SAROWITZ—LEAGUE WITH RUSSIA AGAINST PERSIA—DEPO¬ 
SITION OF ACHMET III.—THE IIOSPODARS—THE FANARIOTS. 1 

The Grand Vizier Kiuprili Housein availed himself of the return 
of peace to check the disorders which had arisen in many parts of 
the empire, especially in Egypt and the Crimea, during the last 
calamitous years of the war. He also endeavoured to effect a 
general reform in the administrative departments of the army and 
navy, in the finances, in the public schools and colleges, in the 
laws respecting religious and charitable foundations, and in the 
treatment of the Christian subjects of the Porte. It was par¬ 
ticularly in this last respect—in his humane and wise mitigation 
of the burdens of the Rayas, that Amoud-schah-zade Housein 
showed himself a worthy successor of his relative Kiuprili the 
Virtuous. Unhappily for the empire, the influence of Kiuprili 
Housein was thwarted by that of other favourites of Sultan Mus- 
tapha; and the fourth great minister of the House of Kiuprili 
retired from office, worn out in body and in mind, within three 
years after the peace of Carlowitz. Kiuprili the Wise, as Kiuprili 
Housein was justly surnamed, died in the autumn of 1702. The 
Sultan did not retain the throne long after the loss of his able 
minister. Mustapha II. appears to have been spirit-broken by the 
disastrous close of his military career; and the latter part of his 
reign shows no trace of the vigour, or of the conscientious zeal in 
the discharge of duty, which signalised him in the commencement 
of his sovereignty. The once resolute leader of his own armies 
sank into an effeminate sensualist, who forgot the boasted example 
of Solyman the Lawgiver, and appeared rather to follow that of 

1 See Voa Hammer, books 6I-60. 


324 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Ibrahim. The general discontent of the nation produced the 
usual result. An insurrection broke out in Constantinople, in 
1703, which raged for several weeks ; until Mustapha, who showed 
no spark of his former courage, abdicated in favour of his brother 
Achmet III., who became Sultan at thirty years of age. 

The position, which the successes of Russia in the late war had 
given her on the shores of the Sea of Azoph and the Euxine, con¬ 
tinued to fill the Ottoman councils with anxiety. Although the 
armistice, which alone the Russians would agree to at Carlowitz, 
was not broken, there were six months of earnest and often angry 
negotiations between the Czar and the Porte in 1700, before the 
final terms of peace between them were arranged. Eventually a 
treaty was signed, which purported to assure amity between 
Russia and Turkey for thirty years. By the second article of that 
treaty, the fortifications of four of the places conquered by the 
Russians—Toghan, Ghazi-kerman, Schahim-kerman, and Nassret- 
kerman—were to be demolished. The fifth article directed that 
in order to form a border land for the two empires, there should 
be a desert-space for twelve leagues between Perekop 1 and Azoph. 
By the sixth article the Tartars and the Russians were to have 
equal rights of fishery, hunting, taking hives, cutting wood, and 
collecting salt in the district between Perekop and the fortress of 
Meyusch. The seventh assigned to the Russians, as appurtenant 
to the city of Azoph, which they possessed, a territory of seven 
leagues in the direction of the river Kuban; end ordained that 
the Nogai Tartars and Circassians should give the Russians and 
Cossacks no annoyance in that domain. The eighth required that 
the Tartars of the Crimea should make no more incursions into 
the Russian territories. The ninth related to the exchange of 
prisoners; the tenth to the freedom of commerce; the twelfth 
stipulated protection for pilgrims to Jerusalem; the thirteenth 
concerned the privileges of agents and interpreters; and the four¬ 
teenth directed that each party should within two months send an 
embassy to ratify the articles. 

A little time after the conclusion of the treaty with Russia, the 
Sublime Porte gave a public proof of how highly it valued the 
friendship of England, and of its sense of the gratitude due from 
Turkey to this country for the mediation which terminated the 
late war.* When Lord Paget was succeeded as ambassador at 
Constantinople by Sir Robert Sutton, the Sultan personally 
addressed the English envoy at his audience of reception, in these 
words; “ The English are old and good friends to us; and we shall 

1 Called “ Or ” in the treaty. 


ACHMET ILL A,D % 1703 - 1730 . 325 

show, when there is an opportunity, that we are the same to them. 
Especially do we desire to prove to your king our remembrance of 
his friendly intervention at Carlowitz, and our confidence in his 
kindly feeling towards us.” 

This high esteem for the friendship of England was probably 
due in part to the troubled state of the Turkish relations with 
Russia, which did not cease when the treaty of 1700 was formally 
ratified. About the same time that the new English ambassador 
reached Constantinople, there was imminent risk of a collision 
between the Turkish and Russian forces north of the Euxine. 
The Crimean Khan, and other Moslem dignitaries wished for a 
renewal of the war; and sent exaggerated representations to Con¬ 
stantinople, respecting the naval preparations of the Russians in 
the Sea of Azoph, and the strength of the new fortresses, which it 
was alleged they were building. These reports were contradicted 
by the Russian ambassador; and the Crimean Khan was deposed 
by the Sultan for his false intelligence. But the Turks laboured 
hard to strengthen the defences of their empire against Russia. 
I 11 order to confine the Czar’s fleet to the Sea of Azoph, they built a 
strong fortress at the eastern extremity of the Crimea, with which 
to command the northern entrance of the straits of Kertch. This 
fortress was called Yenikale. It was finished in 1703; and its 
batteries were arranged on a level with the water, so that the 
bullets could sweep away any vessel that attempted to force the 
passage. On the other hand the Russians continued to strengthen 
Azoph; and they built a new fortress at Taighan, since known as 
Taganrok. They also repaired the old works of Kamienska, on 
the banks of the Dnieper. 

One of the first acts of Sultan Achmet III., on his accession to 
the Turkish throne, was to write a letter to Peter, in which he 
complained of the menacing preparations in the Czar’s southern 
provinces, and declared that he could place no reliance on the 
Russian protestations of friendship. But Achmet was not of a 
warlike disposition; and the intestine commotions, by which his 
realm was troubled in the beginning of his reign, made him 
anxious to avoid hostilities with his powerful neighbour. Russia 
also was too much occupied at this time by her contest with 
Sweden, to make her desire a new war with Turkey; and another 
temporary settlement of the disputes between the two empires 
was effected in 1705. Still, the Porte watched every movement 
of the Czar with jealous care. A fleet of Turkish galleys was sent 
every year to cruise in the Black Sea, and observe the new fortifi¬ 
cations which the Russians formed on its coast. Kcrtch and 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


326 

Yenikale were strongly garrisoned with regular Ottoman troops, 
and a Turkish castle was built near Taman, on the Asiatic side of 
the straits of Kertch. 

The gallant conflict which Charles XII. maintained with Russia 
was the object of the admiring attention of all Europe during the 
first decade of the eighteenth century; and by none was the 
romantic career of that heroic king watched more earnestly 
than by the Ottomans, who felt deeply the value of the Swedish 
arms in averting from Turkey the ambitious attacks of the Mus¬ 
covite sovereign. The Czar Peter was called by the Ottoman 
historians “ White Moustache,” while they speak of King Charles 
by the appropriate title of “ Iron Head.” It is known from these 
writers that the Turkish governor of Oczakow sent an envoy to 
Charles’s camp at Thorn, to negotiate an alliance against Russia. 
And, when the Swedish King was in the Ukraine, he received 
assurances from the same quarter, that the Khan of the Crimea 
should lead an army of Tartars to his aid. But these communica¬ 
tions were without the sanction of Sultan Achmet; and when 
Charles, after his disastrous overthrow at Pultowa 1 (8th July, 
1709), took refuge in Turkey, he was received with dignified 
hospitality; but Achmet showed no desire to break the peace 
with Russia for the purpose of restoring the King of Sweden to 
power. But the Porte returned a noble refusal to the demands of 
the triumphant Czar, when he required that Charles should not 
be permitted to remain in the Ottoman dominions, and sought by 
every possible threat and promise to obtain the extradition of the 
Hetman Mazeppa, who had accompanied Charles into Turkey, and 
whom the Russian claimed for punishment as a traitor to their 
sovereign. 

Charles XII. at first took shelter at Oczakow, but soon removed 
to Bender, where the Porte assembled a little army for his pro¬ 
tection. The necessity of such a precaution had been shown by 
an attack which the Russians made on a body of Swedes, who 
were collected in Moldavia. The Czar’s forces suddenly crossed 
the frontier; surprised the Swedes near Czarnowicz, and carried 
nearly all of them away into Russia as prisoners. This vio¬ 
lation of the Ottoman territory caused the greatest indignation 
at Constantinople ; and it v’as with extreme difficulty that the 
Russian ambassador Tolskoi prevented an immediate declaration 
of war. The Grand Vizier, Tschuli Ali, was in favour of maintain¬ 
ing peace with the Czar, and opposed vehemently the demands of 
Charles, who wished the Sultan to furnish him with 30,000 Spahis 
1 See chapter xii. of the “ Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World.*' 


ACHMET III . A.D. 1703-1730. 327 

and 20,000 Janissaries to escort him across Poland towards his 
own dominions. To have sent such an army as this with Charles, 
would have necessarily involved the Porte in hostilities with both 
Poland and Russia; and Tschuli Ali bade the Divan remember 
the sufferings of Turkey in the last war, as decisive arguments 
against such a measure. On the other hand, the Sultana Valide, 
who admired the chivalrous courage of Charles, pleaded his cause 
warmly with the Sultan, and asked often of her son, “When 
would he aid her lion against the bear V* At the end of 1709, the 
pacific party in the Divan prevailed; and the treaty which had 
been signed between Russia and Turkey in the reign of Mustapha 
II., was renewed, but with an additional article, which stipulated 
that the King of Sweden should be at liberty to return to his 
states by such road as he should judge fitting. The Sultan sent a 
letter to the King, informing him that by virtue of this clause he 
could return to his kingdom in full security; and the letter was 
accompanied by 10,000 ducats for the expense of the journey, and 
by presents of horses from the Sultan and the Vizier. Charles 
accepted the Sultan’s gifts, but made no preparations for leaving 
Turkey; and the Sultan, irritated at the failure of the Vizier’s 
plans for relieving him of the burden of Charles’s presence in the 
empire, deprived Tschuli Ali of the seals of office, and made 
Nououman Kiuprili Grand Vizier, in June, 1710. 

Nououman Kiuprili was the son of Kiuprili the Virtuous, the 
Grand Vizier who fell in battle at Salankaman. The accession to 
power of a fifth Grand Vizier of this illustrious family was hailed 
with joy by all the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire; and Nouou- 
man began his ministry amid the highest expectations of all ranks of 
his countrymen. These expectations were not fulfilled. Nouou- 
man Kiuprili showed the same toleration, the same wisdom and 
justice, which had marked his father in his treatment both of 
Rayas and Moslems. But he was one of those statesmen, who, 
partly out of vanity, partly out of nervousness, take upon them¬ 
selves the personal discharge of more duties than they are equal 
to ; and who give disgust and annoyance to their colleagues and 
subordinate officials, by needlessly and unseasonably interfering 
with the petty details of departmental business. Hence there 
speedily arose confusion and discord in the government, of which 
he was the chief: and the disappointment, which men felt at the 
failure of their exaggerated hopes and predictions respecting him, 
brought on the last Kiuprili by a natural reaction an equally ex¬ 
cessive amount of unpopularity. He was dismissed from the 
Grand Vizierate within fourteen months from the time when he 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


323 

had received that high office, and retired to his former subordinate, 
but honourable station of governor of the important island of 
Euboea. 

One measure of foreign policy, that marked Nouotiman Kiu- 
prili’s brief administration, was singularly unfortunate with regard 
to the effect which its author wished it to produce. Nououman 
Kiuprili was as desirous of maintaining peace as his predecessors 
in office had been; and he endeavoured earnestly, but in vain, to 
persuade the King of Sweden to retire quietly from the Sultan’s 
dominions. But he thought that it would be politic at the same 
time to create a general impression that the resources and warlike 
spirit of the Turkish Empire were undiminished; and he accord¬ 
ingly issued orders for the assembling a large army, and caused a 
resolution of the Divan to be circulated, that the Sublime Porte 
intended to conduct the Swedish King back to his own country 
with a host equal to that which Kara Moustafa had led against 
Vienna. The effect of this boast, and of the military display with 
which it was accompanied, was to excite to an irrepressible ardour 
the warlike spirit of the Ottoman troops, who were generally 
zealous in behalf of the King of Sweden against Russia, and who 
were also eager for an opportunity of effacing the dishonours of 
the last war. 

The numerous aggressions of the Russians on the Turkish terri¬ 
tory caused frequent petitions for protection and redress to be sent 
to the Sultan by the inhabitants of his frontier provinces ; and the 
agents of Charles XII. at the Turkish Court used all possible 
means to make these and similar inducements to war produce their 
full effect upon Sultan Achmet. The Khan of the Crimea, 
Dewlet Ghirai, was as anxious as the Swedish King for immediate 
hostilities between Turkey and Russia. No part of the Ottoman 
dominions was so seriously menaced by the ambitious preparations 
of the Czar, as the Crimean peninsula and the adjacent districts, 
which Dewlet Ghirai ruled as vassal to the Sublime Porte. The 
Russians had built fortified posts near Kamienska, at a short dis¬ 
tance from Perekop; they had also erected a castle at Samancljik, 
at the point of the confluence of the Samara and the Dnieper. 
Another fortress had been built by them at Taighan; and the care 
with which Azoph and the new port of Taganrok were fortified, and 
the strength of the flotilla which the Czar had formed there, were 
also causes of alarm to the Khan, which he succeeded in communi¬ 
cating to the Sultan. Poniatowski, Charles’s chief agent in the 
Turkish Court, pointed out these preparations of the Czar, as 
proofs that ho designed, now that he was master of Azoph and the 


ACHMET III. A.D. 1703 - 1730 . * 329 

coasts of the Mseotis, to assail and conquer the Crimea, whence the 
victorious Russians would soon attack Constantinople. 1 Besides 
these causes of complaint against Russia, the partisans of Charles 
in the Divan referred to the growing ascendency of that power in 
Poland, where the troops of the Czar had now seized and garri¬ 
soned the important fortress of Kaminiec. Other causes why 
Turkey should suspect Russia were also mentioned; such as the 
Czar’s subjugation of the Cossacks Potkal and Bersbasch, and the 
Russian occupation of Stanileschti, a fortress over against Jassy. 
Moved by these representations of the anti-Russian party, the 
Sultan summoned the Crimean Khan to Constantinople, and in a 
solemn audience, which Achmet gave him, Dewlet Ghirai urged 
with vehemence the necessity of an immediate rupture with Russia. 
He warned the Porte that the Czar’s agents were secretly in¬ 
triguing with the Rayas of the empire; and that, if time v r ere 
allowed for the completion of their machinations, the Russians 
would by these means win all the European dominions of the 
Porte. His reasonings finally prevailed with Sultan Achmet. 
The Khan was dismissed with rich presents of honour; and the 
Mufti was consulted as to the lawfulness of war with Russia, and 
returned a Eetva, which pronounced the war to be not only justi¬ 
fiable but necessary. Orders were issued to enrol 30,000 Janis¬ 
saries, and large numbers of other troops ; and a circular was sent 
to all the governors of the coasts, enjoining them to prepare and 
place at the disposition of the Capital! Pacha (whose fleet was 
ready for sea) a certain number of vessels, drawing but little 
water, and therefore fit for operations in the Sea of Azoph. Accord¬ 
ing to a barbarous usage which the Ottomans have only lately 
discontinued, the declaration of w r ar with Russia (November 28, 
1710) was marked by the imprisonment of the Russian Ambas¬ 
sador Tolskoi, in the Castle of the Seven Tow'ers. 2 

It is probable that the Russian sovereign would willingly have 
deferred hostilities with Turkey. It was not till near the close of 
the year 1710, that Peter completed his conquest of Livonia and 

1 Levesque, “Histoire de Russie,” vol. iv. p. 303. 

2 The state answer of the ancient Sultans, when requested to receive an 
embassy, was, “ The Sublime Porte is open to all.” This, according to the 
Turkish interpretation, implied a safe conduct in coming, but gave no 
guarantee about departing. “ Vestigia nulla retrorsum.” Levesque in his 
“History of Russia” (vol. iv. p. 394), fairly remarks on this Turkish custom 
of imprisoning ambassadors when a war broke out : “ On leur a justement 
reproch^ cet usage barbare. Mais Charles XII. retenait encore et laissa 
mourir dans lacaptivite le prince Khilkof, ambassadear de Russie ; et aucun 
hhstorien ne lui a reproche cet attentat contre le droit des gens.” 


330 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


was at liberty to draw troops from the scene of his operations 
against the Swedes, and against the party among the Poles that 
was opposed to him, towards the Ottoman frontier. Had the war 
been delayed for another year, it is probable that the Russians 
would have entered upon the contest with much greater advan¬ 
tages than they possessed in 1711. But finding it impossible by 
negotiations to induce the Sultan to desist from his preparations 
for an immediate conflict, the Czar, on the 25th of February, 1711, 
directed war against the Turks to be solemnly proclaimed in the 
principal church of Moscow. In order to rouse the fanaticism, and 
increase the zeal of the Russian soldiery (and probably also with 
a view of inducing the Christian populations of Turkey to join 
him), Peter endeavoured to give the war all the appearances of a 
war of religion. Instead of the usual ensigns of the Russian troops 
they bore red standards, which on one side were inscribed with 
these words, “ In the name of God, and for the cause of Christi¬ 
anity and on the other side was a cross, and the well-known 
inscription of the Labarum of the former Greek Emperors of Con¬ 
stantinople, 'Ev rovrS v/7ca. 

The rapid development of the vast power of Graeco-Christian 
and Slavonic Russia, and the approaching conflict between her and 
the House of Othman, excited in the highest degree the Greek and 
Slavonic nations that were subject to the Turkish yoke. They 
looked upon the Czar as their coming liberator, and their enthusiasm 
was augmented by a rumour that an ancient prophecy had been 
discovered in the tomb of Constantine, which pointed to the 
Russians as the nation destined to chase the Turks from Constan¬ 
tinople. 1 Even the small and remote tribes of the Montenegrins 
sent messengers to Peter, offering to attack their Turkish rulers, 
and make a diversion in his favour. The Czar thanked them by 
a letter and by presents : but the primary aim of his negotiations 
with the Christian subjects of the Sultan, was to secure the co¬ 
operation of the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia. It was 
into these principalities that he designed first to lead his army; 
and he wished to make them a secure basis for his further opera¬ 
tions in invading Turkey. Brancovan, the Hospodar of Wallachia, 
had for a long time established an intelligence with Russia, which 
the Porte at last suspected, and directed Prince Cantemir, the 
Hospodar of Moldavia, to attack him and deprive him of his 

1 Levesque, “ Histoire de Russie,” vol. iv. p. 400. This rumour has often 
been revived, especially in the time of the victories of the Empress Cathe¬ 
rine II. See the remarks of Gibbon as to its antiquity, vol. vi. p. SS (Dr, 
Smith’s edition), and notes. 


33* 


ACIIMET III. A.D. 1703-1730. 

government. But Cantemir himself determined to aid the Rus¬ 
sians, and obtained such favour with the Czar as raised the jealousy 
of Brancovan, who, by a double treachery, began to intrigue with 
the Turks, for the purpose of misleading Peter and bringing him 
and his army into a position, where the Turks could assail them 
with advantage. 

The new Grand Vizier, Baltaclji Mehemet Pacha (who had 
originally been a woocl-cutter in the Serail), began his march from 
the neighbourhood of Constantinople towards the Moldavian 
frontier, in May, 1711, at the head of a large arid admirably 
equipped army. The Czar collected his forces in the south of 
Poland, and in June advanced into Moldavia. His troops suffered 
severely on their line of march; and great numbers perished by 
privations and disease before they reached Jassy, and before any 
actual hostilities had commenced. Peter halted at Jassy for a 
short time, and endeavoured to gain stores of provisions in that 
city ; but the supplies which Cantemir obtained for him were but 
scanty, and the Wallachian Hospodar, Brancovan, was now acting 
in the interest of the Turks. In this emergency the Czar was 
advised to march soutlrwarcl towards some extensive magazines 
of provisions, which the Turks were said to have collected near the 
lower part of the river Sereth, and which he was assured that he 
might seize without difficulty. At the same time he was misled 
by false reports that the Vizier’s army had not yet passed the 
Danube. The Czar accordingly marched the main body of his 
army down the right (or western) bank of the river Pruth, which 
runs nearly southward from the vicinity of Jassy to the Danube, 
falling into that river near Galatz, a little below the confluence of 
the Sereth. But while the Russians were at Jassy, the Grand 
Vizier had crossed the Danube at Isakclji, below the junction of 
the Pruth, and had been joined in Bessarabia by the Khan of the 
Crimea, at the head of a large force of Tartar cavalry. The Otto¬ 
man commanders were informed of the march of the Czar down 
the western bank of the Pruth, and they forthwith led their com¬ 
bined troops to the eastern bank of the river, that they might 
cross it and attack the Russians in Moldavia. The Russian General 
Scheremitoff was posted with a detachment from the Czar’s army 
near the part of the river which the Turks and Tartars approached. 
He endeavoured to prevent them from passing; but 10,000 Tartar 
horsemen swam the river, and four bridges were thrown over by 
night, which enabled the Vizier to place an overwhelming force on 
the western or Moldavian side. Scheremitoff fell back and re¬ 
joined the main Russian army near Faltasch. The intelligence 


332 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


which he brought was in the highest degree alarming to the Czar: 
, whose force, weakened by disease and famine, was far inferior to 
that of the Ottomans, and was at this time still further reduced, in 
consequence of two large detachments, under Generals Renne and 
Jonas, having been sent into the interior districts of Moldavia and 
Wallachia. The Czar retreated a little distance up the right bank 
of the river in the vicinity of the village of Kousch, and he then 
entrenched himself in a seemingly strong position between the 
Pruth' and a marsh, in imitation of the tactics of Sobieski at 
Zurawna. But the low ground, on which the Russians were en¬ 
camped, was. commanded by hills at a little distance, which the 
superior numbers of the Vizier’s army enabled him to occupy. The 
Russians were thus completely blockaded in their camp : they were 
almost destitute of provisions, and suffered severely from thirst, as 
the Turks had planted batteries on the left bank of the Pruth, 
which swept the river and made it almost certain death for the 
Russians to approach the water. The Vizier prudently abstained 
from attacking them; and all the efforts which the Russians made 
in two days of severe fighting to force the Turkish lines were com¬ 
pletely repulsed. In this emergency the Czar and his men must 
either have perished with famine and thirst, or have surrendered 
at discretion, if it had not been for the dexterity of Catherine, the 
Czar’s wife, who had accompanied Peter in this expedition, and 
was truly the saving angel of Russia. Catherine collected her own 
jewels and trinkets, and all the gold that was in the possession of 
the chief Russian officers in the camp. She sent these by the 
Chancellor Schaffiroff, to the quarters of the Turkish Vizier; and 
together with the presents of Catherine, the Chancellor carried a 
letter written by the General Scheremitoff, in the name of the 
Czar, asking for peace. The Kiaya of the Grand Vizier had great 
influence with Mehemet Baltadji, and to him Catherine’s envoy 
addressed himself. The Kiaya received the presents, and advised 
the Vizier to be favourable to the Russian petitioners. Mehemet 
Baltadji assented; and negotiations for a treaty were accordingly 
commenced. The agent of the King of Sweden, Count Poniatowski, 
who was in the Vizier’s camp, protested against any terms being 
granted to the Russians; and the Khan of the Crimea joined 
warmly in Poniatowski’s remonstrance. But the Grand Vizier paid 
no regard to their opposition ; and his secretary, Omar Effendi, 
drew up the celebrated treaty which liberated the Czar and his 
army from their extreme peril on the 21st July, 1711. 

The treaty commenced with a recital that By the grace of 
God, the victorious Mussulman army had closely hemmed in the 


333 


ACHMET III. A.D. 1703-1730. 

Czar of Muscovy with all his troops in the neighbourhood of the 
river Pruth, and that the Czar had asked for peace, and that it 
was at his request that the following articles were drawn up and 
granted : 

By the first article the Czar was to surrender the fortress of 
Azoph and its territories, and dependencies, in the same condition 
as they were in when the Czar took possession of them. 

By the second article the Czar consented that his new city of 
Taganrok, in the Sea of Azoph, his fortifications at Kamienski, and 
his new castle on the river Taman should be destroyed, and that they 
should never be rebuilt. The cannon and all the military stores 
of the Czar at Kamienski were to be given up to the Sublime 
Porte. 

The third article stipulated that the Czar should no longer 
interfere in the affairs of the Poles, or of the Cossacks, who were 
dependent either on the Poles or on the Khan of the Crimea : and 
all the Russian forces in their territories were to be withdrawn. 

The fourth provided for freedom of commerce ; but directed 
that in future, no Russian ambassador should reside at Constanti¬ 
nople. It is probable that the Russian intrigues with the Greeks 
and other Rayas may have caused this stipulation. 

The fifth article required that the Russians should set at liberty 
all the Moslems whom they had taken prisoners, or made slaves 
of, either before or during the war. 

The sixth declared that, inasmuch as the King of Sweden had 
placed himself beneath the wings of the mighty protection of the 
Sublime Porte, he should have a free and safe passage to his own 
kingdom without any hindrance from the Muscovites : and it was 
recommended that Russia and Sweden should make peace with 
each other, if they could come to an understanding. 

The seventh ordained that in future the Porte should do no 
harm to the Muscovites, and that they should do none to the 
subjects and dependents of the Sublime Porte. 

The treaty concluded with a declaration of the Grand Vizier, 
that the royal and infinite goodness of his thrice powerful and 
gracious Lord and Padischah was entreated to ratify those articles, 
and to overlook the previous evil conduct of the Czar. It averred 
that the Vizier made the peace by virtue of full powers vested in 
him. It directed that hostages should be given by the Czar for 
the fulfilment of the articles, and that the army of the Czar might 
then return forthwith by the nearest road to their own country, 
without being molested by the victorious forces, by the Tartars, 
or by any other persons whatever. The Chancellor Baron Schaffi- 



HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


334 

roff, and General Scheremitoff, were given up to the Ottomans, r.3 
hostages; and then the Czar and his surviving troops, glad at this 
escape from destruction, but shame and sorrow-stricken at their 
losses and humiliations, marched back from the fatal banks of the 
Pruth to the Russian territories. 

It has been said by an able investigator of Turkish history and 
institutions, 1 that “The genius of the Ottoman Empire slumbered 
when the treaty of the Pruth was signed and it might be in¬ 
teresting to speculate on the probable complexion that would have 
been given to the subsequent history of the world if Baltadji 
Mehemet had availed himself to the utmost of the advantages 
which the Turkish arms possessed when the Russians supplicated 
for peace; if the Czar and his troops had then perished, and 
Charles had been sent with strong supplies back to Sweden, to 
seek his revenge for Pultowa. Many of the reforms which Russia 
owes to Peter the Great, were scarcely commenced in 1711. 
None were mature. It is quite possible, that by his death or 
captivity at that period, Russia might have been remanded into 
barbarism; and also that Sweden might have recovered and 
retained the international rank which Gustavus Adolphus formerly 
gave her, that of a first-class European power, and the dominant 
state of the north. 

With regard to the personal conduct of the chief actors in the 
campaign and pacification of the Pruth, the Czar more than com¬ 
pensated for any want of generalship which he may have shown, 
by the magnanimity which he displayed as a patriot and a sove¬ 
reign, when encompassed by his enemies, and reduced to the 
apparent extremity of adverse fortune. His body was at this 
time prostrated by an attack of a fearful malady, to which he was 
subject, but his spirit was unshaken ; and a letter, written by him 
from his tent at the Pruth to the Russian Senate at Moscow on the 
evening before Catherine made her happy attempt at negotiation, 
“ ensures to Peter a place among the heroes of antiquity, for he 
thereby sacrifices himself and his family for the well-being of the 
empire.” 2 Fortunately for the fame of the great Czar, the bearer 
of that letter passed the Turkish lines in safety, and conveyed it 
to the Russian Senate, while the pacification was yet unknown. 
That document is preserved in the Imperial palace at St. Peters¬ 
burg ; nor is there the least reason to question its authenticity, or 
to doubt that it represents the genuine feelings of Peter on the 
occasion when it was written. It is as follows :—“ I announce to 
you, that deceived by false intelligence, and without blame on my 
1 Thornton. 2 Schlosser. 


ACHMET III. A.D. 1705 - 1730 . 335 

part, I find myself here shut up in my camp by a Turkish army four 
times stronger than mine. Our supplies are cut off; and we 
momentarily expect to be destroyed or taken prisoners, unless 
Heaven come to our aid in some unexpected manner. Should it 
happen to me to be taken captive by the Turks, you will no longer 
consider me your Czar and Sovereign, nor will you pay attention 
to any order that may be brought to you from me ; not even if you 
recognise my own handwriting: but you will wait for my coming 
in person. If I am to perish here, and you receive well confirmed 
intelligence of my death, you will then proceed to choose as my 
successor him who is the most worthy among you.” 1 Codrus or 
Leonidas could not have surpassed the unselfish heroism that was 
shown here. Francis I. and Charles XII. were far beneath it. 

The debt of Russia to Catherine, who united all woman’s wit to 
all man’s firmness at the Pruth, was worthily acknowledged by 
Russia’s sovereign in 1724, when Peter caused her to be solemnly 
crowned as Empress, and proclaimed to his subjects and the world, 
how Catherine had aided him at the battle of the river Pruth 
against the Turks, where “ our [the Russian] army was reduced to 
22,000 men, and that of the Turks consisted of 270,000. It was 
in this desperate exigency that she especially signalised her zeal 
with courage superior to her sex, and to this all the army and the 
whole empire can bear witness.” Historians of all natio7is have 
vied with each other in repeating these praises of the heroine of 
the Pruth; but with respect to the third chief actor in that memo¬ 
rable scene, the Turkish commander, a far different tone has pre¬ 
vailed both among his contemporaries, and among those who in 
subsequent times have discussed that crisis in the affairs of the 
Muscovite and the Ottoman nations. The current charge against 
the Vizier is that he was bribed by the gifts of Catherine, and 
consented to the escape of the deadly enemies of his country. It 
has been replied to this, on behalf of Mehemet Baltadji, that all 
^re presents which Catherine had in her power in the Russian 
camp at the Pruth to offer to him and his Kiaya, even if all that 
she could collect from the officers and soldiers were added to her 
own jewels and furs, must have been quite insignificant as bribes 
for one in the station of Grand Vizier. It may also be thought 
that the Turkish commander, if avaricious, could have gratified 
his avarice better by compelling an unconditional surrender of 
the Russian army, and all that it possessed; in which case he 
■would also have had a prospect of obtaining rich gifts from the 
friends of the chief captives in order to secure his influence for 
1 Levesque, “ Histoire de Russie,” vol. iv. p. 410, n. 


336 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

their release. By some it has been thought that the Vizier favoured 
the Czar, out of dislike to his rival the King of Sweden, who had 
treated Mehemet Baltadji with injudicious rudeness and contempt. 
But so many other methods of punishing the ill-manners of Charles 
were open to the Vizier, if he chose to do so, that it is difficult to 
suppose such a motive to have been the primary principle of his 
conduct in signing the armistice with the Muscovite commanders. 
It is impossible to suppose that the Vizier feared the effect of a 
desperate attack by the enemy, whom he spared, or to adopt the 
opinion expressed by one historian of Russia, 1 that the Russians 
at the Pruth would probably have defeated the Turkish force if 
they had boldly attacked it. They had already been worsted in 
several engagements; and the spirit and discipline of Mehemet 
Baltadji’s army were far superior to those of the oft-defeated Otto¬ 
man troops whom Romanzoff afterwards broke through in a 
similar situation. The Czar’s confession of his extreme distress 
(made by him both at the time in his letter to the Senate, and in 
the armistice, and also afterwards in the treaty of 1713, and in 
the proclamation calling Catherine to the throne), is decisive 
evidence that the condition of the Russian army was forlorn, when 
the Vizier consented to treat. It was probably on no one fixed 
principle, or from any one definite motive that the Turkish com¬ 
mander acted, when he took the half-measure of releasing his prey 
on conditions which humiliated and injured, without incapacitating 
for revenge. Mehemet Baltadji deserves credit as a military man 
for his conduct of the war; but, though we may acquit him of 
corruption, the pacification by which he concluded the campaign, 
must be censured as grievously unstatesmanlike. If it was his 
desire to disarm the hostility of Russia by generous moderation, 
he exacted too much ; if he wished to crush her power, he did 
too little. The advice of the old Samnite, Herennius Pontius, to 
his son, when he held the Roman legions in his power at Caudium, 
even as Mehemet Baltadji held the Russians at the Pruth, was 
sound and true. “Frank generosity may, in such cases, win a 
friend; or stern severity may destroy an enemy. To halt be¬ 
tween the two is pernicious imbecility.” 2 Turkey had as deep 
cause as Samnium to rue the middle course that was taken by her 

1 Levesque, vol. iv. p. 415. 

2 “ Ista quidem sententia ea est, qune neque anficos parat, neque inimicos 
tollit. Servate modo quos ignominia in itaveritis, et ea est Horn an a gena 
quse victa quiescere nesciat. \ ivet semper in pectoribus illorum quicquid 
istue prsesens necessitas inusserit; neque eos ante multiplies pceuas ex 
petitas a vobis quiescere sinet,”—Livy, lib. ix. c. 3 . 


ACHMET III ; A.D. 1703 - 1730 . 337 

general. Though the war between Russia and the Ottoman Porte 
did not actually break out again during the lifetime of Peter, it 
is well known that he designed its renewal, and made immense 
preparation for that purpose, of which the leaders of the Russian 
armies availed themselves in the campaign against the Crimea in 
1736. 1 The heritage of hatred and revenge passed undiminished 
to Peter’s successors; and Russia taught Turkey in 1774, when 
the anniversary of the treaty of the Pruth was carefully selected 
for the signature of the treaty of Kainardji, that the ignominy 
which Mehemet Baltadji had inflicted on the great Czar, was 
neither forgiven nor forgotten. 

The indignation of Charles XII. at the pacification of the Pruth, 
his refusal to leave the Turkish dominions, and his obstinate con¬ 
flict at Bender with the Spahis and Janissaries sent to remove 
him, are well-known passages of the biography of that adven¬ 
turous prince. It was not only by the partisans of the Swedish 
King at the Sultan’s court that the Grand Vizier was assailed 
with reproaches for his suspicious lenity to the Russians. The 
general discontent of the Turks was such that Achmet deposed 
Mehemet Baltadji from the vizierate; and the two officers who 
were believed to have been most active at the Pruth in forward¬ 
ing the peace, the Kiaya Osman Aga, and the Reis Effendi, were 
put to death at Constantinople by the public executioner. The 
delay of the Russians in fulfilling the treaty increased the irrita¬ 
tion of the Porte against the Czar ; and it was with considerable 
difficulty that the English ambassador, Sir Robert Sutton, and the 
Dutch ambassador, Collyer, prevented a new declaration of war 
on the part of the Turks. By their mediation a treaty was signed 
on the 16th of April, 1712, which substantially re-enacted the 
stipulations agreed on at the Pruth, and explicitely provided that 
the Czar should withdraw his troops from Poland within thirty 
days. But the Russian sovereign showed no disposition to cease 
from his armed interference in the affairs of that unhappy country; 
and, in the East, though some of the smaller fortifications which 
had been raised by him near the Sea of Azoph and the Black Sea, 
were demolished by his orders, the important new city of Taganrok 
was maintained by him, nor was Azoph itself surrendered to the 
Turks. The Sultan again prepared for war ; but again the inter¬ 
vention of the English and Dutch ministers was successful. A 
treaty was finally arranged in 1713, between Russia and Turkey ; 
of which the first six and the eleventh articles corresponded with 
the seven articles dictated by Mehemet Baltadji at the Pruth. 

* See Manstein’s “Memoirs of Marshal Miinnieh,” p. 117. 

22 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


338 

The eleventh article determined the respective frontiers of the 
two empires between the rivers Samara and Orel in such a manner 
that the territory near the banks of the Samara was thenceforth 
to belong to the Turks, and that washed by the Orel to the 
Russians. Eastward of those rivers to the Don and to Azoph 
the boundary was to be the same that it had been before the first 
Russian occupation of Azoph. It was stipulated that on the one 
part the Cossacks and the Calmucks, and on the other, the Tartars 
of the Crimea, the Noghai Tartars, and the Circassians, who were 
subject to the Porte, should cease from molesting each other. 
Rive commissioners were appointed to mark out the frontier line 
in accordance with those terms. This was effected in the course 
of the year 1714. Azoph was then restored to the Turks, and 
Taganrok demolished; and the great strife between Turkey and 
Russia now ceased for an unusually long period ; though the Czar 
never forgot his purposes of ambition and revenge, and the collec¬ 
tion of magazines and military stores at the river Don was 
continued throughout his reign. 1 

The Grand Vizierate was at this time held by Sultan Achmet's 
favourite son-in-law, Damad Ali, called by some writers Ali 
Coumourgi, the name by which he is immortalised in English 
poetry. 2 He was a statesman of considerable administrative 
ability, an eloquent speaker, and distinguished for his literary 
acquirements. The character of wild and bigoted ferocity, which 
has sometimes been ascribed to him, is erroneous. He was an 
earnest advocate of the peace with Russia; but he willingly 
promoted the scheme of a war of retaliation and recovery against 
Venice, a design which the Porte had never ceased to cherish 
since the peace of Carlowitz. At the very time of that treaty 
the Turks seem to have been well aware of the weakness of the 
Venetian Republic, if unsupported by the great powers of 
Christendom; and, when they ceded the Morea, it was with the 
knowledge that they were powerful enough to regain it, whenever 
they could compel Venice to fight single-handed against them. 3 

1 See Manstein’s “Memoirs of Marshal Mimnich,” ut supra. 

2 See Byron’s “ Siege of Corinth.” 

3 “A consciousness of the real weakness of Venice, and of their own 
ability at some more opportune period to reclaim their possessions, was, no 
doubt, one powerful cause of the facility with which the Porte acceded to 
the treaty of Carlowitz; and Cantemir relates an anecdote of the Reis 
iEffendi, which amply supports the assumption. During the Conference of 
the Plenipotentiaries, previous to the accommodation of the articles, the 
ambassador of Venice had conducted himself rather haughtily towards the 
ministers of Turkey, when the officer I have alluded to gave him a cutting 


ACHMET III. A.D. 1703 - 1730 . 339 

The feebleness shown by Venice during the great war among the 
Christian states, which was closed by the treaties of Utrecht and 
Rastadt; her timorous inaction, which she vainly strove to hide 
under the pretext of dignified neutrality; and the contemptuous 
infringements of her territory by the belligerent parties all tended 
to excite the Ottomans to attack her. Her great Captain Morosini, 
to whose individual genius her victories in the last war were mainly 
due, was now dead; and it was known that so far from having 
strengthened her hold on the Morea by winning the affections of 
the Greeks, and binding them to her cause by a feeling of com- 
munitv of creed and of interest against the Turks, she was as 
bitterly hated in her new province, as she had formerly been 
hated by her subjects in Cyprus and Candia; and that the Moreotes 
would rather be under the rule of the Mahometans than under 
that of the schismatics of the Latin Church. The Turks had 
made great military preparations in 1712 and 1713, in conse¬ 
quence of the expectation then prevalent of a renewal of hostili¬ 
ties with Russia: and, when the risk of war in that quarter had 
ceased, it was resolved to employ the forces of the empire in a 
sudden and overwhelming attack upon Venice. The Grand Vizier, 
Damad Ali, led this enterprise the more readily, because he was a 
firm believer in astrology, and the language of the stars announced 
to him in 1715 that he was to be the conqueror of the Morea. 
Some collisions that had taken place between the Turkish and 
Venetian galleys, and the aid which Venice had given, or was said 
to have given, to the insurgents of Montenegro, served as pretexts 
for the war. The Grand Vizier led an army of 100,000 men, 
supported by a fleet of 100 sail, against the weak Venetian force 
in the Morea, in the summer of 1715. The siege of Corinth was 
terminated by the fall of that city on the 25th of June ; Palamidi, 
Napoli di Romania, Mo don, and Koron, were captured by the 
triumphant Vizier, with almost equal celerity. The operations of 
the Turkish fleet were no less successful; and, by the end of 
November, 1715, Venice had lost the whole of the Morea, and had 
been driven from all the islands of the Archipelago. 

The Ottomans designed to follow up their success by attacking 


reproof, by relating a proverb of a pickpocket having slily crept in and 
stolen away the garments of two athletic wrestlers, which they had for a 
moment doffed for the sake of convenience ; but, he added, that a period 
was fast approaching when the thief should be obliged to surrender his 
booty, and, in all probability, be obliged to yield up his skin along with his 
borrowed habiliments.”—Emerson Tennant’s “Modern Greece,” vol. i. 
p. 240. 



340 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Corfu, and then proceeding to assail the Venetian possessions 
along the coasts of the Adriatic. But the Emperor Charles VI., 
who at first only offered his mediation between the belligerents, 
had now decided on taking a more active part; ostensibly for the 
sake of protecting the Venetians, but it is probable that hopes of 
aggrandising himself by further conquests from the Turks princi¬ 
pally led him to form an offensive and defensive alliance with 
Venice, in the beginning of the year 1716. 1 The greater number 
of the Turkish statesmen and generals were anxious to avoid a 
war with the Germans ; but the Grand Vizier was eager to attack 
them. He had again had recourse to his favourite astrological 
science; and the stars appeared to promise him victory over 
Austria, as clearly as in the preceding year they had assured him 
of triumph over Venice. His self-conceit also was inflated by 
success ; and, in the words of his Turkish biographer Raschid, “ his 
pride had spread the veil of negligence before the eye of his 
sagacity.” War was declared against Austria in a council held at 
Adrianople ; and the Fetva of the Mufti sanctioning the war was 
solemnly read before the assembled dignitaries of the Sword and 
Pen. The Grand Vizier had shown in previous Divans that he 
would brook no opposition to his martial policy, and he now ad¬ 
dressed them thus: “We are not met here to waste idle words 
about the necessity of a war, which we have already resolved on, 
but to excite ourselves to conduct it in a fitting manner, and in 
accordance with the word of the Prophet, ‘ Fight against the 
unbelievers, and be wrathful with them.’ Ye, Sirs, who are learned 
in the law, what say ye 1” Some of the Ulema, whom the Grand 
Vizier thus addressed, replied, “ God speed you and give you 
success.” Others referred to the generals present, as the fit 
persons to answer. The Grand Vizier glanced at the military 
members of the Divan, and they all protested in loud and strong 
words that they were the Padischah’s slaves, and that they were 
ready to offer themselves, body and soul, in the service of the 
Faith and the Empire. The Grand Vizier then said, “ Beyond 
doubt, God will give us the victory, if we obey the precept, 

‘ Exult not, and despond not, so shall ye prevail.’ ” The Sheikh 
of the Imperial Camp closed the proceedings of the council by 

1 “Austria was now roused, in which at that time Prince Eugene had for¬ 
tunately the greatest influence. He found the circumstances very favour¬ 
able ; and besides, a war with the Turks would serve as an excellent pretext 
for keeping the army on foot, without raising the suspicion of the Christian 
power, instead of disbanding it after the close of the war with France, as 
was the custom ; and this was the more desirable as Spain still continued 
threatening.”—Schlosser, “ Hist. Eighteenth Century,” vol. iii. p. 285. 


ACHMET III. A.D. 1703 - 1730 . 341 

reciting other verses of the chapter of the Koran, which the 
Grand Vizier had partly quoted, and which forms the noblest of 
the war hymns of the Mahometans. 1 

Damad Ali took, in person, the command of the forces that were 
to act against the Austrians. This army was assembled at Bel¬ 
grade in July; and a council of war was held there, in which (as 
at the opening of the campaign under Sultan Mustapha, in 1696) 
it was debated whether Temeswar or Peterwaradin should be the 
point on which the troops should march. Housein, the Aga of 
the Janissaries, advised a movement towards Temeswar. The 
Khan of the Crimea (who, as usual, had joined the army at the 
Danube with his contingent of Tartar cavalry) proposed that an 
incursion should be made into Transylvania. The Beylerbey 
of Roumelia replied that they ought to remember the disaster of 
the Zenta, and not risk another army in the presence of Prince 
Eugene, along the difficult line of march to Temeswar. With 
regard to the scheme of an inroad into Transylvania, he remarked 
that, the Tartar cavalry, if once let loose on such an enterprise, 
would cumber themselves with plunder, and would thereafter be 
no more fit for warfare than so many pregnant women. Conse¬ 
quently, his voice was for the march on Peterwaradin, either to 
fight the enemy if he would give them battle, or to form the siege 
of that city The Grand Vizier heard the discussion without 
giving his own opinion, but he determined to march upon Peter¬ 
waradin, which he believed to be protected only by 1500 Aus¬ 
trians under Count Pfalfy, the main body of the army being en¬ 
camped at Futaks, under Prince Eugene. A bridge was accord¬ 
ingly formed across the river Saave, and the Turkish army moved 
along the south bank of the Danube towards Peterwaradin. It 
was remarked, and remembered by the Ottoman soldiery, as an 
evil omen, that their commander, though he might have chosen 
one of the lucky days of the week for the passage of the Saave, 
such as Saturday, Monday, or Thursday, yet thought fit to cross 
the river on a Tuesday, and not in the fortunate hour of morning, 
but in the afternoon. 

The first encounter with the Austrians took place near Carlo- 
witz. The Turks found a body of the enemy’s troops posted 
there, under Count Pfalfy, amounting to 8000 men, according to 
the Ottoman historians; to 3000, according to the reports of the 
German generals. Kourd Pacha, who commanded the Turkish 
vanguard, demanded of the Grand Vizier, and obtained permission 
to charge them; and thus the first act of hostilities, by which the 
1 See chapter iii. of the Koran, and Sale’s notes. 


242 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

peace of Carlowitz between the Houses of Hapsburg and Ottoman 
was formally broken, took place in the immediate vicinity of the 
spot where the treaty had been signed. The Turks were victori¬ 
ous in the action, and took 700 prisoners, among whom was 
General Count Brenner. On the following day, Damad Ali con¬ 
tinued his advance upon Peterwaradin, which is only two leagues 
from Carlowitz. But Prince Eugene had already taken up a 
position across the intended Turkish line of march. He encamped 
in the very entrenchments which Surmeli Pacha had formed in 
the last war. Damad Ali halted his army in presence of the 
Austrians, and kept his men under arms for three hours, in the 
expectation that Eugene would sally from his lines and attack 
him. But the Austrians moved not, and the Vizier hesitated to 
assail them in their fortified camp. He ordered his men to break 
ground, and form trenches as if for a siege; and the Turks 
laboured so zealously during the night that before morning they 
had pushed the approaches within a hundred feet of the Austrian 
camp. 

On the following day (13th August, 1716), Eugene drew out 
his forces for a regular battle, which Damad Ali had no wish to 
avoid. Eugene had 187 squadrons of horse and 62 battalions of 
infantry. He arranged them so that the left wing was protected 
by a marsh, and his right by some rising ground. The Turkish 
army numbered 150,000, of whom 40,000 were Janissaries, and 
30,000 Spahis; the rest consisted of Tartars, Wallachians, Arna- 
outs, and Egyptians. Ali drew up his cavalry on the right wing 
to oppose that of the Austrians; his infantry was ranged in the 
centre and on the left. The battle began at seven in the morning. 
The German cavalry proved their superiority to the Asiatic in 
regular charges, a*nd the victory of the Christians seemed secure, 
when the Janissaries on the Turkish left broke the Austrian 
infantry, routed the wing opposed to them, and pressed hard upon 
the centre. Eugene immediately brought up a reserve of horse, 
with which he charged the Janissaries, and retrieved the fortunes 
of the day. The Grand Vizier, during the beginning of the 
action, took his station near the Sacred Standard of the Prophet, 
which was displayed in front of his tent; he remained there till 
Turk Ahmed, the commander of his right wing, was slain, and 
till the flying Spahis from that part of the battle began to sweep 
by him, heedless of the reproaches and sabre strokes by which he 
strove to check their panic rout. Damad Ali then put himself at the 
head of a body of officers, and galloped forward into the thick of 
the fight. A bullet pierced his forehead, and he fell mortally 


ACHMET III. A.D. 1703 - 1730 . 343 

wounded. His followers placed him on a horse, and removed 
him to Carlowitz, where he soon expired. Two of the Turkish 
generals and the historian Raschid formed a guard round the 
Sacred Standard, and bore it safely away to Belgrade. As soon 
as their flight and the Grand Vizier’s fall were known in the left 
wing, where Sari Ahmed, the Beylerbey of Anatolia commanded, 
the Janissaries who had hitherto combated valiantly, gave way, 
and retreated towards Belgrade. The battle was over at noon. 
3000 Germans and twice that number of Turks had fallen. 
Eugene took possession of his enemy’s camp, and 140 cannon; 
150 banners, five horse-tails, and an immense amount of booty 
and military stores were the trophies of the prince’s victory. But 
the joy of the Austrians was troubled by the sight of the body of 
the unfortunate General Brenner, which was found barbarously 
mutilated. 

The chief surviving Turkish officers, who re-assembled their 
defeated forces at Belgrade, after paying the last honours to the 
corpse of Damad Ali, met together in the tent of the Sacred Stan¬ 
dard to draw up a report of the disastrous campaign to be sent to 
Constantinople, and to elect a provisional commander of the army. 
Sari Ahmed Pacha, the Beylerbey of Roumelia, was next in rank 
to the slain Grand Vizier, and was entitled to assume the chief 
authority; but he declined the office, from fear of exposing him¬ 
self to the envious intrigues of the Kiaya, who was with the 
troops, and who was the object of universal hatred and fear. The 
other generals felt a similar reluctance. But they all concurred 
in resolving that the Kiaya should not take the command of the 
forces ; and the remark made by one of the council, that it could 
not be the Sultan’s wish for that functionary to lead the army, in¬ 
asmuch as he had not received the horse-tails, was admitted to be 
conclusive. At last, a deputation of the troops prevailed on Sari 
Ahmed to take the commancl-in-chief; but he was soon afterwards 
put to death in a mutiny of the garrison of Belgrade, whom he 
had irritated by a severe reprimand. 

A feeble attempt was made by the Turks to relieve the impor¬ 
tant city of Temeswar, the last bulwark of Islam in Hungary, 
the siege of which had been commenced by Prince Eugene twenty 
days after his victory at Peterwaradin. Eugene defeated Kourd 
Pacha, who led a division of the Ottoman army against him, and 
Temeswar capitulated on the 28th of November, 1716. At the be¬ 
ginning of the war, Eugene had endeavoured to rouse the Servians 
and their kindred tribes beyond the Saave to co-operate with the 
Austrians, and had promised them the aid of the Emperor’s armies 


344 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

to shake off the yoke of Turkish oppression. The Servian youth 
flocked zealously under Eugene’s banners; and after the fall of 
Temeswar a corps of 1200 Servians, under the command of the 
Imperial General Dettin, made an inroad into Wallachia, and pene¬ 
trated as far as Bucharest. 

The great object of the Austrian operations in the year 1717 
was the capture of Belgrade. Eugene invested that city in June 
with a magnificent army of 80,000 men, which comprised great 
numbers of the princes and nobles of Germany and France, who 
sought distinction by serving under so renowned a commander as 
Eugene, and in so brilliant an enterprise. Belgrade was garrisoned 
by 30,000 Turks, who resisted their besiegers bravely, and en¬ 
dured with patience a blockade of two months. In the beginning 
of August, an Ottoman army, 150,000 strong, under a new Grand 
Vizier, advanced to attempt the rescue of Belgrade. Eugene’s 
troops had suffered severely during the siege; and, if the Turks 
had attacked him promptly on their arrival, their superiority of 
numbers and condition, and the panic caused by their appearance, 
would, in all probability, have assured their victory. But the 
Grand Vizier hesitated, and held councils of war, and formed 
earthworks and redoubts round the lines of the Austrian army, 
which was now besieged in its turn, but which rapidly regained 
its former confidence in itself and its commander, on finding that 
the foes, notwithstanding their numbers, delayed the expected 
attack. The greater part of the Imperialist forces was posted 
round Belgrade, between the Danube and the Saave, but there 
were strong detachments on the opposite banks of these rivers, 
which were required to keep the garrison in check and complete 
the investment of the city. The Vizier’s army was ranged round 
the rear of Eugene’s main force, in a large semicircle, from the 
south bank of the Danube to the east bank of the Saave. For 
fifteen days the Vizier kept up a heavy cannonade upon the 
Austrian lines; which Eugene replied to with all the artillery 
that he could safely withdraw from the batteries against the city; 
but the sufferings of the Austrian troops from fatigue, disease, and 
want of provisions were so severe, that the liberation of Belgrade 
and the capture or destruction of the besiegers seemed inevitable. 
The Vizier now drew his works nearer to those of the Austrian en¬ 
trenchment ; the cannonade grew fiercer, and the Turks were 
evidently making preparations to storm the Imperialists’ lines of 
defence. In this emergency, Eugene resolved on the daring 
measure of anticipating the enemy’s assault, and of leading his 
enfeebled and scanty army against the strong fortifications and 


ACHMET III . A.D . 1703 - 1730 . 345 

immense numbers of the Vizier’s host. He made the attack at 
two in the morning of the 16th of August, with complete success. 
The Turkish outposts were negligent; the discipline of their 
whole army was lax ; they had slept in careless confidence ; they 
"woke to panic confusion: and when once the Christian columns 
were within their works, the greater part of them fled without 
even attempting resistance. 10,000 Ottomans were slain or 
trampled to death in flight. Their camp, their artillery, and the 
whole of their military stores were captured. Belgrade surren¬ 
dered on the second day after the battle. Eugene had the pru¬ 
dence to grant favourable terms of capitulation to its numerous 
garrison ; and a campaign which had seemed likely to be marked 
with his utter ruin and the destruction of the Austrian army, was 
thus terminated by him with a splendid triumph and a most im¬ 
portant conquest. 

The Porte now sought earnestly for peace with Austria; and 
the proffered mediation of England and Holland was again gladly 
accepted. The Court of Vienna was at this time alarmed at the 
prospects of a new general war in the west of Europe, which had 
been created by the restless genius of Cardinal Alberoni. The 
victorious career of Eugene in the East was therefore checked ; 
and the Emperor determined to secure the conquests which had 
been already won, by treating with Turkey on the basis of the 
“ Uti Possidetis ” though a negotiation on this principle was a 
flagrant sacrifice of the interests of Venice, the ally for whose sake 
Austria had pretended to embark in the war. The operations of 
the Venetian and Turkish forces against each other during 1716 
and 1717 had been unimportant, in comparison with the great 
events of the war on the Danube and the Saave. Corfu had been 
ably defended for Venice against the Turks by Count Stahremberg 
and a German force; and several sea-fights had taken place, in 
which the Republic of St. Mark had generally the advantage. 
But it was obvious that Turkey, if once liberated from an Austrian 
war, was far too powerful for Venice to cope with ; and the 
humbled Queen of the Adriatic was obliged to consent to a pacifi¬ 
cation, in which she was the chief sufferer, and Austria the chief 
gainer ; while their common enemy, the Porte, might be thought 
to indemnify herself for the cessions made by her to the latter 
power, by the acquisition which she obtained at the expense of 
the former. 

The negotiations for peace were opened at a small town in 
Servia, called Passarowitz, in June, 1718. The representatives of 
the mediating states, England and Holland, were present, as had 


346 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

been the case at Carlowitz. The articles of peace were solemnly 
signed on the 21st of July. Venice gave up the Morea to the 
Porte; and though she retained a few fortresses, which she had 
acquired in Dalmatia or Albania, she was obliged to make over to 
the Sultan the unconquered districts of Zarine, Ottovo, and Zubzi 
in order to keep open the Turkish communications with Ragusa.^ 
Her cession of the Morea showed that the power and glory of 
Venice had departed from her with the last of her heroes, Moro- 
sini. After the peace of Passarowitz, Venice possessed no part of 
Greece except the Ionian Islands; and, on the Albanian coast, 
she had nothing but the cities and districts of Butrinto, Parga, 
and Prevesa, a little strip of territory two leagues broad, and 
twenty in length. Like Spain, Venice had been illustrious as a 
defender of Christendom against the Ottomans, when the power 
of Turkey was at its height; and, like Spain, Venice sank into 
corruption and imbecility, even more rapidly than their fast- 
declining antagonist. 

Austria, by the treaty of Passarowitz, not only obtained the 
city of Temeswar and its territory, and thus completed the 
recovery of Hungary from the Turkish power; but she then 
extended her dominion over large portions of Wallachia and 
Servia—aggrandisements of her empire, which she failed to 
retain long, but which were long remembered by her rulers with 
ambitious regret and desire. The treaty of 1718 assigned to 
Austria the cities of Belgrade, Semendra, Rimnik, Krasova, and 
many more. It made the river Aluta, in Wallachia, the boundary 
of the two empires, thus assigning to Austria the whole of the 
country termed Little Wallachia. Six other rivers, the Danube, 
the Timok, the little Morava, the Dwina, the Saave, and the Unna 
then formed the frontier line : so that nearly all Servia and some 
valuable territories in Bosnia, were transferred from the Sultan to 
the House of Hapsburg. The Austrians had not indeed realised 
the threat expressed by some of their generals in the first year of 
the war, when they boasted that they would go on conquering 
until the Austrian Empire touched the Black Sea and the ZEgean; 
but Eugene gave to the Emperor Charles VI. a dominant position 
in Eastern Europe, such as the most renowned of his predecessors 
had never acquired, and which that Emperor himself lost soon 
after the death of the great commander, to whom its temporary 
possession was due. 

It is difficult to read without a melancholy smile that Russia 
and Turkey, in 1720, made a solemn treaty of eternal peace with 
each other. At that time the Czar was menaced by a league 


ACHMET III. A.D. 1705-1750. 347 

which was formed against him by many of his late allies, and 
which the Porte was vainly solicited to join by the ambassadors of 
Austria and England. This made Peter desirous to secure 
tranquillity, at least for a time, on his Turkish frontier: though 
he never abandoned his schemes for aggrandising his empire at 
the expense of its Mahometan neighbours. The next war in 
which Turkey and Russia took part, found them arrayed not as 
antagonists, but as confederates. The extreme weakness into 
which the Persian Empire had been reduced by misgovernment, 
insurrection, and the attacks of the Affghans, tempted both 
Muscovite and Ottoman cupidity ; and the armies of the Czar and 
the Sultan invaded the north-western provinces of Persia with the 
design of dismembering her, and of appropriating at least those 
portions of her empire. A partition treaty was signed by the 
Russian and Turkish ministers in 1723, by which the Czar was to 
take the Persian provinces that lie near the Caspian Sea, from the 
country of the Turcomans, round to the confluence of the Araxes 
and the Kur, and thence to Derbend. This assigned to Russia 
the districts of Asterabacl, Mazanderad, Gliilan, part of Schirvan, 
and Daghistan. The acquisitions of the Porte were to be traced 
out by a line drawn from the junction of the Araxes and the Kur, 
and passing along by Erdebil, Tabriz, and Hamadan, and thence 
to Kermanschai. The Persian Shah Tahmasp was to retain the 
rest of his paternal kingdom on condition of his recognising the 
treaty. Both Russia and Turkey had already attacked parts of 
Persia before that treaty was signed; and the Porte had manifested 
considerable jealousy of the extension of the power of the Czar 
along the shores of the Caspian. But the Russian diplomatists 
were too skilful for the Turkish, and prevailed on them to assent 
to terms, which (besides the original injustice of the whole 
transaction with regard to Persia) were very unequal, and very 
disadvantageous for the Ottomans : inasmuch as the Czar had 
already led his troops down from Astrakhan between the Caucasus 
and-the Caspian, and secured the greater part of the countries 
assigned to him by the treaty; while nearly all the territories, 
which Turkey was to gain, remained yet to be conquered. The 
Ottomans however subdued a large part of Georgia; and they 
strengthened their positions in Mingrelia, Imeritia, Gouriel, and 
other Caucasian districts, eastward of the Black Sea, which had 
long acknowledged the supremacy of the Porte, or of the Porte’s 
vassal, the Khan of the Crimea, but where little effective 
authority of the Sultan had been practically exercised. The 
Turkish Court sought to palliate to itself the moral iniquity of 


343 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

the war upon Persia by procuring a Fetva from the Mufti, which 
sanctioned all hostilities against the Schiis, and expressly 
required the orthodox Mahometans to put the men of an heretical 
nation to the edge of the sword, and to reduce their wives and 
children to slavery. The polemical adage that a heretic is worse 
than an infidel, has nowhere been more frequently verified than 
in the Divans of Sunnite Turkey. 

The abilities of Sultan Achmet’s Grand Vizier Ibrahim, who 
directed the government from 1718 to 1730, preserved an unusual 
degree of internal peace in the empire, though the frontier 
provinces were often the scenes of disorder and revolt. This was 
repeatedly the case in Egypt and Arabia; and still more frequently 
in the districts northward and eastward of the Euxine, especially 
among the fierce Noghai tribes of the Kuban. The state of the 
countries between the Black Sea and the Caspian was rendered 
still more unsettled by the rival claims of Eussia and the Porte ; 
for it was difficult to define a boundary between the two empires 
in pursuance of the partition treaty of 1723; and a serious dispute 
arose early in the reign of Achmet’s successor, in 1731, as to the 
right of dominion over the Circassians of the Kabartas, a region 
about half way between the Euxine and the Caspian, near the 
course of the river Terek. The Kussians claimed the Kabartas as 
lands of Eussian subjects. They asserted that the Circassians 
were originally Cossacks of the Ukraine, who migrated thence to 
the neighbourhood of a city of Eussia called Terki, from which 
they took their name of Tchercassians, or Circassians. Thence 
(according to the memorial drawn up by the Czar’s ministers) the 
Circassians removed to the neighbourhood of Kuban: still, how¬ 
ever, retaining their Christian creed and their allegiance to the 
Czar. The continuation of the story told that the tyranny of the 
Crirn Tartars forced the Circassians to become Mahometans, and 
to migrate farther eastward to the Kabartas ; but it was insisted 
on that the Circassians were still to be regarded as genuine 
subjects of their original earthly sovereign, and that the land 
which they occupied became the Czar’s territory. 1 This strange 
political ethnology had but little influence upon the Turks, 
especially as the Czar had in a letter, written nine years previously, 
acknowledged the sovereignty of the Sultan over the Circassians. 

The course of the Persian war, in which the Turks had at first 
made successive conquests with little check from the Shah’s 
armies, though often impeded by the nature of the country and 
the fierce spirit of the native tribes, became after a few years less 
1 See Von Hammer, book lxvi. note 1. 


ACHMET III. A.D. 1703 - 1730 . 349 

favourable to Ottoman ambition. The celebrated Nadir Kouli 
Khan (who afterwards reconquered and conquered states for him¬ 
self). gained his first renown by exploits against the enemies of 
Shah Tahmasp. A report reached Constantinople that the lately 
despised Persians were victorious, and were invading the Ottoman 
Empire. This speedily caused excitement and tumult. Sultan 
Achmet had become unpopular by reason of the excessive pomp 
and costly luxury in which he and his principal officers indulged ; 
and on the 20 th of September, 1730, a mutinous riot of seventeen 
Janissaries, led by the Albanian Patrona Khalil, was encouraged 
by the citizens as well as the soldiery, till it swelled into an insur¬ 
rection, before which the Sultan quailed, and gave up the throne. 
Achmet voluntarily led his nephew Mahmoud to the seat of sove¬ 
reignty, and made obeisance to him as Padischah of the empire. 
He then retired to the apartments in the palace from whence his 
successor had been conducted, and died after a few years of con¬ 
finement. 

The reign of Achmet III., which had lasted for twenty-seven 
years, though marked by the deep disasters of the Austrian war, 
was, on the whole, neither inglorious nor unprosperous. The 
recovery of Azoph and the Morea, and the conquest of part of 
Persia, more than counterbalanced the territory which had been 
given up to the Austrian Emperor at the peace of Passarowitz. 
Achmet left the finances of the Ottoman Empire in a flourishing 
condition, which had been obtained without excessive taxation 
or extortionate rapacity. He was a liberal and discerning patron 
of literature and art; and it was in his time that the first printing 
press was set up in Constantinople. It was in this reign that an 
important change in the government of the Danubian Principali¬ 
ties was introduced. Hitherto, the Porte had employed Voivodes, 
or native Moldavian and Wallachian nobles, to administer those 
provinces. But after the war with Peter the Great in 1711, in 
which Prince Cantemir betrayed the Turkish and aided the Russian 
interests, the Porte established the custom of deputing Greeks 
from Constantinople as Hospodars, or viceroys, of Moldavia and 
Wallachia. These were generally selected from among the wealthy 
Greek families that inhabited the quarter of Constantinople called 
the Fanar, and constituted a kind of Raya Noblesse, which sup¬ 
plied the Porte with functionaries in many important departments 
of the state. The MoldoAVallachians called the period of their 
history, during which they were under Greek viceroys (and which 
lasted till 1821), the Fanariote period . 1 

1 Ubicini, vol. ii. p. 63. 


35° 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


CHAPTER XIX. 

MAHMOUD I.—TO PAL OSMAN—PEACE WITH PERSIA—RUSSIA AND 
AUSTRIA ATTACK TURKEY—RUSSIAN INVASIONS OF THE CRIMEA 
—SUCCESSES OF THE TURKS AGAINST THE AUSTRIANS—BEL¬ 
GRADE RECOVERED—TREATY OF BELGRADE—PACIFIC POLICY 
OF TURKEY—DEATH OF SULTAN MAHMOUD—SHORT PACIFIC 
REIGN OF OTHMAN III. 1 

Sultan Mahmoud was recognised by the mutineers, as well as by 
the court officials; but for some weeks after his accession the 
empire was in the hands of the insurgents. Their chief, Patrona 
Khalil, rode with the new Sultan to the Mosque of Eyoub, when 
the ceremony of girding Mahmoud with the sword of Othman was 
performed; and many of the chief officers were deposed, and 
successors to them were appointed at the dictation of the bold 
rebel, who had served in the ranks of the Janissaries, and who 
appeared before the Sultan bare-legged, and in his old uniform of 
a common soldier. A Greek butcher, named Yanaki, had formerly 
given credit to Patrona, and had lent him money during the three 
days of the late insurrection. Patrona showed his gratitude by 
compelling the Divan to make Yanaki Hospodar of Moldavia. 
The insolence of the rebel chiefs became at length insupportable. 
The Khan of the Crimea, whom they threatened to depose, was in 
Constantinople; and with his assistance the Grand Vizier, the 
Mufti, and the Aga of the Janissaries, succeeded in freeing the 
government from its ignominious servitude. Patrona was killed 
in the Sultan’s presence, after a Divan in which he had required 
that war should be declared against Russia. His Greek friend, 
Yanaki, and 7000 of those who had supported him, were also put 
to death. The jealousy which the officers of the Janissaries felt 
towards Patrona, and their readiness to aid in his destruction, 
facilitated greatly the exertions of the Sultan’s supporters in 
putting an end to the reign of rebellion, after it had lasted for 
nearly two months. 

The conduct of the war in Persia against the Turks was resumed 

1 Von Hammer, books 66-70. 


MAHMOUD I. A.D. 1750 - 1754 . 351 

in 1733, by Nadir Kouli Khan (during whose absence the Otto¬ 
mans had obtained considerable advantages), and that chieftain 
gave the Sultan’s forces several defeats, and laid siege to the city 
of Bagdad. But that important bulwark of the Ottoman Empire 
was rescued from him by the Grand Vizier, Topal Osman. 

This is a name justly celebrated by Christian as well as Maho¬ 
metan writers; and it is gratifying to turn from the scenes of 
selfish intrigue, and of violence and oppression, which the careers 
of Grand Viziers generally exhibit, and to pause on the character 
of a Turk of the last century, who was not only skilful, sage, and 
valiant, but who gave proofs of a noble spirit of generosity and 
gratitude, such as does honour to human nature. The English 
traveller, Han way, has given a biography of Topal Osman, which 
he introduces by saying that “ the design of it is to instruct us by 
example, which is confessedly the great use of history; and I am 
persuaded this relation will give pleasure to every one who does 
not think gratitude a pious frenzy, or that it is a virtue fit only for 
little minds, whose weakness betrays them into a passion, which 
clashes with self-love, so much the idol of mankind .” 1 

Osman was born in the Morea : he was educated in the Serail, 
at Constantinople, where native Turks were now frequently brought 
up, since the practice of levying Christian children for the Sultan’s 
service had been discontinued. At the age of twenty-six he had 
attained the rank of Beylerbey; and was sent on a mission from 
the Porte to the Governor of Egypt. On the voyage his ship 
encountered a Spanish corsair, and was captured after a brave 
defence, in the course of which Osman received a wound, which 
lamed him for life, whence he obtained his name of Topal or lame 
Osman. The Spanish pirates carried their prize into Malta, where 
a Frenchman of Marseilles, named Vincent Arnaud, was then 
harbour-master. Arnaud came on board the prize, and was scru¬ 
tinising the prisoners, when Osman addressed him, and said, 
“Can you do a generous and gallant action? Bansom me, and 
take my word you shall lose nothing by it.” Struck by Osman’s 
appearance and manner the Frenchman turned to the captain of 
the vessel, and asked the amount of the ransom. The answer was 
a thousand sequins, a sum nearly equal to £500. Arnaud then 
said to the Turk, “ I know nothing of you, and would you have 
me risk a thousand sequins on your bare word ?” Osman replied 
that Arnaud could not be blamed for not trusting to the word of 
a stranger ; “ but,” he added, “ I have nothing at present but my 
word of honour to give to you, nor do I pretend to assign any 

1 Hanway, vol. iii. p. 100. 


352 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

reason why you should trust to it. However, I tell you if you do 
trust to it, you shall have no occasion to repent.” The Oriental 
proverb says well that “ there are paths which lead straight from 
heart to heart.” Arnaud was so wrought upon by Osman’s frank 
and manly manner, that he prevailed on the Spaniards to set him 
at liberty for 600 sequins, which sum the generous Frenchman 
immediately paid. He provided Osman with a home and medical 
assistance until his wounds were healed ; and then gave him the 
means of proceeding on his voyage to Egypt. As soon as Osman 
reached Cairo, he sent back 1000 sequins as payment to Arnaud, 
with a present of 500 crowns, and of rich furs, which are con¬ 
sidered the most honourable of all gifts in the East. A few years 
afterwards, Osman signalised himself greatly in the Turkish re¬ 
conquest of the Morea, and in 1722 he was appointed Seraskier, 
and commanded all the Turkish troops in that country. He im¬ 
mediately invited Arnaud’s son to visit him in the Morea, and 
conferred mercantile privileges on the young man, and placed 
opportunities for lucrative commerce within his reach, which 
enabled him to accumulate large wealth, with which he returned 
to his father. In 1728 Osman was Governor of Iioumelia, and he 
then invited his French benefactor and his son to visit him at 
Nissa, his seat of government, where he treated them with dis¬ 
tinction and honour, such as no Ottoman Turk had ever before 
been seen to accord to a Christian. On taking leave of him at 
Nissa, Arnaud said, as a compliment, that he trusted to live to 
visit Osman as Grand Vizier, at Constantinople. When Topal 
Osman attained that rank in 1731, he again invited Arnaud and 
his son to become his guests ; and, receiving them in his palace, in 
the presence of the highest dignitaries of the state, Osman pointed 
out the elder Arnaud, and said, “ Behold this Frenchman : I was 
once a slave loaded with chains, streaming with blood, and covered 
with wounds : this is the man who redeemed and saved me ; this 
is my master and benefactor; to him I am indebted for life, liberty, 
fortqne, and everything I enjoy. Without knowing me, he paid 
for me a large ransom; sent me away upon my bare word, and 
gave me a ship to carry me where I pleased. Where is there even 
a Mussulman capable of such generosity 1” He then took both the 
Arnauds by the hand, and questioned them earnestly and kindly 
concerning their fortune and prospects, ending with an Asiatic 
sentence, “ God’s goodness is without bounds.” He afterwards 
gave them many receptions in private, when they met without 
ceremony as friends, and he sent them back to their country 
loaded with the richest presents. Hanway well remarks on this 


353 


MAHMOUD I. A.D. 1730-1754. 

exhibition of gratitude by the Vizier, that “ his behaviour was 
truly great and noble, since every action of his life demonstrates 
a mind superior to affectation. This conduct appears the more 
generous, when it is considered what contempt and aversion the 
prejudices of education often create in a Turk against the Chris¬ 
tian ; and, if we reflect further that this confession was made 
before his whole court, the action will appear in all its lustre.” 1 

Topal Osman was superseded in the Grand Vizierate in 1732. 
His friends and dependents lamented bitterly over his downfall, 
but Osman bore it with a nobler feeling than the ordinary stoicism 
of a T urk under misfortune. According to his English biographer, 
he summoned his friends and family round him, and addressed 
them thus : “ What is the reason of your affliction ? Have I not 
always said that the office of Grand Vizier is of all the most likely 
to be short! All my concern was I should get out of it with 
honour; and, thanks to God, I have done nothing with which I 
reproach myself. My master, the Sultan, approves of my services, 
and I resign with perfect satisfaction.” He then gave orders for 
rendering thanks to Heaven, as if it had been one of the most 
happy events of his life. 2 

Before Topal Osman had been long in retirement, the alarming 
progress of the Persian armies made the Porte again require 
his services; and he was sent into Asia as generalissimo of 
the Turkish armies in that continent, and was invested with 
almost unlimited powers. He marched to encounter the dreaded 
Nadir; and on the 19th July, 1733, gave him a complete over¬ 
throw in a pitched battle, near the banks of the Tigris, about 
twelve leagues from Bagdad. There is a narrative of this battle, 
written by Jean Nicodeme (who attended Topal Osman as his 
physician) to the Marquis of Villeneuve, which exhibits the 
manners and spirit of Osman in the same amiable and noble light 
in which they are presented to us by Hanway. He is represented 
as free from all pride and arrogance; he treated his soldiers as if 
they were his brothers; and all who served under his command 
regarded him with the strongest feelings of personal attachment. 
The movements of his troops were ably directed, and in the actual 
conflict his forces were handled by him with great judgment and 
decision. The French writer thus describes Topal Osman’s own 
conduct and demeanour on the day of battle. “ After he had 

1 Hanway’s “Travels,” part iii. p. 106. Hanway travelled in the East 
between 1743 and 1750. Von Hammer praises his works, and states that 
they were eulogised by Arago. 

2 Hanway, part iii. p. 106. 


354 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

prayed, lie mounted on horseback, which he had not done before 
throughout the campaign, having been carried in a litter on 
account of the infirmity of his health, and the pain of his old 
wounds. I could not attribute the strength which he now showed 
to aught but his martial spirit, and the fire that glowed within 
him. I saw before me on horseback, a man, who had been bowed 
down by weakness, and by the numerous sword and gunshot 
wounds which he had received in war, and several of which had 
been injudiciously treated by his surgeons. I saw him riding 
along like a young man, sword in hand, with animated countenance 
and sparkling eyes. He rode from rank to rank, examined all 
with his own eyes, and gave his orders with admirable readiness 
and presence of mind.” 1 

The victory thus gained by Topal Osman on the Tigris, rescued 
Bagdad; and he again defeated the Persians, near Leitan, in the 
same year. But in a third battle with Nadir, near Kerkoud, the 
Turks were routed; and Topal Osman himself died the death of 
a gallant soldier, fighting sword in hand to the last, rather than 
disgrace himself by flight. His body was borne off the field by 
some of his attendants, and was afterwards brought for burial to 
Constantinople. 

Nadir gained repeated victories over the Ottoman generals who 
succeeded Topal Osman, and in 1736 the Porte gladly made a 
treaty of peace with its formidable enemy, which fixed the same 
boundary between Turkey and Persia that had been deter¬ 
mined by the old treaty made with Amurath IV. In the 
preceding year the Russians had made a compact of peace and 
amity with Nadir, by which they abandoned those Persian pro¬ 
vinces which they had appropriated by the partition treaty 
made between Peter the Great and Achmet III. The Court of 
St. Petersburg thought it more profitable to begin a war of con¬ 
quest against Turkey, now weakened by the sword of Nadir Shah, 
than to strive for the retention of districts round the Caspian Sea, 
which were then far distant from any strong parts of the Russian 
Empire. 

It was with reluctance and alarm that the Porte found itself 
again involved in hostilities with the powers of Christendom. 
The war with Persia had been zealously undertaken ; and, though 
unsuccessful, was not unpopular. In combating the Persians, the 
Turks fought against heretics, whom they hated a hundredfold 
worse than the unbelievers, and they hoped also to achieve new 

1 The report of Nicodeme is cited in the note to Von Hammer’s 66th 
book. 


MAHMOUD /. A.D. 1730 - 1754 . 355 

conquests, or to recover ancient dominions. But the prospect of 
collision with either of the great neighbouring Christian empires 
caused far different feelings. Neither Ottoman pride nor Maho¬ 
metan fanaticism could now expect to see the Crescent reassert 
in the battle-field that superiority over the Cross, which it had 
held in the days of Mahomet the Conqueror, and in those of 
Solyman the Lord of his Age. The last dreams of such a reaction 
had vanished when Damad Ali, the conqueror of the Morea, fell 
before Eugene at Peterwaradin. The Turkish ministers who 
succeeded that “dauntless Vizier,” 1 knew the superiority which 
the military system of Austria and Eussia had acquired over the 
Turkish. They watched carefully the political movements of 
Christendom, and made it their chief study to preserve peace. 
It was in vain that the French ambassadors at Constantinople 
strove to excite the Porte to war with Austria, and that the 
Swedish envoys urged it to recommence the struggle against 
Eussia. The Turkish statesmen sought and followed the pacific 
advice of the representatives of England and Holland, the two 
maritime powers whose intervention had obtained the treaties of 
Carlowitz and Passarowitz, and who had no selfish interest in 
plunging Turkey into the perils of new wars. In general the 
Ottoman Empire was then regarded by the Christian powers much 
as it has been in our own times. The decay of its military force 
was considered to be irretrievable ; and the speedy expulsion of 
the Turks from Europe, and the dismemberment of their domi¬ 
nions were confidently and covetously expected. Some sagacious 
observers judged differently. The celebrated French military 
writer, the Chevalier Folard, attributed the defeats of the Turkish 
armies in the early part of the eighteenth century almost entirely 
to their neglect in not availing themselves of the improvements 
that had been made in the weapons -of war. In his opinion 
it was the bayonet that had given the Christians their victories 
over the Moslems. He thought the Turks inferior in courage to 
no nation living, and far superior in all soldierly qualities to the 
Muscovites, whom Peter the Great had then recently made for¬ 
midable to Europe. Folard believed that there needed but the 
appearance of some military reformer, some enlightened Vizier 
among the Ottomans, to restore them to their old renown, and 
change the face of the affairs of the whole world, 2 Montesquieu 

1 “Thus uttered Coumourgi, the dauntless Vizier.”—Byron. 

2 “ Les Turcs ne sont battus que par le seul desavantage de leurs armes. 
Ils ne s^avent ce que c’est que baionette au bout du fusil: car, depuis l’in- 
vention de cette anne ils n’ont pti. rien gagner contre les Chretiens, &o. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


356 

also, the highest political genius of the first half of the eighteenth 
century, pointed out to his contemporaries, that their anticipations 
of witnessing the fall of the Ottoman Empire were premature. 
He foresaw with marvellous sagacity, that Turkey, if her in¬ 
dependence were ever seriously menaced by either of the great 
military monarchies in her neighbourhood, would find protection 
from the maritime powers of Western Europe, who knew their 
own interests too well to permit Constantinople to become the 
prize of either Austrian or Russian invaders. * 1 

This caution was in 1734, as in after years, unknown or un¬ 
heeded at the Court of St. Petersburg. Russia had at this time 
ready for action a veteran army, which had gained reputation in 
the war in Poland; and she possessed a general of no ordinary 
military genius in Count Miinnich, who had brought her troops 
into a high state of efficiency, and was eager for opportunities of 
further distinction. The Russian army was excellently officered, 
chiefly by foreigners from Western Europe; and the artillery (that 
important arm of modern warfare to which the Russians have 
owed so many advantages) was unusually numerous and 'well- 
appointed. The Czarina Anne and her advisers thought that the 
time had come for avenging upon the Turks the disgrace which 
had been sustained in 1711, on the banks of the Pruth; and 
Austria, which was then governed by the infirm Charles VI., was 
persuaded to join Russia in her schemes of aggression. There had 
been numerous disputes between the Czarina and the Porte, arising 
out of their unsettled claims to Daghestan, and the Kabartas, and 


Nous meprisons les Turcs : ils sout certainement peu 4 craindro par 1c ecul 
desavantage de leurs armes et non pas autreraent. 

“ A l’egard du courage, les Turcs ne le cedent 4 aucunc nation du monde. 
II viendra quelque Vizir un jour plus habile et plus ^claire qu’un autre, 
qui ouvrira les yeux sur la cause de tant de defaites, et qui changera toute 
la face des affaires du monde entier. Les Moscovites etoient moins que les 
Turcs. Pierre le Grand a fait voir a toute la terre, qu’il nait des soldats 
partout ou il nait des hommes, et que tout depend de la discipline, de l’ex- 
ercise, et de l’avantage des armes. II ne faut pas croire qu’un tel change- 
rnent soit plus difficile aux Turcs qu’aux Moscovites, dont les qualites pour 
la guerre sont fort au-dessous de celles des premiers.”—Eolard, “Polybe,” 
vol. iii. p. 266, and vol. v. p. 180. 

1 “L’Empire des Turcs est a present h peu-pr£s dans le mcme degre de 
foiblesse oil etoit autrement celui des Grecs ; mats il subsistera long-temps. 
Car, si quelque prince que ce f&t mettoit cet empire en peril en poursuivant 
ses conquetes, les trois puissances commer^antes de l’Eui'ope oonnoissent trop 
leurs affaires pour n’en pas prendre la defense sur-le-champ.”—“Grandeur et 
Decadence des Romaines” (published in 1734), c. 23. Mr. Pitt referred to this 
passage in the debates on the Russian armament in 1792. 



MAHMOUD /. A.D. 1730 - 1754 . 357 

other districts between the Black and the Caspian Seas. The 
march of Tartar troops from the Crimea through the Caucasian 
territories for the purpose of co-operating with the Ottoman armies 
in the north of Persia, had been forcibly resisted by the Russians; 
and collisions had taken place, which gave an ample supply of 
pretexts for war to the Czarina, and her licentious favourite, Biren, 
by whom the councils of St. Petersburg were chiefly swayed. 
Turkey had also caused grave offence to Russia, by earnestly 
remonstrating, in 1733, against the iniquitous attacks of the Rus¬ 
sians upon the independence of Poland. The Reis Effendi made 
an explicit protest against the occupation of that country and its 
capital by the Czarina’s troops. He was met by the answer that 
the Russians had only entered Poland for the sake of enabling the 
Poles to proceed to the election of their new king in freedom, which 
France was endeavouring to disturb by her intrigues in favour of 
Stanislaus Leczynski. The Turk rejoined that the Sublime Porte 
did not concern itself as to whom the Poles chose for their king, 
but that it was resolved to uphold the national independence of 
Poland. The envoy of Russia then made a long catalogue of com¬ 
plaints against the Porte for permitting the Tartars to attack the 
Cossacks, for marching troops through the Caucasian territory, and 
for not delivering up a refugee from Russia, named Caluminski. 
These grievances were said to be the reason why Russia increased 
her forces in the south. These and similar recriminations were 
continued during the two next years; but Biren and the Czarina 
were resolved on war, which the ministers of the maritime powers 
vainly laboured to prevent. 

So long as the hostile intentions of Russia were only manifested 
by conflicts with the Tartars along the ill-defined frontiers of 
Turkey near the Crimea and the Caucasus, the Porte continued to 
negotiate; but in May, 1736, intelligence reached Constantinople 
that the Czarina’s army under Marshal Miinnich had captured two 
Turkish fortresses near Azoph, and that Russian troops were actually 
besieging that important city~ War was then (28th May, 1736), 
declared by a solemn Fetva against Russia, and on that very day 
Miinnich stormed the lines of Perekop. 

We possess in the memoirs of General Manstein , 1 who served 
tinder Marshal Miinnich, and who was also frequently employed 
in the diplomatic service of the Russian cabinet, an unquestionable 
source of ample information respecting these Crimean campaigns, 
and also respecting the inveterate policy of Russia towards Turkey. 
General Manstein expressly states that Peter I., unable to stomach 

1 “Memoires de General Manstein.” 


358 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

the treaty of the Pruth, had long ago planned the war on the 
coasts of the Black Sea, which the Empress Anne undertook. He 
had formed vast magazines on the river Don, and had collected 
materials for a flotilla which was to waft his army down that river 
and the Dnieper. All was ready for the commencement of a cam¬ 
paign, when death cut short his projects (May 16, 1727). On the 
accession of the Empress Anne, in 1730, the design of a Turkish 
war was revived ; and General Keith was sent by the Court of St. 
Petersburg to Southern Russia, to inspect the state of the maga¬ 
zines which Peter the Great had formed, and to re-organise, so far 
as was necessary, his armaments for an attack on the Ottoman 
dominions. The troubles in Poland obliged the Empress to defer 
hostilities against the Porte; but when, in 1735, the Russians had 
been completely successful against the independent party among 
the Poles, Miinnich and his best troops were moved into the 
Ukraine ; and it was resolved to commence the campaign against 
Turkey by attacking Azoph, and to make also the greatest possible 
efforts against the Tartars of the Crimea, in order to conquer their 
whole country, and establish the Russian power over the Black 
Sea. 1 

Miinnich made his preparations for the campaign while it was 
yet midwinter; and he laboured earnestly to prepare his army for 
the hardships which he partly foresaw, and for resisting the 
numerous Tartar cavalry by which he knew that he would be 
surrounded. Each Russian regiment was ordered by him to 
collect a large number of waggons for the transport of its stores. 
Miinnich also re-introduced the pike, a weapon which had for 
many years been entirely discontinued in the Russian service. 
Each regiment was by his command provided with 350 pikes, 
eighteen feet in length. The men in the second rank were armed 
with them; but they were found to be useless in action, and ex¬ 
tremely cumbersome to the troops when on march. Another 
device of the marshal's was far more successful. He supplied every 
regiment with twenty chevaux-de-frise two yards in length. These 
were found to be eminently serviceable, both as temporary defences 
against the enemy’s horse, and as fortifications to the camp. When 
the army halted, the chevaux-de-frise were planted round the posi¬ 
tion, which was thus secured against surprise, and furnished with 
a barricade of no slight efficacy against the pressure of superior 
numbers. Miinnich also made his officers and sergeants lay aside 
their spontoons and halberds, and carry instead of them the fire¬ 
lock and bayonet, as far more useful than their former weapons. 

1 Manstein, p. 123. 


MAHMOUD I. A.D. 1730 - 1754 . 359 

In the month of March, he advanced with six regiments of in¬ 
fantry, three of dragoons, and 3000 Cossacks of the Don, to St. 
Anne, a fortress which the Russians had erected about eight miles 
from Azoph. The Turkish governor of that city sent one of his 
officers to compliment the marshal on his arrival on the frontiers, 
and to express the Pacha’s full belief that the Russian force had no 
design of breaking the peace which existed between the two em¬ 
pires. Munnich. replied in terms of vague civility; but on the 
27th of March he passed the River Don, and marched on Azoph 
with such speed and secrecy that he captured two of the outworks 
of the city before the main body of the Tartars knew of his ap¬ 
proach. He then invested Azoph itself; and on the arrival of the 
Russian General Leontiew with reinforcements, Munnich left him to 
carry on the siege until the arrival of Count Lascy, for whom the 
command of the operations in that quarter was designed. Munnich 
himself on the Gth of April repaired to Zaritsinka, where the main 
Russian army was assembling, which was to effect the great enter¬ 
prise of the campaign, the invasion of the Crimea. 

The Russian forces for this operation, when concentrated at 
Zaritsinka, two leagues from the Dnieper, on the 19th of May, 
1736, consisted of twelve regiments of dragoons, fifteen regiments 
of regular infantry, ten of militia, ten squadrons of hussars, 5000 
Cossacks of the Don, 4000 Cossacks of the Ukraine, and 3000 
Zaporogian Cossacks; amounting altogether to 54,000 men. 
Munnich had directed every regiment to take with it supplies of 
bread for two months; and the officers were bidden to make 
similar provision for themselves. Such ample magazines had 
been prepared, that even a larger supply might have been dis¬ 
tributed ; but the means of transport were deficient. Munnich 
was unwilling to defer operations until more waggons and beasts 
of burden could be collected; but he ordered Prince Troubetski 
to undertake that important duty, and to send forward continual 
convoys of provisions with the fresh regiments, which had not yet 
arrived, but were on their march to join the army. These orders 
of the marshal were ill-obeyed by the prince; and the invading 
forces suffered severely from his neglect. 

Munnich formed his army in five columns, and marched down 
the left bank of the Dnieper, defeating some bodies of Tartar 
horse, which had advanced to reconnoitre the invaders ; they then 
moved by Selnaya Dolina, and Tchernaya Dolina, to the banks of 
the little river Kolytschka. Thence he marched to the narrow 
isthmus which connects the Crimean peninsula with the continent, 


S6o HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

and on the 26th of May, 1736, the Russian marshal halted at a 
short distance from the celebrated lines of Perekop. 

These lines were drawn across the isthmus a little to the north 
of the town of Perekop, at a part where the land is not more than 
five miles in breadth, from the Black Sea, to that recess of the 
Sea of Azoph which is called the Putrid Sea. The defences con¬ 
sisted of a trench about thirty-six feet wide, and twenty-five feet 
deep, backed by a rampart seventy feet high, if measured to its 
summit from the bottom of the ditch. Six stone towers 
strengthened the lines, and served as outworks to the fortress of 
Perekop, which stood behind them. The position was believed 
by the Tartars to be impregnable; and they assembled here under 
their Khan against Miinnich to the number of 100,000, aided by 
a force of 1800 Turkish Janissaries, who garrisoned the towers. 

Miinnich sent a letter to the Tartar Khan, in which he re¬ 
proached him for the depredations committed by his subjects in 
the Ukraine, and declared that the Empress of Russia had ordered 
the whole of the Crimea to be laid waste, in revenge for these 
misdeeds of its inhabitants. Still, the Russian marshal declared, 
such was the clemency of his imperial mistress, that the offending 
country should be spared, but only on condition of the Khan and 
all his people submitting to Russia and acknowledging themselves 
subjects of the Czarina. Perekop was to be instantly ceded, and 
to receive a Russian garrison; and, if this pledge of submission 
were given, Miinnich professed his readiness to enter into negotia¬ 
tions. The Tartar Prince, in answer, denied the charge made 
against his subjects, and expressed his astonishment that the 
Russians should attack him without any declaration of war. He 
represented the impossibility of his severing the long connection 
between the Crimea and the Sublime Porte; and professed his 
inability to surrender Perekop, even if he were willing, inasmuch 
as it was occupied by Turkish troops. He implored the marshal 
to suspend hostilities, and to allow an opportunity of settling by 
negotiations any just cause of complaint that might exist. He 
added, that if attacked he should do his best to defend himself. 

Miinnich sent back a reply, that inasmuch as the Khan would 
not appreciate the gracious clemency of the Russian Court, he should 
soon see his country laid waste, and his cities given to the flames. 
The Russian army followed close upon the messenger who bore this 
fierce message to Perekop, and moved forward to the assault 
during the night before the 28th of May, 1736, in profound 
silence, halting about an hour before daybreak, at the distance of 
a quarter of a mile before the lines. 


MAHMOUD /. A.D. 1730 - 1754 . 361 

Miinnich. first sent a detachment of 2500 men and some pieces 
of artillery forward on his left (the side nearest to the Sea of 
Azoph), to make a false attack on that quarter and draw away the 
enemy’s attention from the Russian right (the side nearest to the 
Black Sea), on which he designed the real assault to he given. 
The manoeuvre was perfectly successful; and the Tartars, who had 
hurried to the eastern part of the lines to meet the Russian de¬ 
tachment that menaced them, were thrown into alarm and con¬ 
fusion when the main Russian force appeared, in six strong 
columns, advancing steadily and rapidly against the Tartar left, 
on the western part of their position. No attempt seems to have 
been made to flood the ditch; and the Russian columns descended 
into it, crossed it, and began to clamber up the opposite rampart, 
while their batteries poured a heavy fire upon the parapet, and 
prevented the Tartars from forming so as to offer any effective oppo¬ 
sition. Terrified at seeing the enemy thus boldly passing through 
the works on which they had relied, the Tartars betook them¬ 
selves to flight; and the Russians surmounted the rampart, and 
drew up on the southern side almost without resistance. The 
Russian general, Manstein, who took part in the events of the 
day, remarks that it would probably have been impossible to force 
the lines in that manner against any other enemy than the Tartars. 
But he observes that the entrance into the Crimea would, never¬ 
theless, have been practicable, inasmuch as the neighbouring part 
of the Sea of Azoph is so shallow in summer that it is easily ford¬ 
able, and Perekop can thus be always turned, even if it cannot be 
stormed. It does not appear that either party in this campaign 
endeavoured to avail themselves of the all-important co-operation, 
which a flotilla of heavily-armed gunboats would give, for the pur¬ 
pose either of attack or defence. 

The tower and the city of Perekop were speedily captured by 
the victorious Russians; and Miinnich then detached General 
Leontiew with 10,000 regular troops and 3000 Cossacks to attack 
the fortress of Kilburun or Kilbourn, 1 on the extremity of the 

1 Von Hammer (vol. iv. p. 323) says that the first syllable of Kilburun 
preserves part of the name of the Greek hero Achilles, who was in the 
classic times believed to have performed many exploits in these regions. I 
wish I could share Von Hammer’s faith, though I neither doubt the pre¬ 
valence of the legends about Achilles which he refers to, nor the real per¬ 
sonal existence of Achilles himself. The legends were as old at least as the 
time of Euripides, who alludes to them in the “ Iphigenia in Tauris,” 1. 436. 
The long, narrow spit of land that stretches from opposite Kilbourn nearly 
to the Crimea was-called “ The Course of Achilles,” and he was worshipped 
here as Pontarches, or Lord of the Pontus. (See Clarke’s “ Travels,” vol. ii. 


362 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

tongue of land of the same name, which projects into the Black 
Sea near the mouth of the river Dnieper, and opposite to Oczakof 
on the mainland. This was on the 4th of June; and, on the same 
day, the marshal held a council of war, in which the future opera¬ 
tions of the main army were considered. The greater number of 
the Russian officers were averse to entering farther into the 
Crimea; and they pointed out to the commander-in-chief that the 
army had now only twelve days’ supply of bread. They urged 
that at least it would be prudent to halt until expected convoys of 
provisions arrived. But Miinnich was eager for the glory of being 
the conqueror of the Crimea, and would not rest content with the 
capture of Perekop. He told his generals, that if they advanced 
boldly into the Tartar territory they would find the means of sub¬ 
sisting at the enemy’s expense ; and he refused to halt longer at 
the isthmus, and so give time for the Tartars to recover from their 
panic. The army accordingly moved forward across the steppes 
of the northern part of the Crimean peninsula; harassed inces¬ 
santly by the Tartar cavalry, but protected against any serious 
attack by the skilful dispositions of the marshal. Miinnich 
formed his force into one vast hollow square composed of several 
battalions, each of which was also formed in square. The baggage 
was in the middle. This arrangement has, since his time, been 
generally adopted by the Russian generals when acting in open 
countries with forces chiefly of infantry against large masses of 
hostile cavalry. As Miinnich advanced, he kept up his communi¬ 
cation with Perekop and the Ukraine by forming little redoubts 
in favourable positions, at a short distance from each other. Each 
of them was garrisoned by an officer, and ten or twelve regular 
foot .soldiers or dragoons, and thirty Cossacks. A complete chain 
of fortified posts was thus formed, along which intelligence was 
readily transmitted. General Manstein observes, that it was 
astonishing to the army to find how vainly the Tartars endeavoured 
to assail their little citadels. Not one of them was captured; and 
it was only in a few instances that the Russian couriers failed to 
pass from post to post in safety. Besides thus preserving the 
army’s communications, the soldiers who were posted along the 


p. 362.) According to another legend, the White Island (now called the 
Isle of Serpents), off the mouths of the Danube, was given to Achilles by 
his mother, Thetis ; and it was the chosen dwelling-place of the spirits of 
the hero and his friend Patroclus. Mariners, favoured by Heaven, were, 
when they approached the island, visited in dreams by Achilles and Patro- 
clus, and instructed where to land. (See Clarke’s “Travels,” vol. ii. p. 397; 
and the notes to the Variorum edition of Euripides, vol. v. p. 86 .) 




3^3 


MAHMOUD I. A.D. 1730 - 1754 . 

lino cf march were charged with the useful service of making hay, 
and storing it up for the supply of the horses of the army on 
their return, when the herbage of the steppes was likely to be 
exhausted. 

Thus arrayed, and with these precautions, the Russians moved 
on through the Crimea, taking also constant care to guard against 
the peril of fire, which they incurred from the Tartar custom of 
setting light to the long grass of the steppes, now dried by the 
fierce sunbeams of the Crimean summer. Vessels of water were 
ordinarily carried in the numerous waggons that accompanied the 
army, for the refreshment of the soldiers while on the march ; and 
Miinnich now ordered that every waggon and carriage should be 
provided with the means of putting out fire; and whenever the 
army halted, the grass and soil were dug up, and removed for the 
breadth of three feet round the camp. The town of Koslof, now 
better known as Eupatoria, on the western coast of the Crimea, 
was the first point on which Miinnich marched on leaving Perekop. 
Koslof was considered at that time to be the richest commercial 
city in the peninsula. It was taken and sacked by the Russians on 
the 17th of June. Thence Miinnich led his troops to Bakchiserai 
(the Palace of Gardens), the ancient residence of the Khans of 
the Crimea. This city was also assaulted; and after a short resis¬ 
tance, the Tartar garrison fled from their post. Miinnich then 
drew his Muscovites and Cossacks up outside the defenceless town, 
and sent in a quarter of his army at a time to pillage for a fixed, 
number of hours. The barbarous work was fully accomplished. 
Two thousand private houses, and all the public buildings were 
destroyed. The vast palace of the Khans, the splendid library 
which Selim Gherai had founded, and that which had been col¬ 
lected by the Jesuit mission in the Crimea, perished in the flames. 
Simpheropolis, to the north-east of Bakchiserai, was next attacked 
by the Russians; its inhabitants and its wealth were given up to 
the brutality and rapacity of the soldiers, its buildings to the 
flames. Miinnich then took the road towards Kaffa, with the 
desire of establishing the Russian force permanently in that ad¬ 
vantageously situated city. But his army, which had inflicted so 
much misery and devastation on the Crimea, was itself suffering 
fearfully; and the marshal saw his ranks diminishing every day, 
not by battle, but by disease, want, and fatigue. The Tartars 
laid waste the country wherever the march of the invading 
columns was pointed ; and the barbarous cruelties of the Russians 
themselves co-operated in increasing their privations. General 
Manstein asserts that the Crimean campaign of 1736, cost Russia 


364 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

nearly 30,000 soldiers : and he justly censures the rashness of 
Miinnich, who plunged with his army into the peninsula, on the 
sole hope that 'perhaps they would be able to subsist at the enemy’s 
expense. He blames also the excessive severity of the marshal in 
discipline, and his recklessness in imposing unnecessary fatigues 
on the soldiers. He states that the Russians were so exhausted 
by their sufferings and trials, that men used to drop down stark 
dead on the march; and that even officers died of famine and 
misery. 1 Miinnich returned to Perekop on the 17th of July; and 
evacuated the Crimea on the 25th of August, having first razed 
a considerable, portion of the defences of the isthmus. General 
Manstein observes as a proof of the severity of the losses which 
the invaders had sustained, that every Russian regiment which 
entered the Crimea in 1736, had its full complement at the begin¬ 
ning of the campaign—that is to say, each regiment of infantry 
was 1575 strong, and each regiment of dragoons 1231. But when 
the army was reviewed at Samara by Miinnich at the end of Sep¬ 
tember, there was not a single regiment that could array 600 men 
round its colours. Never in the annals of warfare had the suffer¬ 
ings of an invading force been more deeply deserved. The whole 
campaign of the army under Miinnich in the Crimea had been 
marked by the most atrocious cruelty, and the most savage spirit 
of devastation. No mercy was shown by the Russians to age or 
sex. Towns and villages were fired and their inhabitants slaugh¬ 
tered, even where no resistance was offered to the Russian troops. 
The monuments of antiquity were wantonly defaced ; libraries 
and schools were given to the flames; and public buildings and 
places of worship were purposely and deliberately destroyed. The 
whole enterprise (which was commenced without any declaration 
of war) was planned and conducted in a spirit of truly Scythian 
ferocity. 2 

Azoph had been captured by the Russian force under General 
Lascy within a short time of that officers taking the command 
against the town ; and while Miinnich’s army was in the Crimea, 
the Kalmuck troops of the Czarina attacked the Tartars of the 
Kuban in Asia, and not only prevented them from crossing the 
straits of Kertch to aid their kinsmen and fellow-subjects of the 
Porte in the Crimea, but compelled large numbers of them to re- 

1 Manstein, p. 174. 

2 Von Hammer cites the indignant remarks on this invasion made by 
De Castelnau, in his “ Essais sur l’histoire ancienne et moderne de nonvello 
Russie,” vol. ii. p. 60. Von Hammer himself classes Miinnich with the 
desolators of the Palatinate, with Louvois and Oatinat. Vol- iv. p, 324* 


MAHMOUD /. A.D. 1730 - 1754 . 365 

nounce their allegiance to the Sultan, and to acknowledge the 
Russian Empress as their sovereign. Kilbourn also capitulated to 
General Leontiew. Russian fraud and force were almost univer¬ 
sally triumphant in the first year of the war. 

The Sultan’s arms were visited but by a single gleam of success. 
In November, when the survivors of Miinnich’s army were in 
winter-quarters, Feth Ghirai, the new Khan of the Crimea (his 
predecessor Kaplan Ghirai having been deposed by the Porte for 
want of vigour in opposing Miinnich’s invasion), made an inroad 
into the Ukraine, defeated a body of 500 Russians, and spread de¬ 
vastation throughout the province. The Tartar force returned to 
the Crimea with a living booty of no less than 30,000 Russian 
captives, whom they carried off' into slavery. 

The Ottoman court was solicitous to put an end to the war 
with Russia, and made frequent attempts to negotiate a peace* 
sometimes through the intervention of France and Sweden, and 
sometimes through that of Austria, which last was insidiously 
proffered in the hopes of retarding and arresting the preparations 
of the Turks for a new campaign. The Emperor Charles VI. was, 
in reality, eager to share with Russia the spoliation of the Turkish 
provinces: and in January, 1737, a secret treaty was made be¬ 
tween the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg, which stipulated 
that the Austrian armies should invade Turkey in concert with 
the Russian forces. But it was wished that the Emperor’s troops 
should have the same advantage of taking the Turks by surprise, 
which the Russians had obtained when they attacked Azoph and 
the Crimea without any declaration of war. The Austrian states¬ 
men therefore feigned to be solicitous for peace ; and a congress 
was opened at Nimirof, in which the Czarina’s and the Emperor’s 
plenipotentiaries kept up the hollow show of negotiations till the 
November of 1737. Turkey was willing to make great sacrifices 
for the sake of peace ; but* when at last the representatives of 
Russia and Austria were pressed into a declaration of the terms 
on which they were willing to grant it, their demands were such, 
as not even the farther humiliations and defeats of another cen¬ 
tury have yet brought the Ottoman spirit to regard as endurable. 

Russia required, first, that all the former treaties between her 
and the Porte should be annulled ; secondly, that the Crimea, the 
Kuban, and all the countries inhabited by the Tartars, should be 
ceded to her; thirdly, that Wallachla and Moldavia should be 
recognised as independent principalities under the protection and 
suzerainty of Russia; fourthly, that the Porte should concede the 
title of Emperor to the sovereign; fifthly, that the Russian fleets 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


3^6 

should have free passage to and from the Mediterranean, by the 
Black Sea, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles. Austria asked for 
fresh territories in Bosnia and in Servia, and for the extension of 
her Wallachian frontier as far as the river Doumbovisa. The 
Turkish plenipotentiaries rejected their arrogant claims with be¬ 
coming indignation. But the language used by them was remarked 
as new from Ottoman Kps, inasmuch as, besides their customary 
references to the Koran, they appealed to the Christian gospels, 
and to Christian writers on the law of nations, to prove the bad 
faith of their adversaries. On the other side, the Russian and 
Austrian ministers taunted the Ottomans with the precept of 
Islam which bids its followers offer to unbelievers the Koran or 
the sword. “ How,” said they, “ can ye Moslems be sincere when 
you negotiate with Christians against your law]” The Turks 
answered that the text which had been cited, applied only to idolaters 
and heretics; and that the Mahometan sword ought to cease from 
smiting the confessors of the Old Testament, the Gospel, or the 
Tora, from the instant when they either submitted to pay the 
capitation tax, or asked for peace, which ought to be granted. 
They added that the Sublime Porte would make war or give peace, 
as was desired : and they appealed to the glory of their former 
victories at Mohacz and Cerestes, to prove the power of the House 
of Othman. They ended by asking if the Christian religion per¬ 
mitted the Austrian Emperor to break the peace, to which he had 
recently pledged his oath on the succession of Sultan Mahmoud ] 
One of the Austrian ministers, confused by this appeal, muttered 
that ambassadors were the mere servants of their courts; and he 
cursed the authors of the war. He added that the Ottomans 
themselves had been the real causers of it by troubling Russia and 
making her put herself into a state of defence, so that the Emperor, 
as Russia’s ally, was obliged to take part in the w~ar. “ It is on 
you, therefore, as the authors of the war,” said the Austrian, “ that 
all the miseries of this war will fall.” “ So be it,” replied the 
Turk; “ may the authors of the war bear the curses of the war ! 
May God distinguish between the guilty and the innocent: and 
may the sword of His justice fall on the guilty only ! ” All present 
cried “Amen,” and the congress terminated with this solemn 
anathema and international appeal of battle. 

While the diplomatists of Russia and Austria had been spinning 
out the web of faithless negotiation, their armies had attacked the 
Turks with equal ambition, but with far different success. 

Miinnich took the field two months before congress had begun 
its meetings at Nimirof, with an army of 70,000 men, and a park 


MAHMOUD I. A.D. 1730 - 1754 . 367 

of artillery that numbered 600 pieces of different calibre. Mttn- 
nich was high in favour with the court at St. Petersburg, which 
cared little for the cruel sacrifice of troops by which the exploits 
of the last campaign had been purchased; and the resources of the 
empire were freely placed at the marshal’s' disposal for the new 
operations which his daring ambition suggested. Miinnich em¬ 
ployed the early months of 1737 in the collection of stores, and of 
waggons, in the formation of a flotilla of flat-bottomed gunboats, 
and in perfecting the organisation and training of his army. His 
severity was inhuman ; but it is to him that the foundation of that 
iron discipline is ascribed, by which the Russian armies have ever 
since been distinguished. 

Miinnich left to General Lascy the renewal of the invasion of 
the Crimea. His design for the main army under his own com¬ 
mand was to advance down the north-western coast of the Euxine 
and to capture the important city of Oczakof. He crossed the 
river Boug on the 25th of June, without experiencing the least 
opposition from the Turks, whose troops were slowly assembling 
at Bender. O 11 the 10th of July the Russian forces encamped 
before Oczakoff. The Turkish generals had succeeded in throwing 
a division of their best men into that city before Miinnich had 
arrived, and the Russian general found that he had to deal with a 
garrison 20,000 strong, well provided with artillery and stores of 
every description. The Turks fought bravely, and made many 
desperate sallies', which from the number of troops engaged and 
the heaviness of the slaughter, deserve to be considered regular 
battles. Miinnich’s men suffered severely from want of provisions, 
of fascines, and other ordinary materials for carrying on a siege. 
Still Miinnich persevered with fierce temerity, which his own 
generals censured, and which the marshal’s good fortune alone 
crowned with success. 1 

After a cannonade of two days a fire was observed to break out 
in the city, and Miinnich instantly hurled his whole army on the 
defences, without regard to the state of the fortifications in the 
quarter where the assault was given, and without providing his 
columns with ladders or fascines, or other usual means for passing 
any obstacle that they might encounter. The Russians forced 
their way to the foot of the glacis, and found there a deep trench, 
which completely checked their farther advance. With unflinch¬ 
ing, but useless bravery, they remained there nearly two hours, 
under a heavy cannonade and musketry fire from the city, to 
which they replied by useless volleys. At length they broke and 

1 Man stein, p. 210, 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


368 

fled back in confusion ; and, had. the Turkish commander followed 
up his success by a vigorous sally of the whole garrison, the siege 
must have been raised, and Miinnich’s army would have been 
almost certainly destroyed. But only a few hundred of the 
garrison followed the flying Russians, and Munnich was able be¬ 
fore long to reform his men, and prepare for a renewal of the 
attack. The conflagration continued to spread in the city, and 
early on the morning after the first assault, the principal Turkish 
magazine of powder exploded, and destroyed 6000 of the defenders. 
The Seraskier, alarmed at this catastrophe, and seeing the flames 
within gathering still greater fury, and the Russians without re¬ 
assembling for the charge, hung out the white flag and capitulated, 
on the condition of surrendering himself and his forces prisoners 
of war. While the capitulation was being arranged, the Russian 
hussars and Cossacks of the Don forced their way into the city, 
and began to plunder it. The Seraskier and part of his troops 
had already marched out to surrender, but the Russian soldiery 
attacked them, slaughtered many, and drove the rest back into 
the town. The Seraskier sent again to Munnich to say that he 
surrendered at discretion, and to beg quarter for himself and men. 
The Russian commander then sent forward a regiment of guards, 
who conducted the Seraskier and between 3000 and 4000 of the 
garrison as prisoners to the Russian camp. But great numbers of 
the Turks were massacred without mercy, and many were drowned 
in a vain attempt to swim off to some Turkish vessels, which had 
been moored near the city during the siege, but which on seeing 
its capture weighed anchor, and sailed with the evil tidings to 
Constantinople. The bodies of more than 17,000 Turks were 
buried by the victorious Russians when they took possession of 
Oczakow. They had themselves lost in killed and wounded 
during their short, but sanguinary siege, nearly 4000 men. 
Disease, want, and fatigue were, as usual, still more deadly 
scourges to the invaders. Munnich found that his army was less 
strong by 20,000 men than it had been at the commencement of 
the campaign. He had projected a further advance upon Bender, 
but a report that the Turks had fired the steppes which it would 
be necessary to cross in a march upon that city, and the enfeebled 
state of his army, made him determine on returning to the 
Ukraine, after repairing the fortification of Oczakof, and leaving a 
strong garrison to secure his conquest. 

In the meanwhile Lascy attacked the Crimea with a force of 
40,000 men, supported by a fleet under Admiral Bredal in the 
Black Sea, and by a flotilla of armed rafts and gunboats, which 


MAHMOUD I. A.D. 1730 - 1754 . 369 

Lascy caused to be constructed in the Sea of Azoph. The Khan 
of the Crimea had repaired the lines of Perekop with great care, 
and posted his army behind them, with the intent to defend them 
much better against Lascy, than they had been defended by his 
predecessor against Miinnich. But Lascy marched his army along 
the narrow bank of land which extends from near Yenitchi on the 
mainland towards Arabat in the Crimea, nearly across the whole 
entrance of the Putrid Sea. He formed bridges of casks and rafts 
over the gaps in this perilous water, and entered the Crimea on 
the 23rd of July, 1737, without the loss of a single man. 1 He 
defeated the Tartars near Karasou Bazaar, and then led his men 
up and down through the devoted country, pillaging, burning, and 
slaying, after the manner of Miinnich’s troops in the preceding 
year. Lascy left the Crimea in August by a bridge, which he 
formed over the narrow part of the Putrid Sea near Schoungar. 
The Russians boasted that during this short invasion they had 
burnt 6000 houses, thirty-eight mosques, two churches, and fifty 
mills. 

Austria commenced her treacherous attack upon Turkey in 1737, 
by suddenly assailing the city of Nissa, in imitation of Miinnich’s 
advance against Azoph in the preceding year. One Imperialist 
army, under Field-Marshal Seckendorf, entered the Ottoman 
territory in Servia in the month of July; and at the same time 
other Austrian forces were marched against the Turkish possessions 
in Bosnia. Nissa was captured without difficulty; and Seckendorf 
then sent part of his army against Widdin; but the Turks had 
time to strengthen the garrison of that city, and the invaders 
perished rapidly by disease and want in their marches and counter¬ 
marches along the banks of the T rade and the Danube. The 
Austrians had begun the war in a spirit of overweening pride in 
their own military skill and prowess, and in arrogant contempt of 
their enemy. Full of recollections of the triumphs of Eugene, 
they thought that the superiority, which under that great captain 
they had maintained over the Ottomans, was certain to continue, 
and that to advance against the Turks was necessarily to conquer. 

1 Lascy took this bold measure against the remonstrances of all his generals 
except one. They came in a body to his tent, and protested against the 
risk to which he was exposing the army. Lascy replied that there was risk 
in all militaiy operations, and that they might return if they liked. He 
made his secretary write their passports, and even ordered out 200 Dragoons, 
who were to escort them to the Ukraine, where they were to remain until 
his return from the campaign. Awed by his firmness, the refractory chiefs 
gave way, but it was three days before Lascy would pardon them. Lascy 
was an Irishman. 


24 


370 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

* 

The cabinet of Vienna was even more arrogant and rash than the 
officers whom it employed. When one of the generals proposed 
to the army-board at Vienna that the palpable weakness of the 
artillery force should be remedied by providing each battalion 
with two field-pieces, his request was rejected, on the principle 
that the Emperor’s armies had always defeated the Turks not¬ 
withstanding any deficiency in cannon, and that the same would 
continue to be the case. The natural results of such a spirit in 
the camp and council were visible early in the campaign. It was 
found that the Turks fought with courage and skill; and rash 
attempts on the part of the Imperialists met with severe repulses. 
At the first appearance of reverse the Austrian generals began to 
quarrel among themselves, and the calamities of their troops soon 
increased. On the Turkish side the Grand Vizier took the com¬ 
mand, ably assisted by the French renegade Bonneval, the fruits 
of whose military ability were manifested in the unusual accuracy 
of the manoeuvres of the Ottoman forces, and in the improved 
discipline of the troops. After a short and inglorious campaign 
Seckendorf led the remains of his army back into Hungary. The 
Turks recovered Nissa and penetrated at several points into the 
Austrian territories. In Bosnia the result of the campaign was 
similar. The Mahometan population of that province resisted the 
invading Imperialists with enthusiastic valour; and though the 
Austrian troops at first gained some advantages, they were before 
the close of the year driven back out of Bosnia with disgrace and 
loss. 

In the following year the Emperor placed new generals at the 
head of his armies, and a new Grand Vizier, Yegen Mahommed 
Pacha, led the Ottomans against them. The Turks did not wait 
for the advance of the Austrians, but acted on the offensive in 
great force and with remarkable boldness. They took Meadia in 
Hungary, and laid siege to the important fortress of Orsova on the 
Danube. The Austrians were successful in an action at Kornia 
near Meadia (4th July, 1738) against Hadji Mahommed, but their 
loss of men was greater than that of the Turks; and the Grand 
Vizier coming up with fresh forces, drove the Imperialist army 
back, captured Semendria, and resumed the siege of Orsova, 
which surrendered to the Ottomans on the 15th of August. The 
Austrian commanders, disunited and disheartened, led their troops 
back in precipitate retreat within the walls and lines of Belgrade. 
The Turkish cavalry followed them, and occupied the heights 
near that city, where the Imperialist army lay shamefully inac¬ 
tive, and the prey of pestilential disorders. A body of Austrian 


MAHMOUD L A.D. 175c-1754. 


37 * 


hussars that ventured to encounter the Turks, was routed with 
severe loss; and the Grand Vizier, when he recalled his cavalry 
from Belgrade, closed the campaign amid merited honours and 
rewards, which the Sultan caused to he distributed to the general 
and officers of the army, and to every private soldier who had dis¬ 
tinguished himself by bravery and good conduct. 

Though less brilliantly successful against the Russians, the Turks 
during the year 1738, prevented those formidable enemies from 
making any important progress along the coast of the Black Sea. 
Marshal Miinnich again led his army across the Dnieper and the 
Bong, and defeated several bodies of Turkish and Tartar troops, 
that encountered him near those rivers. But on arriving at the 
Dniester he found a powerful Ottoman army strongly entrenched 
in a position, which he was unable to force, and which barred his 
intended advance for the purpose of besieging Bender. Several 
conflicts took place, in one of which, according to one account, Sasi 
Ghirai, the Seraskier of Boudjak, with 20,000 Tartars and an 
equal number of Ottomans, dealt a severe blow on the Russian 
army. In the inflated style of the Ottoman writers, “ A great 
number of the accursed ones, destined to hell, took the fatal leap 
over the arch formed by the sparkling sabre of the True Believers, 
into the infernal gulf.” But disease and the want of supplies were 
as usual much more deadly enemies to the Russians than either 
Turkish or Tartar swords; and Miinnich returned in the autumn 
to the Ukraine, with an army that had accomplished little and 
suffered much. 

Marshal Lascy repeated the invasion of the Crimea in the July 
of this year. He appeared with an army of from 30,000 to 35,000 
men at the northern part of the Isthmus of Perekop; and the 
Khan, who thought that the Russians now really meant to pene¬ 
trate the Crimea by that route, prepared for an obstinate defence 
of the lines. But Lascy turned them without the loss of a life. 
The inlet of the Sea of Azoph (called the Putrid Sea) which adjoins 
the eastern side of the Isthmus, is shallow at all times, and espe¬ 
cially so in summer. The consequence is, that if the wind at that 
season blows for a few hours strongly from the west, and drives 
back the water, the passage from the mainland to the Crimea may 
be effected without making use of the Isthmus of Perekop. O 11 
the 7th of July the favourable wind sprang up; and Lascy in¬ 
stantly formed his army in a single line along the coast and 
marched them across the bed of the gulf, before the wind had 
lulled and the waves returned. A few baggage-waggons, that 
followed in the rear, were lost, the wind having ceased to blow 


4—2 


372 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

from the west soon after the Russian troops had effected their 
passage. Lascy immediately took the Tartar position at Perekop 
in the rear. That city surrendered on the 8th; and the Russians 
were successful in an engagement on which the Tartars ventured 
against part of Lascy’s army. Lascy’s object in this campaign was 
to obtain possession of Kaffa, then the strongest place in the 
Crimea, and the mastery of which was considered to involve the 
conquest of the whole peninsula. But the ravages of the Russian 
armies in the preceding years had so wasted the country, that 
Lascy could not find the means of subsistence for his army. The 
Russian fleet, which was ordered to bring him supplies, was blown 
off the coast and severely damaged by a storm. After a few in¬ 
effectual marches and counter-marches the Russians were obliged 
to return to Perekop and thence to their own country. 

Negotiations for peace had been frequently resumed during the 
war; and in the winter of 1738, fresh attempts to terminate hos¬ 
tilities were made under the mediation of France. But these were 
baffled by the exorbitant demands which the Russian Court con¬ 
tinued to put forward. Marshal Miinnich was the great inspirer 
of this ambitious spirit in the councils of the Czarina, and the 
vehement opposer of peace. He had repaired to the Russian 
capital at the close of the campaign of 1738, and employed all his 
influence to cause the continuance of the war, and to induce 
Russia to strike boldly for the conquest of Constantinople itself. 
He proposed to effect this not merely by Russian arms, but by 
raising the Christian subjects of the Turk against their master. 
He pointed out to the Court of St. Petersburg what was the true 
state of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, with its Mahometan popu¬ 
lation so many times outnumbered by the millions of Rayas, 
who had been oppressed for centuries, but who had never ceased 
to hate their conquerors, and who were now watching with anxious 
joy the progress of the Russian power. He told the Czarina that 
all the Greeks regarded her as their legitimate sovereign, and that 
the strongest excitement prevailed among them. “ Now,” he said, 
“ now is the time to take advantage of their enthusiasm in our 
cause, and to march upon Constantinople, while the effect which 
our victories have produced is fresh and vivid. Such an oppor¬ 
tunity may never be offered again.” 1 The Empress Anne adopted 
readily this “ Oriental project,” as it was termed, of Marshal 
Miinnich. The army in the south of Russia was largely recruited, 
and emissaries were sent into Epirus and Thessaly to prepare the 

1 Ruhiere, vol. i. p. 164; vol. iii. p. 2S6. Emerson Tennent’s “Greece,” 
vol. ii. p. 301. 


MAH MO UP /. A.D. 1730 - 1754 . 373 

inhabitants for a rising against the Turks. Miinnich determined 
in 1739 to gain the right bank of the Dniester without exposing 
his troops to the sufferings and losses, which he knew by experi¬ 
ence were the inevitable attendants of the march along the north¬ 
western coast of the Euxine! He accordingly led his army into 
Podolia, audaciously violating the neutral territory of the Polish 
State, in spite of the remonstrances that were addressed to him 
against this contemptuous breach of the law of nations. Spread¬ 
ing desolation round them as if in an enemy’s country, Miinnich’s 
Muscovites and Cossacks traversed Podolia, and crossed the 
Dniester into Moldavia at Sukowza (12 August, 1739), about six 
leagues from the Turkish fortress of Khoczin. The Seraskier of 
Bender, Veli Pasha, took up a position in front of Khoczin, but 
was completely defeated on the 18th of August, and Khoczin sur¬ 
rendered a few days after the battle to the Russians. Miinnich 
proclaimed Cantemir (a descendant of the former rulers of Mol¬ 
davia), Prince of Moldavia under Russian protection, and Cantemir 
immediately raised the natives in arms against the Ottomans 
and the Sultan’s viceroy. Miinnich marched upon Jassy, the 
capital of the province, and he and Prince Cantemir entered that 
city without opposition. Thence the Russian general wheeled 
into Bessarabia, intending to reduce Bender, and the other strong 
places of that district, and so secure his base of operations before 
he advanced southward into the heart of European Turkey. But 
he was checked in the mid career of triumph by tidings of the 
disastrous defeats which his Austrian allies had been sustaining on 
the Upper Danube, and of the still more disgraceful terms on 
which they had begged peace of the common enemy. 

Yegen Mohammed had given offence to Sultan Mahmoud, and 
had been superseded by Elhadj Mohammed Pacha. The new 
Grand Vizier, like his predecessor, took the command against the 
Imperialists ; and it may well be credited that he caused the best 
troops of Turkey, and especially the veterans who had returned 
from the Persian wars, to be enrolled in his own army, while the 
recruits and inferior regiments were given to the Pachas who 
commanded against the Russians. But the miserable imbecility 
of Generals Wallis and Neipperg (the two leaders whom the 
Emperor Charles VI. this year gave to his armies) is of itself 
sufficient to account for the difference of Austria’s fortunes in the 
field from that which the Russians obtained under Miinnich’s 
guidance. 

The main Austrian force was assembled near Peterwaradin in 
May. It amounted to 56,000 men, without reckoning the artillery- 


1 


/ 


374 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

men, or the hussars, and other light and irregular troops. . Mar¬ 
shal Wallis intended to commence the campaign by the siege of 
Orsova, and he had positive orders from the Emperor to fight a 
pitched battle with the enemy at the first opportunity. The 
Austrians crossed the river Saave on the 27th of June, and 
marched along the right bank of the Danube towards Orsova. 
The Turkish army under the Grand Vizier Elhadj Mohammed 
Pacha, about 200,000 strong, advanced through Semendria, and 
took up a strong position on the high ground near Krotzka. 
Wallis on approaching Krotzka thought that he had only a 
detachment of the Turks to deal with, and hurried forward through 
a deep defile with only the cavalry of his army to the encounter. 
On debouching from the hollow way the Austrian horse regiments 
found themselves among vineyards and tracts of underwood, 
where it was impossible for them to form line or charge; and 
they were assailed in all directions by a heavy musketry fire from 
the Turkish infantry, which the Vizier had skilfully posted round 
the mouth of the defile. Unsupported by any foot or artillery, 
the Austrian cavalry suffered severe loss, and was driven back in 
disorder through the pass. The Turks advanced, occupying the 
heights on either side of the road, and assailed the right wing of 
the Austrian infantry. A furious engagement was maintained in 
this part of the field till sunset; when Wallis drew back his 
troops to Vinza. The Austrian loss in the battle of Krotzka was 
more than 10,000 in killed and wounded; and though the Turks 
also had suffered severely in the latter part of the action, they 
were in the highest degree elated by their victory. The Austrian 
general, whose despondency equalled his former presumption, soon 
fell back upon Belgrade. The Turks followed, and opened their 
batteries against the city, the soldiers exclaiming, “ Let us take 
advantage of the panic and blindness which God has inflicted upon 
the unbelievers for having broken the peace of Passowitz.” 1 
Wallis and Neipperg now endeavoured to obtain terms from the 
Grand Vizier; and a series of negotiations ensued, in which the 
Austrian generals and plenipotentiaries showed infatuation, 
cowardice, and folly even greater than General Mack afterwards 
displayed in the memorable capitulation of Ulm. The French 
ambassador Villeneuve came to the Grand Vizier’s camp near 
Belgrade to give the mediation and guarantee of France to the 
pacification which Wallis and Neipperg sought with almost shame¬ 
less avidity. Preliminary articles were signed on the 1 st of Sep¬ 
tember, by which Austria was to restore to the Porte the city of 

1 Coxe, vol. iii. p. 213 . 


MAHMOUD /. A,D . 1730-1754. 375 

Belgrade, and all the districts in Bosina, Servia, and Waliachia, 
which the Emperor had taken from the Sultan at the peace of 
Passarowitz. As a security for the execution of these prelimi¬ 
naries, a gate of Belgrade was given up to the Turks. It was 
stipulated by the Austrians that Turkey should at the same time 
make peace with Russia; and messengers were sent accordingly 
to the camp of Miinnich. The victorious Russian general received 
the intelligence of the convention of Belgrade with the greatest 
indignation; but he knew that it was impossible for him to 
resume his march upon Constantinople with the powerful and 
victorious army of the Vizier free to act against his flank; and 
Russia reluctantly consented to terminate a war, which had cost 
her such heavy sacrifices in treasure and in men, at the very time 
when her most ambitious schemes of conquest seemed to be on 
the eve of realisation. 

The terms of the treaty of Belgrade, as finally arranged be¬ 
tween the Porte and Austria, were substantially the same as those 
of the preliminary articles. The treaty between Russia and 
Turkey provided that the city of Azoph should be demolished, and 
its territory remain desert, as a border-land for the two empires. 
Russia was to be at liberty to erect a fortress on the Kuban, but 
Taganrog was not to be rebuilt. It was expressly provided by 
the third article of the treaty that Russia should keep up no fleet 
either in the] Sea of Azoph, or in the Black Sea, and that she 
should build no vessels of war on the coast of any part of those 
seas. 1 She acknowledged the independence of the Kabartas; 
and a commission was appointed to fix the boundary line between 
the two empires. This gave Russia an increase of territory on the 
side of the Ukraine. Khoczin, and the other conquests of Russia 
in Moldavia and Bessarabia, were restored; and the treaty gave 
to the subjects of both the Turkish and Russian sovereigns assur¬ 
ance of pardon for anything done by them during the war. 

Such was the peace of Belgrade, one of the most honourable 
and advantageous for Turkey that she has ever made with Euro¬ 
pean powers. It marks the reign of Sultan Mahmoud I. with 
lustre, which is the more conspicuous from the contrast between 
this pacification, and the humiliating and calamitous character of 
the treaties, by which subsequent struggles of the House of Oth- 
man with its European neighbours have been concluded. 

The evil day seemed now to be long deferred. A period of rest 
from the perils of war, unusually long in Ottoman history, inter¬ 
venes between the signature of Turkey's treaties with Austria and 

1 See Von Hammer, vol. iv. p. 365 . 


3/6 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Russia in 1739, and the calamitous renewal of her strife with the 
latter power in 1768. Not that these twenty-nine years were 
seasons of perfect calm. A war with Persia broke out in 1743, 
but was terminated in 1746 by a treaty which made little change 
in the old arrangements between the two empires, that had been 
fixed in the reign of Amurath IV. There were from time to 
time the customary numbers of tumults and insurrections in various 
territories of the Sublime Porte; and the governors of remote 
provinces occasionally assumed practical independence, disregard¬ 
ing the Sultan’s commands, though professing allegiance to him, 
and handing down their power from father to son, as if they were 
hereditary potentates in their own right. These disorders were 
sometimes quelled, and sometimes overlooked, according to the 
relative strength and weakness, vigilance and supineness, of the 
central government and the insubordinate provincials. 1 The most 
serious of these internal disturbances of the empire were those 
that became chronic in Egypt, proving that the magnificent con¬ 
quest of Selim the Inflexible was gradually passing away from the 
feeble grasp of his successors. 

The latter part of the reign of Sultan Mahmoud I. is made me¬ 
morable not only in Turkish history, but in the general history of 
Mahometanism, by the rise and rapid increase of the sect of the 
Wahabites in Arabia. These Puritans of Islam (of which 
they claimed to be the predestined reformers and sole true 
disciples) were so named after their founder, Abdul Wahab, 
which means “ The Servant of the All-Disposer.” Abdul Wahab, 
was born at Alaynah, in Arabia, near the end of the seventeenth 
century of the Christian era, and about the beginning of the 
twelfth century after the Hejira. Ilis father was Sheikh of his 
village, and young Abdul Wahab was educated in the divinity 
schools at Bassorah, where he made rapid progress in Mahometan 
learning, and at the same time grew convinced that the creed of 
the Prophet had been overlaid by a foul heap of superstition, and 
that he himself w T as called on to become its reformer. He re¬ 
turned to Arabia, where, fearless of danger, and unbaffled by 
temporary failure, he proclaimed his stern denunciations of the 
prevalent tenets and practices of the Mosque and State. He 
inveighed particularly against the worship of saints, which had 
grown up among the Mahometans, against their pilgrimages to 
supposed holy places, and against their indulgence in several 
pleasures which the Koran prohibited, especially that foul form of 
profligacy, which had become almost nationalised among tho 
1 See Porter's Turkey by Larpent, vol. i. p. 279. 


MAHMOUD I . A . D . 1730-1754. 377 

Turks and other chief peoples of the East. He at first met with 
ridicule and persecution from those to whom he preached; but he 
gradually made converts; and at length his doctrines were adopted 
by Mohammed Ben Sououd, the Sheikh of the powerful tribe of 
the Messalikhs, who at the same time married Abdul Wahab’s 
daughter. The new sect now became a formidable political and 
military body: Abdul Wahab continuing to be its spiritual chief, 
but the active duties of military command being committed to 
Ben Sououd, who enforced the new faith by the sword, as had 
been done previously by the Prophet and the early Caliphs. 
Aziz, the son, and Sououd, the grandson of Mohammed Ben 
Sououd, continued the same career of armed proselytism with 
increased fervour; and the Wahabite sect spread through every 
region of Arabia. The attempts of successive Sultans and Pachas 
to quell this heresy and rebellion were vain, until the late Pacha 
of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, undertook the task. He overthrew the 
temporal empire of the Wahabites, and sent their last Emir in 
chains to Constantinople, where he was beheaded in 1818. But 
the Wahabite doctrines are said still to prevail among many of 
the Bedouin tribes. 

The pacific policy maintained by Turkey towards Austria upon 
the death of the Emperor Charles YI. in 1740, is the more 
honourable to the Ottoman nation, by reason of the contrast 
between it and the lawless rapacity, which was shown by nearly 
all the Christian neighbours of the dominions of the young 
Austrian sovereign, Maria Theresa. The King of Prussia, the 
Elector of Bavaria, the Elector of Saxony, and the Kings of 
France, Spain, and Sardinia, agreed to dismember the Austrian 
Empire; and began the w T ar of spoliation (called the war of the 
Austrian Succession), which was terminated by the peace of Aix- 
la-Chapelle, in 1748. Sultan Mahmoud not only scrupulously 
abstained from taking any part against Austria, the old enemy of 
his House, but he offered his mediation to terminate the hostilities 
which raged between the powers of Christendom. With equal 
justice and prudence the Turks took care not to become entangled 
in the other great European contest, which followed that of the 
Austrian Succession after no very long interval; and which, from 
the period of its duration (1756-1763) is known in history as the 
Seven Years’ War. 

Sultan Mahmoud I. had died (1754) before the outbreak of this 
last-mentioned contest; but his brother and successor, Othman III., 
adhered to the same system of moderation and non-interference 
which his predecessor had established; and he thus preserved 


378 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

peace for the Ottoman Empire during his three years reign, from 
1754 to 1757. He was succeeded by Sultan Mustapha III., the 
son of Sultan Achmet III. The name of Mustapha has always 
been accompanied in Turkish history by calamity and^ defeat; 
and we now approach the time, when, under the third Sultan ot 
that inauspicious designation, the struggle between the Porte and 
Russia was resumed, with even heavier disasters to Turkey than 
those which she endured when she strove against Austria and 
Prince Eugene in the reign of Sultan Mustapha II. 

The first years, however, of Mustapha III. were not unpro¬ 
mising or unprosperous. The administration of the affairs of the 
empire was directed by the Grand Vizier Raghib Pacha, a 
minister, not perhaps equal to the great Ottoman statesmen, 
Sokolli and the second and third Kiuprilis, but a man of sterling 
integrity, and of high diplomatic abilities. He turned the 
attention of the Sultan (who showed a perilous restlessness of 
spirit) to the construction of public works of utility and splen¬ 
dour. The most important of these undertakings was the project, 
so often formed, and so often abandoned, of making a canal 
which should give a communication between the Black Sea and 
the Gulf of Nicomedia, in the Sea of Marmora, without passing 
through the Bosphorus. For this purpose it was proposed to dig 
a channel from the eastern extremity of the Gulf of Nicomedia 
to the Lake of Sabandja; and to form another from the Lake of 
Sabandja to the river Sakaria, which falls into the Black Sea. 
The commercial advantages of such a canal would be great; and 
the Turks would be enabled to use the Lake of Sabandja as a 
naval depot of complete security, and of ample capacity for fleets 
of the greatest magnitude, which could rapidly issue thence as 
emergencies required either into the Euxine or the Propontis. 
This mode of uniting the two seas had been attempted before the 
commencement of the Ottoman Empire, twice by the Kings of 
Bithynia, and once by the Emperor Trajan. Three Sultans, 
Solyman the Great, Amurath III., and Mahomet IV., had com¬ 
menced the same enterprise before Mustapha III. But it had 
never been completed; though the distances to be trenched 
through are inconsiderable, and the engineering difficulties pre¬ 
sented by the character and elevations of the soil are said to be 
few and trivial. Sultan Mustapha abandoned the project in 1759, 
after having caused great interest and excitement among the 
French and English residents at Constantinople, who were anxious 
for the accomplishment of the design, and who in vain urged the 
Turks to persevere. Von Hammer observes that the realisation 


MUSTAPHA III, A.D, I757-I773- 379 

of this great work can then only he hoped for, when it is taken 
up by European energy and skill. 1 

The chief efforts of Raghib Pacha himself were directed to the 
strengthening of Turkey against the inveterate hostility of the 
courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg, by alliances with other 
states of Christendom. The results of the War of Succession, and 
of the Seven Years’ War, had been to bring Prussia forward as a 
new power of the first magnitude in Europe. Prussia, from her 
geographical position, had nothing to gain by any losses which 
might befall Turkey; and both Austria and Russia had been 
bitter and almost deadly foes to the great sovereign of the House 
of Brandenburg, Frederic II. A treaty therefore between Prussia 
and Turkey seemed desirable for the interests of both states; and 
many attempts had been made to effect one, before Raghib Pacha 
held the seeds as Grand Vizier. At length in 1761, the envoy of 
Frederic II. to Constantinople signed a treaty of amity between 
Prussia and the Porte, similar to treaties which the Turkish Court 
had already concluded with Sweden, Naples, and Denmark. But 
Raghib Pacha’s design was to convert these preliminary articles 
into a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. The English 
ambassador strove earnestly to forward this scheme, while the 
ministers of Austria and Russia endeavoured to retard and baffle 
it. Considerable progress had been made in the negotiations, 
when the death of Raghib Pacha in 1763 put an end to a project, 
which, if successful, would certainly have been followed by a new 
war with Austria. In that war the Prussians would have co¬ 
operated with the Turks, and it might have materially varied the 
whole current of subsequent Ottoman history. 

1 Von Hammer, vol. iv. p. 517. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


380 


CHAPTER XX. 

RUSSIAN ATTACK ON POLAND—TURKISH REMONSTRANCES—WAR 
WITH RUSSIA—OPINIONS OF EUROPE—DEFEATS OF THE TURKISH 
ARMIES—RUSSIAN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN—BATTLE OF 
TCHESME—EXPLOITS OF HASSAN OF ALGIERS—LOSS OF THE 
CRIMEA — NEGOTIATIONS — WAR RENEWED — SILISTRIA AND 
SHUMLA DEFENDED—DEATH OF MUSTAPHA III.—ABDUL HAMID 
SULTAN—TREATY OF KAINARDJI . 1 

After the death of Ragliib Pacha in 1763, Sultan Mustapha III. 
governed for himself. He was a prince of considerable industry 
and talent, and honestly desirous of promoting the interests of 
the Ottoman Empire; but he was hasty and headstrong, and he 
often proved unfortunate during the latter part of his reign in his 
selection of councillors and of commanders. And the sceptre of 
the power most inimical and most formidable to Turkey was now 
grasped by one of the most ambitious, the most unscrupulous, and 
also the ablest sovereigns, that ever swayed the vast resources of 
the Russian Empire. Catherine II. (who has been termed with 
such terrible accuracy both as to her public and private character, 
the Semiramis of the North) reigned at St. Petersburg. A mili¬ 
tary revolution had placed her on the throne instead of her weak 
and pacific husband ; and it was only by preserving the favour of 
the Russian army, and by encouraging the fanaticism of the 
Russian people, that she could hope to preserve her royalty or her 
life. The military chiefs, by whom her husband had been mur¬ 
dered, and who were her own personal favourites, the Orloffs, and 
their associates were eager for hostilities in which they might 
gratify their rapacity and pride, and display the courage which 
was their only merit. The Porte watched with anxiety and 
alarm the aggressive but insidious policy, which was pursued 
towards every weak state that was within the sphere of Russian 
influence. That policy was to foment disturbances and civil war; 
to interfere in the pretended character of a friend of the weaker 


1 Von Hammer, books 70*72. 


MUSTAPHA III . A.D. 1757-1773. 381 

party ; to sow the seeds of new and worse dissensions; and then 
to make the misery and anarchy, which Russian arts had pro¬ 
duced, the pretext for the subjugation of the exhausted state by 
Russian arms. It was in Poland, “ that commonwealth of common 
woe/' 1 that this Muscovite Machiavelism was chiefly practised 
during the first years of Catherine’s reign. Prussia, unhappily for 
herself and Europe, became the accomplice of Russia against 
Poland. Frederick II. no longer sought the alliance of Turkey 
against his old enemies at Vienna and St. Petersburg; but con¬ 
cluded, in 1764, a treaty with Catherine, by which the two parties 
mutually pledged themselves to maintain each other in possession 
of their respective territories ; and agreed, that if either power 
were attacked, the other should supply an auxiliary force of 10,000 
foot and 1000 horse. But it was expressly provided that if 
Russia were assailed by the Turks, or Prussia by the French, the 
aid should be sent in money. There was also a secret article to 
this treaty, which was directed against Polish independence, and 
which has earned for this confederacy between Russia and Prussia, 
the name of “the Unholy Alliance of 1764, whence, as from a 
Pandora’s box, have sprung all the evils that have afflicted and 
desolated Europe from that time until the present day.” 2 

The Ottoman Court protested continually but vainly against 
the occupation of Poland by Russian and Prussian troops; against 
the disgraceful circumstances of fraud and oppression, under which 
the election of Catherine’s favourite, Stanislaus Poniatowski, as 
king, was forced upon the Poles; and against the dictatorship 

1 The phrase is Sir Walter Ralegh’s, applied by him to Ireland. 

2 “This was that unholy alliance which, from 1764 till the present day, 
has proved the source of all the misfortunes of the European nations, because 
it-has served as a model for all the treaties which have been since concluded, 
by means of which the fate and internal administration of the weaker states 
have become wholly dependent on the compacts, arms, and diplomatists of 
powerful nations. This first treaty was against the Poles; and those by 
which it has been followed, and which have been drawn up after its model, 
have been concluded against the liberties of the nations ; and in this way 
the seeds of discontent and discord between the governed and those who 
govern, have continued to grow and fructify till the present day. As soon 
as the rights of the bayonet were once made good against Poland and Turkey, 
they were also regarded as good against the freedom and lights of the people. 
The oppressed have gnashed their teeth in despair, and waited for the visi¬ 
tations of the divine vengeance, which has followed close upon the footsteps 
of those insolent and tyrannical oppressors for five and twenty years, and 
W in one d av overtake them as sure as the world is under the superintendence 
of an overruling Providence.”—Schlosser’s “ History of the Eighteenth 
Century.” 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


which the Russian general Repnin exercised at Warsaw. The 
Turkish remonstrances were eluded with excuses so shallow, as to 
show the contempt with which the Russians must now have 
learned to regard their Ottoman neighbours, both in diplomatic 
and warlike capacities. Yon Hammer expressly writes, that “the 
exchange of notes between the Turkish, Prussian, and Russian 
ministers on the affairs of Poland till January, 1768, is a singular 
proof of the simplicity of the Ottoman diplomacy, and of the 
duplicity of that of Russia and Prussia at this epoch. The Turkish 
Government, through their interpreters, continued from time to 
time to put the most pressing questions to the ministers of these 
courts, seeking for an explanation of the deeds of violence which 
were taking place in Poland. The Russian resident always pre¬ 
tended that he heard nothing of such events, or declared that 
these were merely measures for the protection of the freedom of 
the republic, and for the maintenance of solemn engagements.” 

Sultan Mustapha and his Viziers at last felt that they were 
treated as dupes and fools; and the indignation raised at Con¬ 
stantinople against Russia was violent. This was augmented by 
the attacks made by the Russian troops on the fugitive Poles of 
the independent party, who had taken refuge within the Turkish 
frontier; and who sallying thence carried on a desultory warfare 
against their enemies, which the Russians retaliated at every 
opportunity, without heeding whether they overtook the Polish 
bands beyond or within the Ottoman dominions. At last the 
Russian general Weissman followed a body of the confederated 
Poles into the town of Balta, on the confines of Bessarabia, which 
belonged to the Sultan’s vassal, the Tartar Khan of the Crimea. 
The Russians besieged the town, took it by storm, plundered, and 
laid it in ashes. Turkey had received proofs of Russian hostility 
in other regions. There had been revolts in Montenegro and in 
Georgia, and there had been troubles in the Crimea, all of which 
were aggravated, if not created, by Russian agency. The Divan 
resolved, on the 4th of October, 1768, that Russia had broken 
the peace between the two empires, and that a war against her 
would be just and holy. But it was determined that the Grand 
Vizier should have a final interview with M. d’Obresskoff, the 
Russian minister at Constantinople, and inform him that peace 
might be preserved, but solely on condition that Russia should 
bind herself under the guarantee of her four allies, Denmark, 
Prussia, England, and Sweden, to abstain from all future inter¬ 
ference with elections to the crown of Poland, or in the religious 
differences in that kingdom : that she should withdraw her troops 


MUSTAPHA III. A.D. 1757-1773. 383 

from Poland, and no longer hinder the Poles from enjoying full 
liberty and independence. Obresskoff was summoned to an 
audience by the Grand Vizier, who interrupted the complimentary 
speeches of the Russian diplomatist by showing him a paper, by 
which Obresskoff had pledged himself on behalf of the Czarina, 
four years previously, that the Russian army of observation in 
Poland should be reduced to 7000 men, whereas it had been 
augmented to 30,000. Obresskoff replied, that this last number 
was exaggerated, but owned that there were 28,000 Russian 
soldiers in Poland. 

“ Traitor, perjurer !” cried the Vizier. “ Hast thou not owned 
thy faithlessness 1 Dost thou not blush before God and man for 
the atrocities which thy countrymen are committing in a land 
which is not theirs 1 Are not the cannons, which have overthrown 
a palace of the Khan of the Tartars, Russian cannons 1 ” 

The Vizier required him to sign instantly a paper containing 
the pledge on which the Divan had determined. Obresskoff 
replied that he had not sufficient authority for such an act. The 
declaration of war was then pronounced, and the Russian minister 
was sent to the prison of the Seven Towers ; an impolitic as well 
as unjustifiable act of violence on the part of the Turks, which 
enabled the Russian Empress to represent herself to the world as 
the injured party ; although the war had been sought by her, and 
all the acts of aggression which caused it, had been deliberately 
planned by the Russian Cabinet. 

The general feeling of Europe was favourable to the Empress. 
England in particular, though she offered her mediation to prevent 
the Turkish war, was, at this period and for many years after¬ 
wards desirous of seeing the power of Russia augmented, and of 
uniting her with Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and Eng¬ 
land herself, in a great Northern Alliance in opposition to the com¬ 
bination of France and Spain under the House of Bourbon. This 
design had been formed by Lord Chatham (then Mr. Pitt) during 
the Seven Years’ War; and it continued to be a favourite project 
of English statesmen. The French minister Choiseul naturally 
regarded Russia with very different feelings. But that great 
statesman also discerned how necessary it was to watch jealously 
the growth of the Muscovite power, not only for the sake of 
French interests, but for the sake of the general commonweal of 
Europe. Choiseul now, at the outbreak of the war between Russia 
and Turkey in 1763, laboured anxiously to make the English 
.ministry understand the true character of Russian power and 
ambition. His efforts were vain, but one of his state papers on 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


384 

the subject deserves citation. Referring to the well-known desire 
of England for a Northern Alliance, Choiseul said : 

“ The English Secretary of State is in the wrong: he does not 
look at these objects from the higher point of view, which should 
engage the attention of a great minister. Nothing can be more 
dangerous for the happiness and repose of humanity, nor more to 
be feared for the principal powers of Europe, than the success of 
the arms and the ambitious projects of Russia. Far from seeking, 
on such a supposition, the alliance and the friendship of the Em¬ 
press, it would become their most essential interest to unite to 
diminish her strength and destroy her preponderance. If the 
balance of power, that unmeaning word, invented by William III., 
on becoming King of England, to raise all Europe against France, 
could have a just application, and if this pretended balance of 
power could be annihilated, it would be by the prodigious increase 
of the material and moral strength of Russia. She is now labour¬ 
ing to enslave the south ; and she will next encroach on the 
liberty of the north; unless an effective check is seasonably put 
to her inordinate passion of despotism. 

“ Instead of contributing to the aggrandisement of Russia, the 
principal courts ought jointly to restrain her ambition and her 
cupidity, which may in some respects realise the chimerical idea, 
once attributed to France, of aiming at universal monarchy.” 1 

However just their cause, the Turks began the war too soon. 
When Sultan Mustapha issued his declaration of hostilities against 
Russia in the autumn of 1768, his anger had got the mastery over 
his judgment. He should have endured the affronts offered to 
him a little longer, and not taken up arms before the summer of 
the following year. He might then have had the full force of his 
empire in readiness to make good his threats. But it was im¬ 
possible to bring his Asiatic troops together during the winter; 
and the opening of the campaign on the Dniester and Danube was 
thus delayed till the spring of 1769 ; a delay which enabled 
the Russians to make ample preparations for assailing Turkey on 
almost every part of her northern frontier, both in Europe and 
Asia. Neither were the Turkish fortresses in a proper state of 
repair, nor sufficiently stored, when the war was proclaimed at 
Constantinople. The Ottoman government endeavoured to make 
good these defects during the winter; but the spring found the 
Turkish equipments still far from a due state of efficiency. 

One bold leader, on the side of the Moslems, and almost the 

1 Choiseul to Cliatelet, April 16, 1769, cited iu Bancroft’s “ America,” 
vol. iii. p. 298. 


LI US TA PH A III. A.D. 1757-1773. 3S5 

only one who displayed any warlike abilities in support of the 
Crescent during the first years of this disastrous war, made a 
vigorous onslaught on the southern provinces of the Czarina’s 
empire, long before the other generals on either side thought it 
possible to bring troops into the field. This was the Tartar Khan 
of the Crimea, Krim Ghirai. Before the end of January, 1769, 
the Tartar chief collected at the ruins of Balta, which the Russians 
had destroyed in the preceding summer, 100,000 cavalry. With 
this vast force of hardy marauders, Krim Ghirai crossed the river 
Boug, and then sent one detachment towards the Doneck, and 
another towards Orel, while the main body under his own com¬ 
mand swept over the Russian province of New Servia. Khan 
Ghirai was accompanied in this expedition by Baron de Tott, one 
of the ablest (though not the least vaunting) of the numerous 
officers and agents, whom the French minister, Choiseul, had sent 
into Turkey to encourage and assist the Ottomans. De Tott has 
minutely described the predatory activity and adroitness of the 
wild host which he marched with, and the stern discipline under 
which they were kept amid all the seeming license of the cam¬ 
paign by the military genius of their chief. For fourteen days 
Krim Ghirai rode at his will through Southern Russia, with drums 
beating and colours flying, while his wild horsemen swept tho land 
with an ever-widening torrent of devastation. The Khan and his 
guest, the Baron, fared like the rest of the Tartars. Their food 
was meat, sodden and bruised between the saddle and the horses’ 
backs, a mess of fermented mares’ milk, smoked horse-hams, 
caviare, boutargue, and other Tartar aliments ; but wine of Tokay 
was served to the guest in vessels of gold. The Khan camped 
and marched in the middle of his army, which was arranged in 
twenty columns. Before him waved, together with the Turkish 
and Tartar standards, the colours of the Ynad Cossacks, who had 
abandoned the Russian Empire in the time of Peter the Great, 
under the guidance of the Cossack Ignacius, and who had since 
been called Ygnad, or Ynad, which means the Mutineers. By 
their influence, Krim Ghirai prevailed on the Zaporofkian Cos¬ 
sacks to revolt against the authority of the commandant of the 
fortress of Elizabethgrod. A prince of the Lezghis also joined 
the Crimean Khan, and offered a reinforcement of 30,000 men to 
the Sultan’s armies, on condition that certain honours should be 
paid him by the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, and that he should 
retain at the peace all the territories out of which he could drive 
the Russians. Had Krim Ghirai lived a few years, or even months, 
longer, it is probable that his ascendency over the wild warriors 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


336 

of these regions, and his marvellous skill in handling irregular 
troops, would have materially changed the course of the war. De 
Tott admired the severe discipline which he maintained, while he 
permitted and encouraged his followers to develop against the 
enemy to the utmost their astonishing talent both for acquiring 
booty, and for preserving it when taken. Eut, woe to the Tartar 
who pillaged without the Khan’s permission, or who offered any 
outrage against the Khan’s command ! Some Noghai Tartars in 
the army having insulted a crucifix, received each a hundred blows 
of the stick in front of the church where they committed this 
offence; and De Tott saw others, who had plundered a Polish 
village without orders, tied to the tails of their own horses and 
dragged along till they expired. 

Krim Ghirai died within a month after his return from this 
expedition against Russia. It was believed that he was poisoned 
by a Greek physician named Siropulo, an agent of the Prince of 
Wallachia, against whom he had been vainly cautioned by De 
Tott. The Porte appointed, as the Khan’s successor, Dewlet 
Ghirai, a prince without spirit or capacity. These were deficiencies, 
in which he too closely resembled the Grand Vizier and the other 
leaders of the Sultan’s forces. Meanwhile, the Empress Catherine 
and her generals had been preparing for the war with their cha¬ 
racteristic energy. One Russian army, 65,000 strong, was collected 
in Podolia, under the command of Prince Alexander Michailovitsch 
Gallitzin, who was directed to besiege aud capture the city of 
Khoczin, and then to occupy Moldavia. The second, under 
General Count Peter Alexandrewitsch Romanzoff, was to protect 
the frontiers of Russia between the Dnieper and the Sea of Azoph, 
and to reconstruct the fortresses of Azoph and Taganrog, which had 
been razed in pursuance of the treaty of Belgrade. A third army 
of from 10,000 to 11,000 men was to occupy Poland, and prevent 
the Poles from giving any assistance to Turkey. A fourth army, 
under Major-General Medem, advanced from Zarizin into the 
Kabartas and the Kuban ; and a fifth, under General Todleben, 
was directed upon Tiflis, in order to attack Erzeroum and Trebi- 
zond in concert with the Georgian princes of Karthli, Mingrelia, 
Gouriel, and Imeritia, who had submitted themselves to the sove¬ 
reignty of Russia. At the same time, money, arms, ammunition, 
and officers were sent to the Montenegrins : and those warlike 
mountaineers were set in action against the Turkish forces in 
Bosnia. While the Grand Vizier was slowly moving with the 
Sultan’s main army from Constantinople to the Danube, Gallitzin 
passed the Dniester, and made an unsuccessful attempt upon 


MUSTAPHA III. A.D. 1757 - 1773 . 387 

Khoczin ; after which he retreated across the Dniester. Indeed, 
so far as Gallitzin was concerned, the sarcasm of Frederick II. of 
Prussia, on the conduct of this war, was well deserved. He called 
it a triumph of the one-eyed over the blind. But among the 
other Russian commanders and generals of division were Roman- 
zoff, Weissman, Bauer, Kamenski, and, above all, Suwarrow, in 
whom Frederick himself would have found formidable antagonists. 

The Turkish Grand Vizier, Emin Mohammed, was the Sultan’s 
son-in-law. How far he was qualified for the duties of generalis¬ 
simo, may be judged from the report of the proceedings at a 
council of war, which the Turkish historian, Wassif, has preserved. 
The Vizier had reached Isakdji (on the lower part of the Danube, 
near Ismail), early in May. He halted there twenty days, to com¬ 
plete his magazines of provisions and military stores. He then 
summoned his generals together and addressed them in these 
words :—“ On what point do you think that I ought to direct the 
march of the army 'l I have 110 experience in war : it is for you, 
therefore, to determine what are the operations wlr'ch are fit for 
us to undertake, and which present the most favourable chances 
for the arms of the Sublime Porte. Speak, then, without reserve, 
and enlighten me with your counsels.” All the generals sat for 
some time silent, and stared in astonishment at the Grand Vizier 
and each other. At length Schedli Osman Effendi began a long 
discourse, the pith of which was, that inasmuch as the enemy had 
made an unsuccessful attempt on the side of Khoczin, it was pro¬ 
bable that they would next show themselves on the side of Bender. 
When the Grand Vizier comprehended the speaker’s meaning, he 
interrupted his oratory by exclaiming, “ Enough, enough ! every¬ 
body must have time to speak.” Some of the officers then recom¬ 
mended a march on Khoczin, thinking that Oczakof and Bender 
were strong enough to be left to their own resources. Others 
thought that the wisest plan was first to pass the Danube, and 
then act according to circumstances. The Grand Vizier approved 
of this policy ; and the Turkish army crossed the Danube and ad¬ 
vanced as far as Khandepe on the Pruth, between Khoczin and 
Jassy. The deficiency of provisions, and the swarms of gnats and 
musquitos which tormented the Turks in that locality, made the 
Grand Vizier change his line of operations and march towards 
Bender. They halted at Jassipede (June 9, 1769), where they 
found the supplies of food equally scarce, and the gnats and mus¬ 
quitos equally abundant as at Khandep 6 . Meanwhile, Gallitzin 
had reorganised his army, and received large reinforcements in 
Podolia. °The wretched government of Poland had been compelled 

25—2 


338 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

by the Russians to declare war against Turkey, and Sultan Mus- 
taplm and his Mufti issued a Fetva, by which the Turkish troops 
were directed to attack Poland and treat it as a hostile country. 
A series of operations and skirmishes in the neighbourhood of 
Khoczin followed, in which Prince Gallitzin and the Grand Vizier 
rivalled each other in imbecility. At last, the numerous complaints 
which the Sultan received against his son-in-law, made him recall 
Emin Mohammed, who was beheaded at Adrianople in August. 
Ali Moldowandji, who had distinguished himself in some engage¬ 
ments rear Khoczin, succeeded Emin Mohammed in the Grand 
Vizierate. Ali had been a Bostandji, or gardener in the palace, 
and had been sent on an expedition against some gangs of robbers 
who infested the communications between the northern European 
provinces and the capital. In that enterprise, Ali captured a 
number of Moldavian vagrant women, whom, with their children, 
he sold as slaves. It was from this incident that he acquired his 
surname of Ali the Moldavian. On receiving the chief command 
of the Ottoman forces, he made several bold attacks on the Russians 
near Khoczin, and endeavoured to penetrate into Poland. Ulti¬ 
mately, the Turks were unsuccessful, and Khoczin surrendered on 
the 18th September, 1769. The Turkish army was now utterly 
disorganised, and hurried back to the left bank of the Danube, re¬ 
crossing that river at Isakdji, by the same bridge of boats that had 
been constructed for their passage at the beginning of the cam¬ 
paign. The Empress had now recalled Gallitzin, and given the chief 
command to Romanzoff. Under that bold and able chief, the 
Russians speedily overran Moldavia, defeating the Turks at Galacz 
and at Jassy. Romanzoff entered the capital of the principality, 
and received there, in the name of the Empress Catherine, the 
homage of the Moldavian Boyards. The Russian influence speedily 
extended to Wallachia. On hearing of these events, the Sultan 
Mustapha, and his rash and violent adviser, the chief Mufti, pub¬ 
lished a Fetva commanding the slaughter of all Moldavians 
and Wallachians who had submitted to the enemy; and giving 
authority also for the confiscation of their property, and the selling 
of their wives and children into slavery. The chief effect of this 
foolish and tyrannical edict was, as the Turkish historian, Wassif, 
himself observes, to bind the Moldavians and Wallachians more 
firmly to the cause of Russia. Some of its immediate results were, 
that the Wallachian Boyards, at Bucharest, solemnly placed the 
insignia of government in the hands of Russian commissioners, 
took the oath of allegiance to the Empress Catherine, and sent a 


MUSTAPHA III. A.D. 1757-1773. 3S9 

deputation to St. Petersburg to protest their loyalty and implore 
her Imperial protection. 

1 he same Mufti, Pirizadi Osman Effendi, who was the author 
of ^the Fetvas against the Poles and the Moldo-Wallachians, 
endeavoured also in his rabid fanaticism to excite the Sultan to a 
general massacre of all the Christians in the empire. This atro¬ 
cious project had twice before been mooted, in the reign of Selim I. 
and Mahomet III. It was now revived for the last time; but the 
Mufti found no seconders or sympathisers in the Divan. He was 
universally abhorred for his violence and cruelty; and his death 
at the end of the first year of the war was the subject of general 
rejoicing to his brethren, and to the great body of the Mussulman 
as well as the Christian subjects of the empire. 

In Trans-Caucasia and Armenia the Russian generals Todleben 
and Medem had been uniformly successful, and had received in 
the Empress’s name homage and oaths of allegiance from great 
numbers of the inhabitants. But Catherine had resolved on 
carrying out her project of conquering Turkey by means of its 
own Christian population on a bolder and grander scale in another 
part of the Ottoman dominions. The designs of Peter the Great 
and Marshal Miinnich to arouse the Greeks against their Turkish 
master had never been forgotten at St. Petersburg, and Catherine 
now revived them with enthusiasm. The aged Marshal Miinnich 
(who during the reign of the Empress Elizabeth had been banished 
to Siberia) was at Catherine’s Court, and eagerly encouraged the 
Czarina to renew what had been termed his “ Oriental Project.” 
Russian emissaries had long been actively employed in the Morea, 
and other parts of Southern Turkey in Europe; and the Empress 
received numerous assurances of the devotion of the Greeks to 
the crown, and of their eagerness to rise against their Mahometan * 
oppressors. The Empress and her favourites, the Orloffs, resolved 
not to wait till their land armies had effected the perilous and 
doubtful march from the Dniester to the vicinity of Greece, but to 
send a Russian fleet with troops into the Mediterranean, and thus 
assail the Sultan in the very heart of his power, at the same time 
that he was hard pressed on the Danube, in the Crimea, and in 
upper Asia. The state of Egypt, where Ali Bey had made himself 
virtual sovereign, and had discarded even the appearance of 
allegiance to the Porte, furnished an additional motive for the 
expedition. It was thought that Greece, Egypt, and Syria might 
be rent from the House of Othman in a single summer; and 
Constantinople itself was supposed not to be safe, if a sudden and 
bold attack were to be made through the ill-fortified channel of 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


390 

the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora. Towards the end of the 
summer of 17G0 a Russian fleet of twelve ships of the line, twelve 
frigates, and a large number of transports carrying troops, left the 
port of Cronstadt for the Mediterranean. Count Alexif Orloff had 
the chief command of the expedition, and was nominated by 
Catherine, Generalissimo of the Russian armies, and High Admiral 
of the Russian fleets in the Mediterranean Sea. Admiral Spiridoff 
commanded the fleet under Orloff; but the real leaders in all the 
naval operations were Admiral Elphinstone, Captain Gregg, and other 
English officers, some of whom were to be found in almost every 
ship of the Czarina’s fleet. 1 The equipment of this expedition was 
attended by great boasting and ostentation in the Russian Court, 
and in the numerous circles of the literary men of the age, with ' 
whom Catherine loved to correspond, and who debased their 
genius and their profession by heaping flatteries on her character, 
and rhapsodising glory to her arms. The report that a Russian 
fleet was on its way along the Atlantic to liberate Greece spread 
as far even as Constantinople. But the Turkish statesmen refused 
all credence to the rumour, and would not believe that there could 
be any communication between the Baltic and the Mediterranean 
Seas. 

The fact of this astounding ignorance is attested by Wassif, 
the Turkish historian, himself. When afterwards, early in 1770, 
indisputable tidings reached the Divan that the Russian ships 
were actually approaching Greece, the Ottoman ministers made a 
formal complaint to the representative of Venice that the Venetian 
government had permitted the Russian fleet to pass into the 
Mediterranean by way of the Adriatic. Von Hammer, in record¬ 
ing this, mentions that a similar instance of Turkish ignorance 
came under his own notice in 1800, when he acted as interpreter 
to Sir Sidney Smith in an interview with the Grand Vizier You¬ 
souf Sia, respecting the expulsion of the French from Egypt. 
That Ottoman grandee denied the possibility of the English 
auxiliaries from India reaching Egypt by the way of the Red Sea. 
How lamentably had the Turks of the eighteenth century de¬ 
generated from their ancestors in the time of Solyman the 
Magnificent, when Turkish admirals surveyed the Archipelago, 
the Mediterranean, and the Indian Seas, and published scientific 

1 Schlosser, “ Hist. Eighteenth Century, ” vol. iv. The Russian fleet 
never could have reached the Mediterranean, had it not been for the assist¬ 
ance which it received in the English ports. See the full account of the 
expedition in Emerson Tennent’s “ Modern Greece,” vol. ii., and see the 
Oezakof debates in the House of Commons in 1792. 


MUSTAPHA III. A.D. 1757-1773. 391 

as well as practical treatises on their geography, and cn every 
matter connected with their navigation l 1 

At the end of February, 1770, the Russian fleet was off the 
Morea; and OrlofT landed among the Mainotes, who rose fiercely 
in arms against their Turkish masters. The force of Russian 
troops, which Orloff disembarked, was utterly insufficient to main¬ 
tain order or discipline among those savage mountaineers and 
their countrymen from the rest of Greece, who also joined him in 
large numbers. They practised the most revolting cruelties upon 
all the Turks whom they could overpower in the open country or 
less defensible towns ; Misitra, the chief place in Maina, in parti¬ 
cular, was the scene of fearful atrocities, afterwards still more 
fearfully revenged. Four hundred Turks were slaughtered there 
in cold blood; and Ottoman children, torn from their mothers’ 
breasts, were carried up the tops of the minarets, and thence 
dashed to the ground. At Arkaclia the Turkish garrison sur¬ 
rendered to the Russian general, Dolgorouki, on the faith of 
articles of capitulation which guaranteed their lives. Dolgorouki’s 
Greek followers slew them all, and burnt the town to the ground. 
In the stronger cities the Turks repelled all the assaults of Orloff 
and his Greek brigands. He was obliged to raise the siege of 
Modon and Coron ; and on the 8th of April the Albanian troops, 
which several of the Turkish Beys had drawn together from be¬ 
yond the isthmus, encountered the main body of the Russo-Greek 
force near Tripolitza. The Greeks thought themselves so sure of 
victory, that they had brought women with them, with sacks 
ready to be loaded with the spoil of the Mussulmans. But they 
were utterly defeated, and massacred without mercy in the flight. 
After having issued some vaunting manifestoes, in which he 
called on the Greeks to imitate the example of their fellow-Chris- 
tians of the true church in Moldavia and Wallachia, who, he said, 
had risen to the number of 600,000 in defence of their faith and 
freedom, Orloff reimbarked his troops, and the Turkish Seraskier, 
Mouhinzadi, who had commanded at Tripolitza, assumed the title 
of “Fatihi Mora,” which meant that he had reconquered the 
Morea. 

At sea, the Russian undertakings were more successful, because 
(it is a German historian who makes the statement) they were 
under the direction of Englishmen. On the 7th of July, 1770, 
OrlofFs fxeet came in sight of the Turkish near the Isle of Scio. 
Sultan Mustapha had, throughout his reign, paid especial attention 
to his navy; and the Turkish Capitan Pacha, Hosameddin, had 

1 See supra, p. 179 . 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


392 

now under his command a force which the Turkish writers 
describe as two corvettes, fifteen galleons, five xebecques, and 
eight galliotes ; it comprised one ship of 100 guns, one of 96, four 
of 84, one of 74, one of 70, and six of 60. The Russians had 
eight ships of the line and seven frigates. The Turks were 
worsted in the action, which was chiefly memorable for the 
desperate bravery shown by one of the Sultan’s admirals, named 
Hassan of Algiers. This man had been born on the frontiers of 
Persia, and was, while a child, sold as a slave. He had been a 
boatman, a soldier, a corsair, and had acquired such reputation in 
the Algerine squadrons as to be raised to the rank of Port 
Admiral of Algiers. A quarrel with the Dey sent him to Italy 
as a refugee. Thence he found his way to Constantinople, and 
acquired the favour of Raghib Pacha. At the battle of Scio, 
while his superior officer kept at a distance from the enemy, 
Hassan ran his ship alongside that of the Russian admiral, and 
fought yard-arm and yard-arm, till both vessels caught fire by the 
Russian hand-grenades, and blew up together. Spiridofi and 
Theodore Orloff escaped in the Russian ship’s boats before the 
explosion, in which 700 of their men perished. Hassan kept 
the deck to the last; and, though severely injured, escaped with 
life, and swam to shore. The defeated Turkish ships took refuge 
in the port of Tchesme, the ancient Cyssus, where the Roman 
fleet, B.c. 191, defeated that of King Antiochus. Seeing the 
Turkish ships cooped together in this narrow bay, the English 
officers on board Orloff’s fleet formed and executed the bold pro¬ 
ject of attacking them and burning them as they lay on the very 
night after the battle. To use the words of the German historian, 
Schlosser, “ The whole merit of the execution of this plan was due 
to the English. It was three Englishmen who conducted the 
whole of the exploit at Tchesme ; Elphinstone blockaded the 
Turkish ships, Gregg directed the cannonade, and Lieutenant 
Dugdale was intrusted with the dangerous commission of guiding 
the fire-ship by which the fleet was to be set in flames. At the 
very moment of departure, the Russians who were with Dugdale 
on board the fire-ship left him exposed to the danger, leapt into 
the water and swam away; he alone steered the ship, and set fire 
to one of the Turkish vessels, which rapidly conveyed the flames 
to the other ships of the fleet. Only one ship of fifty guns and 
five xebecques remained unconsumed, and these were carried 
away by the Russians. The small town of Tchesme, also, with its 
fort, batteries, and cannon, was taken.” 

After this signal triumph (which procured for Count Orloff tho 


MUSTAPHA III. A.D. 1757 - 1773 . 393 

Biirnaine of Tschesmeski), Elphinstone proposed that the Russian 
Meet should instantly sail for the Dardanelles, force the passage, 
and then at once proceed to "bombard Constantinople . 1 Such a 
bold stroke would probably have been successful, as the panic 
caused at Constantinople by the tidings from Tchesme was 
extreme, and the fortifications both of the straits and the capital 
had been neglected. But Orloff hesitated and lost time, while 
the Sultan despatched his late Vizier, Moldowandji (who had 
befen recalled from the Danube and deprived of the seals), 
together with Baron De Tott, to strengthen and defend the Dar¬ 
danelles. The proceedings of the two officers were characteristic. 
Moldowandji began by whitewashing the old walls of the forts, to 
make the Russians think that the works, which looked so bright 
and clean, must be new or newly repaired. The Frank engineer 
erected four batteries, two on the European and two on the 
Asiatic side, so as to place any vessel, that endeavoured to pass, 
under a cross fire. An attempt which Orloff at last made to 
destroy the first Turkish fort was ineffectual; and the Russian chifef 
then resolved to make himself master of Lemnos, and formed the 
siege of the castle of that island. After sixty days’ investment, 
the Turkish garrison offered to capitulate; and, according to some 
accounts, the articles were actually prepared, and hostages given 
for their execution, when a daring exploit of Hassan of Algiers 
saved Lemnos, and drove Orloff discomfited from his prey. After 
the sea-fight off Scio, Hassan had gone to Constantinople to be 
cured of his wounds. As soon as he was capable of exertion, he 
obtained an interview with the new Grand Vizier, and offered to 
raise the siege of Lemnos. He asked for no troops, or ships, or 
artillery, but merely for permission to collect volunteers among 
the population of Constantinople, for sabres and pistols to arm 
them with, and for some light vessels to take them to Lemnos. 
With 4000 such volunteers he said he would save the island. 
Hassan’s reputation was high among the Turks of all ranks; and 
the fanatic rabble of the capital enrolled themselves readily for 
this service against the Giaours, under so valiant a chief of the 
True Believers. The French general De Tott felt it his duty to 
remonstrate with the Grand Vizier against a proceeding, which 
seemed to be so insane, and which was in such palpable contra¬ 
vention of all the rules of war. The Vizier answered that he also 
thought Hassan 1 s scheme absurd, but that it was sure to do good ; 
as, if it succeeded, it would save Lemnos ; or, if it failed, it would 
rid Constantinople of 4000 rogues and ruffians. The event 
1 Eton, 18 S. Emerson Tennent, vol. ii. p. 867 . 


394 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

showed that the Algerine corsair knew how such work was to bo 
done, better than the Vizier and the Baron. Landing unper¬ 
ceived by the besiegers with his 4000 desperadoes on the eastern 
side of Lemnos, Hassan, in the grey of the morning of the 10th of 
October, fell suddenly upon OrlofFs lines, sabre and pistol in 
hand, cut down Russian artillerymen, soldiers, and sailors, in the 
trenches; and drove the rest in a panic to their ships, in which 
they re-embarked, and abandoned the enterprise. 

Raised to the chief command of what remained of the Turkish 
navy, Hassan, within a short time after the deliverance of Lemnos, 
fought a severe action against OrlofF near the port of Monderos, 
in which each admiral claimed the victory ; but, as Von Hammer 
observes, it is clear that the superiority was on the side of the 
Turks, as after the battle Orloff sailed away, having first given 
up, on Hassan’s requisition, the hostages who had been placed in 
his hands by the garrison of Lemnos. The Russian armament in 
the Mediterranean effected little during the rest of the war, though 
it took possession of one of the Greek islands, frequently cap¬ 
tured Turkish merchant-vessels, and impeded the communications 
between the maritime Pachalics and the capital. Orloff endea¬ 
voured to sustain the rebellion of Ali Bey of Egypt, and the 
Sheikh Tahir of Acre against the Porte. He concluded a treaty 
with the Egyptian insurgent, who at one time was not only master 
of Egypt and part of Arabia, but occupied Gaza, Jaffa, Jerusalem, 
and Damascus. Ali was preparing to march into Asia Minor 
against the Ottomans, where his brother-in-law Abouzeheb be¬ 
trayed him, and revolted against his authority, as he had revolted 
against that of the Sultan. Ali Bey was defeated in Egypt by 
Abouzeheb, and then betook himself to Syria, where, aided by 
the Russian squadrons, and his friend the Sheikh Tahir of Acre, 
he maintained for some time the struggle against the Sultan’s 
officers; but he was at last defeated and taken prisoner in a battle 
near Sahilie, where 400 Russians who were in his army perished 
to a man, except four officers, who were taken prisoners. 

So went the war in the South ; but it was on the natural line 
of contest between Russia and Turkey, in the frontier lands of 
the weaker of the two empires, that the fortune of the combatants 
was decided. The inauspicious campaign of 1769 was followed 
there by others still more disastrous for the Ottoman arms. 
Moldavia was the scene of the early operations in 1770 ; and 
before the new Grand Vizier, Khalil Pacha, had reached that 
province, the Russian general Romanzoff had defeated the ad¬ 
vanced bodies of the Turks and Tartars, and driven them in 


MUSTAPHA III. A.D. 1757 - 1773 . 395 

confusion back upon the army with which the Vizier was ad¬ 
vancing. Khalil Pacha came in presence of the enemy near 
Kartal. The Vizier had led and rallied a force of about 30,000 
effective troops : with these he intrenched himself in front of the 
Russian position, while a vast host of Tartars, under Kaplin 
Ghirai, the new Khan of the Crimea, collected on the other side. 
Romanzoff’s troops were emboldened by repeated victories; and 
he knew the disaffection and demoralisation which previous defeats 
had created among his adversaries. He led his army in three 
columns against the Vizier’s camp (August 1, 1770), stormed it 
with inconsiderable loss, and took possession of immense treasures 
and stores, with which the Ottomans had cumbered themselves, 
and of their whole artillery, amounting to 160 pieces. The 
number of slain on the Turkish side was small, in consequence of 
the panic haste with which they fled. The Vizier reassembled a 
part of his host on the southern side of the Danube ; and the 
Tartar Khan undertook to provide for the safety of the Turkish 
fortresses in the Dobruscha and Bessarabia. But Kaplan Ghirai 
was as incompetent as his predecessor Dewlet had been; and 
fortress after fortress fell before the Russians. Kilia, Ackerman, 
and Ismail surrendered after short sieges; but at Bender, in 
Bessarabia, the Tartar population resisted desperately. The siege 
lasted two months; and when the final assault was given (27th 
September, 1770), although the Russians, by favour of a dark 
night and the laxity of the Turkish discipline, succeeded in 
escalacling the walls by surprise, the conflict in the streets was 
maintained with equal fury on both sides for ten hours, and two- 
tliirds of the population perished before the Russians won the 
town. Their own loss is said to have been so severe, as to have 
drawn a caution from the Empress to Count Panin, that it was 
better not to take such a town than to win it at such a price. 
Brailow, or Ibrail, on the Danube, also made a gallant defence for 
eighteen days, and repulsed an assault of the Russians with 
heavy loss ; but there was no hope of relief for any of the Turkish 
garrisons on the Dniester or the Danube. The Grand Vizier’s 
army had disbanded; and that high commander was left with 
about 3000 half-starved men to receive tidings of the successive 
capture of the bulwarks of the empire. At the close of the cam¬ 
paign all the Turkish fortresses on the Lower Danube were in the 
power of the Russians, and the line of advance along the coast of 
the Black Sea was laid open. 

A gleam of consolation came this year from the Crimea, where 
an attempt of the Russians to force the lines of Perekop.was 


396 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

defeated. But in the following summer the armies of the Giaour 3 
were again directed upon the Crimean peninsula with fatal efficacy; 
and that splendid conquest of Mahomet II. was reft by Cathe¬ 
rine II. from the House of Othman. Another new Khan had 
been appointed by the Porte, named Selim Ghirai; and the Turkish 
council of war judged his presence in his own country to be more 
important than it would be on the south of the Danube. Selim 
Ghirai accordingly left the Grand Vizier’s camp, and repaired to 
Baghdjiserai, the Tartar capital of the Crimea, and the ancestral 
residence of its sovereigns. There Selim indulged in the pomps, 
and pleasures of viceroyalty, until he was roused by the startling 
tidings that Prince Dolgorouki was before Perekop with a Russian 
army of 30,000 regular troops, and 60,000 Noghai Tartars, who 
had taken service under the Empress. Selim hurried to defend 
the isthmus; but the lines were stormed, a division of the Tartar 
army beaten by Prince Prosorofski, and the town of Perekop 
besieged and taken. While the siege of this place was proceed¬ 
ing, Selim Ghirai received intelligence that another Russian army 
10,000 strong had attacked and captured Taman on the Asiatic 
side of the straits of Kertch; that they had entered the Crimea 
on its eastern point, and were in full march for Kaffa. Bewil¬ 
dered by these multiplied perils, the unhappy Khan quitted an 
intrenched camp which he had formed at Tuzla, and hastened to 
Baghdjiserai. He entered his capital, almost alone, and in such a 
state of agitation and terror, that he was incapable of giving any 
commands for defence. The Russians soon appeared before the 
walls; and Selim then fled to Mount Karadagh, where several 
members of his family had collected with their followers,- and had 
formed a fortified post. Fearing to fall into the hands of his 
enemies, the Khan abandoned this refuge also without striking 
a blow, reached the coast, and embarked wfith a few friends in a 
vessel, which conveyed them to Constantinople. This igno¬ 
minious flight of the Prince deprived me Tartars of the last ray 
of hope. Many sought the means of leaving their fatherland, 
which they saw about to become the dominion of the Giaours; 
and considerable numbers set sail for Anatolia. Others sought 
to make peace with the conquerors. Dolgorouki acted with con- 
• summate craft, and promised them independence under the rule 
of a prince of the royal House of Ghirai, and also under the pro¬ 
tection of the Empress of Russia. They took the oaths of 
allegiance to the Russian Empress accordingly, and sent forty- 
eight deputies of their nation, and two sons of Selim Ghirai to 
St. Petersburg, to implore the imperial favour of Catherine. 


MUSTAPHA III. A.D. 1757-1773- 397 

Kafia, Kertch, and Yenikale now opened their gates to the 
Russians. Eupatoria was captured; and the Turkish Seraskier 
in the Crimea, who vainly strove with his feeble force of Ottoman 
regular troops to stem the torrent of disaster and disaffection, was 
beaten in battle, taken prisoner, and sent to St. Petersburg. 
While waiting the gracious response of Catherine to her Crimean 
suppliants, Dolgorouki installed Shahin Ghirai as Khan. The 
Russian general received the surname of Krimski for this im¬ 
portant conquest; and the Muscovites rejoiced that they had now 
completed their revenge for the ancient ignominies and oppres¬ 
sions which their race had formerly endured under the Tartars. 
Of the three great Tartar Khanates, which so long afflicted Russia, 
those of Kazan and Astrakhan had been overthrown by Czar 
Ivan the Terrible. It had been reserved for Catherine II. to 
strike down the last stem of the Tartar stock by subjugating the 
Khanate of the Crimea. 1 

This heavy blow to the House of Othman was poorly compen¬ 
sated by the successful resistance which both Oczakof and Kilburn 
made to the Russian forces which besieged them in the same year. 
On the Danube the Turks obtained some advantages in the begin¬ 
ning of the campaign of 1771. They recovered Giurgevo, which 
the Russians had taken in the preceding winter; and Mouhinzadi 
Mohammed, who had distinguished himself against the Russians 
and Greeks in the Morea, displayed equal energy and bravery as 
governor of Widdin, which important post was now confided to his 
care. He crossed the Danube, and camped at Kalafat, whence he 
pushed his troops as far as Crajova and Kalle. He defeated the 
Russian general Essen, who had endeavoured to regain Giurgevo, 
but was "himself beaten in an attack which he made upon Bucha¬ 
rest. The Russian generals Miloradovitch and Weissman de¬ 
feated bodies of Turks at Tuldja; and altogether the Russians 
maintained their superiority, though their general, Romanzoff, did 
not press the Turks with the vigour which usually characterised his 
movements. Probably the despatch of Dolgorouki’s army to the 
Crimea weakened the Russians in Bessarabia and the Principalities 
and it is also certain that Romanzoff was watching the progress 
of the negotiations for peace which had now been commenced. 

The rapid progress of the Czarina’s armies, the seemingly 
approaching ruin of the Ottoman Empire, and the establishment 
of Russian authority in Bessarabia and the Moldavian and Walla- 
chian Principalities, had made even Austria desirous to interpose 
in behalf of her ancient Mahometan enemy, and to save herself 
1 See Levesque, “Histoire de Russie,” vol. v. p. 357. 


393 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

from the perilous proximity of her ambitious Muscovite friends. 
France, England, and Prussia had offered to mediate between the 
contending parties early in the war; but the Empress Catherine 
had made it a point of personal and national honour to allow no 
one to interfere between her and the Ottoman enemy. Roman- 
zoff had caused an intimation to be conveyed to the Turkish 
government, that peace might be obtained on much easier terms 
by a direct application to the Empress herself, than would be 
granted if the agency of any third parties were employed. But 
the tangled web of diplomacy was still continued ; Austria, Prussia, 
and France being the most active in its complication. The Eng¬ 
lish ambassador at Constantinople, Mr. Murray, seems to have 
offended equally the Turkish and his own government by some 
maladroit attempts which he made to gain the especial favour ot 
the Peis Effendi, and by his not being sufficiently convinced that 
“ Russia was the natural ally of the British Crown/' 1 2 Unhappily 
also for the interest and honour of himself and his empire, Sultan 
Mustapha thought highly of his own statecraft, and followed an 
eccentric tortuous policy, alike inconsistent with high principle or 
sound calculation. Indeed an universal spirit of selfish rapacity 
seems to have animated Russia, Austria, Prussia, and the Turkish 
Sultan in these negotiations; Poland being the victim which all 
four considered feeble enough to be plundered with impunity. It 
is certainly to be remembered that Turkey was at war with the 
nominal government of Poland; which makes the Sultan’s policy 
towards her less execrable, than that of the three Christian powers, 
who were her nominal friends. 

Frederick II. of Prussia, and Joseph II. of Austria (who was 
now associated with his mother, Maria Theresa, in the rule of that 
empire), had determined at a personal interview which took place 
between those two sovereigns, to interpose on behalf of Turkey f 

1 See Von Hammer, and see Lord Rochford’s despatch, censuring Mr. 
Murray, in the appendix to Lord Stanhope’s “ History of England,” vol. v. 

2 Accoi'ding to Archdeacon Coxe it was on this occasion that Frederick 
proposed to Joseph the partition of Poland. He places the scene of those 
royal consultations at the Austrian camp at Neustadt in Moravia in 1770. 
He states that the Austrian statesman, Prince Kaunitz, who was present, 
endeavoured to persuade the Prussian King to join the House of Austria in 
opposing by force of arms the ambitious designs of Russia, and urged that 
such an union was the only sufficient barrier against the torrent from the 
north, which threatened to overwhelm all Europe. Frederick evaded this 
demand, and advised that they should rather invite Russia to join with them 
in the partition of Poland, and either persuade or compel her to accept a 
portion of that country instead of retaining Moldavia and Wallachia. See 
Coxe’s “ House of Austria,” vol. iii. pp. 446, 447 (Bohn’s Edition), and note. 


399 


MUSTAPHA III. A.D. 1757 - 1773 . 

but as they had not agreed on any joint line of action, their re¬ 
spective representatives at Constantinople, Zegelin and Thugut, 
made their offers of mediation in separate interviews with the 
Reis Effendi. In a conversation between that minister and M. de 
Thugut, the Turks suddenly proposed that Austria and the Porte 
should enter into an offensive and defensive alliance against 
Russia. The Reis Effendi added, “ When the Russians are driven 
out of Poland, it will depend entirely on the pleasure of the 
Imperial Court whether it will place a King of its own choice on 
the throne of Poland, or divide the territqries of that kingdom 
with the Porte.” To this project of Polish partition (of which 
Sultan Mustapha himself was the author) Thugut replied, that it 
was not a fit time for the consideration of so vast a project, which 
could only be effected by a great effusion of blood, whereas the 
object of his communications with the Porte was to put an end to 
a war which had already been too sanguinary. At the same time 
that he was making these offers to Austria, the Sultan was treat¬ 
ing with France for an active alliance against Russia. The French 
Court offered the Porte to place at its disposal a fleet of fourteen 
or fifteen ships of war, in return for which certain annual sub¬ 
sidies were to be paid by Turkey. France promised also to 
obtain similar assistance for the Sultan from Spain. This pro¬ 
ject, which was called the Scheme of the Maritime Alliance, was 
not accepted by the Porte; though the French ambassador was 
requested, and promised to obtain from France ships of war, 
stores, and artillerymen, which were to be purchased and hired at 
a fixed rate of payment. The Austrian minister, Thugut, obtained 
information of this project, and sought to conclude an engagement 
on the same principle between Austria and the Porte. A conven¬ 
tion was actually signed (July 6, 1771) by which the Porte bound 
itself to pay a subsidy of 20,000 purses (equal to 11,250,000 
florins), to cede Little Wallachia to Austria, * 1 to liberate Austrian 
commerce from all taxes, and to guarantee her merchant ships from 
all attacks by the Barbaresque powers. Austria in return pledge d 
herself to procure the restoration to the Porte of all the territori es 


Schlosser also (vol. v. p. 525) represents that Polish as well as Turkish 
affairs were discussed at Neustadt. I think, however, that the account of 
Von Hammer, which I have followed, that the scheme of dismembering 
Poland was not formerly proposed by Frederick till 1771, is borne out by 
the dates and tenour of the documents, which Von Hammer cites and re- 

f ers *fco # 

1 Von Hammer, vol. iv. p. 629: Coxe’s “House of Austria,” vol. iii. 
p. 457- 



4oo 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


that Russia had conquered in the war. An instalment of the 
money was paid to Austria; and the troops were put in motion 
towards the frontiers, where they served to overawe the Turks 
and Poles far more than the Russians. 

Russia, on her part, again endeavoured to open negotiations for 
peace with the Porte on the understanding that no intermeddling 
by any other power should be permitted; and a categorical an¬ 
nouncement was made to the Austrian Court (September, 1771) 
that the Empress Catherine was determined to make the Crimea 
independent of Turkey, and to place an independent prince on the 
throne of Moldavia and Wallachia. Soon afterwards Frederick of 
Prussia notified to Austria that he designed to appropriate certain 
parts of Poland, especially Pomerelia ; and that he should invite 
the Court of Vienna to take an equivalent portion of the Polish 
kingdom. This was in October; and about the same time the 
Russian Empress laid before the Austrian government a written 
scheme for dismembering the Ottoman Empire, in which Wallachia 
and Moldavia were allotted to Russia, while it was signified that 
the Austrians were welcome to take Bosnia and Dalmatia. 1 

The English ambassador had succeeded in obtaining a copy of 
the secret convention between Austria and the Porte, and had 
communicated it to the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin. 
Frederick was desirous of a peace between Russia and Turkey, 
both on account of his plans against Poland, and because his 
annual payment to Russia, by virtue of the treaty of 1766 (which 
bound him to supply certain sums in lieu of troops to Russia in a 
Turkish war), began to be burdensome. He saw in this secret 
treaty between Austria and the Sultan an engine for moving 
Russia to make peace with the Porte. The Empress Catherine, on 
the other hand, was more and more anxious for the Prussian money. 
But before January, 1772, though no progress had been made to¬ 
wards a Turkish peace, the common avidity of Russia and Prussia 
for the dismemberment of Poland had drawn those powers closer 
together; and a secret convention had been concluded, by which, 
in return for a promise of part of the Polish territory, Frederick 
bound himself to take arms against Austria, if Russia should be 
attacked by that power. But the same guilty bribe was now 
operating on the Court of Vienna. Austria joined the crowned 
conspiracy against Poland, and totally changed her position to 
wards the Ottoman Court. She did not offer to return the Turkish 
money which she had received in part payment of her promised 
co-operation against Russia; but her ambassador was instructed to 

1 Von Hammer, vol. iv. p. 616. 


4oi 


MUSTAPHA III . A.D. 1757 ^ 773 - 

memorialise the Porte in concert with the Prussian minister, and 
to urge the necessity of convoking a congress for settling terms of 
peace. Catherine, by arrangement with her confederate spoliators 
of Poland, now abated somewhat of her haughty pretensions to 
sole action, and declared that she was ready to accept the good 
offices of the Imperial Court. An armistice by sea and land be¬ 
tween the Turkish and Russian forces was agreed on; and during 
the remainder of the year 1772, negotiations were carried on at 
Fokschani and Bucharest. They were prolonged into the follow¬ 
ing spring, when they were broken off, and hostile operations 
resumed. The Russian plenipotentiary, Obresskoff (who had been 
released from the Seven Towers on the repeated and vehement 
intercession of the other European ambassadors) delivered the 
Empress’s ultimatum on the 15th February, 1773. It contained 
seven articles, which stipulated—1. That Russia should be recog¬ 
nised as protectress of the independence of the Tartars : that the 
fortresses of Kertch and Yenikale should remain in the hands of 
the Russians. 2. That Russian merchant-ships, and ships of war, 
should have free right of navigation in the Black Sea and the 
Archipelago. 3. That all the other fortresses in the Crimea 
should be given up to the Tartars. 4. That the Voivode ot 
Moldavia, Gregory Ghika, then in the hands of Russia, should be 
reinstated in his principality as hereditary prince, with the obliga¬ 
tion of sending a year’s revenue once in three years as a tribute to 
Constantinople. 5. That Russia should have a permanent repre¬ 
sentative at Constantinople. 6. That Kilburn should be ceded in 
full property to Russia ; and that the fortress of Oczakof should be 
razed. 7. That the Porte should allow to the sovereigns of Russia 
the title of Padischah, and the right of protecting those inhabitants 
of the Ottoman Empire who profess the religion of the Greek 
Church. 

The Reis Effendi and the Vizier submitted these articles to the 
dignitaries and generals who were with the Turkish troops. Their 
unanimous answer was, that the principal object of Russia was to 
possess the posts of Kertch and Yenikale; that the rest of the note 
was mere verbiage and sophistry; that it would be easy to come 
to an understanding on the article respecting the navigation of the 
Ottoman seas; that it would be better to recognise the absolute 
independence of the Tartars than to leave things in their actual 
state, especially as in good time it would be possible to seize again 
what was then given up; that the sum of 50,000 purses, which 
Russia threatened to exact for the cost of the war, if the articles 
were not accepted, might be supplied; but that, even if the war 

2G 


402 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


were to go on for seven years, it would be impossible to win an 
advantageous peace. Atallah Bey was sent to Constantinople with 
these resolutions of the council of war. After a long discussion in 
the Imperial Divan it was resolved to reject the terms. The 
Turkish plenipotentiaries endeavoured to protract the negotiations, 
and to induce the Russians to relax some of their demands. The 
Sultan (who was sincerely desirous for peace) sent an autograph 
letter to the Reis Effendi, authorising him to offer to Russia a 
sum of 70,000 piastres if Russia would forego the possession of 
Kertch and Yenikale. Obresskoff replied : “You suppose that my 
court is almost in a state of bankruptcy ; but I will pledge myself 
that we will, without further difficulty, forthwith pay you the 
same sum, if you will accept the articles.” The required cession 
of the two extreme Crimean fortresses to Russia was the insuper¬ 
able difficulty with the negotiations. All the Turkish Ulema 
protested against such a sacrifice, no matter what might be the 
consideration. The Sultan would have yielded to Russia, but he 
feared that the Ulema would raise an insurrection against him. 
He caused an intimation to be conveyed to the Turkish plenipo¬ 
tentiary at Bucharest, the Reis Effendi Abdurrisak, that he would 
do the state a signal service, if he would take it upon himself to 
agree to all the articles, and sign a treaty of peace; but Sultan 
Mustapha owned at the same time, that if such a treaty were to 
be followed by tumults at Constantinople, he should loudly 
disavow his minister’s act, and banish Abdurrisak and all his 
family. The Reis Effendi declined to take upon himself so 
perilous a responsibility; and the congress at Bucharest was dis¬ 
solved. 

The breathing-time which these negotiations procured for the 
Turkish forces, had been well employed. At the end of the year 
1771, Sultan Mustapha had again conferred the Grand Vizierate 
on Mouhinzadi Mohammed Pacha, who had signalised himself in 
1770 by the recovery of the Morea, and afterwards by his energy 
when transferred from the chief command in Greece, to the im¬ 
portant Danubian government of Widdin. Mouhinzadi had been 
Grand Yizier before the war ; but he had offended the Sultan by 
advising him not to commence hostilities against Russia until his 
preparations for war were more complete. For this sound 
counsel, Mouhinzadi had been displaced from his high office : but 
the bitter experience of three campaigns taught the Sultan how 
unwise had been his haste both in attacking the Czarina, and in 
degrading his Yizier. In the inferior posts of Seraskier of the 
Morea, and Seraskier of Widdin, Mouhinzadi had made an honour- 


403 


MUSTAPHA III . A.D. 1757 - 1773 . 

able exception to the general incompetency of the Turkish com¬ 
manders ; and the Sultan turned to him as the man in his 
dominions best fitted, both by his abilities in the field, and by his 
sagacity in council, to bring the calamitous war to an end, or to 
maintain it with better fortune for the empire. Mouhinzadi had 
striven hard to obtain a pacification at the Fokschani and Bucha¬ 
rest congress; but he had also throughout the fifteen months of 
negotiations, neglected no available means for restoring the spirit 
of the Ottoman troops, and for barring the further advance of the 
Russians towards Constantinople. He punished all acts of 
brigandage with unrelenting severity, and beheaded a number of 
officers who had set the example of cowardice in presence of the 
enemy. He reorganised the wrecks of the defeated armies, and 
raised fresh troops, especially from among the Bosnians and the 
other most warlike of the Mahometan populations of the empire. 
He strengthened the garrisons and stores of the fortresses, which 
the Turks yet retained on the Danube, especially of Silistria; but 
he foresaw the necessity of being prepared to defend the inner 
barrier of the Balkan against the Russians, and with this view he 
made Shumla the head-quarters of his forces. 

The city of Shumla (more correctly called Schoumna), which 
has become so celebrated in modern wars between the Turks and 
Russians, lies at the eastern foot of a group of hills which rise a 
little in advance of the northern side of the Balkan. These hills 
curve forwards towards the north-east, and send out projecting 
ridges like the extremities of a horse-shoe. The town of Shumla 
is situate in the basin formed by this curvature of high ground. 
It is of little strength in itself, though it is provided with fortifica¬ 
tions, and is partially screened from an enemy advancing towards 
it from the Danube by a little range in its front of rising ground 
of inferior altitude to that of the hills already mentioned, which 
back and flank the city. It is the plateau of these hills that forms 
the position of Shumla. This plateau is from eighteen to twenty 
miles in area; the sides of it falling at first in precipitous walls of 
rock, and then sinking more gradually. The southward roads 
from nearly all the towns on the lower Danube converge upon 
Shumla; and from Shumla the roads or tracks radiate, which lead 
farther southward through the chief passes of the Balkan. Shumla 
does not physically close any of these passes. They might be 
reached by circling it, but it would be very perilous for an invad¬ 
ing army to attempt this in the presence of a large force encamped 
on the plateau. From the extent of the position, and the nature 
of the country in the vicinity, it is almost impossible to invest 


404 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

Shumla; and a strong defending army stationed there, if vigor¬ 
ously handled, can not only make the capture of the place impos¬ 
sible, but can deal heavy blows against any hostile troops operating 
in its vicinity, and can cut off their lines of communication, should 
they turn Shumla, and advance southward through the Balkan. 1 
If invading troops from Russia endeavour to avoid the reach of 
the Turkish army which holds Shumla, and force a passage through 
distant parts of the Balkan, they must (by reason of the difficulties 
of the ground) emerge from the defiles of that mountain-range in 
disconnected detachments, and may be easily crushed, before they 
can re-unite, by the Turkish army of support, which they must ex¬ 
pect to find stationed at Aidos, or some other suitable position in 
the rear of the mountain barrier. Such is Shumla, a position 
which the Turks have strengthened by field-works and redoubts 
wherever practicable, and which they have for the last century 
regarded as the position of paramount importance for the defence 
of their capital against the Russians, and as the grand pivot for 
a line of operations on the Danube. 2 

Two other places which have acquired an almost equal celebrity 
with Shumla in the Russo-Turkish campaigns of our own age, were 
the scenes of important operations in 1773 and 1774. These are 
Silistria and Varna. 

Silistria is situate on the right bank of the Danube, nearly at 
the commencement of the Delta of that river. The town is built 
almost in the form of a semicircle, of which the river front forms 
the chord. There are high grounds in its vicinity on the landward 
(or Bulgarian) side, the military importance of which has been 
peculiarly exemplified in recent sieges. When Silistria became 
the object of attack in 1773, its principal defences were deep 
trenches surrounding the towns, which inclosed also suburbs, and 
spacious vineyards, and magnificent gardens of rose-trees. The 
possession of Silistria is considered indispensable for a successful 
invasion of Turkey through Bulgaria from Wallachia, as it lies on 
the immediate flank of any operation that can be undertaken against 
the line of the Balkan. 3 Varna (the scene of the great defeat of 
the Christian confederates by Amurath II. in 1444) 4 lies on the 
western coast of the Black Sea, about forty-eight miles eastward 
of Shumla, and is second only to that position in importance ; as 
no hostile army can move with safety through the eastern passes 
of the Balkan, while Vama is uncaptured in its rear. The atten- 


1 Moltbe, p. 118 . Chcsney, p. SS. 
8 Miiltke, p. 2 $ 5 . 


2 Von Hammer, voL iv. p. 623 . 
6 See supra, p. 69 . 


MUSTAPHA III. A.D. 1757 - 1773 . 


405 

tion paid by Mouhinzadi to securing Varna, Silistria, and Shumla 
in 177 3, is a high proof of the strategic talents of that Vizier, and 
the movements of Romanzoff also prove that the Russian general¬ 
issimo understood the value of these posts as well as they have 
been appreciated by his successors in more recent wars. 

By fixing his head-quarters at Shumla, Mouhinzadi was enabled 
not only to provide best for the defence of the Balkan, but also to 
direct with the greatest efficiency operations either of defence or 
of attack along the Danube, as occasion might require. When 
hostilities recommenced in 1773, the arrangements of the Russian 
corps in Wallachia indicated a design to cross the Danube near 
Touldja. A Turkish force under Tcherkes Pacha was at Babatagh 
in the Dobruscha, and the Grand Vizier ordered them to watch 
with the greatest care every movement of the enemy. But the 
troops at Babatagh deserted their colours in disgraceful panic, and 
the Russians advanced as far as Karasou, and destroyed the forti¬ 
fications of Karakerman. Not dismayed by this reverse, the 
Vizier continued to direct and animate the commanders of his 
garrisons and advanced posts ; and a victory near Rustcliuk was 
the first-fruits of this campaign for the Turkish arms. The 
Russians had grown over-confident from success, and advanced 
boldly against that place; but an Ottoman force under Daghistani 
Ali joined the garrison, and they completely defeated the attack¬ 
ing corps, taking 1500 prisoners, and capturing three of the 
Russian guns. On the other hand, General Weissman surprised 
and defeated the Turks under Bakht-Ghirai and Tcherkes Pacha 
at Karasou; and took sixteen cannons from them (7 June, 1773). 
From Karasou the Russian general marched upon Silistria to sup¬ 
port the operations conducted by the generalissimo, Romanzoff, 
against that city. 

Romanzoff crossed the Danube at Balia with the principal 
Russian army, which was commanded under him by Generals 
Stoupischin and Potemkin. Osman Pacha, the Seraskier of 
Silistria, endeavoured to prevent the passage of the river; but the 
flank movement of General Weissman protected the operation, 
and the Seraskier’s troops, after fighting bravely, were repulsed 
and driven into Silistria. The importance of this post was keenly 
felt by the Sultan as well as by the Russian leaders; and Ibrahim 
Pacha, who had commanded the Turkish vanguard in a late un¬ 
successful attack on the enemy, received a letter from Sultan 
Mustapha himself, which contained these laconic but emphatic 
orders : “If thy life is dear to thee, thou wilt rally thy beaten 
horsemen, and fly to the succour of Silistria.” 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


406 

Bomanzoff battered the town with seventy cannons and a large 
number of mortars. The walls were soon trenched, and the 
Bussian columns advanced to storm. 100 waggon-loads ot 
fascines had been provided to fill up the outer ditches; and a 
murderous conflict took place, the Bussians charging with their 
characteristic obstinacy, and the Ottoman garrison resisting with 
determined valour. Bomanzoff continuously sent fresh troops 
forward; and the assault was renewed again and again for six 
hours, when at last the Turks gave way, the outer lines were 
passed, and the Bussians poured into the suburbs, exulting at 
having won Silistria. But here Osman Pacha’s troops, reinforced 
by all the male population, rallied, and fought with redoubled 
fury. The peculiarity in the sieges of Turkish towns (which has 
been so often remarked by military writers), that the chief re¬ 
sistance in them begins at the very crisis where all resistance in 
ordinary sieges terminates, was fully exemplified at Silistria in 
T773. 1 The Bussian columns were at last beaten back, and 
Bomanzoff abandoned the siege with heavy loss. This victory of 
Osman Pacha, which was mainly due to his own courage, and to 
the gallantry of Essud Hassan Pacha, the commandant of the 
place, is the most brilliant exploit on the Ottoman side during 
the campaign of 1773. 

Bomanzoff formed his retreating army into three columns, two 
of which he led back across the Danube, while he placed the third 
under the orders of General Weissman, and directed him to retire 
to Babatagh in the Dobruscha. The Turkish force under 
Nououman Pacha endeavoured to intercept this column at Kai- 
nardji. The Bussians were, as usual, formed in a system of 
squares; but Nououman’s Janissaries charged with such spirit, 
that they broke through the Bussian centre; and the whole 

1 Baron Moltke, at the close of his description of the siege of Brailow in 
182S, remarks : “ The Turkish commanders have the great merit of being 
blind to the weak points of places. Capitulations were not relished by the 
Divan, and those who made them risked their heads. The garrisons, too, 
were defending their own wives, children, and worldly goods within their 
walls, and fighting for their faith and for dominion over their Rayas. They 
make up for the want of outworks by a skilful use of the dry ditch, and 
their most vigorous defence commonly begins at the point where with the 
European troops it usually ends, from the moment when a practical breach 
has been effected. With us a large number of wealthy householders are a 
serious impediment to the protracted defence of a fortress ; but in Turkey 
it is quite the reverse ; every man capable of bearing arms is a soldier, and 
makes his appearance upon the walls daily. Thus, it is from the large towns, 
and fi'om them only, that a very determined resistance is to be expected.” 
P. 44. See ibid., pp. 102-104, 


MUSTAPHA III. A.D. 1757 - 1773 . 407 

Russian force would have been destroyed, had it not been for the 
good conduct of their rear-guard, who charged the victorious 
Janissaries when in confusion, drove them hack, and restored the 
formation of their own army. Eventually the Russians were suc¬ 
cessful, and captured twenty-eight Turkish guns; but their success 
was purchased by severe loss, including that of their brave and 
able general, who was shot dead at the very commencement of the 
battle. The beaten Turkish army was soon reinforced, and made 
an attempt to recapture Hirsova, but was repulsed with severe 
loss by Suwarrow, who commanded there. After this second 
defeat, Nououman Pacha was deposed by the Grand Vizier; and 
the command of his force was given to Daghistani Ali, the victor 
01 Rustchuk. Promotions and rewards were at the same time 
liberally showered on Osman Pacha, Essud Hassan, and the other 
officers whose good conduct had been conspicuous. 

The Russian generalissimo, Romanzoff, irritated at his failure 
at Silistria, was anxious to obtain some success on the right 
of the Danube before he placed his troops in winter quarters. 
Accordingly, he sent a column under Prince Dolgorouki across the 
Danube at Hirsova, and ordered General Ungern (who had suc¬ 
ceeded to Weissman’s command) to move from Babatagh, and 
co-operate in an attack on the Ottoman forces, which were again 
assembled at Karasou. This proved completely successful, and 
the greater part of the Turkish troops dispersed and tied towards 
Shumla. Elated with this triumph, the Russian generals sepa¬ 
rated their forces; and Ungern, with about 6000 infantry and 
3000 horse, marched towards Varna in the hope of carrying that 
important place by a sudden attack, while the rest of the Russians 
moved upon Shumla. This division captured the town of 
Bazardchik after a feeble resistance, nearly all the garrison and 
inhabitants having fled. The facility of their conquest did not 
prevent the Russians from practising the most barbarous atrocities 
on the remnant of the population, which consisted almost entirely 
of feeble old men, and helpless women and children. But these 
cruelties were not long unpunished. 

When it was known in the camp at Shumla that the army at 
Karasou had been routed, and that the enemy was marching 
towards the Balkan, the Grand Vizier assembled a council of war, 
and asked if there was any officer of spirit and resolution, who 
would undertake to rally the fugitives from Karasou and Bazard¬ 
chik, and repair the calamity that had happened. The Reis 
EfFendi, Abdurrisak, volunteered for the perilous duty, and his 
offer was gladly accepted by the Vizier and the other members of 


4 oS HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

the council. Accompanied by Wassif Effendi (the Turkish his¬ 
torian), by the Mufti of Philippopolis, and by 400 men (nearly 
all being his own household retainers), the brave minister for 
foreign affairs set forward; and on the road to Kozlidje he suc¬ 
ceeded in reuniting the fragments of the different Turkish corps 
which were scattered about the neighbourhood. At Kozlidje he 
attacked the Russian vanguard and beat it; and then hurrying 
forward, he fell upon the Russians in Bazardchik. They fled 
before him with precipitation, thinking that the whole Ottoman 
army was upon them; and leaving part of their baggage and 
stores, as trophies of Abdurrisak’s daring exploit. 

Meanwhile, General Ungern had received a severe repulse at 
Varna. The Turkish commander in the Black Sea, Keliedji 
Osman Pacha, was cruising with a small squadron near Varna 
when the Russian army approached the walls. He immediately 
landed his Kiaya with 600 marines to the succour of the place. 
The fortifications were weak, and the Russians after a short 
cannonade advanced to storm. But they were driven back in 
disorder from one part, which they had endeavoured to carry 
without having fascines for the ditches, or scaling-ladders for the 
walls; and the division, which at another part had made good its 
entrance and occupied the Christian quarter of the town, was 
attacked there in turn and driven out again by the Turks. Prince 
Dolgorouki, with part of the Russian force, retired to Babatagh; 
the rest, under General Ungern, retreated upon Ismail. The 
Russian loss at Varna amounted to nearly 2000 killed and 
wounded, and they left behind them 100 baggage-waggons and 
ten cannon. The successful defence of Varna, and the recovery 
of Bazardchik, were the two last events of the campaign of 1773; 
a campaign in which the balance of advantages was considerably 
on the side of the Turks. 

They brought, however, inadequate consolation to the Sultan 
amid the general decline of the fortunes of the empire since the 
commencement of the war, and for the disappointment of the 
hopes which he had based on his own supposed pre-eminence in 
state policy. He had also, like many of his race, been a devotee 
to supposed occult sciences, to the kabala of the Moors and the 
astrology of the Egyptians. These had been to him, as he believed, 
sources of assurance that he should prosper in the war; and he 
now, in the bitterness of his heart, felt that either his cunning 
was foolishness, and he had been a visionary and a dupe, or that 
the stars had lied to him. Sick in body as in mind, he com¬ 
plained that he was weary of the mode in which his Seraskiers 


ABDUL HAMID . A . D . 1773-1789. 409 

carried on war; and when the news of the second defeat at 
Karasou reached Constantinople, Mustapha exclaimed that he 
would repair to the army in person. His ministers represented to 
him that such an important step ought not to he taken without con¬ 
sulting the Divan ; and the Ulema declared that the departure of 
the sovereign for the army might he attended with evil con¬ 
sequences in the actual state of circumstances, especially having 
regard to the bad state of his health. On this the Sultan deferred 
his journey to the camp until the restoration of his health, a time 
that never came. The hand of death was already upon him ; and 
on the 25th of December, 1773, after many w r eeks of severe 
suffering, Sultan Mustapha III. expired. 

He was succeeded by his brother Abdul Hamid, who had been 
shut up in the Serail for forty-three years, till called from the 
dreary monotony of a royal prison to the cares and fears of a 
royal throne. He made few alterations in the government, and 
had the good sense to appreciate the merits of his Vizier, Mon- 
hinzadi, and of his Capitan Pacha, Hassan of Algiers. Above 
all, he was sincerely desirous of peace, as were his ministers, his 
generals, and every class of men in his empire, except the Ulema, 
who raised theological objections to the Sultan, as Caliph, aban¬ 
doning his sovereignty over the Tartars, and against the cession 
of the Ottoman fortresses of Kertch and Yenikale to the Russian 
Giaours. But the new campaign was soon marked by such reverses 
and perils, as silenced these orthodox demurrers; and the digni¬ 
taries of the sword, who longed for peace, prevailed over the 
dignitaries of the law, who demanded warfare. 

On the 14th of April, the Grand Vizier displayed the horse-tails 
with great pomp in front of his camp at Shumla. A hymn on the 
birth of the Prophet was recited ; and a grand council was held, at 
which it was resolved to take the offensive, and drive the Russians 
from Hirsova. But the Russian general at that place was Suwar- 
row ; and, instead of waiting to be attacked, he advanced towards 
the Turks, formed a junction with the division of General Kamen- 
ski, and brought the Turkish army, 25,000 strong, to action at 
Kozlidje. He completely defeated them, captured their camp, 
baggage, and military stores, and twenty-nine cannon. The 
defeated army dispersed over the country; and when the Generals 
Kamenski and Milarodovitch advanced, after the battle, upon 
Shumla, the Grand Vizier found that he had but 8000 troops 
under him to defend that extensive position. Even among these 
a faction-fight broke out; and detachments of the Russians moved 
southward of Shumla to the very gorges of the Balkan. In this 


4io 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


emergency the Grand Vizier sent an officer to the Russian camp, 
where the generalissimo, Count Romanzoff, now commanded in 
person, to request an armistice. This was refused, but the Vizier 
was invited to send plenipotentiaries to treat for peace. After a 
brief delay, during which Mouhinzadi obtained the sanction of the 
Sultan, the plenipotentiaries were despatched to treat with Prince 
Repnin, who acted on behalf of Russia, and the first conference 
took place on the 16th of July, at Kainardji. 

The negotiations were carried on with military celerity; for 
both sides were sincerely anxious for a termination of the war. 
Notwithstanding the conquests and glory which Russia had 
achieved, she was suffering almost more severely than her beaten 
enemy. 1 Her losses in battle had been heavy; and, as is cus¬ 
tomary with Russian armies, the number of the soldiers that had 
perished by disease and privation, far exceeded the amount of the 
killed and wounded. At home, many of her provinces were 
ravaged by the plague. A district near Astrakhan had been left 
almost desolate by the migration of a horde of 400,000 Calmucks, 
who, irritated by the oppressive interference of the Russian 
government with their free customs, left the territories of the 
Czarina in 1771, and retired within the frontiers of the Chinese 
Empire. Still more formidable to the power of Catherine was the 
civil war raised against her by the remarkable impostor Pugatcheff, 
who, during 1773 and the greater part of 1774, spread desolation 
throughout Southern Russia. If, in addition to all this, it is 
remembered that the first great treaty for the partition of Poland, 
was made in 1773, and that there was deep need of Russian 
troops to coerce the anarchical but high-spirited population of that 
ill-fated land, we may appreciate at its true value the boasted 
magnanimity of Russia, in exacting no harsher terms of peace 
from Turkey, in 1774, than had been almost consented to in 1772. 

After a discussion of only seven hours, the plenipotentiaries at 
Kainardji agreed, on the 17th July, 1774, to the minutes of the 
new treaty, that was to be made between the two empires; but 
the Russian generalissimo, Count Romanzoff, delayed the time for 
signature for four days, so as to make the treaty bear date on the 
21 st July, the anniversary of the Treaty of the Pruth. That day 
was thenceforth to be a clay of humiliation and shame, not to the 
Muscovite, but to the Ottoman race. Nor was it by accident that 
the town of Kainardji was chosen as the scene of the conferences. 
The Russian General Weissman had been slain there by the Turks 


1 Levesque, “ Histoire de Rcs&ie.” 


ABDUL HAMID . A . D . 1773-1789. 411 

in the preceding year, and Romanzoff designed the treaty to he a 
votive offering to the memory of his brave companion in arms. 

The peace of Kainardji consisted of twenty-eight public articles; 
to these were added two secret clauses, by which the Porte bound 
itself to pay to Russia, within three years, 4,000,000 roubles, 
and the Empress engaged that her fleet should be withdrawn from 
the Archipelago without delay. The twenty-eight public articles 
were the most important. They established that the Tartars of 
the Kuban, the Crimea, and the adjacent regions between the 
rivers Bercla and Dnieper, and also of the countries between the 
Boug and the Dniester, as far as the frontier of Poland, were to 
be politically an independent nation governed by their own sove¬ 
reign, of the race of Zenghis Khan, elected and raised to the 
throne by the Tartars themselves. It was expressly stipulated 
that “ neither the Court of Russia nor the Ottoman shall interfere, 
under any pretexts whatever, with the election of the said Khan, 
or in the domestic, political, civil, and internal affairs of the said 
state, but, on the contrary, they shall acknowledge and consider 
the said Tartar nation, in its political and civil state, upon the 
same footing as other poAvers, who are governed by themselves, 
and are dependent upon God alone.” 

But from out of the natural territories of this newly organised 
Tartar nation Russia retained for herself the fortresses of Kertch 
and Yenikale in the Crimea, with their ports and districts ; also 
the city of Azoph with its district; and the Castle of Kilburn at 
the north of the Dnieper, with a district along the left bank of 
the Dnieper. The opposite fortress of Oczakof, with a similar 
district, was to remain in the possession of the Turks. The two 
Kabartas were also to be Russia’s; but the formal cession of them 
was to be made by the Khan and Ancients of the new inde¬ 
pendent Tartar nation. Russia was to withdraw her troops from 
the fortresses which she had conquered in Georgia and Mingrelia; 
and these provinces “ were to be considered by Russia as belonging 
to those on whom they were formerly dependent; so that if, in 
ancient times or for a very long period, they have actually been 
under the Sublime Porte, they shall be considered as belonging 
to it.” With the exception of Azoph, Kilburn, Kertch, Yenikale, 
and the Kabartas, Russia gave up all her conquests. The Porte 
confessed that it received back from her Moldavia and Wallachia 
on conditions which it religiously promised to keep—these were 
(in substance) “the grant of an amnesty for all offences during 
the war : free exercise of the Christian religion; humane and 
generous government for the future; and permission from the 


4-12 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Porte that, according as the circumstances of these two Princi¬ 
palities may require, the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia 
resident at Constantinople may remonstrate in their favour; and 
a promise to listen to them with all the attention which is due to 
friendly and respected powers.” 

A very important clause of the treaty (Art. VII.) respecting the 
Christian subjects of the Sultan, generally declared, that “ The 
Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian reli¬ 
gion and its churches, and it also allows the ministers of the 
Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representa¬ 
tions, as well in favour of the new church at Constantinople, of 
which mention will be made in Article XIV., as on behalf of its 
officiating ministers, promising to take such representations into 
due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of 
a neighbouring and sincerely friendly power. 5 ’ 1 

The words of the XIVth section (referred to by the Vllth) 
were, “ After the manner of the other powers, permission is given 
to the High Court of Russia, in addition to the chapel built in the 
minister’s residence, to erect in one of the quarters of Galata, in 
the street called Bey Oglu, a public church, in which Christians 
may worship according to the Greek ritual, which shall always be 
under the protection of the ministers of that empire, and secure 
from all coercion and outrage.” And the Vlllth article stipulated 
that Russian subjects should have full liberty to visit the holy city 
of Jerusalem without being subjeoted to capitation tax, or other 
impost, and that they should be under the strictest protection of 
the laws. Other articles provided that merchant ships belonging 
to the two contracting powers should have free and unimpeded 
navigation in all the seas which wash their shores; that merchants 
should have a right to such sojourn as their affairs required, 
“ and,” as the Xlth clause of the treaty expressed it, “ for the 
convenience and advantage of the two empires, there shall be a 
free and unimpeded navigation for the merchant ships belonging 
to the two contracting powers, in all the seas which wash their 
shores.” 

The same clause gave expressly to Russia the right of having 
resident consuls in all parts of the Turkish Empire, where it should 
think fit to appoint them ; but no equivalent right was given to 
Turkey to have consuls in Russia. The treaty merely said that 
the subjects of the Sublime Porte were to be permitted to carry on 

1 This is the clause on which Prince Menschikoff in 1853 founded the 
claim of Russia to the general protection of all the inhabitants of the Turkish 
countries who were members of the Greek Church. 


ABDUL HAMID, A.D. 1775-1789. 413 

commerce by sea and land in Russia, with all advantages of the 
most favoured nations. 

It was formally declared by the fourth article, “ that it is con¬ 
formable to the natural right of every power to make, in its own 
country, such dispositions as it may consider to be expedient: in 
consequence whereof, there is respectively reserved to the two 
empires a perfect and unrestricted liberty of constructing anew in 
their respective states, and within their frontiers, in such localities 
as shall be deemed advisable, every kind of fortresses, towns, habi¬ 
tations, edifices, and dwellings, as well as of repairing and rebuild¬ 
ing the old fortresses, towns, habitations, &c.” 

J3y other clauses the Sultan was bound always to permit the 
residence of a Russian minister at the Porte, and to give the 
sovereign of Russia the title of “ Padischah,” which had hitherto 
been refused. 1 It was also declared that “the two empires 
have agreed to annihilate and leave in an eternal oblivion all 
the treaties and conventions heretofore made between the two 
states, including therein the Convention of Belgrade, with all 
those subsequent to it; and never to put forth any claim grounded 
upon the said conventions, excepting, however, the one made in 
1700 between Governor Tolstoi and Hassan Pacha, Governor of 
Atschug, on the subject of the boundaries of the district of Azoph 
and of the line of demarcations of the frontier of Kuban, which 
shall remain invariably such as it has heretofore been.” 

Finally, the whole treaty was drawn up and concluded without 
the insertion of a syllable relating to Poland, although the treat¬ 
ment of Poland by Russia had been one of the primary causes of 
the war.. It was considered that this implied negation of all right 
in Turkey to interfere in Polish affairs, and also the circumstance 
that the treaty was concluded without any third power being 
allowed to be party to it as mediator between the Russian Empress 
and her defeated enemy, were not the least of the triumphs which 
were achieved for Catherine in the close of this contest. 

Such in substance was the treaty of Kainardji; in which one of 
the ablest diplomatists of the age saw not only the preparation of 
the destruction of the Mahometan Empire of the East, but also 
the source of evil and troubles without end for all the other states 
of Europe. 2 The German historian of the House of Othman 

1 See supra, p. 98. 

2 “La position des deux empires a ete totalement changee par le traite 
de Kainardje, et par consequent, s’il etait encore possible de sauver la 

Porte, il conviendrait de trouver des mesures toutes nouvelles.Par 

l’adroite combination des articles de ce traite, V Empire Ottoman devient des 


414 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


(whose guidance I have so long enjoyed, but must henceforth 
regret through this work) considers that treaty to have delivered 
up the Ottoman Empire to the mercy of Russia; and to have 
marked the commencement of the dissolution of that empire, at 
least in Europe. He sees in the articles of Kainardji “ the germs 
of those of Adrianople.” 


aujourd’hui une sorte de province russe, d’ou la cour de Saint-Petei'sbourgh 
peut tirer de l’argent et des troupes, &c.; enfin, comme a l’avenir la Russie 
est a memo de lui dieter ses lois et qii’elle a entre ses mains les moyens de 
forcer la Sultan a les accepter, elle leconteatera peut-6tre,pendant quelques 
annees encore, de regner au nom du Grand Seigneur, jusqu’a ce qu’elle juge 
le moment favorable d’en prendre possession definitivement. ... Si a ces 
exemples d’une frenesie incroyable, on ajoute la mauvaise administration 
de la Porte, qui viciee dans les fondemens prepare depuis quelque temps, 
comme adessein et mieux que ne l’ont pu faire les armes de la Russie, la de¬ 
struction de cet Empire d’Orient, on sera convaincu que jamais une nation 
pr§te a.disparaltre de la scene politique n’aura moins merite la compassion 
des autres peuples que les Ottomans; malheureusement les evenemens qui 
se passent en ce moment dans cet empire exerceront a l’avenir la plus grande 
influence sur la politique de tous les autres etats, et feront naitre des maux 
et des troubles sans fin.”—Extraits des rapports de M. de Thugut, dates du 
S Septembre, 1774, et du 17 Aout, 1774. 



ABDUL HAMID. 


A.D. I773-I7«9. 


4i5 


CHAPTER XXL 

ATTEMPTS OP GAZI HASSAN TO RESTORE THE EMPIRE—PRESH 
ENCROACHMENTS OF RUSSIA—CONVENTION OF 1779 — RUSSIA 
ANNEXES THE CRIMEA—VAIN ATTEMPTS OF FRANCE TO INDUCE 
ENGLAND TO ACT WITH HER AGAINST RUSSIA—CONVENTION OF 
1783 —SCHEMES OF AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA FOR THE DISMEMBER¬ 
MENT OF TURKEY—WAR—RESISTANCE OF THE TURKS TO AUS¬ 
TRIA—AUSTRIA MAKES PEACE—DISASTERS SUSTAINED BY THF 
TURKS IN THE WAR WITH RUSSIA—ACCESSION OF SULTAN 
SELIM III.—INTERVENTION OF ENGLAND AND PRUSSIA—TREATY 
OF JASSY. 

The literary men of Western Europe and the Ulema of Turkey 
alike regarded the treaty of Kainardji as consummating the glory 
of Kussia and the degradation of the House of Othman. The En¬ 
cyclopaedists of Paris 1 wrote felicitations to the Empress Catherine, 
and to her generalissimo, Count Komanzoff, which were echoed by 
all pretenders to enlightened opinions in other parts of Europe, who 
recognised the centralisation of literary authority amid the circles 
of the French metropolis. 2 

1 See Capefigne, ** Louis XVI.,” pp. 13, 14, 93. There is too much founda¬ 
tion for his bitter remark at p. 14 on the influence of the Encyclopaedists 
and their admirers on the foreign politics of the Western Courts—“ II faufc 
reconnaitre cette triste verite, que si un gouvernement veut se perdre, il n’a 
qu’a suivre l’opinion des ecrivains, gens de lettres, societes savantes et 
litteraires.” 

2 One English literary man of this period deserves to be mentioned as an 
honourable exception to the general adulators of Russia. Even before the 
triumphs of Catherine II. in the war of 1765-1774, Oliver Goldsmith wrote 
thus of Russia in his “Citizen of the World,” published 1758 : 

“ I cannot avoid beholding the Russian Empire as the natural enemy of 
the more Western parts of Europe—as an enemy already possessed of great 
strength, and, from the nature of the government, every day threatening to 
become more powerful. This extensive empire, which both in Europe and 
Asia occupies almost a third of the Old World, was, about two centuries 
ago, divided into separate kingdoms and dukedoms, and from such a divi¬ 
sion consequently weak. Since the time, however, of Johan Basilides, it 
has increased in strength and extent, and those untrodden forests, those in¬ 
numerable savage animals, which formerly covered the face of the country, 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


416 

In Constantinople devout followers of Islam looked wistfully to 
Asia as their refuge from the great infidels, as they termed the 
Russians; and sorrowfully recalled the old tradition that the city 
abounding in faith is destined to be taken by the Sons of Yellow¬ 
ness. 1 But still many among the Ottomans were superior to the 
torpor of despairing fatalism. They understood better both their 
duty to their empire and the precepts of their Prophet, who bade 
his followers not to lose heart at reverses in warfare, but to view 
them as visitations of Allah, designed to prove true believers ; and 
who gave them the great maxim of “ Fortitude in adversity, and 
Self-control in prosperity “ Despond not, neither exult; so shall 
ye prevail“ God loveth those who persevere patiently “ He 
turned you to flight before them that He might make trial of you 
“ God giveth life and causeth to die ; and God seeth that which 
ye do“ Oh, true believers, be patient and strive to excel in 
patience, and be constant-minded and fear God, that ye may be 
happy.” 2 

Foremost among these better spirits was the Capitan Pacha 
Hassan of Algiers, now commonly styled Gazi Hassan, for his 
glorious conflicts against the Giaours. Sultan Abdul Hamid 
placed almost unlimited authority in his hands; and Hassan 
strove to reorganise the military and naval forces of Turkey, and 
to prepare her for the recurrence of the struggle against Russia, 


are now removed, and colonies of mankind planted in their room. A king¬ 
dom thus enjoying peace internally, possessed of an unbounded extent of 
dominions, and learning the military art at the expense of others abroad, 
must every day grow more powerful ; and it is probable we shall hear 
Russia in future times, as formerly, called the £ Officina Gentium.’ 

“It was long the wish of Peter, their great monarch, to have a foot in 
some of the Western parts of Europe; many of his schemes and treaties were 
directed to this end, but, happily for Europe, he failed in them all. A fort 
in the power of this people would be like the possession of a floodgate : and 
whenever ambition entered, or necessity prompted, they might then be able 
to deluge the whole Western woidd with a barbarous inundation. Believe 
me, my friend, I cannot sufficiently condemn the politicians of Europe, who 
thus make this powerful people arbitrators in their quarrel. The Russians 
are now at that period between refinement and barbarity which seems most 
adapted to military achievement; and, if once they happen to get footing 
in the Western parts of Europe, it is not the feeble efforts of the sons of 
effeminacy and dissension that can serve to remove them. The fertile val¬ 
ley and soft climate will be ever sufficient inducements to draw whole 
myriads from their native deserts, the trackless wild, or snowy mountain. 
History, experience, reason, nature, expand the book of wisdom before 
the eyes of mankind, but they will not read.” 

1 Eton, 193. Thornton, 78. 

2 See the 3rd chapter of the Koran. 



ABDUL HAMID. A.D. 1773-1789. 417 

which all knew to be inevitable. He endeavoured to discipline 
the troops; but finding that all attempts to introduce improved 
weapons and drill, or to restore subordination among the Janis¬ 
saries and Spahis were fruitless, he gave up these schemes, but 
proposed a new order of battle, by which more effect was to be 
given to the fury of the wild Turkish onset. “ He would have 
divided an army of 100,000 men into ten different corps, which 
were to attack separately, and so arranged that the retreat of the 
repulsed corps should not overwhelm and put in disorder those 
which had not attacked. He affirmed, that though the artillery 
of an European army would make great slaughter, yet no army 
could withstand ten Turkish attacks, which are furious but short 
if they do not succeed, and the attack of 10,000 is as dangerous as 
of 100,000 in one body, for, the first repulsed, the rest, on whom 
they fell back, immediately take to flight.” 1 

This system of attacking in detail was never found practicable; 
and probably the Capitan Pacha in proposing it was judging more 
from his experience of the capacities of squadrons of ships, 
than from any sound knowledge of the possible evolutions of 
troops in face of an enemy. The navy was a force which Hassan 
understood far better; and his efforts to improve the Turkish 
marine were spirited and judicious, though some of his practical 
measures showed the true ruthless severity of the old Algerine 
sea-rover. Hassan possessed little science himself, but he respected 
it in others; and his great natural abilities and strong common 
sense taught him how to make use of European skill, and of the 
most serviceable qualities, which the various seafaring populations 
of the Sultan’s dominions were known to possess. The repairs 
and improvements which he sought to effect in the Turkish navy, 
extended to the construction of the vessels, the education of the 
officers, and the supply of seamen. Aided by an English ship¬ 
builder, Hassan entirely altered the cumbrous rigging of the 
Turkish ships, and equipped them after the English system. He 
lowered their high and unwieldy sterns; and he gave them regular 
tiers of guns. He collected all the good sailors that he could en¬ 
gage from Algiers and the other Barbaresque states, and also from 
seaports on the eastern coast of the Adriatic: though he was still 
obliged to depend chiefly on Greek crews for the navigation of his 
fleets, as the Turks refused to do any duty on ship-board beyond 
working the guns. He compelled the commanders of vessels to 
attend personally to the good order and efficiency of their ships 

1 Eton. ** Survey of Turkish Empire,” p. 63 . 

27 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


41S 

and crews and, by a still more important measure, he endeavoured 
to keep a sufficient body of able seamen always ready at Constan¬ 
tinople to man the fleet in case of an emergency. It was usual 
to lay up the ships from autumn till spring-time, and to dismiss 
the sailors for the winter. Hassan pointed out the danger of 
leaving the capital thus unprotected, and the ease with which the 
Russians might at any time during the winter months sail down 
from their new ports in the Black Sea, occupy the Bosphorus, and 
destroy the Turkish marine in its harbours. He proposed that a 
winter home for the sailors should be built at Constantinople; 
where they should be quartered, like troops in barracks. This 
scheme met with great though secret opposition from the Grand 
Vizier, and other high officers, who were jealous of the power 
which the Capitan Pacha would acquire by having so large a force 
at his disposal in the metropolis. As the supply of the necessary 
funds for this design was continually retarded under various pre¬ 
texts, Hassan formed an institution, such as he had projected, but 
on a smaller scale, at his own expense. He also founded a naval 
school for the scientific education of officers for the fleet. But all 
these plans of the brave and sagacious admiral were thwarted, and 
ultimately nullified, by the envy and prejudices of other officials 
of the state. 1 2 * * * * * 8 Nor was Hassan more successful in an attempt 
which he made at a thorough reform of the ancient but much 
aggravated abuses of the Turkish feudal system, by which Ziamets 
and Timars were given to court favourites, who trafficked in their 
sale, and the Porte w r as deprived in time of war of the greater 
part of its military resources. 

The necessity of recovering for the Sultan some of the provinces, 
which during the recent troubles of the state had cast off all 

1 “ In 1778 the finest ship in the fleet foundered in the Black Sea ; being 
too weak, she worked her caulking out, and leaked between all her planks. 

The famous Capitan Pacha Hassan attributed it to the bad caulking, and 
when the fleet came back into the port of Constantinople, he ordered all the 
captains of the ships of war to attend in person the caulking of their own 
ships, on pain of death. One of them, being one day tired of sitting by his 
ship, went home to his house, not above a quarter of a mile off. The Capitan 
Pacha happened to go himself to the arsenal to see the work, examined tho 
caulking, found fault, and asked for the captain ; the truth was obliged to 
be told him : he sat down on a small carpet, sent one man for his blunder¬ 

buss, and another to call the captain ; as soon as the unfortunate man camo 

near him, he took up his blunderbuss and shot him dead, without speaking 

a word to him. “Take and bury him,” he said, “and let the other captains 

attend him to the grave, and the caulking be suspended till they return,”— 

Eton, p. 77. 

8 Ibid., pp. 66, 69, 


ABDUL HAMID. A.D. 1773-17C9. 419 

allegiance, made it impossible for Hassan to be a regular resident 
in the capital; and gave frequent opportunities for his enemies to 
countermine his policy during his absence. Against open foes in 
the field he commanded ably and successfully. He defeated the 
forces of Sheikh Tahir in Syria, besieged him in Acre, captured 
that important city, and reduced the district round it to temporary 
obedience to the Porte. 

In 1778 he recovered the Morea, and destroyed or expelled the 
rebellious Albanians, who had been led into that peninsula in 
1770 to fight against Orloff and the Greek insurgents; and who 
had after the departure of the Russians established themselves 
there in lawless independence; oppressing, plundering, and 
slaughtering both the Greek and Turkish residents, with ferocious 
impartiality. 1 

After relieving the Peloponnesus from this worst of all scourges, 
the tyranny of a wild soldiery, which had killed or deposed its 
officers, which had never known the restraint of civil law, and had 
shaken off all bonds of military discipline, Hassan was made 
governor of the liberated province, and exerted himself vigorously 
and wisely in the restoration of social order, and the revival of 
agriculture and commerce. 2 Subsequently to this he led a large 
force to Egypt against the rebellious Mamelukes. He had made 
himself master of Cairo, and had effected much towards the re¬ 
establishment of the Sultan’s authority in that important pro¬ 
vince, 3 when he was recalled to oppose the Russians in the fatal 
war of 1787-1792; a contest still more disastrous than that which 
had terminated in the treaty of Kainardji. 

The interval of fourteen years between the two wars had been 
marked by measures on the part of Russia as ambitious, and as 
inimical towards the Turks, as any of her acts during open 
hostilities. Even the writers who are the most unscrupulous in 
their eulogies of the Empress Catherine, and the most bitter 
against the Ottoman nation, avow that the Empress from the very 
beginning of her reign had constantly in view the expulsion of the 
Turks from Europe; and that the vast design which she sought to 
accomplish, was the same which Peter the Great first entertained, 
and which the cabinet of St. Petersburg has never lost sight of during 
the succeeding reigns to this day. 4 A temporary peace was neces- 


Emerson Tennent’s “Greece,” vol. ii. p. 376. 
a Ibid., vol. ii. p. 378. 

Ibid., vol. ii. p. 379. Eton, pp. 88, 383. 

4 See Eton, p. 407. The position occupied by Mr. Eton at the Court of 
St. Petersburg:; his intimacy with CounPPotemkin, and other leading rnen 

27—2 


420 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


sary for Russia in 1774; but after Pugateheff’s rebellion was 
quelled, and the Russian grasp on the provinces which she had 
rent from Poland was firmly planted, Catherine scarcely sought to 
disguise how fully she was bent on the realisation of the “Oriental 
project.” Her second grandson was born in 1778. He was named 
Constantine. “ Greek women were given him for nurses, and he 
sucked in with his milk the Greek language, in which he was 
afterwards perfected by learned Greek teachers : in short, his 
whole education was such as to fit him for the throne of Constan¬ 
tinople, and nobody then doubted the Empress’s design.” Such 
is the testimony of Mr. Eton, an Englishman then resident at St. 
Petersburg, highly esteemed by the Empress and many of her 
favourite statesmen and generals, and strongly devoted to the 
cause of Russia. On his authority we also know that in the next 
year (1779) the Empress and Prince Potemkin formed a scheme for 
giving the King of England effective assistance against the 
Colonists in the American war, on condition of England giving 
the Empress aid in a renewed attack upon the Turks. The island 
of Minorca (then in the possession of the English) was to be ceded 
by this country to Russia, as a station for the Russian fleet in the 
Mediterranean, and a rendezvous for the insurgent Greeks. Ac¬ 
cording to Mr. Eton, the details of this project were drawn up by 
Prince Potemkin, ready for presentation to the British ambassador 
at St. Petersburg, but the adroitness of Count Panin, the Russian 
minister for foreign affairs (who favoured the French interests 
against the English), prevented its being proceeded with further, 
and caused the Empress to adopt the anti-British policy of the 
Armed Neutrality. It is added that Prince Potemkin, to the last 
day of his life, regretted the failure of this scheme, and constantly 
affirmed that the success of the Russian enterprise against Turkey 
depended upon the alliance with Great Britain. * 1 

The annexation of the Crimea to the Russian dominions was 
formally completed in the j^ear 1783 ; but the plot for the subjec¬ 
tion of that peninsula had been in progress from the very date of 
the treaty of Kainardji, by which Russia solemnly bound herself 
to treat the Crimean Tartars as an independent nation accountable 
to God only for their internal government, and to abstain from all 


in the Russian councils, and his strong prejudice in favour of Russia, make 
him an unexceptionable witness as to the ambitious schemes of the Empress 
Catherine ; but his invectives against the Turks are to be received with 
great caution. 

1 Eton, p. 409. 



ABDUL HAMID . A.D. 1773-1789. 421 

interference in the election of their sovereign, or in other matters 
of their civil polity. Under the old pretexts of friendly mediation, 
and of relieving her frontier from the dangerous neighbourhood of 
anarchy, Russia soon made the Crimea a second Poland; except 
that in this case there were no accomplices with whom she was 
obliged to share the spoil. The Tartars had elected as their Khan, 
Dewlet Ghirai, who did not prove sufficiently subservient to the 
influence of St. Petersburg. The Russians, therefore, fomented 
disaffection and revolts against him, and made these troubles the 
pretext for marching an army into the peninsula for the ostensible 
purpose of restoring order. They sedulously disclaimed all pro¬ 
jects of conquest, but they effected the abdication of Dewlet 
Ghirai, and the election in his stead of Schahin Ghirai, who had 
been a hostage at St. Petersburg, and was known to be most un¬ 
popular with the majority of his countrymen. The expected 
results soon followed. The new Khan, being threatened both by 
his own subjects and by the Turks (who justly regarded his 
election through Russian intervention, as a breach of the late 
treaty) sent a deputation of six of* his Mirzas to St. Petersburg 
(1776) to implore the Empress’s protection. This was graciously 
promised; and Romanzoff was ordered to collect troops on the 
Dnieper, to act, if necessary, against the Turks. But the Sultan 
felt himself too weak to renew the war. Some risings of the 
Tartars of Kuban against Russia were sternly quelled by Suwarrow; 
and, in 1779, a Convention was signed between Russia and Turkey, 
by which the stipulations of the treaty of Kainardji were formally 
recognised and renewed, with the addition of explanatory clauses, 
by which the Sultan acknowledged the new Khan as lawful ruler 
of the Crimea, and bound himself to prompt performance of the 
religious formalities, by which it was necessary for him, as Caliph 
of the orthodox Mahometans, to give due spiritual sanction to the 
Tartar sovereignty. 1 

Schahin Ghirai, the object and unhappy instrument of Russian 
statecraft, was not suffered long to enjoy even the semblance of 
royalty. Prince Potemkin (who appears to have regarded the ac¬ 
quisition of the Crimea by force or by fraud as his peculiar 
function) placed dexterous agents at the Tartar Court, who per¬ 
suaded the weak Khan to adopt Russian usages and costume 
(thereby offending the national pride and religious prejudices of 
his people), and also to commit numerous costly absurdities, which 
brought him more and more into public hatred and contempt. At 

1 Schlosser, vol. vi. pp. 124-127. The Convention (dated March 10, 1779) 
may be seen in Martens et Cussy’s “Recueil des Traites,” See., vol. 3 . 


422 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


the same time they secretly but sedulously encouraged the disaffec¬ 
tion of his subjects. A revolt soon broke out; and the terrified 
Khan was persuaded by his Russian friends to call in the troops 
of the Empress to his assistance. Again the Russian soldiers 
occupied the Crimea in the guise of pacificators; but Potemkin 
and his imperial mistress now thought that they might safely _ 
appropriate the long-coveted prize. The Tartars, who opposed 
the Russian measures, were slaughtered or expelled without mercy; 
and, partly by threats, partly by bribes, Schahin Ghirai was in¬ 
duced to resign the crown of the Crimea and the Kuban to the 
Empress, and to attest that the individuals of his family, in which 
the throne was hereditary, were rightfully deposed for ever. 1 

In the Empress’s manifestoes respecting the annexation of the 
Crimea, the Kuban, and the adjacent territories to Russia (which 
were published in April, 1783), the same spirit of grim hypocrisy 
was maintained, with which Europe was already familiarised by 
the sayings and doings of the Czarina and her confederates in the 
case of Poland. It was pretended that the Russian sovereign was 
only seeking to confer benefits on the Tartar nation. They were 
to be delivered by her from the miseries of civil war and internal 
anarchy; and were also to be relieved from the evils to which 
their former position between the frontiers of the Turkish and 
Russian dominions, exposed them in the event of any collision of 
those two powers. These flourishes of Russian liberality served 
the sophists and declaimers of Western Europe with materials for 
new panegyrics on the magnanimity of the Empress Catherine ; 2 
but the Tartars themselves felt the oppression of Russian con¬ 
quest in all its bitter reality. Some of them took up arms for the 
independence of their country; and the chief men of the nation 
hardly sought to disguise their disaffection under Muscovite rule. 
General Paul Potemkin (the cousin of the Prince) put the malcon¬ 
tents to the edge of the sword, in a massacre, in which 30,000 
Tartars of every age and sex are said to have perished. 3 Many 
thousands more were obliged to quit the country. Among the 

' 1 Clarke’s “ Travels,” vol. ii. pp. 174-177. 

2 Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 128. Mr. Fox, in his advocacy of the proceedings 
of the Russian Empress, put the matter on a broader and a clearer basis. He 
said (in his speech in the House of Commons, March 29, 1791), “ After the 
independence of the Crimea had been established by the peace of Kainardji, 
the Empress informed the Porte and other powers that she found it impos¬ 
sible to secure her old dominions if she was not complete mistress of Kuban 
Tartary and the Crimea ; and. by a kind of royal syllogism , she said, ‘ And 
therefoi’e I must have them.’ ” 

3 Schlosser, p. 129. 


ABDUL HAMID . A.D • 1773-17S9. 423 

refugees from Russian tyranny were 75,000 Armenian Christians, 
all of whom, except 7000, perished from cold, hunger, and fatigue, 
as they endeavoured to cross the steppes on the eastern side of 
the Sea of Azoph. 1 Paul Potemkin was awarded for this carnage 
and his conquests by the dignity of Grand Admiral of the Black 
Sea, and Governor of the new Russian province of Tauris, as the 
Crimea and the adjacent territory on the mainland were now de¬ 
nominated. Prince Potemkin (under whose directions the general 
had acted) was signalised by the title of the Taurian. 2 The result 
of these injuries and violences was, that Russia increased her 
dominion by the possession of all the countries which had made 
up the independent Tartar kingdom, so formally recognised and 
guaranteed by herself in the treaties of 1774 and 1779. These 
countries were not only the Crimean peninsula itself, with its 
admirable harbours and strong positions, but also extensive regions 
along the north coast of the Euxine; and, in Asia, the island of 
Taman, and the important Kuban territory, where the outposts of 
Russian power were now planted, ready for further advance 
against either the Turkish or the Persian dominions in Upper Asia. 

The progress of this high-handed robbery excited the greatest 
indignation at Constantinople; nor did Western Europe observe 
unmoved such inordinate aggrandisement of the Russian power. 
The American war was over. The House of Bourbon had grati¬ 
fied its ancient feelings of feud with England by aiding in the 
humiliation which the events of that war inflicted on this country. 
France for a brief period before her Revolution was at leisure to 
consider the general interests of the civilised world. Louis XYI. 
and his minister, M. de Yergennes, were sincerely desirous to 
check the ambitious career of Catherine, and to save the Turkish 
Empire from dismembermemt. Austria was found to be too much 
under Russian influence to be trusted; and the French Court 
addressed itself to that of England on the subject of the Crimea, 
even before the definitive treaty of peace between France and 
England was formally signed. In June, 1783, M. d’Adhemar, 
the representative of France at London, informed Mr. Fox (then 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) that “ The Most Christian 
King had just received from the cabinet of St. Petersburg the 
official notification that Russia had taken possession of the Crimea 
and the Kuban. Would England look on with indifference at 
such a spirit of conquest V } The English minister replied by ex¬ 
pressing a doubt of the fact of definite possession of those pro¬ 
vinces having been taken by Russia: he said that Frederick of 
1 Clarke, vol. ii. pp. 179 n., 184. 2 Schlosser, p. 129. 


424 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Prussia would make war sooner than allow it. Again and again, 
by orders from his court, M. d’Adhemar addressed Fox on the 
subject. He asked, “ Would England see with indifference a 
Russian fleet in the Bosphorus 1 was it wished that Constantinople 
should be given up to Catherine 1 at any rate, could not some 
limit be imposed on the Empress’s career of conquest 1 might not 
the Kuban be conceded to her, so as on that cession to found ‘ 
a demand for her resigning the Crimea h If France and England 
would join in a remonstrance, their voice must be attended to at 
St. Petersburg; but, acting singly, France would not be heeded.” 
Fox coldly replied that it was too late to interfere. “ The annex¬ 
ation of the Crimea was now a fait accompli. Besides, England 
had engagements with the Empress which it was inconvenient to 
break.” Thus repelled by the minister, M. d’Adhemar sought and 
obtained an audience from the King of England. He explained 
to George III. the importance of the Russian conquests; he pointed 
out the political intimacy that was forming between Joseph II. of 
Austria and the Eussian sovereign, and their evident intention to 
dismember Turkey, as the greater part of Poland had already been 
seized and partitioned. The honesty and strong common sense of 
George III. were moved; and he exclaimed, with indignation, “If 
things are to go on in this fashion, Europe will soon be like a wood, 
where the strongest robs the weakest, and there will be no security 
for any one.” But a King of England can only act constitution¬ 
ally through his ministry and parliament. Fox persevered in his 
indifference to Turkey, or rather, in his partiality to Russia; nor, 
indeed, is it probable that the English people, exhausted as they 
were by a long and unsuccessful war, would at that period have 
co-operated willingly with France in new hostilities. The irrita¬ 
tion felt here against that country for the part which she had taken 
against England in the American contest was too bitter; and the 
recollection of the combined fleets of the House of Bourbon riding 
supreme in the Channel was far too fresh and painful. 

The French minister, by a despatch of the 8th of August, 1783, 
sorrowfully assured his court that there was no hope of obtaining 
the co-operation of England, and that Mr. Fox seemed bound to a 
false system ; but M. d’Adh6mar added a prophetic expression of 
belief, that a nullification of the policy of England in so grave a 
matter could not be permanent; and that sooner or later England 
would come to an understanding with France for the purpose of 
arresting the progress of the military and naval power of Russia, 
which threatened to overwhelm the East. 1 

1 A minute and interesting narrative of these negotiations is given by M. 


ABDUL HAMID . A.D. 1773-1789. 425 

The Prussian King, when applied to by M. de Vergennes to act 
in concert with France in the Oriental question, merely replied by 
complaints against the alliance of 1756 between the Houses of 
Hapsburg and Bourbon ; and he called on France to renounce her 
connection with Austria before she asked Prussia to take part 
with her. 1 Louis XYI. and his minister found the same selfish 
indifference to prevail both at the court of Turin and in that of 
Vienna. 2 It was, indeed, well known that Austria was conspiring 
with Russia for the spoliation of Turkey, and that her policy was 
to indemnify herself against the increase of the Russian power by 
seizure of territories for herself. A vain appeal was made to her 
sense of expediency by M. de Vergennes, who bitterly lamented 
that, according to the new system of European international 
policy, it was useless to talk of justice ; and that self-interest was 
now openly recognised as the natural prime agent in the disposal 
of the affairs of the world. 3 The French ambassador at Vienna 
represented to the Austrian cabinet that “ Austria could not 
desire to see her military and maritime interests sunk in the ab¬ 
sorbing influence of Russia. Even if the Crimea and the Kuban 
•were to be given up to the Empress, at least let an admission be 
required of her in behalf of the commercial and maritime interests 
of all nations. Let there be a stipulation that she is to have only 
merchant vessels in the Black Sea, or such vessels of war as 
mount less than twenty guns.” 4 The same disregard was shown 
at Vienna, as at the other capitals of Western Europe, to the pro¬ 
posals of France; Louis XVI. judged it imprudent to act alone. 
The Sultan was informed that he must look for no aid from the 
West. Fie knew too well the strength of his northern adversary 
and his own. The Turkish preparations for the recovery of the 
Crimea were discontinued, and a new treaty was signed on the 
8 th of January, 1784, between Turkey and Russia, by which it 
was agreed that the new state of things in the Crimea, Taman, 
and the Kuban, should not disturb the peace between the two 
empires. The stipulation of the treaty of Kainardji, which 
assured to the Porte the sovereignty over Oczakof and its territory, 
was formally renewed ; and the third article of the new conven¬ 
tion provided that whereas the river Kuban was admitted as the 


Capefigue in his recent historical work, entitled “Louis XVI., ses relations 
diplomatiques avec l’Europe, l’lnde, l’Amerique, et 1’Empire Ottoman,” pp. 
195-209. See also Mr. Fox’s speech in the Oczakof debates of 1791, in 
the “Parliamentary History of England,” vol. xxix. p. 63. 

1 Capefigue, p. 203. “ Ibid., pp. 204, 206. 

3 ibid. " 4 Ibid., p. 206. 




HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


426 

frontier in the Kuban, Russia renounced all sovereignty over the 
Tartar nations beyond that river; that is to say, between the 
river Kuban and the Black Sea. 1 

The pacific words inserted in this treaty, like those in the con¬ 
vention of 1779, were mere hollow formalities; for the Porte 
could not but cherish resentment for the wrongs to which it 
seemed to submit; and the aggressive ambition of Catherine was 
only stimulated by conquests and concessions. Austria was now 
entirely devoted to the interests of Russia; and a league was 
made between the two empires, by which each bound itself to aid 
the other. 2 3 In a triumphal progress which Catherine made in the 
early part of the year 1787 to her new Taurian province, she was 
joined by the Emperor Joseph at Kherson. He accompanied her 
to the Crimea, and, amid the festivities and frivolities of theii 
journey, the imperial tourists sometimes argued, and sometimes 
jested on the details of the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire, and on the questions of what was to be done with the 
Greeks, and what was to become of “ those poor devils the 
Turks.’ 53 Batchiserai, the ancient capital of the deposed Tartar 
Khans, was the scene of many of these schemes and scoffs; and 
the downfall of the Sultan was gaily plotted at Sebastopol also, 
as Catherine’s new city by the Gulf of Aktiar was pompously 
designated. The Empress and her guests saw there with pride 
and exultation a new Russian navy riding in the finest harbours 
of the Black Sea. Even then they boasted of the facilities which 
Sebastopol would give for a sudden and a decisive attack upon 
the Turkish capital. 

It was the design of Catherine and Joseph to attack Turkey 
along the whole line of her northern frontier, from the Adriatic 
to the Caucasus. But, as it was wished by the Empress to keep 
up her character for magnanimity and equity in the literary world 
of Christendom, means were taken to provoke the Turks to be the 
first in declaring war. The emissaries of Russia excited disturb¬ 
ances in Moldavia, Wallachia, Greece, and other parts of the 

1 The treaty is printed in Martens et Cussy, vol. i. p. 343 ; and in Mar¬ 
tens’ “ftecueil des Traites,” vol. ii. p. 505. 

2 Coxe, vol. iii. p. 477. 

3 “Leurs Majestes Imperiales se tatoient quelquefois snr les pauvres 
diables de Turcs. On jetait quelques proposes en regardant. Comme 
amateur de la belle antiquite, et un peu de nouveautes, je parlais de retablir 
les Grecs ; Catherine, de faire renaitre les Lycurges et les Solons : moi, je 
parlais d’Alcibiade ; mais Joseph II., qui etait plus pour l’avenir que pour 
le passe, et pour le positif que pour le chimere, disait: ‘ Que diable faire de 
Constantinople?’ ’’—Prince de Ligne, Lettres, &c., p. 55 (ed. 1810). 


ABDUL HAMID . A.D. 1773-1789. 427 

Ottoman Empire. Offensive claims were put forward on the part 
of the Empress to the province of Bessarabia, and the towns of 
Oczakof and Akerman, on the pretext that they had formerly 
been governed by the Khans of her new Taurida. 1 These and 
similar measures irritated more and more the haughty spirit of 
the Osmanlis, which had already been deeply incensed at the open 
insults put upon Turkey by the Russian and Austrian sovereigns 
during their progress to the Crimea, in which their hostility to 
Turkey had been so little veiled, that when Catherine and Joseph 
passed through the southern gate of her new city of Kherson, a 
pompous inscription, in the Greek language, was set up, announc¬ 
ing that this was the way to Byzantium. 2 

Had Gazi Hassan been at Constantinople in the summer of 
1787 , it is probable that the war would have been deferred, until 
Turkey had prepared herself to sustain it with more vigour. His 
policy was to complete the subjugation of the rebellious and dis¬ 
affected provinces of the Sultan, before the renewal of the contest 
with the foreign enemy. In furtherance of this plan, he was, in 
1787 , occupied in the recovery of Egypt to his sovereign’s power. 3 
But, partly through the rivalry with which the Grand Vizier, 
Yusuf, and other Ottoman grandees regarded Gazi Hassan, and 
partly through the popular indignation at Constantinople, which 
the studied insults and aggressions of Russia excited, hostilities 
were declared by the Sublime Porte against that country on the 
15 th of August, 1787 ; 4 the Sultan unfurled the Sacred Standard 
of the Prophet, proclaimed a holy war, and summoned the True 
Believers to assemble round the banner of their Faith. 

The first object of the Turks was to recover the fortress of Kil- 
burn (which had been ceded to the Russians by the treaty of 
Ivainardji, and so regain the mastery of the important embouchure 
of the rivers Boug and Dnieper. For this purpose, Gazi Hassan 
was recalled from Egypt, and placed in command of the Sultan’s 
land and sea forces in and near the Black Sea. On the Russian 
side, Prince Potemkin (who chiefly directed the operations of the 
war) sent Suwarrow to defend the menaced fortress. A division 
of the Turkish army was posted at Oczakof, on the coast imme¬ 
diately opposite to Kilburn; and Gazi Hassan’s design was to 
land part of these forces, and also the troops which his fleet had 

1 Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 141 ; “Parliamentary History,” vol. xxix. p. 193; 
Emerson Tennent’s “Greece,” vol. ii. p. 401. 

8 Coxe, vol. iii. p. 515. 

3 Eton, p. 423. 

4 Ibid., p. 423; Coxe, vol. iii. p. 515; Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 141, 


42 S HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

conveyed from Constantinople, on the Kilburn side, for the pur 
pose of assailing the fortress by land, while the Turkish fleet 
bombarded it from the sea. Suwarrow’s troops were few in 
number, and Kilburn was then ill-fortified: but his generalship 
and daring not only protected it, but nearly destroyed the assail¬ 
ants. Kilburn lias justly been called “ Suwarrow’s glory,” 1 down 
to our own time. Suwarrow erected a battery at the very 
entrance of the Liman (as the embouchure of the two rivers, 
which widens out after the passage between Oczakof and Kilburn, 
is termed), and he drew together a strong force of Russian gun¬ 
boats from Nicolaieff under the Prince of Nassau Siegen. Suwar¬ 
row permitted the Turkish fleet to enter the Liman without moles¬ 
tation ; and he remained inactive till the Turks had disembarked 
from 6000 to 7000 men on the Kilburn shore. He then made a 
sudden and desperate attack on them with two battalions of 
infantry, which he led on with fixed bayonets; and when he had 
broken them with this charge, he brought forward some regiments 
of Cossacks to complete their rout. All the Turkish troops that 
had been landed on the Kilburn shore were slain. At the same 
time, the Russian battery at the end of the promontory opened its 
fire upon the Turkish ships, and the flotilla of the Nicolaieff gun¬ 
boats assailed them in the Liman. The greater part of Hassan’s 
armament was destroyed; and thus, at the very commencement 
of the war, the prestige of success (always important in war, but 
doubly so when the contest is with Orientals) was fixed on the side 
of the Muscovites. 2 

The approach of the winter season checked the progress of 
hostilities during the remainder of 1787 : and in the following 
year a seasonable diversion in behalf of Turkey was effected by 
the war, which broke out between Sweden and Russia, and 
which detained the Empress’s best fleet and many of her troops 
in and near the Baltic. War had not yet been declared between 
Austria and Turkey; and the Emperor Joseph’s internuncio at 
Constantinople was instructed to offer the mediation of his sove¬ 
reign to prevent the further effusion of blood. 3 The cause of this 
delay on the part of Joseph, was the troubled state of his do¬ 
minions in the Netherlands ; but so soon as a temporary suspension 
of these disturbances had been effected, the Austrian sovereign 

1 “Oh! Kilburn, Kilburn, Suwarrow’s glory, and my shame !” was the 
exclamation of the Russian general on surrendering it to the combined 
French and English armament in 1S55. 

\ Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 142; Eton, p. 91. 

3 Coxe, vol. iii. p, 516. 


ABDUL HAMID. A.D. 1773-17S9. 429 

resumed his hostile preparations against Turkey. He even en¬ 
deavoured to obtain a treacherous advantage by surprising the 
important fortress of Belgrade, while he still affected the character 
of a peacemaker. This discreditable enterprise took place on the 
night of the 2nd December, 17S7. But the Austrian troops, that 
were sent against the Turkish city across the Danube and the 
Saave, were delayed by natural obstacles, and by the want of due 
concert between their commanders. The morning found a detach¬ 
ment of them under the walls of Belgrade, who were exposed to 
certain destruction if the Turkish garrison had assailed them. 
But the Pacha, who governed there, pretended to be satisfied 
with the apologies of the Austrian officer in command and per¬ 
mitted him and his men to withdraw unmolested. This shameful 
violation of public faith and the law of nations on the part of 
Austria was met by the Ottomans with only a dignified appeal to 
the gratitude of the Emperor. They reminded him of the for¬ 
bearance of Turkey in the time of Austria’s distress after the 
death of Charles VI., and of the scrupulous honesty with which 
the treaties betv/een the two empires had been observed by suc¬ 
cessive Sultans. 1 But cupidity and ambition had more influence 
on Austria than such feelings as gratitude or generosity, as 
honesty or honour; and on the 10th of February, 1788, Joseph 
published a declaration of war, in which he imitated the document 
by which the Emperor Charles VI. had commenced the war 
of 1737, even as he had imitated the treachery of his predecessor 
in attacking the possessions of a neighbour, while still professing 
peace and good-will. 2 

Joseph hoped to aggrandise his dominions by the conquest and 
annexation of not only Bosnia and Servia, but also of Moldavia 
and Wallachia. He began the war with an army of 200,000 men 
and a train of 2000 pieces of artillery; but what he effected 
in 1788 with this enormous force, was more in accordance with 
the scanty justice of his cause, than with the magnificence of his 
preparations. It had been arranged that a Russian army should 
enter Moldavia, and march thence to co-operate with the Aus¬ 
trians. But the breaking out of the Swedish war obliged the 
Empress to reduce the Russian corps that was to act with Joseph’s 
troops to a division of 10,000 men under General Soltikoff. The 
same cause prevented the sailing of the intended Russian arma¬ 
ment to the Archipelago. But the Empress’s fleet on the Black 
Sea was now strengthened and well equipped, nearly all the 

1 Coxe, vol. iii. p. 516. 

2 Ibid., vol. iii. p. 536. 


430 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


officers being foreigners. Russian troops, under Generals Tallizjm 
and Tamara made vigorous progress in the regions between the 
Black Sea and the Caspian; and the main army which was col¬ 
lected near the river Boug, under the favourite, Prince Potemkin, 
was numerous and efficient, though little activity was shown in its 
operations during the greater part of the year. 1 

On the Turkish side Oczakof was strongly garrisoned ; and was 
regarded as the bulwark of the empire against Potemkin’s army. 
Gazi Hassan commanded on the Black Sea, and the Grand Vizier 
assembled his forces in Bulgaria, to act as necessity required, 
either against the Russians, who were expected to advance by 
their old line of invasion, through Bessarabia and Wallachia; or 
against the Austrians, who threatened Turkey from the north¬ 
west. Joseph wasted the early part of the year in waiting for 
the Russians, and in unsuccessful intrigues with the Pacha ot 
Scutari, and other Turkish commanders, whose customary in¬ 
subordination towards their Sultan was erroneously thought con¬ 
vertible into traitorous co-operation with the enemies of their 
race and faith. When, at length, the Austrian Sovereign, 
ashamed at the ridicule which his indecision had brought on him, 
began to advance, he encountered an obstinate resistance from 
the Mahometan population of Bosnia; though in Servia the 
Rayas again welcomed the Imperialists, and formed armed bands 
that fought bravely against the Turks. 2 But the Grand Vizier, 
who found that there was no serious peril of a Russian advance 
upon the Balkan during that year, moved his whole force upon 
the flank of the Austrian line of operations. Joseph retired 
with precipitation. The Turks crossed the Danube; defeated an 
Austrian army under Wartersleben at Meadia; laid waste the 
Bannat; and threatened to invade Hungary. Joseph now gave 
the command of part of his forces, called the army of Croatia, to 
Marshal Laudohn, a veteran hero of the Seven Years’ War, who 
instantly assumed the offensive, 3 defeated the Turks opposed to 
him at Dubitza, and, before the close of the campaign, had ad¬ 
vanced into the heart of Bosnia, and besieged and taken the town 
of Novi. Joseph, himself, had marched with 40,000 men to 
relieve General Wartersleben and to protect Hungary. For 

1 Coxe, vol. iii. p. 517 ; Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 143. 

• Coxe, vol. iii. p. 518. Ranke’s “Servia,” p. 91. 

3 “Laudohn had always disapproved of a defensive war; and his axiom 
was that more men are lost by sickness or desertion in inaction, than fall by 
the hand of the enemy in the most bloody battles. ”->-Coxe, vol. iii. p. 518, 
note. 


ABDUL HAMID. A.D. 1773-17S9. 431 

this purpose, he took up a position near Slatina, in the valley 
of Karansebes, where he closed his military career by inflicting 
upon himself one of the most remarkable defeats recorded in 

history. 

The forces under his command amounted to 80,000 men. The 
Vizier’s army was posted opposite to him at a little distance. 
Elated with the numbers and admirable condition of his troops, 
Joseph had resolved to attack the Turks, and to carry the war 
into Wallachia. The project was approved of by his generals; 
and an easy victory was anticipated at the cost of not more than 
3000 or 4000 men. On the 20th of September all was prepared 
for the attack, and the generals were assembled in the Emperor’s 
tent to receive their final orders : the troops were in the highest 
spirits, and everything seemed to promise a brilliant triumph to 
Austria. Suddenly the Emperor felt nervous and disquieted, and 
asked the veteran Marshal Lacy if he was sure of beating the 
enemy. The marshal replied (as any sensible man would under 
the circumstances), 1 that he expected victory, but that he could 
not absolutely guarantee it. This answer so discouraged Joseph, 
that he instantly abandoned the intention of attack, and resolved 
to fall back to Temeswar. The plan of retreat was arranged ; and, 
as an additional security, orders were given that the retrograde 
march should begin at midnight. The troops had proceeded a 
little distance, when Marshal Lacy discovered that the piquets of 
the left wing had not been withdrawn. He immediately directed 
that this should be done, and that the further movement of the 
main body should be checked, till it was joined by those detach¬ 
ments. The word of command to halt was passed and repeated 
loudly through the ranks; and in the darkness and confusion 
some of the Austrian troops thought that it was the Turkish war- 
cry of “ Allah” which they heard, and that the enemy was upon 
them. The panic spread rapidly. The drivers of the ammunition 
tumbrils urged their horses to full speed, in the hope of escaping. 
The infantry, thinking that the noise thus made was caused by 
the charge of the Turkish cavalry, clustered together in small 
bodies, and opened a musketry fire in all directions. At daylight 
they discovered their fatal error, and the havoc ceased, but not 
before 10,000 Austrians had fallen by the weapons of their own 
comrades. Order was then restored, and the army continued its 
retreat to Temeswar. But the Turks, whose courage was raised 
in proportion as that of their adversaries fell, captured part of the 
Austrian baggage and artillery; and before the campaign was 

1 The words are Marshal Mannont’a, 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


433 

terminated in November by an armistice for three months, 20,000 
more of Joseph’s best soldiers had perished by sickness, which was 
the consequence of his prolonged occupation of an unhealthy tract 
of country. 1 Altogether Austria lost in the operations of this 
year 30,000 men in killed and wounded, the greater part of whom 
fell at Karansebes or in desultory skirmishes; and 40,000 more, 
who were swept away by pestilential disorders. 

On the north-western coast of the Black Sea, where Prince 
Potemkin commanded, the Russians effected little during the 
greater part of the year; though Oczakof was invested as early as 
August. At length Potemkin summoned the victor of Kilburn to 
urge on the siege, and the Russian arms made their customary 
progress under Suwarrow, though he was obliged by a wound to 
retire from head-quarters before the final assault was given. This 
took place on the 16th of December, 1788. Valour, maddened to 
ferocity, was shown on both sides. The Turks of Oczakof had, 
before the siege, surprised a Russian village in the vicinity, and 
mercilessly slaughtered all the inhabitants. Potemkin and Su¬ 
warrow caused the Russian regiments, that were to assault the 
town, to be first led through this village as it lay in ashes, and 
with its streets still red with the blood of their fellow-countrymen. 
With their natural stubborn savage courage thus inflamed by the 
longing for revenge, the Russians advanced on the 16th of Decem¬ 
ber over the frozen Liman against the least fortified side of the 
city. Whole ranks were swept away by the fire of the besieged ; 
but the supporting columns still came forward unflinchingly 
through musketry and grape; 4000 Russians fell; but the sur¬ 
vivors bore down all resistance, and forced their way into the city, 
where for three days they revelled in murder and pillage. No 
mercy was shown to age or sex; and out of a population and 
garrison of 40,000 human beings, only a few hundreds (chiefly 
women and children) escaped, whom the exertions of the officers 
in the Russian service rescued from the indiscriminate fury of the 
soldiery. 2 

1 See Marshal Marmont’s account of the havoc of Karansebes at p. 11 of 
his Memoirs (Sir F. Smith’s translation) : see too C'oxe, vol. iii. p. 520. 

2 Eton, p. 424; Sehlosser, vol. vi. p. 164. Mr. Eton, who was with 
Prince Potemkin at Oczakof, describes a touching scene which he witnessed 
there, and which he cites as a proof of the “fortitude and resignation bor¬ 
dering upon apathy,” with which the Tux-ks bear evils of the gi'eatest magni¬ 
tude. He says (p. 115), “ The Turkish women and children (in number 
about 400) who wei’e brought out of Oczakof when the city was taken, to 
the head-quarters of the Russian army, were put all together the first night 
under a tent. No better accommodation could under the pressure of the 


SELIM III . A . D . 1789-1807. 433 

In the March of 1789, the Turkish Grand Vizier began the 
campaign against Austria with unusual activity. He left troops on 
the lower Danube to observe the enemy in Wallachia and Mol¬ 
davia ; he crossed the river at Rustchuk, with 90,000 men, whom 
he led in person. He advanced rapidly towards Hermanstadt in 
Transylvania, with the design of pressing forward and carrying 
the war into the hereditary provinces of the Emperor. Unfor¬ 
tunately for Turkey the death of Sultan Abdul Hamid at this 
crisis caused a change of Grand Viziers; and the able leader of 
the Turks was superseded by the Pacha of Widdin, a man utterly 
deficient in military abilities. The effect of this change was the 
abandonment of the late Vizier’s plans for the campaign; and the 
Turkish troops were drawn back to the south of the Danube. * 1 

Sultan Selim III., the successor of Abdul Plamid, ascended the 
Turkish throne on the 7th of April, 1789, being then twenty-seven 
years old. He was a young man of considerable abilities and high 
spirit; and his people gladly hailed the accession of a youthful 
prince, active in person, and energetic in manner, under whom 
they hoped to see an auspicious turn given to the long-declining 
fortunes of the empire. Selim had been treated by his uncle, the 
late Sultan, with far greater kindness, and had been allowed much 

circumstances be made for them, though it froze exceedingly hard, and they 
suffered dreadfully from cold and nakedness, and many from wounds. As 

I spoke Turkish, 1 had the guard of that post, and the superintendence of 
them that night. I observed that there reigned a perfect silence among 
them, not one woman weeping or lamenting, at least loudly, though every 
one, perhaps, had lost a parent, a child, or a husband. They spoke with a 
calm and firm voice, and answered the questions I put to them apparently 
without agitation. I was astonished, and knew not whether to impute it 
to insensibility, or the habit of seeing and hearing of great vicissitudes of 
fortune, or to a patience and resignation inculcated by their religion ; and 
at this day I am equally unable to account for it. One woman sat in a silent 
but remarkably melancholy posture, insomuch that I was induced to offer 
her some consolation. I asked her why she did not take courage and bear 
misfortune like a Mussulman, as her companions did. She answered in 
these striking words : ‘ I have seen my father , my husband, and my children 
killed ; 1 have only one child leftI ‘ Where is it ?’ I asked her with some 
precipitation. ‘ Here /’ she calmly said, and pointed to a child by her side, 
which had just expired. I and those with me burst into tears, but she did 
not weep at all. I took with me that night into my warm subterranean 
room as many of these miserable women and children, wounded and perish¬ 
ing with cold, as it would contain: they stayed with me twelve days, during 
all which time none of them either complained aloud, or showed any signs 
of excessive internal grief, but each told me her story (both young and ojd) 
as of an indifferent person, without exclamation, without sighs, without 
tears.” 

1 Coxe, vol. iii. p. 521. 


28 



434 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


more freedom, both bodily and mental, than the non-reigning 
princes of the blood-royal were usually permitted to enjoy. One 
of his intimate associates was an Italian physician, named Lorenzo; 
and from him and other Franks, Selim eagerly sought and ob¬ 
tained information respecting the nations of Western Europe, their 
civil and military institutions, and the causes of that superiority 
which they had now indisputably acquired over the Ottomans. 
Selim even opened (through a confidential agent, Isaac Bey) a 
correspondence with the French King and his ministers Yergennes 
and Montmorin, in which he sought political instruction from the 
chiefs of what he was taught to regard as the foremost nation of 
the Franks. 1 Lie felt keenly the abuses which prevailed in his 
own country; and it is said that his father, Sultan Mustapha III., 
had bequeathed to him .a memorial (diligently studied and vene¬ 
rated by young Selim), in which the principal events of Mustapha’s 
unhappy reign were reviewed, the degeneracy of the Turkish 
nation discussed, and the great evils that prevailed in the state 
were pointed out, with exhortations to their thorough removal. 
Thus trained and influenoed, Selim came an ardent reformer to the 
throne; but the war, which he found raging between his empire 
and the confederate powers of Austria and .Russia, required all his 
attention in the beginning of his reign, which opened with the 
darkest scenes of calamity and defeat. 

The great mass of the Austrian forces in 1789 was placed under 
the able guidance of Marshal Laudohn. The Prince of Coburg 
commanded the corps which was to co-operate with the Russians. 
Potemkin’s army, after the destruction of Oczakof, occupied the 
country from the Dnieper to the Delta of the Danube; and 
Suwarrow (who had now recovered from his wound) was sent into 
Moldavia with the Russian division, which was to assist the Prince 
of Coburg. 2 Sultan Selim had recalled Gazi Hassan from the 
command of the fleet in the Black Sea, where he had experienced 
several reverses; and the old admiral was now placed at the head 
of the Turkish army, which was to act against Coburg’s forces. 
Hassan advanced upon the Austrians, who were stationed at 
Fockshani, at the extreme point of Moldavia. He would, pro¬ 
bably have overwhelmed them, if they had not been succoured 
by Suwarrow, who marched his army no less than sixty English 
miles over a wild mountainous district in thirty-six hours. 3 

1 Aleix. “Precis d’Histoire Ottoman,” vol. ii. Article Selim III,, 
lc Biographie Universelle.” 

2 Coxe, vol. iii. p. 521. Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 1G0. 

8 Marmont, p. 32. 


SELIM III. A.D. 17S9-1007. 435 

Suwarrow reached the Austrian position at five o’clock in the 
evening of the 30th of July. Instead of waiting for Hassan’s 
assault, he issued his order for battle at eleven o’clock the same 
night; and at two hours before daybreak the next morning, he 
led the allied armies forward against the Turkish fortified camp, 
in one of those bold bayonet attacks, which became national and 
natural to the Russian soldiery under his guidance. 1 The Turks 
were utterly routed, and all their artillery and baggage taken. 
Another and a larger army was collected by Selim’s orders and 
exertions, which on the 16th of September encountered Suwarrow 
with the same result, though the contest was more obstinate. 
This great victory of the Russian general was gained by him near 
the river Rimnik, whence came the well-merited surname of Rim- 
nikski, which was conferred on Suwarrow by his Empress. 2 The 
excitement and alarm of the Turks were now extreme ; and Selim, 
in order to appease the popular tumult at Constantinople, disgraced 
himself by putting to death the gallant, though lately unsuccessful 
veteran, Gazi Hassan. The Ottoman forces in Bosnia and Servia 
experienced defeats almost as severe from the Imperialists under 
Laudohn. Belgrade and Semendria were captured; and the 
advance of the converging Russian and Austrian armies upon the 
Turkish capital seemed irrestrainable, when the Emperor Joseph 
was compelled by the disorder and revolts, which had broken out 
in almost every part of his dominions, to check the progress of his 
forces in Turkey, and to employ them against his own subjects. 
The death of the Austrian sovereign in 1790, relieved the Sultan 
from one of the most vehement, though not of the most resolute 
foes of the Ottoman power. 3 The succeeding Emperor, Leopold, 
alarmed at the perilous condition of many of his most important 
provinces, and menaced with war by Prussia, was anxious to con¬ 
clude a secure and honourable peace with Turkey : and after some 
further operations on the Danube, in the course of which the 
Austrians captured Orsova, but were defeated by the Turks near 
Giurgevo, an armistice was agreed on, which was eventually 
followed by a peace : though the negotiations were protracted into 
the middle of the year 1791. The treaty of Sistova (as this 
pacification was termed) was signed on the 4th of August of that 
year. The Emperor relinquished all his conquests except the 
town of Old Orsova, and a small district in Croatia along the left 

1 Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 167, n. 

2 Coxe, vol. iii. p. 521. Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 163. “Biographic Umver- 
eelle,” tit. Souwarof. 

3 Coxe, vol. iii. p. 541. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


435 

band of the river Unna. With these slight variations the same 
boundary between Austria and Turkey was reconstituted in 1791 
that had been defined by the treaty of Belgrade in 1739. 1 

Russia was a far more persevering and a far more deadly 
enemy to the Ottomans. The Empress Catherine made peace 
with Sweden in the August of 1790 ; but she long treated with 
haughty neglect the diplomatic efforts of England and Prussia in 
favour of the Turks. 2 Constantinople was the great prize which 
she sought to win at any cost, and at all hazards ; and she boasted 
that she would find there a capital for her empire, even if the 
Western powers were to drive her from St. Petersburg. In 
general, this design w T as veiled under the showy pretext of rescuing 
the Greeks from the Ottoman yoke, and reviving the classical 
glories of the Hellenic name. As in the preceding war, Russia 
now used every available method by which she might make the 
Greek population of the Turkish Empire fight her battles against 
the Sultan. Before hostilities commenced in 1787, Catherine had 
sent manifestoes to all parts of Greece, inviting the inhabitants 
“ to take up arms and co-operate with her in expelling the enemies 
of Christianity from the countries they had usurped, and in re¬ 
gaining for the Greeks their ancient liberty and independence.” 3 
The Suliotes and other mountain tribes of Northern Greece (or 
rather Epirus) were leagued at her instigation in active insur¬ 
rection against the Turks. The Swedish war at first, and after¬ 
wards the menacing attitude assumed by England towards Russia, 
detained in the Baltic the ships which the Empress had destined 
for the Archipelago and the Propontis; but a Greek squadron of 
twelve vessels had been equipped by her orders in various ports 
in the Mediterranean; and the Plellenic patriot, Lambro Canzani, 
sailed early in 1790 in command of this little force against the 
enemies of the Czarina. Lambro cruised for some weeks in the 
Archipelago, where he captured many Turkish vessels, made 
frequent daring descents on the mainland, and conquered the 
island of Zea, which he occupied with part of his crews. The 
Sultan was compelled to withdraw from the Black Sea part of the 
remaining Turkish navy to oppose these active enemies, and 
he sought and obtained also the more effectual aid of a squadron 
from Algiers. The united Ottoman and Barbaresque fleet, brought 
Lambro to action on the 18th of May, and succeeded, by the 
superiority of their numbers and the skilful gunnery of the 

1 Coxe, vol. iii. p. 550. 5 Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 170. 

3 Eton, p. 323. Emerson Tennent’s “Gieece,” vol. ii. p. 401. 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789-1807. 437 

Algerines, in destroying the whole of his ships. 1 On land, the 
insurrection continued ; and the troops of the Pacha who attacked 
the Suliotes (the celebrated Ali of Yanina), met with repeated 
defeats. A general deputation of the Greeks was sent in the 
early part of 1790 to St. Petersburg, to implore the aid of “the 
most magnanimous of sovereigns,” and to beseech that she would 
give to the Greeks, for a sovereign, her grandson Constantine. 2 
This address was graciously received by the Empress, who pro¬ 
mised them the assistance which they requested. They were then 
conducted to the apartments of her grandson, where they paid 
homage to the Grand Duke Constantine, and saluted him as 
Emperor of the Greeks ((3a.a7.ev; tvjv ‘E Xkqvw). A plan for the 
military co-operation of the Greek insurgents with the expected 
advance of the Russians upon Adrianople was then discussed; 
and the deputation was sent with the Russian General Tamaran 
to Prince Potemkin’s head-quarters in Moldavia. 

The great military event of the year 1790, was the capture of 
Ismail by Suwarrow. This important city is situate on the left 
bank of the Kilia, or northern arm of the Danube, about forty 
miles from the Black Sea. It was strongly garrisoned by the 
Turks, and presented an almost insurmountable barrier to the ad¬ 
vance of the Russians through the coast districts of Bessarabia and 
Bulgaria. Potemkin besieged it in person for several months with¬ 
out success. He then retired to Bender, to enjoy his usual life 
of more than viceregal pomp and luxury, and sent the hero of 
Kilburn, Fockshani, and the Rimnik to reduce the obstinate city. 
His laconic orders to Suwarrow were, “ You will take Ismail, 
whatever be the cost.” 3 Suwarrow joined the besieging army on 
the 16th of December, and on the 22nd, Ismail was taken ; but at 
a cost of carnage and crime, for which the hideous history of sieges, 
ancient or modern, can hardly furnish a parallel. 

An accomplished scholar and linguist, a highly scientific tac¬ 
tician, an acute and profound calculator, Suwarrow yet assumed 
the manners and appearance of a boorish humourist; and en¬ 
couraged the belief that each of his successes resulted rather from 
the happy inspiration of the moment, than from elaborate com¬ 
binations and consummate military skill. 4 He acted this part 

1 Emerson Tennent, vol. ii. p. 407. 

2 Ibid., vol. ii. p. 495. Eton, p. 344, gives the Greek original of the ad¬ 
dress itself. 

3 Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 173. Castera, “Histoire de Nouvelle Kussie, 
vol. ii. p. 205. 

4 See Marshal Marmont’s account of Suwarrow, p. 29 of his Memoirs. 


433 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

through his deep insight into human nature ; through his perfect 
understanding of the dispositions and inclinations of those around 
him, and especially through his knowledge of the character and 
capabilities of the Russian soldiers. The men, who would have 
misunderstood and perhaps suspected him, if he had displayed the 
high accomplishments which he possessed, loved him for the rough 
frankness and grotesque coarseness which he assumed. “ Brother,” 
was the term by which Suwarrow spoke to and of a Russian com¬ 
mon soldier, to whom the sound of kindness from a superior was 
new; and there was a thorough heartiness in this military fra¬ 
ternity. He was ever ready with the rude but cheering jest, as he 
mixed.familiarly with the ranks in the drill, on the march, or in 
battle. He shared too in all the perils and privations which he 
required them to endure; and he knew how to address them in 
homely, spirit-stirring phrases, which roused at once the patriotism, 
the fanatic devotion to his creed and his sovereign, which the 
Russian recruit brings with him from his peasant-home, and the 
' military pride which the Russian soldier soon acquires under the 
colours. 1 

However elaborate might be Suwarrow’s strategy, his mode of 
handling his troops in action was most simple. “ Stuppai e Be !” 
“ Forward and Strike !” was his favourite maxim. He knew that 
his Russians were deficient in the alacrity and intelligent bravery, 
which the troops of some other European nations possess ; but he 
knew that he could rely on the same dogged obstinacy which had 
made Frederick II. exclaim that “ Russians might be killed, but 
not routed.” Suwarrow, therefore, led his men on in masses, 
which were taught always to attack, and to attack instantly and 
decisively. He discouraged long musketry firing, and evolutions 
in the presence of the enemy. His rules were: “ Draw out the 
line immediately, and instantly attack with the cold steel,”—“ Fire 
seldom, but fire sure,”—“Push hard with the bayonet: the ball 
will lose its way—the bayonet never !”■—“ The ball is a fool—the 
bayonet a hero T 2 The Russian soldiers almost idolised him ; and, 
during his long military career he never met with a single defeat. 
At Ismail, the army, which had been preparing to abandon the 
siege in discouragement, returned to its duty with enthusiastic 
ardour, as soon as the men saw Suwarrow among them. He 

1 See for specimens of these phrases the extraordinary document called 
f ‘ Suwarrow’s Catechism, or the Discourse under the Trigger.” It is printed 
at the end of the second volume of Clarke’s “ Travels,’’"and also at the end 
of Mr, I)anby Seymour’s valuable work on the Crimea. 

2 See the “ Military Catechism,” ut supra. 


439 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1807 . 

drilled the young soldiers in person, and taught them hour to use 
the bayonet against the Turkish sabre. Abandoning the tedious 
operations of a formal siege, Suwarrow ordered a general assault 
to be made on the Turkish defences, which, though not regularly 
breached, were not insurmountable. So far as the loss of life among 
his own troops was concerned, he probably judged well; as the 
protraction of the siege through the winter would have caused the 
death of far more men in the Russian lines, through cold, priva¬ 
tion, and disease, than even the amount of the thousands who fell 
in the storming. But the slaughter of the brave defenders, and 
of the helpless part also of the population of Ismail, which stained 
Suwarrow’s triumph, was horrible beyond the power of description. 
The assault was given at night, and it was not till after sustaining 
heavy loss, and frequent repulses, that the Russians forced the 
walls. But the fiercest part of the contest was within the city 
itself; every street was a battle-field; every house was a fortress, 
which was defended with all the wild energy of despair. It was 
near noon before the Russian columns, slaying and firing all in 
their way, converged upon the market-place, where a body of 
Turks and Tartars of the garrison had rallied. The struggle raged 
there for two hours, quarter not being even asked, till the last of the 
Moslems had perished. Fresh troops from the Russian camp, 
eager for their share of booty and bloodshed, continued to pour 
into the devoted city, the remnants of-which were given up for 
three days to the licence of the soldiery. According to Suwarrow’s 
official report to Potemkin, in the course of four days 33,000 Turks 
were either slain or mortally wounded, and 10,000 taken prisoners. 
According to other accounts, nearly 40,000 of the defenders were 
destroyed by the Russians at Ismail, and only a few hundreds sur¬ 
vived as captives. No reckoning seems to have been taken of the 
thousands of feeble old men, and of women and children, who 
suffered death, and worse than death, in the annihilated city. 
Suwarrow, while the ruins yet reeked before him, wrote a despatch 
to the Empress, in which he announced, in a couplet of doggerel 
exultation, that Ismail was -won. It is probable that this callous 
buffoonery was affected. He afterwards told an English traveller 
that -when the massacre was over, he went back and wept in his 
tent. So Scipio wept over Carthage burning ; but such tears can¬ 
not wash out such blood. 1 

1 The Siege of Ismail is described in the “Annual Register ” for 1791 by Dr. 
Lawrance, and Castera in the “ Histoire de Nouvelle Russie.” Large ex¬ 
tracts from these and other authorities are given in the notes to Mr. Mur¬ 
ray’s late editions of Byron. 


440 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


Many of the ablest Turkish generals and officers perished at 
Ismail; and the remaining part of the war was a series of unin¬ 
terrupted calamities to the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Selim still 
found the means of sending forward fresh armies; but these 
dispirited and undisciplined levies only furnished the Russian 
generals with the materials for further triumphs. Kutusoff routed 
a Turkish army near Babadagh, in January, 1791, and in the 
following July the host of 100,000 men, which had been collected 
under the Grand Vizier, was scattered by 40,000 Russians under 
General Repnin. The death, however, of Potemkin in the October 
of this year, removed the most violent promoter of the war on the 
Russian side, and the remonstrances of Prussia and England began 
at last to command attention from Catherine. William Pitt was 
now Prime Minister of England; and he discerned, far more 
sagaciously than most of his contemporaries, the true interest of 
England with regard to Russia and Turkey. A triple alliance had 
been formed in 1788, between England, Holland, and Prussia; 
the immediate object of which was to terminate the internal dis¬ 
sensions of the United Provinces. But the alliance was maintained 
after that purpose had been effected. The powers that were 
parties to it, had interfered at the Congress of the Hague, in 1790, 
in the disputes between the Emperor Joseph and his Belgian sub¬ 
jects ; and they also had compelled Denmark to withdraw the 
support which she had given to Russia against Sweden in 1788. 1 
Prussia, in her extreme jealousy of the power of the House of 
Hapsburg, had off ered, when the Austro-Turkish war broke out in 
1788, to conclude a treaty ot alliance, offensive and defensive, with 
the Porte ; and articles had been prepared, by which the Prussian 
King was to guarantee the recovery of the Crimea.” 2 These, how¬ 
ever, were never executed; but the triple alliance mediated between 
Austria and the Porte in the Congress at Reichenbach, in 1790, 
the result of which was the peace between Austria and Turkey, 
signed at Sistova, in 1791. 3 Having succeeded in the case of 
Austria, Prussia and England endeavoured to induce the Court of 
St. Petersburg to negotiate with the Porte, on the same basis to 
which Austria had consented, which is called in diplomatic termi¬ 
nology, the basis of the statu guo, and involves the principle of a 
general restoration of conquests. This was refused on the part of 
Russia; and various modifications of the statu quo were insisted on 
by Catherine’s representatives. One design which she communi¬ 
cated to the Courts of Berlin and London, was a project for erecting 

’ Wheaton’s “History of Modern Law of Nations,” p. 2S6. 

2 Schlosser, vol. vi. p. 170, and note. 3 Wheaton, p. 2S0. 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1807 . . 441 

the provinces of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia into an inde¬ 
pendent sovereignty, to be governed, as the Russian proposal 
vaguely phrased it, by a Christian prince. Some supposed that 
this sovereign was to be the Archduke Constantine; others, that 
the new crown was designed for the Empress’s favourite, Prince 
Potemkin, who was actually ruling these regions with fully regal 
pomp and power . 1 But, whoever might receive the title of King 
of Moldo-Wallachia, the recent fate of the Crimea had shown that 
the erection of such a state was the mere preliminary to its annexa¬ 
tion with Russia. The proposal was rejected by England and 
Prussia ; and the Empress was obliged to abandon this not the 
least cherished of her schemes. But she was peremptory in ex¬ 
cepting Oczakof and its territory from the suggested rule for 
negotiation, and in requiring that the Russian frontier should be 
extended to the Dniester . 2 We have better means than the 
majority of our countrymen possessed eighty years ago, for appre¬ 
ciating the wise policy of the English minister, who wished to 
prevent the Empress from converting the Liman of the Boug and 
the Dnieper into a Russian lake, where armaments prepared at 
Nicholaieif and other places on those rivers may be collected in 
secrecy and security; and whence they may suddenly issue into 
the Black Sea for decisive operation against Constantinople itself. 
Pitt resolved to support his diplomatic remonstrances by the guns 
of an English fleet in the Baltic; and the requisite forces for a 
naval expedition were prepared accordingly in the English ports at 
the close of the year 1790. But the project of a Russian war was 
made unpopular in England by the violent and unscrupulous 
exertions of Fox and other opponents of Pitt’s ministry. In the 
numerous debates on the subject, which took place in the English 
Parliament in the session of 1791, Turkey was reviled by the 
Opposition speakers as a barbarous country, which had no part in 
the European state system, and the fate of which could have no 
eflect on the balance of power. The Empress was eulogised as the 
most magnanimous of sovereigns; and the idea of any peril 
accruing to Western Europe from the aggrandisement of Russia 
was derided as chimerical. It was asserted by Mr. Fox that the 
overthrow of the Ottoman Empire was improbable, and that, if it 
happened, it would be an advantage. Mr. Whitbread said: 
“ Suppose that the Empress could realise all her imputed views 

1 Adolphus’ “Hist, of England,” vol. v. p. 5. Tomlin’s “Life of Pitt,” 
vol. ii. p. 236. “Parliamentary History,” session 1791. 

2 << Parliamentary History,” vol. xxix. passim. See also in Martens’ 

“ Recueil des Traites,” voL v. p. 55, the various notes on this subject. 


443 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


of ambition and get possession of Constantinople, and expel tlio 
Turks from all their European provinces, would any unprejudiced 
man contend that, by such an event, mankind would not bo 
largely benefited 1 ” The Ministerialist speakers replied by point¬ 
ing out how much cause England had for guarding against the 
inordinate aggressiveness of the Empress, and for taking care that 
the Russian maritime power should not acquire predominance first 
in the Black Sea, next in the Dardanelles, and then by a natural 
consequence in the Mediterranean, where it would assume its true 
and most formidable appearance. They exposed the real character 
of Catherine in her conduct towards weak foreign nations ; and 
protested earnestly against the influence of Great Britain in the 
pending negotiation being impaired by such party attacks as those 
which were resorted to by the British Parliamentary Opposition. 
Afterwards, in the debates of the subsequent session in 1792, when 
the English minister was at liberty to speak more freely than he 
could have prudently spoken while our relations with Russia were 
yet undetermined, Mr. Pitt and Mr. Jenkinson (afterwards Lord 
Liverpool) splendidly demonstrated that the principle, by which 
the foreign policy of this country should be directed, was the 
fundamental principle of preserving the balance of power in 
Europe; and that the true doctrine of the balance of power re¬ 
quired that the Russian Empire should not, if possible, be allowed 
to increase, nor that of Turkey to diminish.” 1 

France at this time (1790, 1791) was in the early agonies of her 
revolution; and no joint action against Russia, such as M. de 
Vergennes had proposed in 1783, could be hoped for now. But 
though thus deprived of what would have been the most effective 
co-operation abroad, and thus hampered by party warfare at home, 
Pitt continued his interposition in behalf of Turkey. The intended 
armament was not indeed sent to the Baltic, but the Empress 
thought it wise not to provoke its appearance there by increasing 
her demands for cession of Turkish territory ; though the victories 
which her armies continued to gain during the negotiations be¬ 
tween the Court of St. Petersburg and those of London and 
Berlin, made her waver for a time, and almost resolve to brave 
England and Prussia, and place her grandson on the throne of 
Constantinople. 2 Ultimately, more prudent counsels prevailed, 

„ , „ ■ C r r ' • 

1 The debates on the Russian armament in the session of 1791, and the 
Oczakof debates (as they have been termed) of the session of 1792, deserve 
careful study at the present time. They are reported in the 29th volume 
of the “Parliamentary History of England.’* 

2 Eton, pp. 539, 560. 


SELIM III . A.D. 1789-1807. 4.43 

and it is probable that she was in no little degree induced to 
assume an appearance of moderation towards Turkey, by the state 
of affairs in Poland. Kosciusko and his compatriots had effected 
important reforms in that country, of which the Empress had 
openly expressed her disapprobation. She saw with anxiety the 
progress that was being made in reorganising the military force 
and general resources of the Polish provinces, which had not yet 
been deprived of independence, and she felt that she had need of 
her General Suwarrow, and her veterans from the Turkish wars, 
to consummate the final invasion and dismemberment of Poland, 
on which she had already resolved. 

Preliminary articles of peace were agreed on between General 
Repnin and the Grand Vizier in the autumn of 1791; and regular 
conferences were opened at Jassy which ended on the 9th of 
January, 1792, in the peace between Russia and Turkey of that 
name. 

By the treaty of Jassy, the dominions of Russia were extended 
as far as the Dniester; and that river was made the boundary line 
of the two empires. An article was inserted (the oth) which in 
somewhat vague terms enjoined that the Turkish commandants on 
the north-eastern frontiers of the Ottoman Empire should cause 
no annoyance or disquiet under any pretext, either secretly or 
openly, to the countries and people, then under the rule of the 
Czar of Tiflis and Kartalinia; and that he should levy nothing 
from them. In order to chow the full purpose of Russia in 
making this astute stipulation, it is necessary to explain that 
Catherine, like her predecessor Peter the Great, coveted the pro¬ 
vinces that lie between the Euxine and the Caspian Seas, not 
only for their intrinsic value as acquisitions to the Russian Em¬ 
pire, but on account of the advantages, which the possession of 
them seemed to offer for attacks on the Turkish dominions in 
Asia, and also for wars of conquest against Persia. Catherine 
caused lines of fortresses to be constructed between the two seas, 
and she maintained a fleet on the Caspian. Russian emissaries 
continually tampered with the Christian Princes of Georgia, 
Immeritia, Mingrelia, and the other smaller principalities, to in¬ 
duce them to renounce their ancient allegiance to the Sultan, or 
the Shah, and to place themselves under the sovereignty of the 
Russian Empress. These practices had been especially successful 
with Heraclius of Georgia, who was styled Czar of Tiflis and of 
Khartil. He had become the pensioner, and acknowledged vassal 
of Russia as early as 1785. The effect of the 5th article of the 
treaty of Jassy was to make Turkey acknowledge Russia as the 


444 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

protector of these important regions. The same policy, the same 
design of Russia to appropriate the Caucasian provinces, had dic¬ 
tated the seemingly obscure 19th article of the treaty of Kainardji; 
we shall recognise it presently more clearly in the provisions of 
the treaty of Akerman. 1 

The pacification of Jassy was never regarded by the Russian 
Empress as anything more than a temporary pause in her opera¬ 
tions against Constantinople, until the thorough subjugation of 
the Poles should be effected, and the Western powers should be 
too much engaged in other operations to be willing and able to 
interfere with her Oriental schemes. This was the case in 1796 ; 
and she was then on the very eve of accomplishing what her 
admirers term “ the great design,” when her death rescued the 
Ottoman Empire from a more formidable attack than it had ever 
experienced. We know, from Mr. Eton’s pages, how she intended 
to recommence the war, and how it was proposed to overwhelm 
the Sultan by the combined operations of Russian armies in 
Europe and Asia, and of a fleet and flotilla from Nicholaieff and 
Sebastopol conveying a force across the Black Sea, which was to 
strike at the Turkish capital itself. His words (proceeding from 
a knowledge of facts acquired at St. Petersburg) deserve considera¬ 
tion. He says of Catherine immediately before her death, that 
“ She was now in possession of every resource she required in 
Poland for her army, in acting against the Turks on the European 
continent. The government of the acquired provinces was so 
firmly settled, that she had no apprehension of disturbances; her 
army was so formidable, that she could have marched beyond her 
frontiers at least 300,000 effective men ; and she had raised 
150,000 men to recruit it. Her fleet in the Black Sea was much 
superior to the whole Turkish navy, and there was a flotilla of 
small vessels built for the purpose of landing troops in three feet 
of water, which could have conducted, in three days, 60,000 men 
within a few miles of the capital of the Turkish Empire. The 
first blow would have been the destruction of the Ottoman fleet 
in its own port, and the attack of Constantinople by land at the 
same time. A great army had passed Derbent; an arrangement 
would have immediately taken place with the Persian Khans, in 
whose quarrels, without any apparent interest, she had inter¬ 
meddled ; and this army would have fallen on the Turkish Asiatic 
provinces, the consequence of which would have been, that all the 
Asiatic troops which compose the garrison of their fortresses in 

1 Chcsney, p. 2. “ Progress of Russia in the East,” p. 20. 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1 S 07 . 445 

Europe would have quitted them, and fled to succour their own 
country, and have left the road to Constantinople defenceless. 1 

As we are now approaching the time when Turkey became 
involved in the great wars of the French Revolution, and also the 
commencement of the reforms which cost Sultan Selim his life, 
but which Sultan Mahmoud II. effectively resumed, it may be 
convenient to pause, and take a brief survey of the state of the 
Turkish Empire, as it was near the close of the last century, and 
before the changes which have been wrought in its inhabitants 
and institutions by the Nizam-Djinid and other innovations. 

1 Eton, p. 433 , 


446 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


CHAPTER XXII. 

VIEW OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF 
SELIM III.’S REFORMS — TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS; EYALETS, 
LIVAS, KAZAS—APPOINTMENTS OF THE PACHAS—THE AYANS— 
EXTENT OF THE EMPIRE—ITS MISRULE AND MISERY—FEEBLE¬ 
NESS OF THE SULTAN’S AUTHORITY—THE WAHABITES, DRUSES, 
MAMELUKES, AND SULIOTES—REVOLTS OF THE PACHAS— 
ABUSES OF THE FEUDAL SYSTEM—TYRANNY OF THE FARMERS 
OF THE REVENUE—MILITARY WEAKNESS OF THE EMPIRE— 
THE JANISSARIES AND OTHER TROOPS—THE HOUSE OF OTIIMAN 
AT ITS NADIR. 

Sultan Selim III. reigned over twenty-six Eyalets (as the larger 
divisions of the Ottoman Empire were named) in Europe, Asia, 
and Africa. These were parcelled out into 163 smaller depart¬ 
ments called Livas; and each Liva was again subdivided into 
Kazas, or communal districts. 1 Each Kaza had its own municipal 
jurisdiction; and it generally consisted either of a town and its 
dependencies, or of a rural canton (Nahiya) which often comprised 
small towns as well as villages. An Eyalet was presided over 
by a Pacha with three horse-tails, who had the rank of Vizier. 
He had assigned to him as the special sphere of his government, 
one or more of the chief Livas of his Eyalet, and he exercised a 
general superior authority over the local rulers of the rest. 
Seventy-two Livas were under the immediate command of Pachas 
with two horse-tails, and these, as well as the Eyalets, were 
generally, though not accurately, spoken of as Pachalics. In 
general the appointment to the Pachalics were annual; though 
the same individual often retained his post for many years, and 
sometimes for life, if he was too strong for the Porte to depose 
him, or if he provided a sufficient sum of money from time to 
time to purchase his reappointment from the venal ministers of 
the Imperial Divan. Twenty-two of the Livas were held by 
Pachas on life-appointments. 

1 This description of the Turkish Empire is chiefly taken from the 7th 
vol. of tho work of Mouradjea D’Ohsson. 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789*1807. 447 

The Turkish governor was supposed.to he assisted in his 
administration by two or three individuals chosen by the inhabi¬ 
tants of his province, and confirmed in their functions by the 
Porte. These were called Ayans or Notables. Sometimes the 
office of Ayan was hereditary ; but it was then requisite that the 
succession of the new Ayan should be ratified by the majority of 
the inhabitants. The Eayas also, or tributary subjects of the 
Porte, had officers called Codji Bachis of their own nations, who 
assessed upon individuals the tax imposed on the district. 

The list of the twenty-six Eyalets was as follows :—Roumelia, 
Bosnia, Silistria, Djezaer (which included the greater part of 
Greece), Crete, Anatolia, Egypt, Bagdad, Eicca, Syria, Erzeroum, 
Sivas, Seide, Tchildeir, Djiddar, Aleppo, Caramania, Diarbekir, 
Adana, Trebizond, Moussoul, Taraboulous, Elbistan, Kars, Scherz- 
roul and Van. There were also several districts and cities not 
included in any Pachalic or Eyalet. Such were the trans-Danubian 
principalities of 'Wallachia and Moldavia. Such also were the 
cities of Mecca and Medina; and many cantons of Kurdistan were 
under their own hereditary chiefs, and were merely bound to 
supply the Sultan with a certain number of soldiers. The political 
condition of six Turkoman cantons was the same. The Barbaresque 
regencies continued to hold the position relatively to the Sublime 
Porte, which has been before described when we were tracing the 
reign of Sultan Mahomet IV. 1 

Thus, although the Turkish power had, before the end of the 
last century, been reft of many fair provinces; though itsPadischah 
had no longer dominion in Hungary, in Transylvania, in the 
Crimea, or along the northern coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea 
of Azoph, still, the empire over which the House of Othman 
claimed sovereignty, might have been deemed one of the amplest 
and richest in the world, if its natural advantages and capacities 
only were regarded. But the authority of Sultan Selim III. was 
scarcely recognised, even in name, in many of the best provinces 
of which he styled himself the ruler; and almost the whole of 
Turkey was in that state of official insubordination and local 
tyranny, in which the feebleness of the sovereign is commensurate 
with the misery of the people. The Wahabites were masters of 
all Arabia, except the two cities of Mecca and Medina, which they 
had not yet conquered. In Egypt, the Mamelukes treated the 
Sublime Porte and its officers with open scorn, though the 
Sultan’s standard was permitted to float at Cairo. In Syria, the 
Druses and the Metualis of Mount Lebanon and the hill-country 

1 See p. 296 , supra. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


448 

of Palestine were practically independent tribes. So were tlio 
Suliotes, and others in northern Greece and Epirus. So were the 
Montenegrins, and the dwellers in the Herzegovene. Moldavia 
and Wallachia, though in form restored to Turkey, were in reality 
far more under Russian than Ottoman authority. And not only 
by these races (which though comprised within the populations 
that had submitted to the House of Othman, were aliens from 
that House in creed, in language, and in olood), but also by the 
most powerful of his Mahometan subjects the Sultan’s authority 
was systematically disregarded, though the forms of allegiance and 
lip-worship might still be preserved. Revolt and civil war were 
the common practices of the chief Pachas. In Acre, Djezzar 
Pacha refused tax and tribute, put to death the Sultan’s mes¬ 
sengers, and tyrannised over the neighbouring country with a 
savage cruelty that procured him his surname of The Butcher. 
The Pacha of Bagdad was equally insubordinate, and for many 
years the Porte received no revenues from the rich territory which 
that potentate commanded. The same was the case with the 
Pachas of Trebizond, and Akhalzik. 1 In Widdin, the celebrated 
Passwan Oglou for many years defied the whole force of the 
Sultan, and made invasions of the adjacent provinces, like an 
independent and avowed foreign enemy. These are only some of 
the most conspicuous instances of viceregal revolt. It would be 
impossible to enumerate all the cases of local rebellion and civil 
war, of which the Pachas were the causes or the victims, or both; 
and it is hardly possible for the imagination to comprehend the 
character or the amount of the sufferings, with which these evils 
must have worn and wasted the population of the empire. 

Even when the orders of the Central Government received 
obedience, the misery of the people was extreme. It has been 
already mentioned that the appointments of the Pachas (with 
some exceptions) were annual; and they were generally and 
notoriously obtained for money. It was seldom that the Turk, 
who intrigued among the officials and court-favourites at Constan¬ 
tinople for a Pachalic, was possessed of the necessary purchase and 
bribery-money. He usually borrowed the requisite sums from one 
of the wealthy Greeks of the Fanar, or from one of the Armenian 
bankers. The lender of the money became in reality the mort¬ 
gagee of the Pachalic; and he may be said to have been a mortgagee 
in possession, inasmuch as his confidential agent accompanied the 
Pacha as secretary, and was often the real ruler of the province. 
As usually happens wnen a few members of an oppressed race 

1 Eton, p. 2 S 0 . 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789-1807. 449 

purchase power under the oppressors, these Eava agents of 
Moslem authority were the most harassing and merciless in their 
policy towards their fe.low-countrymen. The necessity which the 
Pacha was under of re-purchasing his appointment at the end of 
each year, prevented him, in ordinary cases, from shaking off this 
financial bondage. Sometimes, before an appointment could be 
obtained from the Porte, it was required that one of the Sarrafs, 
or Armenian bankers, should become surety for the due trans¬ 
mission of the imperial revenue. The power thus given to the 
money-lenders, who, by their refusal to continue their security, 
could reduce the Turkish grandee to the state of a private indi¬ 
vidual, was a fresh source of exaction to the inhabitants of the 
Pachalic. By these and similar other abuses, the greatest possible 
amount of extortion and cruelty towards the subject was combined 
with the smallest possible benefit to the Imperial Government: as 
each of the agents and sub-agents who were employed in this 
system of bribery, usury, and peculation, endeavoured to wring all 
he could from those beneath him, and to account for as little as 
possible to his superiors. The Ayans, or Provincial Notables, 
who ought to have protected their fellow-countrymen from the 
Pacha and his attendant harpies, became too often his accomplices. 
If an Ayan was refractory and honest, it was an easy thing to ruin 
him by a false charge brought before a Cadi, who had generally 
purchased his appointment by the same means as the Pacha, and 
was therefore equally venal and cruel. 

As the Pachas had the power of life and death in their respec¬ 
tive districts, and each maintained the pomp and luxury of an 
Eastern court as well as the force of a camp, all of which had to 
be paid for by the provincials, the motives to tyranny on the part 
of the viceroy were infinitely multiplied, and the checks to it were 
almost entirely absent. If the requisite amount of revenue was 
regularly transmitted to Constantinople, no questions were asked 
as to how it had been collected. Long and vehement complaints 
against the cruelty of a Pacha might rouse the Sublime Porte to 
punish him, especially if he was wealthy. But in such cases the 
provincials obtained no redress for their past wrongs. The 
treasures of the bow-strung Pacha were appropriated by the 
Sultan; and those, from whom they had been extorted, only 
gained a new governor, frequently more rapacious, because more 
needy than his predecessor. 

The power of the inferior Turkish officers, the Beys and Agas, 
was like that of the Pacha in kind, both as to obtaimnent and 
exercise, though less in degree. There were also throughout the 

29 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


450 

empire swarms of petty local tyrants, who farmed from the Porto 
the revenues of small districts of four or five villages each, under 
grants which were termed Mocattehs, if the lease was for life, 
and Iltezim, if it was for a term of years. 1 The misery, which the 
inhabitants of the Turkish Pachalics endured, may best be 
paralleled by referring to the descriptions which we possess, of 
the sufferings which were inflicted on the same regions, nearly 
2000 years ago, by the Proconsuls and Publicani of the Roman 
Commonwealth in its last age of corruption. 2 

The weakness and disorder of the Turkish Empire were seriously 
increased by the enormous abuses of its feudal system, and by the 
infinite and antagonistic variety of dominations, princedoms, and 
powers, that had been suffered to grow up ki many of its most 
important provinces. In describing the state of the Ottoman 
Empire when at its meridian of glory under Solyman the 
Ordainer, 3 * * * * 8 I have drawn attention to the peculiar incidents of 
feudalism among the Turks in their best ages, and to the causes 
which prevented the growth of an insubordinate noblesse, like 
that which defied the throne and oppressed the commons through¬ 
out nearly all Christendom in the mediseval times. But before the 
close of the eighteenth century all this had been widely changed ; 
and Turkey (especially in its Asiatic districts) abounded with muti¬ 
nous hereditary feudatories, who generally were styled Dereh Beys 
or Lords of the valleys; and their lawless arrogance towards their 
sovereign and oppression of their dependents emulated the worst 
baronial and knightly abuses that ever were witnessed in Germany 
or France. A nominal deference to the Sultan and his Pacha 
might be professed; but an officer from Constantinople who en¬ 
deavoured to enforce any order of the Sublime Porte in the strong¬ 
hold of a Dereh Bey, would have met with the same treatment 
that an emissary of the Emperor Frederick III. might have ex¬ 
pected in the castle of a German baron on the Rhine, or as the 

1 See Browne’s Travels, published in Walpole’s “Turkey.” 

2 “ Surrounded by an army of officials all engaged in the same work of 

carving out fortunes for .themselves and abetting their colleagues, the pro- 

consuls had little sense of responsibility to the central government, and 
glutted their cupidity without restraint. The tithes, tolls, and other im¬ 

posts from which the public revenue was drawn, were farmed by Roman 
contractors, belonging generally to the order of knights, who had few op¬ 
portunities of rising to the highest political offices at home ; and the con¬ 
nivance of their superiors in the province, backed by the corrupt state of 

public feeling in Rome, shielded to a great extent the sordid arts by which 

they defrauded both the state and its subiectsy*” &c.—Merivale, vol. i. p. 25, 

8 Page 203. 


SELIM III. A.D. 17S9-1807. 451 

messengers of Charles the Simple would have received, if they 
had carried threat or mandate to Brittany or Rouen. 

It is impossible to supply any adequate description of the 
number and nature of the minor local powers, that struggled with 
each other and with the central government of Turkey, during 
this period of “ her wild misrule of her own anarchy.” The ac¬ 
count which Sir John Cam Hobhouse (afterwards Lord Broughton) 
gave of a single province, Albania, as seen by him a few years 
after the close of the last century, may serve as an example. He 
says, “ Specimens of almost every sort of government are to be 
found in Albania. Some districts and towns are commanded by 
one man, under the Turkish title of Bolu Bashee, or the Greek 
name of Capitan, which they have borrowed from Christendom; 
others obey their elders; others are under no subjection, but each 
man governs his own family. The power in some places is in 
abeyance, and although there is no apparent anarchy, there are no 
rulers. This was the case in our time at the large city of Argyro 
Castro. There are parts of the country where every Aga or Bey, 
which, perhaps, may answer to our ancient country squire, is a 
petty chieftain exercising every right of the men of the village. 
The Porte, which in the days of Ottoman greatness divided the 
country into several small Pachalics and commanderies, is now but 
little respected, and the limits of her different divisions are con¬ 
fused and forgotten.” 

In the nominally central government at Constantinople, the 
Grand Vizier was still the Sultan’s principal officer in temporal 
aflairs, both civil and military; and the Mufti, as head of the 
Ulema, continued to be next in spiritual rank to the Sultan, who, 
as Caliph, was and is, the religious chief of all Sunnite Mahome¬ 
tans. Under the Grand Vizier, besides his Kaimakan or lieuten¬ 
ant, were the Kehaya Bey, who attended to the home department, 
and also to the war office. Foreign affairs were the special province 
of the Reis Effendi. The Tchaoush Baschi was vice-president of 
the Grand Vizier’s judicial tribunal, and chief of the police force 
of the capital. He also acted as the Lord High Marshal. Besides 
these, there were the Nischandyis or secretaries, the Defterdarsor 
treasurers, and the holders of the other ancient offices that have 
been described when we examined the Turkish system of govern¬ 
ment in the times of Mahomet the Conqueror. 1 And, without 
attempting to enumerate or analyse the prolix catalogue of cere¬ 
monious courtiers and speculating placemen, who are described by 
those who wrote seventy or eighty years ago on Turkish matters; .it 

1 Page 96, et sej. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


452 

may be generally stated, that, both in quantity and character, they 
were such and so many, as are usually found to multiply in decay¬ 
ing empires, especially in empires of the East. 

The Imperial Divan was now generally convened not oftener 
than about once in six weeks. The ordinary Divan of the Grand 
Yizier sate much more frequently : and formed a court of justice, 
at which, besides the Yizier, the Capitan Pacha, the two Kadi- 
askers, and the Niscliandyis and Defterdars attended. On impor¬ 
tant occasions a grand council was summoned, consisting of nearly 
forty members, and comprising the chiefs of all the orders in the 
State. In extreme emergencies the members were called together 
to what was termed a standing Divan, and deliberated without 
taking seats. 

The power of the Ulema, and especially of the head of them, 
the Mufti (which has been before alluded to), 1 had increased and 
was increasing. So was the amount of ecclesiastical property, 
the Yakoufs. 2 And though the system of permitting so large a 
proportion of the landed property of the empire to be held in 
mortmain was unquestionably evil, it was made to act in some 
degree as an alleviation of other evils, which generally affected 
the possessors of property under the extreme misgovernment of 
Turkey. Not only private estates, but whole districts and cities 
were the properties of mosques or other ecclesiastical foundations; 
and the occupier of them, on paying the stipulated quit-rents (which 
were usually light), lived in undisturbed possession, and in immu¬ 
nity both from the imposts of the central government, and the 
exactions of the local functionaries. Similar privileges were often 
enjoyed by those who dwelt in districts, that were the special pro¬ 
perty of the Sultana Yalide and other high individuals. There 
were also many places, where, by ancient custom or royal grant, 
the Raya lived almost free from the intrusion of any of the domi¬ 
nant race ; and where it was absolutely forbidden for any Turk to 
become a resident. It was to the existence of these and similar 
privileged localities in the empire—to the protection which the 
Frank residents enjoyed under their own laws and consuls—to the 
exceptional good government of just and able men who sometimes 
became Pachas—and also to the stern order sometimes enforced in 
their provinces by some of the most ferocious Pachas, who would 
tolerate no crimes but their own, that Turkey was indebted tor 
what little commercial activity and wealth was to be found in her 
at the period of which we are speaking. 


1 Supra, p. 94, 


2 Supra, p. 208. 


SELIM III. A.D . 1789-1807. 453 

_ If we look to the means which the Sultan possessed of asserting 
his authority against domestic rebels or foreign invaders, we shall 
find the military system of the empire so wretched, that instead 
ot wondering at the success of the Christian powers against it, 
there seems to be rather cause for surprise at the Russians and 
Austrians not having completed its overthrow. The classification 
of the Turkish troops which Thornton has adopted in his 
“ Treatise on the Ottoman Empire” (published in 1807) seems to 
be authentic and convenient. There were the paid troops, called 
generally the Kapikouli (which means, literally, slaves of the 
Porte), and the unpaid troops, who were termed Toprakli. The 
largest and by far the most important part of the paid troops was 
the once renowned corps of the Janissaries. In one of the earlier 
chapters of this work we have traced the institution of this soldiery 
by the councils of the Vizier Alaeddin and Black Khalil Tschen- 
dereli in the reign of Orchan, the second sovereign of the House 
of Othman. We have seen the increase of their numbers and the 
excellence of their discipline under Mahomet the Conqueror, and 
Solyman, the Lord of his Age; their growing insubordination 
under the subsequent Sultans; the change in the system by which 
they were recruited ; the increase of their numbers ; and the de¬ 
crease of their military efficiency. At the close of the eighteenth 
century they were computed to consist of 150,000 registered 
members, who were settled in the various towns of the empire, 
where they arrogated authority and military pre-eminence, and at 
the same time followed various trades. But the large number of 
those, who procured the enrolment of their names as Janissaries 
for the sake of the privileges and immunities which were thereby 
acquired, was no proof that any force of corresponding amount 
could be relied on by the State for actual service. The grossest 
frauds as to the character and capacity of the individuals who 
were placed on the muster-rolls, were practised by the private 
Janissaries themselves, and still more extensively by officers, who 
also enriched themselves by drawing pay for non-existent hundreds 
and thousands. Still, the Janissaries formed a large community 
in the empire, and one of the greatest importance both in war and 
in peace. They were conspicuous for their bigotry as Mahometans ; 
and, as they knew the suspicion with which they and their prede¬ 
cessors had been regarded by successive Sultans, they in turn 
watched every innovation and reform with jealousy and hatred, and 
were ready even to rise in each other’s aid to exercise the right of 
oppressing the Rayas who were beneath them, and what they 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


454 


deemed their still more sacred right of insurrection against the 
authorities that were over them. 1 

Besides the Janissaries, there was a force of artillerymen, called 
Topidjis, said to be 30,000 in number, but dispersed, like the 
Janissaries, in the chief cities of the empire, and bound to join 
their standards on receiving orders. 2 The Bostandjis, or gardeners, 
of the Imperial palaces of Adrianople and Constantinople, con¬ 
tinued to be enrolled and armed, and formed a kind of body¬ 
guard for the Sultan. There were other small bodies of regular 
infantry; and the old cavalry corps of the Spaliis and the Silih- 
dars were still preserved, though in little numerical strength or 
efficiency. The irregular forces, the Toprakli, consisted chiefly of 
the old feudal contingents which the holders of Ziamets and 
Timars were bound to supply; but which, owing to the abuses 
in these institutions, were now uncertain in amount and inferior 
in quality; nor could the services even of those who appeared be¬ 
neath the horse-tails, be relied on for the continued operations of 
a war. There were also in time of hostilities, levies of troops 
called Miri-Askeris, which received pay while in the field. When 
a Turkish town was besieged, the Mahometan inhabitants were 
enrolled as a kind of national guard for service while the peril 
lasted, and were called Yerli Neferats. The other irregular 
volunteers that joined a Turkish army were termed Guenullus. 

Besides the forces of the Sultan, regular and irregular, that 
have been mentioned, there were also corps of provincial troops 
called Serratkuli, who were levied and paid by the Pachas. These 
were not kept permanently embodied, but were only called 
together in time of war, or during the march of an army. They 
consisted of Azaps, or pioneers, of Lagunjis or miners, and His- 
sarlis, who assisted the Topidjis in the artillery service. 3 

Great assemblages of armed men from these various sources 
were sometimes arrayed under the Ottoman standards, especially 
in the early part of a* war. At the opening of a first campaign, 
the Porte could set in motion 300,000 sabres ; and if the war was 
a successful one, there was no lack of volunteers to recruit the 
armies. But these large hosts were for the most part mere heaps 
of irregular troops, incapable of discipline, and destitute of experi¬ 
ence. They were seldom even nominally enrolled for more than 
six months, and, on the first serious reverse that the army met 


See as to the number, composition, See., of the Janissary force (besides 
D’Ohsson), Ranke’s “Servia,” pp. 41, 100; Thornton’s “Turkey,” p. ISO; 
Eton, pp. 27, 66 ; Porter, vol. i. p. 273. 

2 Thornton, p. 183. 3 Ibid p. 1SG. 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1807 . 455 

with, they disbanded by thousands, and dispersed towards their 
homes, generally plundering the provinces in their way, whether 
hostile or friendly, Christian or Mahometan. Behind walls or 
entrenchments, and in confused engagements in broken countries, 
the native valour of the individual Turk, and his skill in the use 
of the sabre, made him a formidable opponent; and the wild 
charge of the Ottoman horse, often over ground which no other 
cavalry would dare to traverse, was still more destructive to a 
shaken or unready enemy. But, as compared with the steady 
movements and intelligent organisation of the forces of European 
Christendom, a Turkish army was (as Napoleon termed it) a mere 
Asiatic rabble. Two astonishing but indisputable facts both 
attest and account for this. Throughout the Turkish infantry 
and cavalry there was now no regulation whatever as to what 
weapons should be used, nor were any of them ever drilled 
together, or instructed to act in bodies in the commonest military 
evolution. 1 Each armed himself as he pleased; and, when an 
action had commenced, each may be said to have fought as he 
pleased. The French General Boyer well describes the Turkish 
soldiers of this time as “ without order or firmness : unable even 
to march in platoons, advancing in confused groups, and falling on 
the enemy in a sudden start of wild and savage fury.” 2 

The barbarous custom of receiving pay for the heads of fallen 
enemies, and the consequent eagerness of the Turkish soldiers to 
obtain “these bloody testimonials,” 3 tended not a little to 
increase the disorder and the heedlessness of mutual support, in 
which they combated. More than once the advantage which 
Ottoman armies gained at the beginning of a battle, was lost in 
consequence of the men dispersing to gather these hideous trophies, 
and to obtain head-money for them at the Seraskier’s tent. 

The condition of the navy, notwithstanding the exertions of 
Gazi Hassan, and of the Capitan Pacha Hussein, who succeeded 
him, was even worse than that of the army. And altogether it 
may be safely asserted that the Turkish Empire had reached its 
nadir of misery and weakness about three-quarters of a century 
from the present time. With the commencement of Sultan 
Selim’s reforms a new era was opened. It is true that Turkey 
has since then suffered from defeats and revolts—she has lost 
armies, fleets, and provinces; but a new spirit has been infused 

1 D’Ohsson, vii. pp. 345-370. 

2 ‘‘InterceptedCorrespondence from Egypt,”p. 183. Adolphus’ “History 
of England,” vol. v. p. 112. 

s gee Sir Walter Scott’s o^eryation, “Life of Ecsaparte,” vol. iv. p. 126. 


456 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

into her rulers and statesmen, which, though often checked, has 
never been extinguished ; and which, whatever may be her ulti¬ 
mate doom, has falsified the confident predictions of Yolney and 
other writers at the close of the last century, according to whom 
“ the Sultan, equally affected with the ignorance of his people, 
was to continue to vegetate in his palace, women and eunuchs 
were to continue to appoint to offices and places; and govern¬ 
ments were still to be publicly offered for sale. The Pachas were 
to pillage the subjects, and impoverish the provinces. The Divan 
was to follow its maxims of haughtiness and intolerance. The 
people to be instigated by fanaticism. The generals to carry on 
war without intelligence, and continue to lose battles, until this 
incoherent edifice of power, shaken to its basis, deprived of its 
support, and losing its equilibrium, should fall, and astonish the 
world with another instance of mighty ruin.” 1 

This vaticination of Yolney’s may well be compared, both with 
that of Sir Thomas Roe, in 1622, 2 and with many of the present 
day. Threatened states, like threatened men, sometimes live 
long; especially if the threatenings make them forewarned and 
forearmed. 

1 Yolney, “Considerations sur la Guerre actuelle des Turcs.” 

2 See supra, p. 245. 


SELIM III . 1789 - 1807 . 


457 


1 


r 


CHAPTER XXIII. 

SELIM'S REFORMS—THE NEW TROOPS—NAPOLEON ATTACKS EGYPT 
— WAR BETWEEN TURKEY AND FRANCE — ALLIANCE WITH 
RUSSIA AND ENGLAND—DEFENCE OF ACRE—FRENCH EVACUATE 
EGYPT—GENERAL PEACE—TROUBLES IN SERVIA—THE DAHIS— 
KARA GEORGE—WAR WITH RUSSIA AND ENGLAND—THE PAS¬ 
SAGE OF THE DARDANELLES—TRUCE WITH RUSSIA—SELIM III. 
DEPOSED BY THE JANISSARIES—MUSTAPHA IV. SULTAN—DE¬ 
POSED BY MUSTAPHA BAIRACTAR — MAHMOUD II.—DEATH OF 
BAIRACTAR — TRIUMPH OF THE JANISSARIES, AND APPARENT 
END OF REFORMS — RUSSIAN WAR CONTINUED — TREATY OF 
BUCHAREST. 

Relieved from the immediate pressure of Russian war by the 
peace of Jassy, and from the imminent peril of its renewal by the 
death of the Empress Catherine, Sultan Selim earnestly applied 
himself to the difficult and dangerous duty of internal reform. 
To meet the multitude of evils that distracted the State, he pro¬ 
jected manifold and extensive changes in almost all its depart¬ 
ments. The abuses of the feudal system were to be dealt with by 
abolishing feudality itself. The Ziamets and Timars were to be 
resumed by the sovereign on the deaths of their holders; and 
their revenues were thenceforth to be paid into the royal treasury, 
and appropriated to the maintenance of a new military force. The 
administration of the provinces was to be ameliorated by curtailing 
the powers of the Pachas. Each ruler of an Eyalet or a Liva was 
to be appointed for three years; and at the expiration of that 
term, the renewal of his office was to depend on his exertions to 
give satisfaction to the people over whom he ruled. Another 
reform was proposed, from which the provincials would have 
derived still greater benefits. All farming of the taxes was to be 
abolished; and the revenue was to be collected by officers of the 
Imperial treasury. In the General Central Government the Grand 
Vizier’s power was to be restrained by making it necessary for him 
to consult the Divan on all important measures. The Divan was 
to consist of twelve superior ministers; one of whom was bound 


453 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

to attend especially to the collection of the funds by which the 
new troops were to be kept on foot. 1 The spread of intelligence, 
and the advancement of education among all classes of his subjects 
were earnestly encouraged by Selim III. The printing establish¬ 
ment which had been founded in the reign of Achmet III., was 
revived; and many European works on tactics and fortification 
were translated from the French and published by the Sultan’s 
orders, under the inspection of the Turkish mathematician, Ab- 
durrhahim Effendi. 2 3 Selim also showed favour and patronage to 
the establishment of schools throughout his dominions. It was 
especially among the Greeks that new educational institutions 
sprang up, and old ones regained fresh energy under the Sultan’s 
auspices f and when it was found that the revolutionary party 
among the Greeks availed themselves of this intellectual move¬ 
ment to excite their fellow-countrymen against the Turks, Selim, 
instead of closing the Greek schools and printing-offices, established 
a Greek press at Constantinople, and sought to counteract the 
efforts of those opposed to the Turkish Government, by employing 
the pens of the Greek clergy of the capital in its favour. 4 He 
designed to provide a certain number of his Ottoman subjects 
with a better political education than could be acquired at Con¬ 
stantinople, by attaching them to the permanent embassies which 
lie sought to establish at the chief European courts. Turkish 
missions were received at London, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin; but 
the Cabinet of St. Petersburg artfully avoided Selim’s proposal to 
accredit a regular ambassador to the Kussian Empire. 5 

However needful were these and other measures for improving 
the civil and social condition of the inhabitants of the Turk¬ 
ish Empire, and however valuable they were likely to prove, if 
carried into effect, Selim well knew that a properly disciplined 
and loyal armed force was as indispensable for the enforcement 
and maintenance of internal reform, as it was for preserving the 
integrity of the empire from further attack from without. The 
example of Peter the Great of Eussia, who, by means of the new 
troops that Lefort trained for him on the model of the armies of 
Western Europe, overthrew both domestic and foreign foes, was 
ever before the eyes of Selim; and the inquiring Turkish Sove¬ 
reign may have been aware that almost the highest political 
authority of the West had deliberately pronounced that “ whoever 

1 See Ranke’s “ Servia,” p. 100, and the authorities therein. 

2 White’s “Three Years in Constantinople,” vol. ii. p. 205. 

3 Emerson Tennent, vol. ii. p. 423. 

4 Ibid., vol. ii. p. 521, note. 5 D'Cteon, vol. vib 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1807 . 459 

examines with care the improvements which Peter the Great in¬ 
troduced into the Russian Empire, will find that they almost all 
resolve themselves into the establishment of a well-regulated 
standing army .” 1 Among the prisoners made by the Turks during 
the last war, there was one who was a Turk by birth, but had 
long been in the Russian service, in which he had attained the 
rank of lieutenant, and the reputation of a good officer. The 
Grand Vizier, Yussuf Pacha (by whose troops he had been taken), 
was fond of conversing with him on the military systems of the 
two nations ; and was at last persuaded to allow a little corps 
(consisting chiefly of renegadoes) to be armed and drilled on the 
European plan. The Vizier used to amuse himself with seeing 
them go through their exercises ; and when he left the camp at 
the end of the war, he took the little company with him, and 
stationed them at a village at a short distance from Constantinople. 
The Sultan, hearing of them, expressed a wish to see “ how the 
infidels fought battles,” and went to one of their parades. He 
instantly saw the superiority of their fire to that of the ordinary 
Turkish troops, and appreciated more than ever the advantages 
which the arms and discipline of his Christian enemies had long 
given them over the Ottoman troops. The little band was kept 
on foot; and Omar Aga, as its chief was called, was enabled to 
recruit it by enrolling other renegadoes, and also a few indigent 
Turks, who consented to learn the exercise and wield the weapons 
of the Giaour . 2 The Divan was required by the Sultan to con¬ 
sider the policy of introducing the new system among the Janis¬ 
saries ; but this produced a mutiny, which the Sultan appeased for 
the time by fair promises, and by desisting from any further 
measures, though Omar Aga’s company was still kept together . 3 
In 1796, General Albert Dubayet arrived at Constantinople as 
ambassador from the French Republic. He brought with him, as 
a new and acceptable present to the Sultan, several pieces of 
artillery, with all their appointments and munitions, to serve as 
models, and a number of French artillerymen and engineers, who 
were to instruct the Turkish Topidjis, and to aid in the manage¬ 
ment of the Ottoman arsenals and foundries. The ambassador 
was accompanied also by drill-sergeants from the French horse 
and foot regiments, who were to give lessons to the Spahis and Janis- 
saries. The efforts of the French artillerymen were well received ; 
and marked improvements in the fabric, and the equipment, and the 
working of the Turkish guns was effected by them. Some progress 

1 Adam Smith. 2 Eton, p. 92; Ranke, p. 99. 

3 Ranke, p. 1GS; Eton, p. 93. 


460 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

was made in arming and training a squadron of horse on the Euro¬ 
pean system; but the Janissaries again absolutely and angrily 
refused to adopt the arms or learn the manoeuvres of Frankish 
infantry; and Dubayet’s drill-sergeants were only able to serve 
the Sultan by improving the discipline of Omar Aga’s men. 
Albert Dubayet died within a few months after his arrival at 
Constantinople, and many of his officers then left Turkey. But 
the Capitan Pacha, Hussein, who, like the Sultan, saw the value 
of the new system, took some of them into his own service, and by 
high pay and patronage induced a few more Mussulmans to enter 
into Omar’s corps. These new troops were about 600 in number, 
when war broke out between France and Turkey, in 1798, in con¬ 
sequence of the attack which the French Republic, or rather Napo¬ 
leon Bonaparte made on Egypt. 1 

It had been the anxious wish of Sultan Selim to keep clear of . 
the conflicts which the French Revolution had produced in Europe. 
He knew the paramount necessity of reorganising his empire, and 
the impossibility of this being effected while it was involved in 
the jeopardies of war. But the tidings which reached Constanti¬ 
nople in July, 1798, that a French army, 30,000 strong, under 
the most celebrated general of the Republic, had suddenly landed 
in Egypt and taken the city of Alexandria by storm, left the 
Sultan no alternative. It was true that the Turkish authority in 
Egypt was little more than nominal; and that the Mamelukes, 
the real lords and tyrants over that country, were as deeply 
hated by the Sublime Porte as by the Copts and the Fellahs 
■whom they oppressed. It was true also that Napoleon professed 
hostility against the Mamelukes only, and put forth proclama¬ 
tions, in which he vaunted the sincerity of the alliance between 
the Turks and the French, at the very time that he was ordering 
all the severities of military execution against the Turkish Janis¬ 
saries who had defended Alexandria. But the intention of the 
French General to conquer and retain Egypt for France, or rather 
for himself, was self-evident; nor could the Porte forego its rights 
of dominion over that province, where its Pacha was still titularly 
the supreme ruler, and which it had made vigorous efforts to 
reduce to effective obedience so lately as 1787, when the outbreak 
of the Russian war checked Gazi Hassan in his successful per¬ 
formance of that duty. We know from Napoleon’s own memoirs 
that he expected to overawe Constantinople by means of the 
magnificent fleet which had brought the French army to Egypt. 2 

1 Juchereau de Saint Denis, “Revolution de Constantinople.” 

2 Montholon’s “History of the Captivity of Napoleon,” vol. iv. p. 195. 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1807 . 461 

His victory over the Mamelukes at the battle of the Pyramids on 
the 21st of July, and the submission of Cairo six days after that 
battle, seemed to ensure the realisation of the dazzling visions 
which had led him across the Mediterranean. But on the 1 st of 
August Nelson destroyed the French fleet in the battle of the 
Nile. This at once removed all considerations of alarm, which 
might have made the Sultan pause. An alliance was concluded 
between Turkey, Russia, and England, and war was solemnly de¬ 
clared against France. An Ottoman army and a fleet were forth¬ 
with ordered to be assembled at Rhodes, and another army was 
collected in Syria. The formidable Pacha of Acre, Djezzar Pacha, 
though contemptuously independent of his Sultan in times of 
peace, consented to act as his Seraskier against the Giaours of 
Franghestan, and took the command of the Syrian forces. It was 
designed that the Syrian army should cross the desert and attack 
the French in Egypt early in 1799, and that the armament from 
Rhodes should act simultaneously with it by landing 16,000 of 
the best Turkish troops under Mustapha Pacha at Aboukir. The 
activity of Napoleon disconcerted these projects. Instead of wait¬ 
ing to be thus assailed in Egypt, he anticipated his enemies by 
crossing the desert into Syria during the winter, and carrying 
offensive war into that important province. In his own words, 
he expected that “ according to this plan, the divisions of the 
army of Rhodes would be obliged to hasten to the aid of Syria, 
and Egypt would remain tranquil, which would permit us suc¬ 
cessively to summon the greatest part of our forces to Syria. The 
Mamelukes of Mourad Bey, and of Ibrahim Bey, the Arabs of 
the Egyptian desert, the Druses of Mount Lebanon, the Metualis, 
the Christians of Syria, the whole party of the Sheiks of Azor in 
Syria might join the army when it was master of that country, 
and the commotion would be communicated to the whole of 
Arabia. These provinces of the Ottoman Empire in which the 
Arabian language was spoken, desired a great change, and only 
waited for some one to bring it about. Should the fortune of 
war be favourable, the French might, by the middle of summer, 
reach the Euphrates with 100,000 auxiliaries, who would have as 
a reserve 25,000 veteran Frenchmen of the best troops in the 
world, and numerous trains of artillery. Constantinople would 
then be menaced; and if the French could succeed in re-establish¬ 
ing friendly relations with -the Porte, they might cross the desert, 
and march upon India towards the end of autumn .” 1 

These dreams of Oriental conquest were finally dissipated before 
1 Montliolon’s “History of the Captivity of Napoleon,” vol. iv. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


462 

St. Jean d’Acre. Djezzar Pacha had proved himself in readiness 
and energy no unworthy opponent of the great victor of Italy 
and Egypt; and English skill and gallantry now co-operated with 
the stubborn valour of the Turks. Djezzar had sent Abdallah, 
the Pacha of Damascus, forward with the advanced guard of the 
Syrian forces as early as January, 1799. Abdallah garrisoned 
Gazi and Jaffa, and proceeded as far as El Arisch, which is the 
key of Egypt on its Syrian side. Napoleon commenced his 
march in 'February. He took, without difficulty, El Arisch on 
the 15th of February, and Gaza in a few days afterwards. Jaffa 
resisted more obstinately, but was breached and stormed on the 
3rd of March. 2000 Turkish soldiers, who were made prisoners 
here, were on the following day put to death in cold blood. As 
the best biographer of Napoleon relates this fearful scene:—• 
“The body of prisoners were marched out of Jaffa, in the centre 
of a large square battalion. The Turks foresaw their fate, but 
used neither entreaties nor complaints to avert it. They marched 
on silent and composed. They were escorted to the sand-hills to 
the south-east of Jaffa, divided there into small bodies, and put 
to death by musketry. The execution lasted a considerable 
time, and the wounded were despatched by the bayonet. Their 
bodies were heaped together, and formed a pyramid, which is 
still visible, consisting now of human bones, as originally of bloody 
corpses.” 1 

Napoleon then advanced upon Acre, which was the only place 
that could stop him from effecting the complete conquest of Syria. 
The siege began on the 20th of March, and was maintained with 
the greatest vigour and determination on both sides until the 
20 th of May, when Napoleon reluctantly abandoned his prospects 
of an imperial career beyond the Euphrates and the Indus, and 
retreated with the remains of his forces upon Egypt. In this 
siege, no less than eight assaults were given by the French, and 
eleven desperate sallies made by the defenders. The operations 
of Napoleon were greatly retarded in the first weeks by his de¬ 
ficiency in heavy artillery. Sir Sydney Smith, who was cruising 
off Syria with two English ships of the line, captured the flotilla 
which was conveying the French battering train along the coast; 
and he aided the defenders of Acre still more effectively by land¬ 
ing gunners and marines from his own ships, and also the 
emigrant French officer, Colonel Philippeaux, who took the com¬ 
mand of the engineer force in the city. Philippeaux, and many 
more brave men perished during the defence; and the French. 

1 Scott’s “Life of Napoleon.” 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1807 . 463 

obtained in April some mortars and heavy guns which their R ear- 
admiral Perree landed near Jaffa. A large army also which the 
Pacha of Damascus assembled in Syria for the relief of Acre, 
was completely defeated and dispersed by Napoleon, and two 
divisions of his troops at the battle of Mount Thabor; while the 
remainder of his force maintained the position before the besieged 
city. But it was impossible for him to prevent Djezzar Pacha 
from receiving reinforcements by sea; and on the 7th of May a 
Turkish squadron landed 12,000 men in the harbour. These in¬ 
cluded the new troops, armed with musket and bayonet, and 
disciplined on the European system, who have been already de¬ 
scribed. This body signalised itself by gallantry and steadiness 
during the remainder of the siege, and attracted the notice of the 
besieging general as well as of the Turks. Napoleon had received 
further supplies of artillery, and the greater part of the defences 
of Acre became a mass of blood-stained ruins. But every attempt 
of the French to charge through the living barriers of the garrison 
and their English comrades was repulsed with heavy loss. The 
number of Napoleon’s wounded who lay at Jaffa and in the camp, 
was 12,000; and the plague was in his hospitals. 1 His retreat 
was conducted with admirable skill and celerity; and Napoleon 
soon found that his presence in' Egypt was deeply needed to quell 
the spirit of insurrection that had arisen there, and to encounter 
the Turkish army from Ehodes. 

This army, commanded by Mustapha, the Pacha of Roumelia, 
and escorted by Sir Sydney Smith’s squadron, landed at Aboukir 
on the 11th of July. It consisted of about 15,000 infantry, with 
a considerable force of artillery, but without horse. . Mustapha 
Pacha assaulted and carried the redoubts which the French had 
formed near the village of Aboukir, put to the sword the detach-. 
ment of Marmont’s corps which he found there; and then, in 
expectation of an attack from the main French army, he pro¬ 
ceeded to strengthen his position with a double line of entrench¬ 
ments. Napoleon collected his forces with characteristic rapidity, 
and on the 25th of July was before the peninsula of Aboukir. 
The action that ensued was well contested but decisive. Napoleon 
cut off some detached bodies of the Turks, and carried their first 
line without much difficulty. But behind the second line the 
Pacha’s troops resisted desperately; and aided by the fire of the 
English gunboats in the bay, they drove the French columns 
back with considerable loss. At this critical moment, the Turks 
left their entrenchments and dispersed about the field to cut off 

1 Montholon, vol. iv. p. 2S6. 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


464 

the heads of their fallen enemies. Napoleon took instant advan¬ 
tage of their disorder. He sent his reserves forward ; and Murat, 
with the French cavalry, dashed through an opening between the 
redoubts into the midst of the Ottoman position. Murat forced 
his way to Mustapha Pacha’s tent, and had exchanged blows with 
the Turkish general, each slightly wounding the other, before the 
Pacha, seeing the inevitable ruin of his army, consented to sur¬ 
render. 1 Pursued at the point of the bayonet by the victorious 
French, the mass of the Turks was thrust into the sea, the whole 
bay appearing for a few minutes to be covered with their turbans, 
until they sank by thousands, and perished beneath the waves. 
After this victory, which restored to the French, for a few months, 
the undisputed possession of Egypt, Napoleon departed from that 
country to win empire in the West, though it had eluded him in 
the Eastern world. 

General Kleber, who was left in command of the French force 
in Egypt, entered into a convention with Sir Sydney Smith, the 
English Commodore, for evacuating the province, but the English 
Admiral, Lord Keith, refused to ratify the terms; and a large 
Turkish army, under the Grand Vizier, entered Egypt early in 
the year 1800. Kleber completely defeated this host at the battle 
of Heliopolis, on the 20th of March ; and it was ultimately by the 
English expedition under Abercrombie and Hutchinson that 
Egypt was wrested from the French. 

On the western frontier of the Ottoman dominions in Europe 
some territorial acquisitions were made in consequence of the war 
between the Porte and France, and of the alliance of the Sultan 
with Russia and England, which that war produced. France had, 
by the treaty of Campo Formio, between her and Austria, in 
1797 (when these two powers agreed that the republic of Venice 
should be extinct), obtained possession of the Ionian Islands and 
their dependencies on that continent, Prevesa, Parga, Vonitza, 
Gomenitza, and Butrinto, which had formed portions of the 
Venetian dominions. Immediately that the war was declared 
against France by the Porte, in 1798, Ali Pacha, the celebrated 
Vizier of Epirus, marched troops upon Prevesa, Vonitza, and 
Butrinto, and won these cities from the French. Soon afterwards, 

1 “Mustaplia Pacha was taken, and carried in triumph before Bonaparte. 
The haughty Turk had not lost his pride with his fortunes. ‘ I will take 
care to inform the Sultan/ said the victor, meaning to be courteous, ‘of the 
courage you have displayed in the battle, though it has been your mishap 
to lose it.’ ‘ Thou mayst save thyself the trouble/answered the prisoner 
haughtily ; ‘my master knows me better than thou canst/ ”—Scott. 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1807 . 465 

a Russian fleet from the Black Sea sailed to the Bosphorus, where 
it was joined by a Turkish squadron, and the combined armament 
entered the Mediterranean, where it conquered the Ionian Islands, 
and afterwards endeavoured to aid the enemies of the French on 
the coasts of Italy ; which then witnessed the strange spectacle of 
the forces of the Sultan and the Czar co-operating to support the 
Pope. 1 

The Ionian Islands were at first (1801) placed under the joint 
protectorate of the Russians and Turks. Disputes naturally 
followed : and it was agreed in 1802 that one of these ill-matched 
guardians should resign. It was left to the Greek inhabitants of 
the islands to make the selection. They chose to retain the 
Russian Emperor as their protector, and the Turks withdrew 
accordingly. The acquisition of these islands was always a 
favourite project with Ali Pacha: more, however, with a view to 
aggrandise himself than from any desire to strengthen his master. 
But he never succeeded in obtaining them. They passed, in 1807, 
from Russian to French sovereignty, and were afterwards captured 
by the English, who were for many years the supreme rulers of 
what was termed the Septinsular Republic. 

The possession of the old Venetian districts on the mainland 
was confirmed to Turkey by agreement between her and Russia 
in 1800. Butrinto, Prevesa, and Vonitza, which had been taken 
by Ali Pacha, were retained by him; but Parga, which was 
garrisoned by a body of hardy Suliotes, refused to submit, and 
nobly maintained her independence for fourteen years. During 
four more years she was protected by England; and when that 
protection was withdrawn, and the city given up to the Pacha, the 
inhabitants (like the Phocseans of old) abandoned their homes 
rather than become the subjects of an Eastern despot. We have 
been glancing far forward, while speaking of the fate of these 
relics of the old Venetian Empire in Greece, in order that they 
may not again require our notice. But we must now revert to the 
early part of the nineteenth century. It has been mentioned that 
the Turks, in the year 1802, gave up to Russia their share of the 
protectorate of the Seven Islands; and in the October of that 
year the influence of Russia obtained a Hatti-scheriff from the 
Sultan in favour of the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia; 
by which the Porte pledged itself not to remove the reigning 
Hospodars of those principalities without previous reference to 
Russia, and not to allow any Turks, except merchants and traders, 
to enter either territory . 2 The November of the preceding year, 

1 See Eanke’s “Servia,” p. 210. 8 Ibid., p, 145. 

.30 


4 66 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

1801, had been a still more important epoch. It was then that a 
general though brief pacification throughout Europe was effected, 
in which the Ottoman Empire was included, so far, at least, as 
regarded foreign powers. By a treaty between France and 
Turkey (negotiated concurrently with the peace of Amiens be¬ 
tween France and England), Napoleon, then Chief Consul, 
acknowledged the sovereignty of the Porte over Egypt and its 
other dominions in full integrity; and the Sultan renewed the 
ancient privileges which the French had, under their kings, 
enjoyed in Turkey. The old policy of France, in seeking the 
friendship of the Ottoman Court, was now revived: and, before 
long, the skill of Napoleon’s ambassadors, Generals Brune and 
Sebastiani, restored the French influence at Constantinople. 

Selim had now a second respite from war with any European 
power, until he was attacked by Bussia in 1806. But this was no 
period of tranquillity for the Turkish Empire. The Wahabites 
renewed their attacks on Syria; and in 1802 they captured the 
cities of Mecca and Medina, so that all Arabia was now in their 
possession. The loss of the Holy Cities, the indignities with 
which the Wahabites treated the sanctuaries and reliques of Ma¬ 
hometanism, and the cruelties practised by them towards the 
Hadjis, or pilgrims, especially those of the Sunnite persuasion, 
excited a profound sensation throughout the Ottoman Empire, and 
tended to prejudice the Turkish part of the population against their 
innovating Sultan, whose reign was marked by such visitations. 
In Egypt, the remnant of the Mamelukes long kept at bay the 
troops by which Selim endeavoured to bring that province under 
effectual control. In Syria, Djezzar Pacha resumed his old attitude 
of haughty insubordination towards the Porte, and exercised inde¬ 
pendent tyranny until his death, in 1804. On the Danube, Pass- 
wan Oglou maintained himself against all the forces that the Sultan 
could employ for his reduction; until, at last, the Porte, in 1806, 
made peace with its stubborn rebel, confirmed him in all the 
power which he had usurped, and sent him the insignia of a Pacha 
of the highest rank. 

The troubles in Servia deserve more careful consideration, as 
their ultimate effect was to withdraw that important province from 
the practical authority of the House of Othman, and to convert it 
into an independent Christian State. The narrative of this is also 
closely connected with that of the contest between the Janissaries 
and the Sultan, and it gives fearful proof of the stern necessity 
under which Selim and Mahmoud acted in all their measures 
against that force. 


SELIM III . A . D . 1789-1807. 


467 


It lias been mentioned, while tracing the events of the war of 
the Emperor Joseph II. against Turkey, that the Austrian forces, 
which entered Servia, were actively assisted by the Rayas of that 
province. The Servians formed a considerable force, both of horse 
and foot, which rendered excellent service to the Emperor, and 
defended many important districts from the attempts made by the 
Turks to reconquer them. When the peace of Sistova gave Servia 
back to the Porte, with merely a provision for an amnesty in favour 
of such of the inhabitants as had acted against the Sultan, Turkish 
commissioners were sent from Constantinople to take possession of 
the province : their surprise was extreme, and not unmingled with 
apprehension, wdien they found the change that had taken place in 
their Christian subjects, whom they had been accustomed to regard 
as “ a weaponless and submissive herd.” One of them exclaimed 
to the Austrian officers, when a Servian troop, fully armed and 
accoutred, marched out in military array from one of the fortresses, 
“ Neighbours, what have you made of our Rayas V’ L The Servian 
regiments were disbanded, and the Turks returned to their old 
dominion; but the military spirit which had been called into action 
among the Rayas could not be easily extinguished. 

It was, however, not against, but in aid of the Sultan, that the 
Servians next appeared in arms. The turbulent tyranny of the 
Janissaries was the cause of this strange phenomenon. At no place 
had the members of that body proceeded to such lengths of lawless 
outrage, as at Belgrade, where their commanders already styled 
themselves Dahis, in imitation of the rulers of the Barbaresque 
States, who had originally been raised to independent power from 
among a mutinous soldiery. 2 The Janissaries of Belgrade, and the 
other Servian towns robbed and murdered not only the Rayas, but 
their fellow-countrymen, the Spahis—the feudal lords of the land. 
The Pacha’s authority was so insignificant, that the Austrians, 
during the war, treated with the Aga of the Janissaries instead of 
with the legitimate viceroy of the Sultan. As this state of in¬ 
subordination and violence was renewed in Servia, after the peace, 
Selim determined to act vigorously against these rebels; and Ebu 
Bekir was sent to Belgrade as Pacha, with a firman which com¬ 
manded the Janissaries to quit that city and the entire pachalic. 
According to the too common policy in the East of using the 
basest crimes to punish criminals, the chief leader of the Janis¬ 
saries was removed by assassination, and the firman was then pub¬ 
lished and enforced. The expelled Janissaries joined Passwan 
Oglou, the rebel of Widdin; and at their instigation, Pass wan’s 
1 Ranke’s “Servia,” p. 84. 2 Ibid., p. 104. 


468 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

forces invaded Servia. In this emergency, Hadschi Mustapha (who 
had succeeded Ebu Bekir as Pacha of Belgrade) called on the 
Servians to take up arms in defence of the province. Both 
Hadschi Mustapha and Ebu Bekir had governed Servia with jus¬ 
tice and humanity, and the country had flourished and become 
enriched by commerce with Austria under their rule. The Ser¬ 
vians gladly obeyed the summons of the Pacha against their old 
tyrants, the rebel Janissaries, and victoriously defended the 
pachalic. But the other Janissaries of the empire, and especially 
those at Constantinople, received the tidings of the events in Servia 
with the highest indignation, with which the Ulema and the 
Mahometan population in general largely sympathised. “ The pride 
of the Mussulmans revolted at the idea that old Moslems of the 
True Faith should be banished from the pachalic, and that Eayas 
and Giaours should be armed and set up against them.” 1 Selim 
found it necessary to give way; Hadschi Mustapha received an 
order of the Divan to re-admit the Janissaries to Belgrade. They 
were restored accordingly; and they recommenced their sway 
there by murdering one of the chief Servian officers, and soon 
proceeded to overpower and murder the Pacha. They conde¬ 
scended to ask for a new Pacha from the Porte; but their intention 
to keep the sovereign power in their own hands was evident. Four 
of their chiefs assumed the title of Dahis, and allotted the country 
between them. Each was the Tetrarch of a district; but Belgrade 
was their common capital, where they met and deliberated. As 
the number of the Janissaries of Belgrade seemed insufficient to up¬ 
hold their power, they formed another armed force of Mahometans 
from Bosnia and Albania, who flocked together to the pillage of 
Servia. It was not only the Rayas over whom they tyrannised— 
the old Turkish feudal proprietors, the Spahis, were expelled by 
them from the province, and the Janissaries now established them¬ 
selves as absolute lords of the soil. 

In Bosnia Ali Bey Widaitsch of Sumnik made himself master 
of a large territory in the same manner, and entered into close 
alliance with the Dahis of Belgrade. Passwan Oglou also (who 
was still in rebellion against the Porte) was their confederate; and 
thus a Mahometan brigand league was formed nearly across the 
whole north of European Tartary, in direct antagonism to the 
House of Othman. The exiled Spahis of Servia implored the 
Sultan’s aid ; and the Rayas, whose sufferings were now infinitely 
multiplied, also called on him as their sovereign to rescue them 
from these oppressors. The Servian Kneses (as the Christian local 

1 Ranke, p. 112 . 


SELIM III, A.D. 1789- 1S07. 469 

magistrates were termed) sent an address to Constantinople in 
which they recapitulated some of the wrongs which they endured. 
They said they were not only reduced to abject poverty by the 
Dahis, but “ they were attacked in their religion, their morality, 
and their honour; and no husband was secure as to his wife, 
no father as to his daughter, no brother as to his sister. The 
church, the cloister, the monks, the priests, all were outraged.” 
They demanded of the Sultan—“ Art thou still .our Czar h then 
come and free us from these evil-doers; or, if thou wilt not save us, 
at least tell us so, that we may decide whether to flee to the moun¬ 
tains and forests, or to seek in the rivers a termination of our 
miserable existence.” 1 

The Porte was at this time destitute of means to crush the 
Dahis. It could only threaten. An intimation was sent to Bel¬ 
grade, that unless the Janissaries amended their conduct, the Sultan 
would send an army against them ; “ but not an Ottoman army, 
for it would be a grievous thing to cause true believers to fight 
against each other; but soldiers should come against them of 
other nations, and of another creed; and then such evil should 
overtake them as had never yet befallen an Osmanli.” 2 

On hearing this, the Dahis said to one another, “ What army 
can the Padischah mean % Is it to be of Austrians or Russians % 
Nay, he will not bring those foreigners into his empire.” “ By 
Allah,” they exclaimed, “ he means the Rayas.” They believed 
that the Sultan would send a general to arm and lead the Servians 
under their Kneses against them. They resolved to prevent this 
by a massacre of all such Rayas as, from their position or spirit, 
might prove dangerous. Each Dahi repaired for this purpose to 
his own district; and, in February, 1804, they simultaneously 
commenced the work of horror. Great numbers of the chief Ser¬ 
vians were at first surprised and slaughtered; but some received 
timely warning and fled. The Dahis and their emissaries con¬ 
tinued to murder; and the belief grew general in Servia that it 
was intended to extirpate the entire Christian population. 3 But 
there was still bold and able men among them; and too high a 
military spirit had been created by recent events in the Servian 
Rayas for them to perish without resistance. At first the shepherds 
and peasants, who fled from their homes and joined the Hey dues, 
or robbers, in the mountains, did so merely to save their lives, or 
to gain a chance of taking life for life. Their next thought was 
how they could return to their homes in safety. But soon came 
the reflection that, in order to be safe, they must put down their 
1 Ranke, p. 118 . 9 Ibid., p. 119 . 3 Ibid., p. 121 . 


4/0 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


oppressors; and that this could only be done by a national war 
throughout the country. Such a war was soon organised in Servia. 
The Heyduc chiefs came forward zealously in the good cause; and 
there were many other men of capacity and courage, who combined 
the peasantry of the various districts in a general rising. The 
bands of the Dahis were rapidly driven from the open country, 
from the villages, and from all the smaller towns; and, in a few 
weeks, all Servia was in the hands of Servians, except Belgrade 
and some of the other strong fortified places. 

The Servians now determined to choose a commander-in-chief 
of their nation. They offered the supreme dignity to George 
Petrowitcsh, called Czerny George by his countrymen, and Kara 
George (both meaning Black George) by the Turks. The name of 
Kara George is that by which he is most conspicuous among the 
heroes of revolutionary warfare. 

Kara George was the son of a Servian peasant named Petrowni, 
and was born at Vischessi between 1760 and 1770. He served in 
the corps of Servian volunteers against the Turks in the Austrian 
war of 1788-91 ; and after the peace of Sistova, he was for some 
years a dealer in swine, one of the most profitable and respectable 
employments in Servia. When the Dahis began their outrages, Kara 
George left his forests and swine-droves, and betook himself to the 
mountains, where he became one of the most redoubtable of the Hey- 
ducs. When the war of independence broke out, he showed himself 
as eminent for skill in command, as for personal bravery in action. 
He despised pomp and parade; and, in the days of his highest pros¬ 
perity, when sovereign of Servia, and of more than Servia, he was 
always seen in his old herdsman’s garb, and his well-known black 
cap. He was in general kindly disposed; but was easily irritated, 
and was terrible in his wrath. He would cut down or shoot the 
offender with his own hand; and he made no distinction between 
friend and foe, between stranger and kinsman. But, though cruel, 
he was not vindictive; and if he could be brought once to promise 
forgiveness, he pardoned with the heart as well as with the lip. 

It is recorded of him with truth that he shot his own father and 
hanged his own brother; but it ought to be added that he shot 
the old man in order to prevent his falling into the power of 
enemies, who would have put him to death with lingering tortures; ' 
and that his brother, presuming on his relationship with the Com¬ 
mander of Servia, had acted with violence and licentiousness, 
which Kara George for a time overlooked; but at length the 
young man committed a gross outrage on the honour of a family, 
which complained loudly, saying that it was for such crimes the 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789-1807. 471 

nation had risen against the Turks. Kara George instantly had 
the offender hanged at the door of the house, and forbade his 
mother to wear mourning for her son. 1 

. Kara George knew the fierceness of his own character, and so 
did the Servian people before they chose him to rule over them. 
When he was proposed in the assembly, he at first excused himself 
on the ground that he did not know how to govern. The Kneses 
replied that they would give him counsel. He then said, “I am 
too hasty of mood for the office. I cannot stop to take counsel. 

I shall be inclined to kill at once.” They answered that “ such 
severity was needed at that time.” 2 

Such was Kara George; and thus did he become Commander 
of Servia. He afterwards styled himself “ Supreme Euler.” How¬ 
ever arbitrary we may think his acts, and however ferocious his 
energy, he unquestionably saved his country, and for many years 
maintained her independence with matchless resolution and ability. 
And yet, such is the inconsistency of genius, that ultimately this 
very man, while still in the prime of life, wavered and grew fatally 
weak of heart, at a crisis and in a situation where even ordinary 
men might have been expected to be firm. But in 1804 none 
could foresee the ignominious termination of his career; and all 
eyes were directed to him, as the victorious patriot, and as the 
establisher of the principle of the emancipation of the subjected 
Christian races from the government and power of the Maho-. 
metans. 

It was not in a single year that the liberation of Servia was 
accomplished. The Dahis had been surprised and driven out of 
the open country at the first uprising of the patriots, but they were 
not thoroughly overcome without a formidable struggle. They 
called to their aid their confederate Ali Bey of Bosnia; and they 
enrolled among their supporters many of the bands called Krid- 
schalies, formed of adventurers of every description, creed, and 
class, who had fought in the late wars, and who were leagued 
together, like the Free Companies of the Middle Ages. 

On the other hand, the Servians received help from an unex¬ 
pected ally. The Pacha of Bosnia came to their assistance with 
the Sultan’s forces from that province : and Turkish recruits 
appeared in the Servian camp. The Porte was now firmly re¬ 
solved that the Janissaries of Belgrade, as the most turbulent of 
that turbulent body, should, if possible, be crushed; and the arms 
of the Servians were to be employed, together with those of loyal 
Mahometans, for that purpose. The union was again successful; 

1 Ranke, p. 2 GS. 8 Ibid., p. 127 . 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


472 

but the Servians this time insisted that the destruction of their 
tyrants should be made sure. The Dahis and their followers were 
not to be exiled, they were to be slain. The Pacha felt little 
anxiety to interpose in their favour. Such as could not escape to 
Pass wan Oglou, were cut down without mercy; and the heads of 
the four Dahis were displayed in the Servian camp. The Pacha 
now pronounced the object of the war to be gained. The re¬ 
bellious enemies of the Sultan had been punished; and the old 
order of submission by Rayas to Turks was to be restored. He 
directed the Servians to disarm, and return to their flocks and 
herds. But the command was issued not to spiritless and power¬ 
less Rayas, like those of the olden time, among whom humility 
before the Moslems had become a second nature; but to practised 
and victorious soldiers, who had fought and beaten the most 
renowned of the old Ottoman troops; who had stormed Turkish 
fortresses, and had torn down Mahometan standards. The Ser¬ 
vians regarded as their real chiefs, not the Pachas and the Spahis, 
but Kara George and the other leaders of their own race and 
creed—men who had shared in the extremity of the land’s 
distress, and had been foremost in fighting their way out of it. 
These were the commanders, whose words alone were heeded; 
and their words were not words of submissiveness. The Servian 
chiefs were men who had created their own strength and power; 
they were surrounded each by his band of resolute partisans, called 
Momkes, ready for any service ; and they were not disposed to 
resign the pleasure of commanding, which they so recently had 
enjoyed. 1 The original bbjects of the uprising of Servia had been 
merely to obtain protection for life and honour against the blood¬ 
thirsty and brutal Dahis; but, in the course of that struggle, a 
national feeling had been evoked, and a national power evolved, 
which made it impossible that Servia should not now aspire to a 
higher destiny, than she had known since Sultan Amurath II. 
overthrew the Prince George Brankovitch and his Christian con¬ 
federates at Varna. 2 

The struggle which the Servians had hitherto maintained 
against the Sultan’s Mahometan rebels, was now to be continued 
against the Sultan himself. They determined to seek the aid of 
one of the great powers of Christendom. Austria was first 
thought of. Many of them had fought under her banner; and 
many of their kindred tribes were already under the sovereignty 
of the Kaiser of Vienna. But it was remembered that the 
Austrians, though they had more than once occupied Servia, had 
l Ranke, p. 141 . 2 p a g e gg^ svprct. 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789-1807. 473 

always given back the country and the people to the Turks. 
Moreover, Austria was known to be now directing all her energies 
to the conflict, which was approaching on her western frontiers 
between her and the French, by whom she had been twice 
humbled during the last few years. But there was another great 
Christian Empire near Servia. Russia was strong and active, and 
undefeated by either Turks or French, both of whom her famous 
general, Suwarrow, had repeatedly vanquished. The Russians, 
moreover, were, like the Servians, Christians of the Greek Church; 
and they had shown their zeal for their co-religionists by their 
repeated and formidable intercessions with the Porte in behalf of 
the Moldavians and Wallachians. The Servians accordingly, in 
August, 1804, sent a deputation to St. Petersburg, which returned, 
in February, 1805, with a favourable answer. But the Russian 
Emperor advised the Servians first to prefer their requests at 
Constantinople, promising to support them by all his influence 
with the Sultan. 1 

The Servians, in obedience to this direction, sent, in the summer 
of 1805, an embassy to Constantinople, which was instructed to 
demand, that in future all the fortresses of their country should 
be garrisoned by Servian troops; and that, in consideration of the 
sufferings of the province during the recent troubles, all arrears of 
taxes and tribute should be remitted. The first article was the 
most important, and the one respecting which most difficulty was 
anticipated, especially as, at the time when it was preferred, Bel¬ 
grade and other strong places in Servia were still in the power of 
the Moslems. 

The period when these demands were laid before the Porte, was 
an important crisis in Selim’s reign. The rival influences of 
France and Russia in the Divan, and also the conflicting spirits of 
reform and conservatism in the Ottoman nation, were now en¬ 
gaged in a trial of strength, with which the Servian question be¬ 
came closely connected. 2 

Russia was at this time at war with France; and was redoubling 
the efforts, which she had been making for several years, to gain 
such a paramount authority in Turkey, as should render the 
populations and resources of the Ottoman Empire subservient to 
the Czar’s schemes of aggrandisement against his Western enemies, 
as well as in the Eastern world. Selim had made large concessions 
to Russia since they had become allies in 1798 : concessions which 
the Turkish nation viewed with anger and alarm. Her fleets had 
been permitted to pass and repass the Bosphorus and the Dar- 
1 Ranke, p. 146 . 8 Ibid., p. 150 . 


474 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


danelles, after as well as before the general pacification in 1801. 
This had caused great indignation among the Turks in Constan¬ 
tinople ; and the Sultan had been obliged to declare that such 
permission should not be repeated, if Russia were at war with any 
nation friendly to the Porte. By means of the squadrons which 
she thus sent from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, Russia had 
largely increased her force in the Ionian Islands ; and she further 
augmented that force by levying troops among the Albanians of 
the mainland, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Turkish 
authorities. 1 We have already noticed her successful claims 
regarding Moldavia and Wallachia in 1802 ; and in the early part 
of 1805 the influence of Russia over the Sultan was still more 
strikingly displayed on the south-eastern coasts of the Black Sea. 
The Porte consented that the Russians should have the free navi¬ 
gation of the river Phasis in Mingrelia, and erect fortresses, and 
place garrisons on its banks for the better security of their flotillas. 
The Pacha of Erzeroum was ordered to assist the Russians in 
establishing these posts, and in any other operations that might 
be of use to them, for the purposes of the war with Persia, in 
which Russia was then engaged. 

The Russians took more than full advantage of this permission 
by occupying districts at some distance from the Phasis, seizing 
the fortress of Anakria, and building another on the coast of the 
Black Sea. At last, when Russia was about to join Austria and 
England against Napoleon in 1805, her ambassador, M. Italinski 
(Suwarrow’s son) formally declared to the Reis Effendi, that his 
government found it necessary, owing to the state of affairs in 
Europe, to require that Turkey should forthwith enter into an 
offensive and defensive alliance with Russia ; that all the subjects 
of the Sultan, who professed the faith of the Greek Church, should 
thenceforth be considered to be under the protection of the Emperor 
of Russia, and that, whenever they were molested by the Turks, 
the Porte should be bound to do right upon the representations of 
the Russian ambassador. 2 These requisitions of M. Italinski were 
made at the same time that the demands of the Servian deputa¬ 
tion were laid before the Sultan on the avowed recommendation 
of Russia. 

It is said that when Sultan Selim heard that Russia required the 
Protectorate of all the inhabitants of the Turkish Empire, who 
professed the faith of the Greek Church, he shed tears of anger 
and humiliation. For many days he remained in silent gloom: he 
then called to him such members of the Divan, as were not 
1 Alix. vol. iii. pp. 154 , 169 . 8 Ibid., 170 . 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1807 . 475 

notoriously influenced by Russian bribes, and be took counsel with 
them in this emergency. All agreed that it would be better to 
bury themselves beneath the ruins of Constantinople, than to sign 
a treaty which would annihilate the Ottoman power. Rut when 
they reflected that the troops of Russia then assembled in her ports 
on the Black Sea, could in eight days be under the Serail; that 
the forces which she had gathered in the Ionian Islands could 
instantly land in Albania, and, joined by the insurgent Arnauts and 
Greeks, march without resistance upon Adrianople; that her army 
in Georgia, which had b«en victorious over the Persians, could 
advance upon the Turkish capital through Asia Minor; that on 
the Danube she could join her troops with the revolted Servians, 
and at once overrun Bulgaria;—when Selim and his advisers 
thought over these things, on the strength of the enemy which 
thus grasped them, and on their own weakness, they resolved that 
they must not venture to return a direct refusal to the demands of 
Russia, but must temporise, and negotiate, and make any sacrifice 
of treasure or territory, if absolutely needed, rather than consent 
to a term so fatal. 1 

The Turkish ministers succeeded in gaining time in their con¬ 
ferences with Italinski; but it was necessary to come to a prompt 
decision as to what line the Porte should follow in dealing with 
the Servians. There "were strong inducements to endeavour to win 
their loyal devotion to the Sultan by a frank concession of their 
wishes. Selim had now made considerable progress in his military 
reforms. The Topidjis (the artillerymen) had been trained to a 
promising extent by French officers; and they were placed on a 
footing superior to that of the Janissaries. Omar Aga’s little 
corps, which had acquired so much credit in the defence of Acre, 
had further signalised itself by destroying some formidable bands 
of brigands or free companions, which had ravaged Bulgaria and 
Roumelia, and defeated the Janissaries, whom the Pachas of those 
provinces led against them. Selim increased the number of new 
troops. Two regiments of the Nizam Djidites, uniformly armed 
and accoutred after the most approved French models, were now 
seen performing the same evolutions as those of the best European 
troops. Special funds were provided for their pay : a few of the 
Pachas—especially Abdurrahman of Caramania—adopted zealously 
their Sultan’s views; and in 1805, Selim ventured on the bold 
measure of issuing a decree, that in future, the strongest and 
finest 3 T oung men should be selected from among the Janissaries 


1 Alix. vol. iii. pp. 1GS-171. 


476 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

and other corps in the empire, for the purpose of serving in the 
Nizam Djidid. 1 

This was at the time when the power of the Janissaries in 
Belgrade had been broken by the Rayas; but in other parts of 
the empire they gave terrible proofs of their strength. At 
Adrianople they gathered together in resistance to the Sultan’s 
edict to the number of 10,000. A Cadi who endeavoured to en¬ 
force the royal orders, was seized by them and strangled; and in 
the greater part of the empire it was found impossible, at least for 
the present, to carry out the reforms which had been decreed. 
The services of a brave and well-armed Raya, like the Servian, 
would have been invaluable to Selim, if he could have been sure 
that they would have loyally preferred the cause of the Sultan to 
that of Russia; and if he could have employed them against the 
Janissaries of Adrianople and the capital, without raising in re¬ 
bellion the great mass of his Mahometan subjects, already deeply 
incensed at the means which had been used against the Dahis of 
Belgrade. Threatened as Selim was at this very time by Russia, 
and in hourly expectation of being obliged to appeal to the fanatic 
energy of the Moslem population of his empire for a final effort 
of despair against the invading Giaours, he abandoned the thought 
of winning the friendship of the Servian Rayas, and determined 
to treat them as foes, whom he must deprive of the means of in¬ 
juring him. The Servian deputies at Constantinople were arrested; 
and Afiz, the Pacha of Nissa, was ordered to enter Servia and dis¬ 
arm the Rayas. Kara George met him at the frontier of the 
province ancl defeated him; and when, in 1806, Servia was at¬ 
tacked by two of the Sultan’s armies on different sides of the 
province, the Servians (who had now become altogether a warlike 
people, every man bearing arms) defended themselves heroically. 
They drove back their invaders with heavy loss; and by captur¬ 
ing Belgrade and the other fortresses, which had hitherto been 
garrisoned by Turks, they made themselves completely masters of 
their own country. The generalship displayed by Kara George 
during this campaign was of the very highest order. Under him, 
Servia, in 1806, completed her independence, without foreign inter¬ 
ference, and by the weapons of her own sons alone. But before 
another year’s warfare commenced, she obtained important assis¬ 
tance through the outbreak of avowed hostilities between Russia 
and the Porte. 

While the Russian ambassador, Italinski, had pressed the Porte 
with demands, which, if complied with, would have made the 
1 Ranke, p. 151. Juchereau St. Denys. 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1807 . 477 

Sultan the mere vassal of the Czar, the French minister had been 
equally earnest in encouraging Selim to resist, and in endeavouring 
to induce him to acknowledge Napoleon as Padischah, or Em¬ 
peror of France. The British ambassador, as well as the Russian, 
strongly opposed this recognition of their great enemy by his new 
Imperial title; and war was plainly threatened by both these 
powers in the event of any closer connection being formed between 
France and Turkey. The successes gained by Napoleon over the 
Austrians and Russians, in the autumn and winter of 1805, 
materially augmented the influence of the French minister at Con¬ 
stantinople, and diminished the dread with which Russia was 
regarded. The effect of the French victories round Ulm and in 
Moravia, was practically felt in the Black Sea and the Bosphorus. 
A corps of 15,000 Russians, which had been collected at Sebasto¬ 
pol to overawe or attack Turkey, was withdrawn into central 
Russia, to replace the troops which it was necessary to march 
westward against the advancing French. 1 

Italinski grew more moderate in his demands on the Porte, 
which were heard with increasing indifference, while those of 
France were listened to with more and more attention. 

The treaty of Presburg, by which Napoleon on the 26th Decem¬ 
ber, 1805, triumphantly concluded his war with Austria, trans¬ 
ferred to the French sovereign, among other territories, Dalmatia 
and part of Croatia; so that the French was now in contact with 
the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon is said to have made it a point 
of primary importance thus to advance his dominions to the 
frontier of Turkey, and acquire the means of keeping a force ever 
ready to act promptly and effectively, either in supporting Turkey, 
or in seizing on a share of her provinces, as circumstances might 
make it expedient. 2 A copy of the treaty of Presburg was 
promptly laid before the Grand Vizier by M. Ruffin, the French 
minister, who dilated on the advantage which it would be to the 
Sultan to secure the friendship of the great Conqueror, who had 
now become his neighbour. The effect of this was speedily 
displayed in a Hatti-scheriff, by which the titles of Emperor and 
Padischah were solemnly given to the Ruler of the French; and 
when in the summer of 1806 General Sebastiani arrived at Con¬ 
stantinople, as an ambassador extraordinary from Napoleon to 
Selim, that able military diplomatist persuaded the Sultan to take 
measures, which were almost certain to lead to a war between 
Turkey and Russia. Such a war was then most desirable for 

1 Alix., vol. iii. p. 174. 

8 Ibid., p. 175, and note. Mamont’s “ Memoirs,” pp. 85, 148. 


473 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Napoleon’s purposes, as it was calculated to make an important 
diversion of part of the Russian forces from the great scene of 
conflict in Prussian Poland, where the Czar Alexander was striv¬ 
ing to support King Frederick William of Prussia against the 
armies of victorious France. 

At Sebastiani’s instigation, the Sultan deposed the Hospodars 
of Wallachia and Moldavia, Prince Moroutzi and Prince Ipsilanti, 
who were more than suspected of being the pensioned agents of 
the Russian Court. This dismissal of the Hospodars without any 
previous notification to St. Petersburg, was a violation of the 
pledge given in the Hatti-scheriff of 1802 ; and the Russian 
' ambassador at Constantinople protested angrily against it. He 
was joined in his remonstrances by the ambassador of England; and 
they informed the Porte that “ the armies and fleets of the Allies 
were about to receive a new impulse.” This meant that a Russian 
army would be marched into Moldavia, and that an English fleet 
would sail against Constantinople. 1 Selim offered to repair the 
breach of his engagement respecting the government of the Princi¬ 
palities ; and an order was issued to reinstate Moroutzi and Ipsi¬ 
lanti as Hospodars. But before this could be accomplished, the 
tidings reached Constantinople that Russian troops had entered 
Moldavia and advanced as far as Jassy. The Emperor Alexander 
had promptly seized on the pretext, which the intelligence of the 
dismissal of the Hospodars gave him, for an attack upon Turkey; 
and 35,000 men under General Michelson were ordered into 
Moldavia and Wallachia, without even the formality of a declara¬ 
tion of war. The Russians speedily overran the Principalities, 
and beat back the scanty forces with which the Turkish com¬ 
manders of the neighbouring Pachalics had endeavoured to check 
their progress. On the 27th of December, Michelson entered 
Bucharest; and it was announced that his troops would speedily 
cross the Danube. 

A declaration of war by the Sublime Porte against Russia was 
the natural and inevitable result of the indignation which these 
things excited at Constantinople; nor was the Turkish govern¬ 
ment awed into submission by the threats of the British minister, 
Mr. Arbuthnot, who required that the Porte should instantly 
renew its alliance with Russia and England, and dismiss the am¬ 
bassador of France ; and who menaced Turkey with an attack by 
the combined English and Russian fleets, as well as by the Russian 
armies, in case of non-compliance with his demands. The Reis 
Effendi returned an answer of much sense and dignity, in which 
1 Lord Broughton’s “Travels,” vol. ii. p. 390. 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789 - 1807 . 479 

lie recapitulated the exertions which Turkey had made to preserve 
peace, and especially alluded to the late humiliation which Sultan 
Selim had voluntarily undergone in reinstating the two traitorous 
Hospodars. He stated that in making war with Russia after her 
attack on Turkish provinces and Turkish troops, the Sultan was 
only repelling force by force. He expressed a hope that a great 
and enlightened nation like the British, would appreciate the 
sacrifices which the Sublime Porte had made for the sake of 
amity, and the spirit which now made it act in self-defence. 
“ But if Great Britain was determined to aid Russia in attacking 
the Sultan, he would repel force by force, and would trust in 
God for deliverance from the most unjust of aggressions. And 
if, after all,” said the Turkish statesman, “ Turkey is to perish, 
she will perish in the defence of her capital: and the English 
nation will, above all others, experience the irreparable mischief 
that will follow the downfall of the Ottoman Empire.” 1 

On receiving this reply, the English minister repaired to the 
fleet, that was then moored off Tenedos, under the command of 
Admiral Duckworth. The admiral’s instructions were to proceed 
forthwith to Constantinople, and to insist on the surrender of the 
Turkish fleet, or to burn it and bombard the town. 2 On the 19th 
of February, 1807, the fleet (consisting of seven ships of the line 
and two frigates), favoured by a strong wind from the south, 
sailed through the formidable straits of the Dardanelles with 
little or no loss. A Turkish squadron of one sixty-four gun ship, 
four frigates, and some corvettes, that lay in the Sea of Marmora, 
was destroyed by the English; and, if Constantinople had been 
promptly assailed, it could not have been defended with any 
jmospect of success ; so defective were the fortifications, and such 
was the panic caused by the forcing of the straits. But the 
English wasted time in negotiations; while the Turks, roused 
from their temporary consternation, and excited and directed by 
Sultan Selim and General Sebastiani, laboured energetically at 
the defences of the capital, until the English commander became 
convinced that it would be impracticable for him to make any 
impression on them. 3 Accordingly, the English fleet withdrew 
from the Sea of Marmora, and on the 3rd of March repassed the 
Dardanelles, but not without a dangerous contest and severe loss. 
The Turks on the first occasion had been negligent, surprised, 
and dismayed. They were now well-armed and prepared. Under 
the direction of French engineers, whom Sebastiani had sent 

1 Alix., vol. iii. p. 229. 2 Lord Broughton, vol. ii. p. 515, n. 

3 See the Appendix to Lord Broughton’s “Travels,” vol. ii. p. 510. 


4 S 0 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

down from the capital, they had repaired the old batteries and 
erected new ones. Even the huge granite-shooting guns, that had 
lain inactive opposite each other on the European and Asiatic 
shores for centuries, were now employed, and with no inconsider¬ 
able effect. Several of the English ships were struck and seriously 
injured by the 800 lb. globes of stone which these cannon dis¬ 
charged. One result of the expedition was certainly to destroy 
the belief, which had long prevailed, that the Dardanelles gave an 
infallible protection to the Holy City against the fleets of the 
Infidels from the south ; but altogether the appearance and 
ultimate retreat of the English force raised greatly the spirit of 
the Mahometan population of Constantinople and the neighbour¬ 
ing provinces. Unhappily for Sultan Selim, the same events 
raised also the fanatic hatred of that population towards all who 
were supposed to favour the Giaours and their usages, and who 
were said to be traitors to the good old faith and the good old insti¬ 
tutions of the true believers. 

An English expedition against Egypt was undertaken almost 
immediately after that against Constantinople, and was still 
more unsuccessful. A small British force, utterly inadequate 
for such an enterprise, was landed near Alexandria. It occupied 
that city, and endeavoured also to reduce Rosetta, but was 
ultimately obliged to retire from Egypt, after much loss, both of 
men and reputation. 

In the Archipelago, a Russian squadron, under Admiral 
Siniavin, gained some advantage over the Turkish fleet; but the 
Turkish Capitan Pacha was able to retire into the Dardanelles 
and protect the capital: and altogether in the south the fortune 
of the war in 1807 was not unfavourable to the Ottomans. In 
the north, the Russian and Turkish forces on the Danube car¬ 
ried on the contest without either side gaining a decided supe¬ 
riority over the other. Indeed the war which began at the close 
of 1806, and was terminated by the treaty of Bucharest in 1812, 
is, of all the struggles between Turkey and Russia, the least in¬ 
teresting and the least important. Neither party put forth its 
full strength against the other. Hostilities were suspended for a 
considerable time by the truce of Slobosia ; and, even while they 
were being carried on, Russia was obliged to employ her chief 
force either to combat or to watch a far more formidable enemy. 
She had only the use of her left hand against the Turk. On the 
Ottoman side, the revolts, the civil wars, and the revolutions of 
this period, were almost incessant. At the commencement of 
hostilities, the Pacha of Caramania (who was a partisan of Sultan 


SELIM III. A.D. 1789-1S07. 481 

Selim’s reforms) while leading a force, trained on the new model, 
towards the seat of war on the Danube, was intercepted at Babaeska 
on the Yena by a large force of Janissaries and other troops op¬ 
posed to the change of system. A battle ensued, in which the 
Caramanians were utterly defeated. 

It was evident that Selim was the weakest in the balance of 
physical power between himself and his malcontent subjects, and 
that a decisive struggle was fast approaching. He had neither 
the military ability nor the cruelty, which the part of Cleomenes 
required ; and he was soon destined to sustain that of Agis. The 
death (early in 1807) of the Mufti, who had been a devoted 
friend to Selim, and had aided in all his undertakings, was a 
heavy blow to the Sultan. The Ulema, as a body, were most 
inimical to his reforms; and their new chief entered into an 
active alliance with the leading Janissaries against the throne. 
But the individual who did most to overthrow Selim, was the 
Kaimakan, Mousa Pacha, This man had, during twenty years of 
court intrigue, been the seemingly meek instrument of the ambi¬ 
tion of others, and was generally despised as a submissive drudge 
of office. Djezzar Pacha of Acre had alone discovered the 
vindictive venom, that sweltered under Mousa’s guise of patient- 
humility. Djezzar foretold that he would be the cause of many 
troubles to the state. Selim gave Mousa Pacha the important 
office of Kaimakan, in the hope that its real powers would be 
dormant in his hands, and that he would be abundantly content 
with the mere pageantry of high station. Mousa used the oppor¬ 
tunity of his office to instigate the mutinous spirit of the Janissaries 
and other malcontents, while he at the same time retained the 
confidence of the Sultan by the outward show of simple-minded 
loyalty. An order that was given by Selim in May (not much 
more than two months after the departure of the English fleet) 
for some changes in the equipment of the garrison of the forts on 
the Bosphorus, was the immediate signal for the fatal revolt. 
The garrison mutinied; and the Janissaries of the capital, who 
were in co-operation with them, repaired to the Etmeidan (the 
head-quarters of Janissary-sedition for centuries), and there over¬ 
turned their camp-kettles, in token that they would no longer 
accept food from Sultan Selim. Under the influence, and on the 
lying assurance of the traitorous Kaimakan, the Sultan tried to 
appease the storm by concession, and by the sacrifice of his best 
ministers, instead of sending for his new troops who were near 
the capital, and defending the seraglio with his body-guard until 
their arrival. The natural result was a resolution of the mutineers 

31 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


482 

to depose their sovereign. They obtained a fetva from the Mufti 
sanctioning their proceedings ; and, headed by the traitor Mousa, 
who now threw off the mask, the Janissaries forced their way 
into the palace, and placed Mustapha, the eldest son of the late 
Sultan, Abdul Hamid, on the throne. Selim retired with dignity 
to the prison apartments, and there employed the brief remainder 
of his life, not vainly, in instructing his young cousin, Prince 
Mahmoud, afterwards Sultan Mahmoud II., how to rule the 
empire; and in holding out his own fate as a warning against the 
weakness, which the Sultan, who would reform Turkey, must dis¬ 
card, in order to save both her and himself. 

Mustapha IV., whom the Janissaries and their accomplices then 
made Padischah of the Ottoman Empire (May 29th, 1807), was 
at this time about thirty years old. He was a prince of imperfect 
education, and slender capacity. During the few months for 
which he was the titular sovereign of Turkey, the armed multi¬ 
tude who had appointed him were its real rulers. But the deposed 
Sultan had friends : and a bold effort to restore or at least to 
avenge him, was speedily and sternly made. The Pacha of Rust- 
cliuck, Mustapha Bairactar, owed his elevation to Selim; and as 
soon as the truce of Slobosia with the Russians (August, 1807) 
enabled him to move his forces from the frontier, Bairactar 
marched upon Constantinople. At the end of 1807 he was at the 
head of 40,000 soldiers, chiefly Bosnians and Albanians, who were 
encamped on the plains of Daoud, about four miles from the 
capital. He summoned to his camp many of the chief men of 
the empire, who assembled at his bidding and swore to aid in 
abolishing the Janissaries, and in restoring good government to 
the empire. Sultan Mustapha remained in his palace, little 
heeded and little honoured, even in semblance, for a space of six 
months, during which Mustapha Bairactar, from his tent on the 
plains of Daoud, exercised the chief authority in the Ottoman 
Empire. At length he led his Albanians to the capital itself, with 
the design of dethroning Mustapha and reinstating Selim III. 
The adherents of Mustapha (or rather the partisans of the Janis¬ 
saries and the Ulema) closed the gates of the Serail against him. 
Bairactar had brought with him from the head-quarters of the 
army of the Danube the sacred standard of Mahomet. He un¬ 
furled this before the Serail, and demanded that the gates should 
be opened to admit him and his brave soldiers, who were bring¬ 
ing back the holy banner from the wars. The chief of the 
Bostancljis replied from the wall, that the gates could not be 
opened but by command of Sultan Mustapha; “ Talk not of 


483 


MUSTAPHA IV. A.D. 1807-180S. 

Sultan Mustapha,” shouted Bairactar with fury, “ let us see 
Sultan Selim, our Padischah and thine, false slave.” He gave 
orders for an immediate assault; an entrance into the palace was 
soon effected, but, brief as the delay was, it proved fatal to Selim. 
On hearing the demand of Bairactar, Mustapha ordered that 
Selim and his own brother, Mahmoud, should be instantly seized 
and strangled. By their deaths he would have been left the sole 
representative of the House of Othman, whom no Osmanli would 
dare to destroy or depose. The executioners found and murdered 
Selim, though not till after a desperate resistance, which was 
maintained by the unhappy prince almost long enough to save his 
life; for at the very time when he was expiring under the bow¬ 
string of Mustapha’s mutes, Bairactar’s Albanians had forced the 
outer gate. As Bairactar pressed forward to the inner gate, it 
was suddenly thrown open, and Mustapha’s eunuchs cast the body 
of Selim before him, saying, “ Behold the Sultan whom ye seek.” 
Bairactar bent over the corpse of his benefactor, and wept bitterly; 
but his confederate, the Capitan Pacha, Seid Ali, shook him by 
the shoulder and exclaimed, “ This is the time for vengeance, not 
for tears.” Bairactar roused himself, and they rushed into the 
presence-chamber, where Sultan Mustapha had placed himself 
on the throne, in the hope of awing the insurgents by the dis¬ 
play of legitimate royalty. But Bairactar dragged him down, 
exclaiming, “ What dost thou there 'l Yield that place to a 
worthier.” 

Mustapha had almost gained the security of being the last of the 
Othman Princes. The mutes and eunuchs who had murdered 
Selim, sought eagerly after young Mahmoud, who had been 
secreted by a vigilant and faithful slave in the furnace of a bath. 
While the ministers of death were searching the very apartment 
in which he was hid, the shouts of the victorious Albanians rang 
through the palace, testimonies not only of life preserved, but of 
royalty acquired for Mahmoud. Before the night had closed in, 
the cannon of the Seraglio announced to the people of Constanti¬ 
nople that Mustapha had ceased to reign, and that Mahmoud II. 
was Padischah of the Ottoman world. (July 28, 1808.) 

Bairactar assumed power as the Grand Vizier of the new 
Sultan, and acted for a time with vigour and success against the 
party that had dethroned Selim. Mousa Pacha and other traitors 
were executed; and a plan was commenced for superseding the 
Janissaries by a new armed force under an old name. The troops, 
whom Bairactar designed to arm and train on the European 
system ; were to be called Seymens, the title of an ancient corps in 


484 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

the Ottoman service. The Vizier’s measures were received with 
simulated, which he mistook for real, submissiveness, by the 
Janissaries and the Ulema. In fatal confidence he dismissed his 
provincial army, retaining not more than 4000 European soldiers 
on whom he could rely, in the capital; but Cadi Pacha, who was 
his friend, was encamped near Scutari with 8000 Asiatic troops. 
On the second night after the departure of the Bosnian and 
Albanian forces, a large body of the Janissaries surrounded the 
Palace of the Porte, where the Vizier resided, and set fire to the 
building. Bairactar escaped into a stone tower, which was used 
as a powder magazine. There he defended himself desperately, 
but, either by accident or design, the tower was blown up, and 
the Vizier perished, before he could collect his adherents or com¬ 
municate with Sultan Mahmoud. The whole Janissary force of 
the capital now assailed the Seymens. But these were aided by 
Cadi Pacha, who led his 8000 Asiatics across from Scutari, and 
commenced a furious engagement with the Janissaries, which 
raged for two days in the streets of Constantinople with varying 
fortune. The Capitan Pacha, Seid Ali, co-operated with Cadi 
Pacha ; and caused a ship of the line, that lay in the harbour, to 
fire repeated broad-sides upon the part of the town where the 
Janissaries’ barracks were situated. Several extensive districts of 
Constantinople, and immense magazines of military stores, were 
set on fire during this fearful conflict, which was still maintained 
on the morning of the 17th of March, 1809, when the Galiongi 
and the artillerymen, who had hitherto been neutral, pronounced 
in favour of the Janissaries, and determined the victory. The 
Sultan and his attendants had kept the palace gates closed; and 
the deposed Sultan, Mustapha, had been put to death in his apart¬ 
ments, while the result of the civil war in the streets was still 
doubtful. It is uncertain who gave the order for Mu staph a’s 
execution, but it is certain that if he had been left alive, the 
victorious Janissaries would have restored him to the throne, and 
3iave murdered Mahmoud. As sole scion of the House of Othman, 
Mahmoud knew that he bore a charmed life. But he was obliged 
to yield, at least in appearance, to the demands of the victors. An 
imperial edict was issued in favour of the Janissaries. All the 
customs of the Franks, and all the late innovations were solemnly 
cursed and renounced ; and the old system, with all its abuses, 
seemed to be re-established more firmly than ever. But there 
were men of judgment and action among the Turks, who had seen 
all these things, and who saw in them only the sterner proof of 
the necessity of sweeping changes. They were obliged to think 


MAHMOUD If. A.D. 1808 - 1839 . 4 S 5 

in silence ; but they were preparing themselves for the time when 
their thought might be embodied in deed. Above all, the Sultan 
himself watched from year to year, as Amurath IV. had watched 
under not dissimilar circumstances , 1 for the hour and the means 
of ridding himself and his country from these worst, these home- 
oppressors of his race. 

We must now turn again to the provinces near the Danube, 
that were the scenes of the war between the Porte and. Russia. 
No great advantages had been obtained by the forces of the Czar 
over those of the Sultan; and Kara George, though victorious in 
defence of Servia, had been-unsuccessful in an attempt to conquer 
Bosnia, when, in consequence of the peace of Tilsit, between 
Alexander and Napoleon on June 7, 1807, the French general, 
Guillemot, negotiated a cessation of hostilities between the Turks 
and Kussians, which was agreed to at Slobosia in the August of 
the same year. One of those terms of the treaty of Tilsit, which 
•were made pub) c, stipulated that the Russians should evacuate 
Moldavia and Wallachia, but that the Turks should not re-enter 
those provinces until a peace between them and the Emperor 
Alexander was finally arranged. There was a show of attempting 
to make this the basis of a treaty at Slobosia, but nothing was 
definitively settled, although an armistice was agreed on, in which 
the Servians were included. Hostilities were in fact suspended 
for nearly two years, when the irritation caused among the Turks 
by the evident design of Eussia to retain Moldavia and Wallachia, 
and the belief that their interests had been sacrificed by the 
French Emperor led to the renewal of the war. It was not with¬ 
out cause that the sincerity of Napoleon’s professions of friendship 
for the Sublime Porte was suspected. In the interviews between 
him and the Emperor Alexander, when those two great potentates 
dazzled each other with the scheme that they should form an 
Imperial Duumvirate of the world, each gave up his weaker allies. 
As the Triumvirs who divided the Roman world, when they met 
on the little island on the Rhenus, sacrificed each his own friends 
to the ambition and wrath of the others, so Alexander and 
Napoleon, on their raft on the river Niemen, sacrificed friendly 
nations. Spain was to be abandoned to the French Emperor in 
return for his leaving Turkey at the mercy of the Muscovite. It 
was formally provided by a secret article of the treaty of Tilsit, 
that if the Porte did not comply with the private recommenda¬ 
tions of France and Russia, her European provinces, except 

1 See supra , p. 247. The account of the Revolutions 1807-1809 is chiefly 
taken from Lord Broughton, and from Jucheieau St. Benia, 


486 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

Roumelia and Constantinople, should be withdrawn from the 
vexation of Turkish government; 1 and it was arranged between 
the two Emperors, that the provisions in the public treaty for the 
evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russians should be 
practically disregarded. Afterwards, Napoleon, in the negotia¬ 
tions of his ministers with Alexander, and in their subsequent 
interviews at Erfurt, sought to effect a dismemberment of Turkey, 
by which some of her best provinces should fall to his own share. 
Two plans were discussed; by one of which the Turks were to be 
allowed to retain their Asiatic, and part of their European terri¬ 
tories ; by the other, the Ottoman Empire was to be almost 
annihilated. The first scheme assigned to Russia the Danubian 
Principalities and Bulgaria. The Balkan was to be the boundary. 
France was to have Albania, Greece, and Candia. Bosnia and 
Servia were to be transferred to the Austrians, as a compensation 
to them for seeing the Russians established at the mouth of the 
Danube. According to the second project, Austria was to be 
bribed by receiving not only Bosnia and Servia, but Macedonia 
also, except the town and harbour of Salonica. France was to 
take (besides Albania, Greece, and Candia), all the islands of the 
Archipelago, Cyprus, Syria, and Egypt. Russia’s portion was to 
be Wallachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, Thrace, and the Asiatic 
provinces nearest to the Bosphorus. The Turks, thrust back be¬ 
yond Mount Taurus, might still worship Mahomet on the banks 
of the Euphrates. 

This last gigantic scheme of national robbery involved the 
cession of Constantinople to Russia, and to this Napoleon would 
not consent. His minister, M. Caulaincourt, proposed to obviate 
the difficulty by making Constantinople and the shores of the 
straits a neutral territory, a kind of Hanseatic free state, like Ham¬ 
burgh or Bremen. The Russian negotiator, M. de Romanoff, was 
tenacious as to Constantinople, the city of St. Sophia, the true 
metropolis of the Greek Church, and the natural capital of the 
empire of the East. Caulaincourt hinted that Constantinople 
might perhaps be given up by France, but only on condition of her 
occupying the Dardanelles and the coasts of those straits, as the 
proper means of passage for her armies into Syria by the old route 
of the Crusaders. The Russian would not yield the Dardanelles, 
and stated that the Czar would prefer the first, the limited scheme 
of partition, to any arrangement that would give France the keys 

1 The text was, “Soustraire les provinces d’Europe aux vexations de la 
Porte, excepts Constantinople et la Roumilie.” See Thiers, “Histoiredu, 
Consulat et de l’Einpire,” vol. vii. p. 663. 


MAHMOUD II. A.D. 180 S- 1 S 39 . 4 S 7 

of the passage between the Euxine and the Mediterranean. 1 Thus 
wrangled they over the ideal proceeds of an uncommitted crime, 
little thinking that Moscow was soon to blaze, with French in¬ 
vaders for her occupants, and that Paris, in a few more years, was 
to yield to .Russian cannon, while the House of Othman proceeded 
to complete its fourth century of unbroken dominion at Constan¬ 
tinople. 

However much Alexander and Napoleon in 1807 and 1808 
differed in their theories respecting the future of Turkey, the 
Russian Emperor had this practical advantage, that he retained 
possession of Wallachia and Moldavia ; and it became evident to 
the Austrian as well as to the Ottoman Court, that he had no 
intention of retiring from them. Austria regarded the establish- 
men of the Czar’s dominion in these Danubian Principalities with 
the utmost anxiety and alarm. Justly suspecting that France and 
Russia were leagued together against the integrity of Turkey, 
Austria employed her mediation to reconcile the Porte with Eng¬ 
land, as the only power that could effectually withstand the project 
of the Cabinet of the Tuileries and St. Petersburg. 2 Aided by 
this influence, Sir Robert Adair, the English ambassador, con¬ 
cluded the treaty of the Dardanelles with Turkey, in January, 
1809. The imperious menaces, by which France and Russia 
endeavoured to prevent the Porte from making peace with Eng¬ 
land, only incensed the Turkish nation more and more against 
Russia. The national cry was loud for war; and the Ottomans 
demanded that it should be war in earnest, and not broken by 
armistices to suit the convenience of false foes and falser friends. 
Volunteers for the campaign came forward readily from the 
Mahometan populations of every part of the empire; but such was 
the extreme disorganisation, which the recent revolution had 
caused, that there was no concert, no subordination, and sometimes 
not even the semblance of superior authority, among the Turkish 
commanders. Sir R. Adair, the English ambassador at Constan¬ 
tinople, in a despatch to his government, dated June 3,1809, gives 
a striking sketch of the disorders, which had then prevailed for 
several months, and which, though abated at the time when he 
wrote, were soon revived. The Janissaries had refused for a con¬ 
siderable time to accept the Grand Vizier whom the Sultan 
nominated, and until their consent was gained, that high officer 
did not venture to appear in Constantinople. Sir R. Adair pro- 

1 Thiers, vol. viii. p. 440. See also “ Montholon,” vol. iv. p. 229, ancl 
De Garden, “Histoire des Traites,” vol. x. p. 243, et seq. 

2 Schlosser, vol. viii. 


488 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS 

ceeds to state : “ During this long period, from the death of Mus- 
tapha, the Ottoman Empire may be said to have been without a 
government. The heads of the different departments confined 
themselves to the details of their several charges. No man would 
undertake the responsibility of a general measure. Public business 
in all its essential parts was at a stand. The disorders in the 
provinces continued with as little intermission. Government, 
indeed, appeared everywhere to be fallen into such a state of relax¬ 
ation, as to have lost the means of acting right, even when it was 
supported by the public sentiment. Nothing can so truly charac¬ 
terise both the nature and the source of these disorders as what 
has passed at the frontiers upon the renewal of hostilities with 
Russia. I have already had the honour of informing you to what 
degree the spirit of the people was roused by the insolent demand 
made at the end of March by that power. Some degree of vigour 
seemed also to have been inspired into the ministry on that occa¬ 
sion. Great activity prevailed in all the war departments. The 
fleet was ordered to be fitted out; and, in fact, ten sail of the line 
have been equipped with uncommon expedition. Troops and pro¬ 
visions were ordered to the fortresses; and numbers of men were 
seen to pass the Bosphorus, day after day, taking their route for 
the frontiers. Unhappily, when they reached the Danube, instead 
of being embodied into an army to oppose the enemy, finding no 
leader to command them, they enlisted under one or the other of 
two ferocious chiefs, who, in the very sight of the Russian tents, 
were desolating their country with civil war. There is an Ayan 
of Schumla, and a chief named Pehlivan Aga, under whose banners 
all the new comers engaged, and who have already had many 
desperate encounters, to the unspeakable injury of the public 
cause.” 1 

About the same time that hostilities between the Turks and 
Russians recommenced on the Danube, the Austrian Empire began 
its calamitous war of 1809 with France; a war in which Russia, in 
pursuance of her confederacy with Napoleon, took part against 
Austria. It is true that the Emperor Alexander’s troops entered 
but languidly into that struggle ; for the general feeling among the 
Russians towards Napoleon was already one of jealousy and dis¬ 
like. But the prevalence of those very feelings, in which the Czar 
himself ere long fully shared, kept the attention of Russia fixed 
more on her perils from the West, than on her prospects in the 
South ; and neither her best nor her largest armies were drawn 
away from the Polish to the Danubian provinces. Still, before 
1 Adair, “Mission to Constantinople,” vol. i. p. 206-7. 


MAHMOUD //. A.D. iCoS- 1839 . 489 

the end of 1809, her general, Prince Bagration, had taken Isaktja, 
Tulosch, and Hirsowa, on the right bank of the lower Danube. 
The Servians and the Turks of Bosnia again fought with varying 
success, neither party being able to make any serious impression 
on the territories of the other. 

In the next year the Bussians captured Silistria on the 10th of 
June; but they failed in a series of operations against the Grand 
Vizier’s camp at Shumla; and on the 3rd of August they sustained 
a sanguinary overthrow in an assault made by them upon Rust¬ 
chuk. The Russians owned to a loss of 8000 killed and wounded 
in this obstinate contest. If the Turkish commander, Bosniak 
Aga, had followed up his success by a vigorous sally upon his 
defeated enemy, the whole army of the besiegers would have been 
destroyed. 1 But Bosniak Aga was, like many of the Ottoman 
commanders during the war, rather an independent Mahometan 
potentate, than an officer of the Sultan. He had succeeded Mus- 
tapha Bairactar as Governor of Rustchuk.; and, after Bairactar’s 
death, he disregarded all orders from Constantinople, and reigned 
as petty autocrat of Rustchuk and its territories. When the 
Russians advanced against the city, Bosniak Aga resisted them 
heroically; but when he had saved Rustchuk from the Giaours, 
he remembered that he might have to save himself from the Grand 
Vizier, who regarded him as a rebel. He avoided, therefore, the 
risk of weakening his force by any operations against the Russians 
in the open field. 2 Afterwards, when reconciled to the Porte, he 
fought loyally and bravely in the last campaigns of the war ; but 
this incident is a fair example of the manner in which the contest 
was often conducted on the Turkish side. In the autumn of 1810 
the Russians obtained some important successes. A large Turkish 
army was entirely defeated at Battin, on the 7th of September, 
with the loss of camps, artillery, and baggage. Sistova, Rustchuk, 
and other strong places, -were yielded to the Russians; but all 
their attempts at penetrating through Shumla, across the Balkan, 
were unsuccessful. In the following year, the Russian generals on 
the Danube were ordered to act only on the defensive ; so evident 
and so imminent was the gathering storm from the West against 
Russia. The Turks boldly carried the war to the left bank of the 
Danube, and fought with great gallantry in several engagements; 
but through the incompetency of their commanders, they were 
beaten in detail, and one whole army was obliged to surrender to 
the Russian general, Kutosoff, as prisoners of war. Russia was 
now most anxious to conclude peace with the Porte, in order 
1 Valentini, p. 104, 2 Ibid;, pp. 64, 104. 


490 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


to have the full means of defending herself against Napoleon. 
Several attempts at negotiating a treaty were made in 1811, but 
■without success ; as the Emperor Alexander required the annexa¬ 
tion of not only Bessarabia, but Moldavia and Wallachia, to his 
empire : terms which Sultan Mahmoud peremptorily refused. But 
the growing pressure of the danger from France made the Russians 
abate their demands, and consent to restore Moldavia and Walla¬ 
chia, but on condition that Bessarabia should remain in their 
possession. Napoleon now recognised, when too late, the error 
which he had committed in sacrificing the friendship of Turkey to 
the hope of propitiating or duping Russia. He directed his ambas¬ 
sador to urge the Sultan to advance with the whole strength of 
his empire on the Danube; and promised in return, not only to 
secure Moldavia and Wallachia, but to obtain also the restoration 
of the deeply regretted Crimea to Turkey. But this “ war¬ 
breathing message” 1 arrived too late. The Porte had already 
resolved on a cessation of hostilities with Russia. The envoys of 
the Emperor Alexander and the English ministers (who zealously 
promoted the pacification between the Czar and the Sultan) found 
means to give the Turks full information as to the designs which 
Napoleon had encouraged and brought forward for the dismember¬ 
ment of their empire; so that Sultan Mahmoud now naturally 
disregarded the interests of the French, and sought only to obtain 
an alleviation of the miseries which his own nation was enduring. 
By the treaty of Bucharest, which was signed on the 28th of May, 
1812, the river Pruth was made the boundary between the Russian 
and Turkish Empires, from the point where it enters Moldavia to 
its confluence with the Danube. All Moldavia to the right of the 
Pruth, and the whole of Wallachia, were given back to the Sultan, 
who bound himself to maintain and respect all the former con¬ 
ventions and stipulations in favour of the inhabitants of the 
restored countries. The Eighth Article of the treaty relates to 
Servia. It recited that, “ though it was impossible to doubt that 
the Sublime Porte would, according to its principles, act with 
gentleness and magnanimity towards the Servians, as to a people 
that had long been under its dominion, still it was deemed just, in 
consideration of the part taken by the Servians in the war, to 
come to a solemn agreement respecting their security.” A full 
amnesty was therefore granted to the Servians. The regulation 
of their internal affairs was to be left to themselves, and only 
moderate imposts were to be laid on them, which were not to be 
farmed, but received directly by the treasurers of the Porte. But 

1 Scott. 


MAHMOUD //. A.D. 1808 - 1839 . 491 

the Servian fortresses were to be given up to the Sultan, and. were 
again to be occupied by Turkish garrisons. The Servian states¬ 
man, Cunibert, who has lately become the historian of his adopted 
country, rightly comments on the selfishness with which Russia 
acted in this negotiation ; on her eagerness to obtain Bessarabia 
for herself, and her indifference as to the fate of her Servian allies. 
He observes that the vagueness of the stipulations in the treaty, 
as to the future relative positions of the Turks and Servians, was 
probably intentional on the part of the Russians; who knew well 
that disputes and conflicts would ensue, which would furnish pre¬ 
texts for Russian intervention at a more convenient season. “ Such 
conduct might promote the ulterior designs of Russia in the East; 
but it showed little justice and little generosity to Servia.” 1 

1 “ Essai Historique sur les Revolutions et l’lndepenckance de la Serbie,” 
vol. i. p. 46. 


492 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


CHAPTER XXIV. 

CHARACTER OF MAHMOUD II.—MEHEMET ALI—OVERTHROW OF 
THE MAMELUKES AND THE WAHABITES—FRESH TROUBLES IN 
SERVIA — MILOSCH OBRENOWITCH — GENERAL EXCITEMENT 
AMONG THE RAYAS—TIIE HETiERIA—THE GREEK REVOLUTION 
—MAHMOUD DESTROYS THE JANISSARIES—RUSSIA, UNDER 
NICHOLAS I., FORCES THE TREATY OF AKKERMAN ON TURKEY 
—FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND RUSSIA INTERFERE ON BEHALF OF 
THE GREEKS—BATTLE OF NAVARINO—WAR WITH RUSSIA— 
TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE—REVOLT OF MEHEMET ALI—BATTLE 
OF KONIEH—RUSSIAN TROOPS PROTECT THE SULTAN—TREATY 
OF UNKIAR SKELESSI—FRESH WAR WITH MEHEMET ALI— 
DEATH OF MAHMOUD—THE TURKS DEFEATED—SULTAN ABDUL 
MEJDID AIDED BY ENGLAND AGAINST MEHEMET ALI—SETTLE¬ 
MENT OF DISPUTES WITH EGYPT. 

• 

Peril from Russia, peril from England, peril from France, peril 
from mutinous Janissaries and factious Ulemas ; peril from many- 
headed insurrection among Wahabites, Mamelukes, Servians, Alba¬ 
nians, Greeks, Druses, Kurds, Syrians, and Egyptians ; peril from 
rebellious Pachas, who would fain have founded new kingdoms on 
the ruins of the House of Othman—such were some of the clouds 
that hung over the reign of Mahmoud, the second Sultan of that 
name, and the thirtieth sovereign of his dynasty. He braved 
them all. Though often worsted by fortune, he never gave up the 
struggle ; and his memory deserves the respect of those, who are 
capable of judging historical characters according to the rule laid 
down by the great statesman and orator of antiquity; 1 according 
to the principle of giving honour to sage forethought and energetic 
action, whether favoured by prosperous or baffled by adverse cir¬ 
cumstances. The time has not yet come when a full biography of 
Mahmoud may be written. Our knowledge (in Western Europe 
at least) of the details of many parts of his career is imperfect. 

* To pep yap Tlepag tog av 6 daipwv (3ov\i]6Sj ttclvtmv yiyvzrai' 7 ) Tlpoa'ipecrig 
cdrr) n)v rov <jv p(3ov\ov Siavoiav c jjXoI, <c. r. X.— Demosthenes, “Pe Corona,” 
voh i. p. 292, 1. IS. Ed. Reieke. 


MAHMOUD II. A.D. 1808 - 1839 . 493 

Bat the general features of his character are plainly discernible. 
He was neither coward nor fool; nor was he a selfish voluptuary 
like Louis XV., who could understand the growing miseries of a 
state, and the approaching overthrow of a monarchy, but rest con¬ 
tent with the calculation, that the means and appliances of pomp 
and indulgence were safe for his life at least, and that after him 
might come the deluge. The evils that Mahmoud saw around him 
were gigantic, and he gave up the repose of his seraglio to grapple 
with them in the true heroic spirit. It would be absurd to assert 
that he fell into no errors; it would be rash to maintain that he 
was sullied by no crimes; but, take him on the whole, he was a 
great man, who, amid difficulty, disappointment, and disaster, 
did his duty nobly to the Royal House whence he was sprung, 
and to the once magnificent empire, which it was his hard lot to 
govern. 

It is observable in the early part of Mahmoud’s reign, that two 
formidable classes of his enemies were swept away by the in¬ 
strumentality of a high officer, who afterwards became himself 
the most formidable of all the foes who crossed the Sultan’s path. 
The Mamelukes were destroyed, and the Wahabites completely 
conquered by Mahmoud’s Egyptian Pacha, Mehemet Ali, himself 
one of the most remarkable men that the Mahometan world has 
produced in modern times. 

Mehemet Ali was born in Macedonia, about the year 1765. 
He served in the Turkish army against the French in Egypt, and 
learned there the superiority of the arms and tactics of Western 
Europe over those of the Turks and Mamelukes. He afterwards 
distinguished himself greatly in the repulse of the English expedi¬ 
tion against Egypt in 1807. Having attained the rank of Pacha 
of the province, he strove sedulously to free the country and 
himself from the lawless tyranny of the Mamelukes. He effected 
this in 1811 by a stroke of the vilest treachery and most ruthless 
cruelty. Under the show of reconciliation and hospitable friend¬ 
ship he brought those formidable cavaliers to his palace; and then 
caused them to be shot down by his Albanian guards, while cooped 
helplessly together in a narrow passage between high walls. 1 

1 The following account (in “ Walpole’s Travels,” p. 32), of the massacre 
of the Mamelukes, was written by an English gentleman who was at Cairo 
at the time: 

“ Nothing can be imagined more dreadful than the scene of the murder. 
The Mamelukes had left the Divan, and were arrived at one of the narrow 
passages in their way to the gates of the citadel, when a fire from 2000 
Albanians was poured in on them from the tops of the walls, and in all 
directions. Unprepared for anything of the sort, and embarrassed for want 


494 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

The Mamelukes were effectually exterminated by this atrocious 
massacre; and Mehemet Ali rapidly consolidated his power 
within his province, and also extended it beyond the Egyptian 
territory. His armies, under his sons, carried on a series of cam¬ 
paigns against the Wahabites in Arabia, at first with varying 
success; but at last the power of those fierce sectaries was com¬ 
pletely broken. The holy cities and the rest of Arabia were 
recovered; and Abdullah Ibn Saud, the last Emir of the Waha¬ 
bites, was made captive. Mehemet sent him to Constantinople, 
where he was beheaded on the 19th of November, 1819. The 
Egyptian Pacha next conquered Nubia and Sennaar, and annexed 
those regions to his dominions. He had formed an army on the 
European model, trained and officered by European military 
adventurers, chiefly from France, whom the cessation of the great 
wars in Christendom after 1815 set at liberty, and who were 
tempted to Egypt by the high pay and favour which Mehemet 
offered. Equal care was taken in preparing and manning a naval 
force, in the improvement of harbours, the construction of docks 
and roads, and all those other territorial improvements, which are 
at once the emblems and the engines of what is called enlightened 
despotism. The people of Egypt suffered bitterly under Mehe- 
met’s imposts, and still more under the severe laws of conscription, 
by which he filled the ranks of his army. But, arbitrary and 
oppressive as was Mehemet's system, it succeeded in gaining him 
the great object of his heart, a permanent and efficient military 
force ; as was well proved when he aided the Sultan against the 
Greeks, and still better proved at a later period, in the campaigns 


of room, they were capable of scarcely any resistance ; a few almost harm¬ 
less blows were all they attempted ; and those who were not killed by the 
fire were dragged from their horses, stripped naked, with a handkerchief 
bound round their heads, and another round their waists, they were led 
before the Pacha and his sons, and by them ordered to immediate execution. 
Even there the suffering was aggravated, and instead of being instantly be¬ 
headed, many were not at first wounded mortally. They were shot in 
different parts of their bodies with pistols, or stuck with daggers. Many 
struggled to break loose from those who held them, some succeeded, and 
were killed in corners of the citadel, or on the top of the Pacha’s harem. 
Others, quite boys of from twelve to fourteen years, cried eagerly for mercy ; ^ 
protesting, with obvious truth, that they were innocent of any conspiracy, 
and offered themselves as slaves. All these, and, in short, every one, how¬ 
ever young and incapable of guilt, or however old and tried in his fidelity, 
the more elevated and the more obscure, were hurried before the Pacha, 
who sternly refused them mercy, one by one, impatient until he was assured 
the destruction was complete. Here then is an end of the Mamelukes, and 
this is the Pacha who piques bimfcalf upon his clemency I” 



MAHMOUD II. A.D. 1808 - 1839 . 495 

which Mehemet’s son, Ibrahim Pacha, conducted against the 
generals of the Sultan himself. 

Before, however, we consider these last-mentioned events, we 
must revert to the affairs of Servia, and the other northern pro¬ 
vinces of European Turkey. It has been observed, how vague 
and unsatisfactory were the stipulations respecting the Servians, 
that were introduced in the treaty of Bucharest. One natural 
result of this was, that Kara George, and the other Servian chiefs, 
were desirous of having some definite provisions made for the 
security of their people, before the Turks took possession of the 
fortresses; whereas the Sultan’s officers insisted on Belgrade and 
the other strongholds being given up to them immediately. 
While these and other differences were pending, Molla Pacha of 
Widdin who (like the former chief of that pachalic, Passwan 
Oglou) was in active rebellion against the Sultan, proposed to the 
Servians that they should ally themselves with him against the 
Porte. The Servians declined this offer, in compliance with the 
advice of the Russians, who were endeavouring to induce 
Turkey to join the confederation against France (Napoleon not 
yet having been completely overthrown), and were consequently 
at that time desirous to save the Porte from embarrassment. 1 
The disputes between the Turks and Servians continued to in¬ 
crease, and, in 1813, Turkish armies assailed, and overran the 
country. Kara George (who had made himself absolute ruler of 
the Servians, and from whom at least the example of courage was 
expected) now betrayed his self-assumed trust. He buried his 
treasure, which was considerable, and fled across the frontier into 
Austria. Once more Servia seemed hopelessly bowed down 
beneath the Turkish yoke, but the gallantry of one of her Kneses, 
Milosch Obrenowitch, once more preserved her. Animated and 
guided by him, the Servians rose in arms in 1815, and before the 
close of the year the Turkish troops that had occupied the country 
were broken and dispersed; though the fortresses remained in the 
occupation of the Sultan’s garrisons. Two formidable Ottoman 
armies advanced upon Servia in the succeeding year; but instead 
of overwhelming her, they halted on the frontier, and offered to 
negotiate. This hesitation on the part of the Ottomans was 
caused by the universal excitement then prevailing throughout 
the Christian populations of Turkey, who expected an intervention 
in their behalf to be made by the confederate sovereigns of the 
Holy Alliance, and were ready to rise throughout the empire at 
the first signal of encouragement. The Porte also had watched with 

1 Ctfniberfc, vol i p. 47. 


496 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


anxiety and alarm the proceedings of the Congress at Vienna, to 
which no representative of the Ottoman Empire was admitted; 
and the league of the three sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia, as “ Holy Allies,” seemed eminently menacing to the 
excluded Ottomans. Under these circumstances .the Sultan was 
averse to entangling and risking his whole available military force 
in a war against the Servian Rayas. No resolute attempt was 
made to conquer Servia; but a series of embassies and treaties 
occupied several years; during which Milosch made himself 
absolute ruler of the Servians, much after the manner of his pre¬ 
decessor, Kara George. Kara George himself, who ventured to 
return to his country, was seized and shot by the commands of 
Milosch, on the requisition of the Turks. Milosch observed the 
external semblance of obedience to the Porte ; which had reason 
at that period to be content that a chief should rule the Servians, 
who would keep them in control, and whose self-interest would 
deter him from joining in revolutionary projects for the total 
overthrow of the Ottoman Empire. 1 But it is not probable that, 
after the Holy Alliance had clearly shown its disinclination to 
interfere in the affairs of the East, Mahmoud would long have 
acquiesced in the real independence of the Grand Knes of Servia, 
had it not been for the grave difficulties that were brought upon 
the Sultan by the Greek insurrection, and other circumstances 
connected with that celebrated event. 

Many causes combined to originate and to sustain the Greek 
War of Independence. The first, and the most enduring, were 
unquestionably those feelings which are among the noblest of our 
nature ; and which the national historian of modern Greece refers 
to, when he claims peculiar glory for his country, “ because from 
the very commencement of the struggle, her purpose, proclaimed 
before God and man, was to break the yoke of the stranger, and 
to raise again from the dead her nationality and her independence. 
She took up arms that she might by force of arms thrust out of 
Greece a race alien to her in blood and in creed, a race that had by 
force of arms held her captive for ages, and that regarded her to 
the last as its captive, and as subject to the edge of its sword.” 2 
To these public feelings were added, in the bosoms of many, the 

1 Ranke, p. 365. 

2 H 'EWag Kai irpoeGsro Kai snijpv^ev tviomov Qsov kci l dvOpiomov t? apxy Q row 
dySiVoq Tijg, on W7r\(<x@»7 7 rpbg ovvrpifajv tov tkvov £ vyov Kai 7 rpug dvtyeptnv row 
iGvia/jiov njg, Kai Trig dveZaprijaiag rpg' vd i^ioay Sid tCov 07 rXiov tK rijg 'EXXacog 
liiav %kviiv Kai aXXu9p7]<JKGV (pvXrjv, ») viroia Sid ru>v OTcXiav ti)v yxf.iaX(t)ravat vrpd 
aiioviov, Kai ti)v iGeiSpei /uexpi rkXovg aixf^dXits-rdv rrjg f Kai vi to rtjv /xa^aipav tuq. 
Tiicoupi, tom. A. p. 2 and p. 1, 


MAHMOUD II. A.D. 1808 - 1839 . 497 

remembrance and the sense of intolerable private wrong. More¬ 
over, the general diffusion of knowledge among the Greeks, and 
the impulse that had been given to education and literary pursuits 
since the time of Selim III., powerfully contributed in arousing 
the courage as well as the intelligence of a long oppressed and 
much enduring people . 1 Many also of the Greeks had acquired 
both wealth and habits of energetic enterprise by the advancing 
commerce of their nation; and the insular and seafaring popula¬ 
tion of the country had generally shown the greatest activity and 
skill in availing themselves of the opportunities, which the state 
of Europe for the first fifteen years of the century gave them, for 
securing a large share of the carrying trade of the Levant. While 
Greece thus possessed admirable materials for a national maritime 
force, she had also better resources for an immediate military 
struggle on land, than nations, which have been subject to others 
for centuries, can usually command. Her bands of Klephts, or 
robbers, were numerous, well-armed, and brave; and such an 
occupation in a country in the condition of Greece before the 
revolution, implied no greater degree of discredit than was 
attached in England during the early Norman reigns to the “bold 
outlaws” of Sherwood, or in Greece herself in the Homeric ages 
to the avowed sea-rover and pirate . 2 There was also in central 
and northern Greece another important class of armed natives, 
forming a kind of militia, which had been originally instituted 
and sanctioned by the Turks themselves for the purpose of main¬ 
taining order and repressing the Klephts. These national guards 
(as they might be termed) were composed exclusively of Greeks, 
and were officered by Greeks, but they acknowledged the authority 
of the Pachas of their respective districts. They frequently con¬ 
sisted of Klephts, who had come in from the mountains, and made 
terms with the government, and who were thenceforth denominated 
“Tame Klephts” (K Ksprcu -q/iepoi); but the regular name of the 
defensive troops was the Armatoli. The Porte had for some 
years before the Greek Revolution been jealous of the numbers 
and organisation of the Armatoles; and violent efforts had been 
made to reduce their strength, which chiefly resulted in driving 
them into open rebellion, and increasing the power of the V A ypioi 
K \e$rat, the armed, or wild Klephts. Another circumstance, 
which favoured still more the insurrection of Greece, was the 
density and homogeneousness of its Christian population, far ex¬ 
ceeding the usual proportions to be found in the Turkish Empire. 

1 See Emerson Tennent, vol. ii w 561. 

2 Triooupi, vol. A. p. 15; and Tmeydides as theio cited. 

32 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


498 

Napoleon had remarked, in one of his conversations at St. Helena 
on the subject of the East, that the Sultans had committed a great 
fault in allowing so large a mass of Christians of the same race to 
collect together, and in such numerical preponderance above their 
masters, as in Greece; and he predicted that “ sooner or later 
this fault will bring on the fall of the Ottomans.” 1 

Such were the impulses and resources which Greece possessed 
within herself for her War of Independence, "which must, however, 
have been ultimately unsuccessful (notwithstanding the gallantry 
with which it was w T agecl) had it not been for the sympathy which 
the Greek cause excited among all the nations of Europe : “ a 
sympathy such as had never been known before, in which recol¬ 
lections of the classic ages, liberal tendencies, and an universal 
Christian feeling were united.” 2 Unhappily, other motives, selfish 
and sordid motives, tended not a little to throw the sword of 
Christian Europe into the scale against the Turks in the Greek 
war. 3 The ambition of one great power was predominant, and 
used as its most effective, though unconscious instrument, the en¬ 
thusiastic generosity of others. 

Ever since the ineffectual rising with Russian help, which took 
place in 1770, 4 the Greeks had been incessantly scheming fresh 
attempts. Their national poet, Rhiga (whose lyrics powerfully 
contributed to keep up the flame of freedom in the hearts of his 
countrymen), towards the close of the last century formed the 
project of uniting the whole Greek nation in a secret confederacy 
for the overthrow of their Turkish masters. Thus was originated 
and first organised the celebrated Hetaeria. It made rapid and 
extensive progress under Rhiga; but it decayed after his death 
in 1798. It was revived in 1814 among the Greeks of Odessa, by 
Nicholas Skophas. He termed it the Society (or Hetaeria) of the 
Philikoi, 5 and, by engrafting it on a Literary Society, which was 
flourishing at Athens, he obtained the means of spreading it with 
rapidity among the most intelligent Greeks, and at the same time 
of masking it from the suspicion of the Turks. The association 
soon comprised many thousand members. A great number of 
officers in the Russian service were enrolled in it: and it was sup- 

1 Montholon, vol. iv. p. 229. 2 Ranke, p. 865. 

3 That strong-minded and strong-spoken man, William Oobbett, said that 
the Greek Revolution was “ a war got up by poets and stock-jobbers for the 
benefit of Russia.” 

4 See p. 391, supra. 

5 ’Eraipia t&v ®i\ucu>r, seems meant for “ Society of Friends.” But 
Triccupi censures the name as Ovopaaiav dpKov<rav povtjv va y^aouKT^piarj rpv 
m::puv yi’uxyiv rov GV£i]-ov kul avrijg rijs pijrpucijQ yXuuayc rov, 


MAHMOUD II. A.D. 1808 - 1839 . 499 

posed to identify Russian policy and Greek interests more closely 
than really was the case; a supposition highly favourable to its 
advancement; as the belief that they were acting under Russian 
authority, and were sure to receive Russian aid in time of need, 
naturally increased the numerical strength and boldness of the 
confederates. The association had its hierarchy, its secret signs, 
and its mysterious but exciting formalities. Its general spirit 
may be judged of by the oath administered to the initiated in the 
third of its seven degrees :—“Fight for thy Faith and thy Father- 
land. Thou shalt hate, thou shalt persecute, thou shalt utterly 
destroy the enemies of thy religion, of thy race, and of thy 
country.” The Hetreria had its branches and agents in every 
province of European Turkey, in the chief cities of Asia Minor, 
and in every foreign state where any number of Greeks had 
settled. Early in 1820 its chiefs were making preparations for a 
general insurrection, which could not have been much longer de¬ 
layed. But the event, which was the immediate cause of the 
rising, was the war between the Sultan and Ali Pacha, which 
broke out in the spring of that year, and offered the Greeks the 
advantage of beginning their revolution while the best troops of 
the Porte were engaged against a formidable enemy—against one, 
who long had been himself one of the strongest and cruellest 
oppressors of the Greek race, but now seemed driven by self- 
interest to become its most valuable ally. 

Nothing certain at this time was known in the Divan at Con¬ 
stantinople of the danger that was gathering against the Ottoman 
power in the Hetseria of the Greeks; and Sultan Mahmoud had 
determined on commencing one of the many difficult tasks of his 
reign, that of effectually putting down the over-powerful and 
rebellious vassals, who had long maintained their empires within 
his empire, and who overshadowed the majesty of his throne. None 
of these was more insolently independent, or had given juster cause 
of alarm or offence to the Porte, than Ali of Epirus, the Pacha of 
Jannina, whose name has already often occurred to us, but who 
requires more special notice in considering the recent history of the 
Ottomans and their subject-races. 

Ali Pacha was an Albanian, and his family belonged to one of 
the tribes, that had long embraced Mahometanism. His ancestors 
had, for several generations, been hereditary chiefs of the little 
fortified village of Tepelene, where Ali was born about the year 
1750. His father (who died before Ali was fourteen) had been 
deprived of nearly all the possessions of the family, in a series of 
unsuccessful feuds with the neighbouring chieftains. Ali’s mother, 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 


500 

Khamko, trained the lad up to make revenge and power the sole 
objects of his existence. He formed a band of freebooters, at the 
head of which he sometimes won plunder and renown, and some¬ 
times experienced extreme reverses and peril. On some occasions 
he sought refuge in the mountains, where he wandered as a soli¬ 
tary Klepht or robber, till he again gathered comrades, and struck 
for power as well as for existence. After some years of romantic 
but savage adventures, Ali had recovered the greater part of the 
territories of his family, and had acquired fame throughout 
Albania as a bold and successful chieftain. He did good service 
in the armies of the Porte against the Austrians in 1788; and 
partly by the reputation thus gained, but still more by bribery, 
he obtained from the Divan the Pachalic of Tricala, in Thessaly. 
By unscrupulous and audacious craft and crime, he afterwards 
made himself Pacha of Jannina, in Epirus, which thenceforth was 
the capital of his dominions. Gifted with great sagacity, and 
embarrassed by no remorse and little fear, Ali triumphed over 
rival Beys and Pachas, and almost accomplished the subjugation of 
the neighbouring mountain tribes; though he experienced from 
them, and especially from the gallant Suliotes, a long and obsti¬ 
nate resistance. Every forward step of Ali’s career was stained 
by the foulest treachery and the most fiendish cruelty. But the 
cities and lands under his rule obtained peace, security, and com¬ 
mercial prosperity. Ali watched eagerly the conflicts and changes, 
of which nearly all Europe was the scene for many years after the 
breaking out of the first French Revolution. He had frequent 
negotiations with Napoleon and other rulers of the West, who 
substantially, though not formally, recognised him as an inde¬ 
pendent potentate. It is said 1 that “ his scheme was, to make 
himself master of all Albania, Thessaly, Greece, and the Ionian 
Islands; and the Gulf of Arta, a bay with a narrow entrance, but 
spacious enough to contain the united fleets of Europe, was to 
become the centre of this new empire. His Albanians were the 
best soldiers in Turkey; the forests of Jannina and Del vino abound 
with excellent timber, and Greece would have furnished him the 
most enterprising sailors in the Mediterranean.” Ali never could 
realise this project; but he maintained and increased his dominion 
until 1819, when the acquisition of Parga was his last triumph. 
Mahmoud had long resolved to quell his insubordinate Pacha, 
whose haughty independence was notorious throughout Europe; 
and a daring crime committed by Ali, in February, 1820, gave the 

1 “Biographical Dictionary” of Useful Knowledge Society; title, “Ali 
Pacha.” 


MAHMOUD II. A.D, 180S-1S39. 501 

immediate pretext for his destruction. Two of Ali’s agents were 
detected in Constantinople in an attempt to assassinate Ismail 
Pacha Bey, who had fled from Jannina to avoid the effects of the 
Pacha's enmity, and had been employed in the Sultan’s own court. 
A Fetva was forthwith issued, by wdiich Ali was declared Fermanli 
(or outlaw), and all loyal viziers and other subjects of the Padi- 
schah were ordered to make war upon the rebel. In the conflict 
which ensued, Ali had at first some success; but Mahmoud in¬ 
spired his generals with some portion of his own energy; and by 
sternly declaring that he would put to death any one who dared 
to speak in favour of the outlaw, the Sultan checked the usual 
efficacy of the bribes which Ali dispensed among many members 
of the Divan. Cooped up in Jannina, Ali prolonged his resistance 
till the beginning of 1822, when he was lured into the power of 
his enemies by pretended terms of capitulation, and put to death 
by Churchid Pacha, who commanded the besieging army. 

But while the “old Lion of Jannina” (as Ali was called) thus 
long held at bay the Sultan’s forces, and detained one of the ablest, 
though most ferocious, of the Sultan’s generals, 1 almost all Greece 
had risen and beaten back the Ottomans ; and a similar insurrec¬ 
tion had been for. a time successfully attempted in the trans- 
Danubian provinces. In February, 1821, Ipsilanti, a Greek who 
had obtained high distinction in the Russian army, and who was 
then the chief of the Hetseria, crossed the Pruth into Moldavia 
with a small band, and called on his countrymen throughout the 
Turkish Empire to take up arms. Unhappily, the very first acts 
of the Greek liberators (though Ipsilanti was not personally 
responsible for them) were the cruel and cowardly murders of 
Turkish merchants, in the towns of Galatz and Jassy. 2 The tidings 
of these things, with the addition of much exaggeration and 
many false rumours, soon reached Constantinople. The consequent 
indignation, and the alarm of the Mahometans at the wide-spread 
confederacy of their Rayas against them, which was now sud¬ 
denly revealed, produced a series of savage massacres of the Greek 
residents in the capital; and these were imitated or exceeded by the 
Turkish populations, and especially the Janissaries, in Smyrna and 
other towns. Indeed, throughout the six years’ war that followed, 
the most ferocious, and often treacherous cruelty, was exhibited 

1 See the powerfully-drawn character of Churchid Pacha in Tricoupi, 
vol. A. p. 67. 

2 Tricoupi, vol. A. p. 53. He expressly speaks of the murder of the Thirks 
at Galatz, as of Aipoarayovg ravTtjg irp a&iog rug Trpixtrrjg TronZeutg tov vtt ip 
i\ev9epias Kai tvvopiag ayuivog. 


502 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

on both sides. But many acts of heroism, worthy of the best days 
of ancient Greece, cast a lustre on the cause of the insurgents, and 
added to the sympathy with which the peoples of Christian 
Europe regarded their efforts ; sympathy, which was shown in the 
accession of frequent volunteers to the Greek armies, and in liberal 
contributions by individuals and private societies to their funds, 
before the kings of Christendom interfered in the conflict. In 
Moldavia and Wallachia, the Turks destroyed Ipsilanti’s force, and 
put an end to the insurrection at the battle of Drageschan, on the 
19th of June, 1821. But in Greece, and on the Greek seas, the 
bands and light squadrons of the insurgents were generally vic¬ 
torious over the Turkish armies and fleets, until, in 1825, Sultan 
Mahmoud summoned to Greece the forces of his Egyptian Pacha, 
Mehemet Ali. The effect of superior arms and discipline was at 
once apparent. Ibrahim Pacha, at the head of his father’s regular 
battalions, defeated the Greeks in every encounter, laid waste their 
territory at his will, and gradually reconquered the cities and for¬ 
tresses which had been won from the Turks : Missolonghi (which 
was regarded as the great bulwark of Western Greece) falling after 
a noble resistance, on the 22nd of April, 1826, and Athens sur¬ 
rendering in the June of the following year. 

While the Egyptian troops were thus maintaining a decided 
superiority by land, the squadron sent by Mehemet Ali had com¬ 
bined with the Turkish, and a powerful fleet of heavily-armed and 
well-manned ships was thus collected under the Sultan’s flag in the 
Greek waters, with which the lighter vessels of the insurgents 
were utterly unable to cope. The usual curses of a liberal cause, 
when the fortune of arms goes against it—disunion and civil war— 
now raged among the Greek chiefs; and despite of the general 
gallantry of the nation, and of the high abilities and boundless 
devotion displayed by some of the leaders, Greece must have sunk 
in 1827, if the forces of the Three Great Powers of Christian 
Europe had not appeared with startling effect on the scene. 

Before, however, we consider the final catastrophe of the Greek 
war, we must revert to the intervening transactions between the 
Porte and the Court of St. Petersburg on the subject of Servia 
and the Principalities; and also to the bold measures by which 
the Sultan, in 1826, struck down the long-hated, and long-dreaded 
power of the Janissaries, and revolutionised the military system 
of his empire. The destruction of the Janissaries is the greatest 
event of Mahmoud’s reign. While considering the state of Turkey 
in the first years of Selim III., 1 we have seen how indispensably 

1 Page 475, supra. 


MAHMOUD II. A.D. 1808-1839. 503 

necessary it had become, both for the internal amelioration of the 
empire, and for strengthening it against attacks from without, 
that there should be a thorough change in the composition, the 
organisation, the discipline, and the arms of the regular troops. 
AVe have seen how obstinately the Janissaries resisted all improve¬ 
ments, and the savage fury with which they destroyed the sove¬ 
reign and the statesmen who endeavoured to effect the requisite 
alterations. Since those events the worthlessness of the Janissaries 
in the field had been further proved, not only in the campaigns on 
the Danube, in 1810 and 1811 , but still more conclusively in their 
repeated failures against the Greek insurgents. On the other 
hand, the victorious progress of the Egyptian troops in Greece 
demonstrated that the European discipline could be acquired by 
Mahometans, as well as by natives of Christendom, and that the 
musket and bayonet were as effective in the hands of a Copt or 
Arab, as in those of a Muscovite or Frank. The comparison be¬ 
tween the troops sent from his Egyptian provinces, and those 
supplied by other parts of his empire, was at once inspiriting and 
galling to the Sultan. He saw that Mehemet Ali had realised 
in Egypt the very projects, which had hitherto been beyond the 
power, and almost beyond the daring of the Padischahs of the 
Ottoman world. Mahmoud determined that this contrast should 
cease to shame him, and that the Janissaries should no longer sur¬ 
vive the Mamelukes. But he knew well the numerical strength 
and the unscrupulous violence of the body which he was about to 
assail. Scarcely a year of his reign had passed, in which some 
part of his capital had not been destroyed by fires caused by mal¬ 
content Janissaries, or in which it had not been necessary to make 
some concession to their turbulent demands. It was impossible to 
collect and destroy them by any stratagem, such as Mehemet Ali 
had used against the Mamelukes; nor, indeed, is there any act of 
Mahmoud’s life, which justifies us in suspecting that he would have 
been willing to employ such treacherous artifices, even if they could 
have availed him. Mahmoud foresaw that a battle in the streets 
of Constantinople must decide the question between him and the 
Janissaries ; and he diligently strengthened himself in the arm of 
war, which is most effective in street-contests. It is said that 
when he heard of the manner in which Murat, in 1808 , used can¬ 
non to clear the streets of Madrid of the insurgent populace, it 
made such an impression on the Sultan’s mind, that it never was 
forgotten. 1 He sedulously improved the condition of his own 
artillery force, and by degrees officered it with men on whose 

1 Panke, p. 3 G 9 . 


504 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

loyalty and resolution he could rely. When, in the eighteenth 
year of his reign, he made ready for the final struggle with his 
Janissaries, he had increased the force of Topidjis, or artillery¬ 
men, in and near Constantinople, to 14 , 000 , and he had placed at 
their head an officer of unscrupulous devotion to his sovereign’s 
will. This general of Turkish artillery was named Ibrahim; but 
his conduct on the day of the conflict, and his swarthy complexion, 
made him afterwards known by the grim title of Kara Djehennin, 
or “ Black Hell.” Mahmoud also had taken an opportunity to 
appoint as Aga of the Janissaries themselves, Hussein, who was 
ready to carry out all the Sultan’s projects. The Grand Vizier 
was staunch to his sovereign, and a man of spirit; and a large 
body of trustworthy Asiatic troops was encamped at Scutari, 
which could be brought into action at the fitting moment. Mah¬ 
moud also reasoned, not unsuccessfully, with the leading Ulema 
on the folly of their abetting by their influence the obstinate dis¬ 
loyalty of the Janissaries, who might once have been the truest 
champions, but were now clearly the worst enemies of Islam. He 
had a little before this time raised to the dignity of Chief Mufti a 
man who would support him; and he determined to proceed in 
strict accordance with every recognised formality and law, so as to 
throw upon the Janissaries the odium of being the first to appeal 
to brute force. In a great council of Viziers and Ulema, held in 
June, 1826 , it was resolved that it was only by encountering the 
infidels with a regularly-disciplined army that it was possible for 
the Moslems to regain the advantage over them ; and a Fetva was 
drawn up, and signed by all the members of the council, which 
ordered a certain number out of each Orta of the Janissaries to 
practise the requisite military exercises. 1 After some murmurings 
and partial tumults, the whole body of the Janissaries of the capital 
assembled on the 15 th June, 1826 , in the Etmeidan, overturned 
their camp-kettles (the well-known signal of revolt), and advanced 
upon the palace, with loud cries for the heads of the Sultan’s chief 
ministers. But Mahmoud was fully prepared for them. He un¬ 
furled in person the Sacred Standard of the Prophet, and called 
on all True Believers to rally round their Padischah and their 
Caliph. The enthusiasm of the people was roused into action on 
liis side; and he had ready the more effectual support of his artil¬ 
lerymen and Asiatic troops. As the Janissaries pressed forward 
through the narrow streets towards the Serail, “ Black Hell ” and 
his gunners showered grape on them ; and round shot cut lanes 
through, their struggling columns. They fell back on the Etmei- 

1 Banke, p. 369, 


MAHMOUD IT. A.D. 180S-1839. 505 

dan, and defended themselves there with musketry for some time 
with great steadiness and courage. After many had perished, the 
remnant of the sons of Hadji Beytasch retired in good order to 
their barracks, which they barricaded, and they prepared them¬ 
selves to offer the most desperate resistance to the anticipated 
assault. But Mahmoud and his officers risked no troops in such 
an encounter. The Sultan's artillery wms drawn up before the 
barracks, and an incessant storm of shot and shell was poured in 
on the devoted mutineers. Some of the most daring of them 
sallied out, sabre in hand, but were all shot or cut down as they 
endeavoured to escape. Some few begged for mercy, which was 
sternly refused. The artillery of Kara Djehennin continued to 
thunder upon the buildings till they were set on fire and utterly 
destroyed; and the last of the Janissaries of Constantinople 
perished among the blazing and blood-stained ruins. 

The number of those who fell on this memorable day has been 
variously estimated. 1 The most accurate calculation seems to be 
that which gives 4000 as the number of the Janissaries killed in 
the battle. Many thousands more were put to death afterwards 
in the various cities of the empire; for Mahmoud followed up his 
victory with unremitting vigour and severity. The Janissary force 
throughout the Ottoman dominions was abolished, their name was 
proscribed, their standards destroyed; and the assemblage of new 
troops, on a new system, was ordered; which were (in the words 
of the Sultan’s proclamation), to sustain the cause of religion and 
of the empire, under the designation of the “ Victorious Maho¬ 
metan Armies.” 

At this point in Sultan Mahmoud’s career, it was not without 
reason that he was “ aroused into courageous self-confidence, and 
animated with high and promising hopes.” 2 The endurance, and 
the preparations of eighteen years had gained their reward. He 
had accomplished the task which had baffled so many of his pre¬ 
decessors ; he had swept away the military tyranny under which 
the empire had groaned for centuries. At last the Sultan felt real 
freedom for himself, and real sovereignty over his kingdom. He 
now formed an army of upwards of 40,000 men, clothed, armed, 
and disciplined after the European system. It was expected that 
this force would by degrees be raised to the number of 250,000. 
True it is, that Mahmoud found no adequate aid from among en¬ 
lightened members of his own nation, that nearly everything had 
to be done “by the Sultan’s own iron will.” 3 But that will had 

1 See Marshal Marmont’s remarks on this, p. 77. 

8 ltanke, p. 371. ? Moltke, p. 13. 


506 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

already worked wonders; and each success gave him tenfold 
means for achieving others. In the provinces, the most formid¬ 
able of the rebellious Pachas, who had set at nought the authority 
of the throne in the beginning of his reign, were now dead or 
deposed; and, above all, the head of Ali of Jannina had been 
shown by Mahmoud himself, in stern triumph, to his submissive 
Divan. The Wahabites were crushed, the Mamelukes extermi¬ 
nated. Mehemet Ali had hitherto committed no overt act of in¬ 
subordination. Rebellion had been trodden out in Moldavia and 
Wallachia; and though it had blazed more fiercely and more 
enduringly in Greece, it seemed about to be extinguished there 
also by the victorious Turco-Egyptian forces of Ibrahim Pacha. 
All that Mahmoud now recpiired from fortune, was immunity from 
attack by foreign powers during the period of transition, through 
which it was necessary for Turkey to pass between the abolished 
old, and the yet uncreated, or immature institutions, under which 
he designed her to flourish. It is the opinion of one of the ablest 
historians of Mahmoud’s reign, 1 that, “if Turkey had enjoyed 
ten years of peace after the destruction of the Janissaries, Sultan 
Mahmoud’s military reforms might in that time have gained some 
strength; and, supported by an army upon which he could depend, 
the Sultan might have carried out the needful reforms in the ad¬ 
ministration of his country, have infused new life into the dead 
branches of the Ottoman Empire, and made himself formidable to 
his neighbours. All this was prevented by Russia, which nipped 
the Sultan’s military reforms in the bud.” And the strongest 
possible proof of the wisdom with which Mahmoud’s measures 
were planned, of the beneficial effects which they actually pro¬ 
duced in Turkey, and far greater benefits which they would have 
conferred if Russia had not hastened to attack her while those 
measures had scarce begun to ripen, is to be found in the 
despatches of the chief statesmen of Russia during the war of 
1828-29, in which they take credit for their sagacity in discerning 
in Mahmoud’s reforms the necessity for prompt hostilities on the 
part of Russia; and in which they own that Turkey had dis¬ 
played, under the stern guidance of Mahmoud, a degree of energy 
and power higher than she had long previously possessed; and 
they felicitate themselves in not having waited until the new Tur¬ 
kish forces, which even in their infancy were so hard to conquer, 
had acquired consistency and mature strength. 2 

1 Moltke, p. 456. 

2 See the Despatches qf Count Pozzo di Borgo, and the Trinco dl Lieven, 
cited infra, p. 515, 


MAHMOUD II A.D . 1808-1839. 507 

It was singularly unfortunate for Sultan Mahmoud, that only a 
few months before he struck the decisive blow, which destroyed 
the principal old military force of Turkey, there was a change of 
emperors at St. Petersburg. In Alexander I., the abhorrence of 
revolution had predominated over every other sentiment. He 
therefore kept aloof from the side of the Greek insurgents; and he 
was in the latter part of his life (which was clouded with melan¬ 
choly and sickness) indisposed to the energetic action which wars 
of conquest require in a sovereign. But on the 24th of December, 
1825, he was succeeded on the Russian throne by Nicholas, a 
prince of many high merits, but a genuine representative of 
Russian national feeling, and, as such, ready and willing for a war 
in support of the Christians of the Greek Church, against the 
“ old arch-enemy” of Muscovy. 1 Moreover, the civil strife which 
had broken out at St. Petersburg on the accession of Nicholas, at 
the end of 1825, and the disquiet which had not ceased to pervade 
the Russian nation, and especially the army, made the statesmen 
of St. Petersburg consider a Turkish war most desirable for their 
own empire’s internal security. 2 The negotiations which had been 
long pending between Russia and the Porte respecting Servia, the 
Principalities and other matters, were resumed in a far more 
peremptory tone by the ministers of Nicholas, than had previously 
been employed towards the Ottomans. In the August of 1826 
(two months after the destruction of the Janissaries) the Russians 
insisted that the Porte should forthwith give up certain fortresses 
in Asia, which were alleged to have been ceded by the treaty of 
Bucharest; that the Moldavians and Wallachians should be re¬ 
stored to their full privileges, as before the revolt of 1821; and 
that the confirmation of the political rights of the Servians should 
be no longer delayed. The Turks at first received these demands 
with avowed indignation ; but in the utterly unprepared state of 
Turkey at that crisis of internal change, the Sultan felt himself 
obliged to give way; and on the 7th of October, 1826 (the very 
last day which Russia had allowed for deliberation), the treaty or 
convention of Akkerman was signed. 

It ratified the treaty of Bucharest; and ordained that the 
Moldavians and Wallachians should thereafter enjoy all the 
privileges conferred by the fifth article of that treaty, and also 
those bestowed by the Hatti-scheriff of 1802. The future Hos- 
podars of the provinces were to be elected by the Boyards from 
among their own body for a period of seven years. No Hospodar 
was to be deposed by the Porte without the consent of Russia. 

1 Moltke, p. a * 3 Ibid., p. 3 . • 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


50 S 

The Moldavian Boyards, who had been implicated in the insur¬ 
rection of 1821, and obliged to take refuge in Russia, were now to 
be at liberty to return, and to resume their rank, estates, and 
possessions. With respect to Servia, the Porte and a body of 
deputies from the Servian nation were to settle the necessary 
regulations for the future government of the province, which were 
to be forthwith published in an imperial Hatti-scherifF, and 
become part of the treaty between Russia and Turkey. It was 
stated that among the privileges of the Servians, which were to be 
thus guaranteed, were religious liberty, free choice of their chiefs, 
independent internal self-government, the re-union of the districts 
that had been detached from Servia, the consolidation of the 
various imposts in a single charge, freedom of commerce, the 
establishment of hospitals, schools, and printing-offices, and an 
edict that no Mahometan should be allowed to reside in Servia, 
except those belonging to the garrisons of the fortresses. The 
treaty of Akkerman contained many other stipulations, all to the 
disadvantage of Turkey ; such as that the Porte should be obliged 
to indemnify Russian merchants for depredations committed by 
the Barbary corsairs ; and that in granting the free navigation of 
the Black Sea to nations which had not yet obtained that right, 
the Porte would do so in such a manner as to cause no injury to 
Russian commerce. 

Bitter as was the humiliation which the necessity of accepting 
the treaty of Akkerman imposed upon Mahmoud, he was soon to 
experience heavier blows from the same quarter, and also from 
powers which he had hitherto regarded as sure friends. On the 
6 th of July, 1827, a treaty was signed at London between Russia, 
England, and France, the object of which was declared to be to 
stop the effusion of blood, and to effect the reconciliation of the 
Turks and the Greeks. 

The mediation of the three high contracting powers was offered 
for this purpose : and the basis of pacification was to be the prac¬ 
tical independence of Greece: the Sultan retaining only a nominal 
sovereignty, and receiving a fixed annual tribute, to be collected 
by the Greeks themselves. An armistice was to be insisted on 
before the discussion of terms ; and if the Porte rejected this in¬ 
tervention, the three powers were to form international relations 
with the Greeks, by sending and receiving consuls, and thereby 
recognising the insurgent province as an independent state. The 
offer of these terms was eagerly accepted by the Greeks, then in 
their extreme distress, but indignantly rejected by Sultan Mah¬ 
moud. He stated that the country, which it was proposed to 


MAHMOUD II. A.D. 180 S- 1 S 39 . 509 

■withdraw from his rule, had for centuries formed part of the Otto¬ 
man Empire ; and that those, whom powers, professing friendship 
to the Porte, designed to treat with and recognise as a Greek govern¬ 
ment, were mere brigands and rebels to their lawful sovereign. 
The Sultan appealed to history as offering no example of such in¬ 
terference in violation of all principles of legitimate authority, and 
also to the law of nations, by which every independent power has 
a right to govern its own subjects without the intervention of any 
foreign power whatever. He declared finally his inflexible reso¬ 
lution never to renounce his rights. 

The statesmen of Christendom, who interposed on behalf of the 
Greeks, had great difficulty in justifying their intervention under 
any generally recognised principle of the law of nations, especially 
after the forcible manner in which the chief continental Christian 
potentates had lately concurred in upholding the legitimate right 
of ancient sovereignty against the revolutionists of Italy and Spain. 
They shrank from openly professing a broad general principle that 
it is lawful and laudable to aid the oppressor against the oppressed. 
They might have quoted against the Turks the authority of their 
own renowned Grand Vizier Ahmed Kiuprili, who (as we have 
seen) 1 thus justified in 1672 the interference of Turkey in behalf 
of the Cossack subjects of the Polish Republic. But such a mere 
argumentum ad hominem would have been of little value : and the 
principle of foreigners interfering with an established government 
because the foreigners think the conduct of that government 
towards part of its subjects cruel and iniquitous, is certainly a 
principle liable to gross abuse ; and it is one little likely to be 
favoured by despotic rulers, or by states in which one race is 
dominant over other races. 2 

1 See p. 287, supra. 

2 See as to intervention by a foreign state on behalf of oppressed sub¬ 
jects, Grotius, lib. 2, xii. 40; lib. 2, xxv. 8 ; Wheaton’s “ Elements,” vol. i. 
p. 87 ; Kent’s Comment., vol. i. p. 25; Phillimore, vol. i. p. 441 ; Count 
Mamiami, p. 359; Mackintosh’s “Review of the Causes of the Revolution of 
1688,” c. ix. ; Vattel, livre i. c. 4, secs. 51-54, and livre iii. c. 18, sec. 296. 
I have examined this subject in “The First Platform of International Law*,” 
p. 297, et seq. , more fully than can be done in the present volume. 

The national historian of modern Greece, Spiridion Tricoupi, takes a 
natural pride in the peculiar circumstances under which the great Powers 
of Christendom saved his country. He boasts that the intervention put an 
end to the principle of the Holy Alliance, which condemned all political 
changes, if sought by revolt and force of arms ; that it disturbed the balance 
of power in Europe ; and that it tended to destroy an ancient empire, to 
which he, as might be expected, applies severe epithets : 

Td dironXeapara ri/£ ‘EXXjjj 'ucrjg inai'cto-uosiog iSiiyQnaav yiyavraia tccti kcit 
uWov rpoTiOV’ cion dvkrpi^av rug iroXvOpvWrjTOvg dpxdg rrjg 'lepag Zuppax<ceg, 


510 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

We find accordingly that this principle of intervention was very 
faintly and hesitatingly put forward by the diplomatists of the 
great powers, in 1827. They did, indeed, state that one of the 
reasons for their proceedings was to stop the effusion of blood; 
but this might have been explained as being no more than a 
common formula of negotiation. * 1 They appealed to another justi¬ 
fication, which was the fact of their mediation having been 
solicited by one of the contending parties. But the request of one 
only of two disputants is no sufficient ground for interference, 
especially if that party consist of revolted subjects. The main 
ground on which the intervention was vindicated, was the alleged 


KaraS ikoZovgtjq t rctaav ttoXituo)v ptTaj3oXi)v kv£pyovj.dvr]v Si inroGTamorv icai 
07 rXwv, Sion erapat-av to TroXvOpvXXrjTOv avtrrppa rpc, iGoppoTnag, to biroiov irsol. 
7 roXXov dx ev r) EvpioTrdiKi) toXitiio), icai Sion, civaKaXtoavTa eig tt)v S6t,av icai 
eig Tt)v TToXirucriv ^loriv iv tQvog, to bvoiov ippiipOp 7rpb aiojviov tig tov Tcapov T^g 
aSo'^iag teal rrjg SovXeiag, GvvsTpeZav icai tig to vd SioXvgojgi piiav peyaXpv icai 
7mXaidv avTOKparopiav yzvvpQtioav, dvSpiodelaav, yijpdaaGav icai cnrodvrioicouGav 
aven-iGTijpova dvmcoiviovucrjv Kai fidpfiaoov. 

1 At one period in the war the Duke of Wellington was prepared to re¬ 
commend forcible intervention to check atoocious violations of the laws of 
war, such as were alleged against the Turks. “ When, in 1S26, Ibrahim 
Pacha was rapidly reconquering the Morea, besides the continuance between 
him and his armed opponents of the same merciless spirit on both sides, 
which had characterised the contest from its commencement, it was imputed 
to the Egyptian commander that in every district and town which he won 
from the Greeks, he seized the Greek male children for circumcision and 
forcible conversion to the Mahometan faith, and that he had declared and 
was beginning to act on a system of transplanting the remains of the Greek 
population to Egypt, and of repeopling the Peloponnesus with colonies of 
Copts and Arabs. Atrocities of similar character may be found in the his¬ 
tories of ancient and of mediaeval Oriental conquerors ; but even if anything 
of the kind had ever been practised by any of the civilised nations of the 
West, certainly many centuries had passed away without European warfare 
being sullied by such abominations. It is to be remembered that the Otto- 
3nan Turks had long before the Greek war of independence, on more than 
one occasion, appealed to the European laws of nations, and had recognised 
the principles and usages which those laws established. Even if this had 
not been the case, it is not likely that civilised European communities would 
have tolerated the obtrusion into their continent, or into any part of the 
world where their usages predominated, of such hideous barbarism. The 
Duke of Wellington urged that these charges against Ibrahim Pacha should 
be investigated ; and the Duke maintained that, if true, they gave third 
states the right to intervene in the war.” (See the Wellington Despatches, 
3rd series, vol. iii. p. 75.) “ But the Egyptian commander denied the truth 

of these charges. No proof of them was given or found ; and consequently 
other grounds for intervention, besides a general statement that the war was 
carried on by the Turks in a ferocious manner, were put forward by England 
and her allies, when intervention actually took place in the October of 1S27. ” 
—(“ Fivst Platform of International Law,” p. 439.) 




MAHMOUD II. A.D. 1808-1839. 511 

necessity of affording protection to the subjects of other powers 
who navigated the seas of the Levant, in which for many years 
atrocious piracy had been exercised, while neither Turkey nor 
revolted Greece was, de facto, either able or willing to prevent the 
excesses springing out of this state of anarchy. But, unfortunately 
for the validity of this pretext, the three powers intervened at the 
very crisis, when the Sultan had acquired a decided ascendency in 
the war; and when it was clear that in a short time the contest 
would be over, and the condition of the Levant restored to what 
it had been for centuries. Moreover, if the suppression of piracy 
in the Turkish waters had been the genuine object of England, 
France, and Bussia, they might have effected it with a tenth part 
of the force employed at Navarino ; and in order to effect it, there 
was not the least occasion for them to burn the Sultan’s men-of- 
war, or to land troops to reduce his fortresses in the Morea. 

On the 20th of October, 1827, the combined squadrons of Eng¬ 
land, France, and Bussia, entered the Bay of Navarino, in which 
the Turco-Egyptian fleet was moored. The avowed object of the 
allies was to compel Ibrahim Pacha to desist from further hos¬ 
tilities against the Greeks. Their force amounted to ten ships of 
the line, ten frigates, and some smaller vessels. It was much 
superior to that of the Sultan, which, though it comprised a large 
flotilla of small barks, and nineteen frigates, presented only five 
line-of-battle ships. It is probable that the ministers of England 
and France (who could have no wish to see Turkey weakened for 
purposes of Bussian ambition) hoped to the very last that such an 
imposing demonstration of force would awe the Sultan or his 
officers into submission, and that Greece might thus be saved 
without her old masters being further injured. 1 But the stern, 
unbending spirit that nerved Sultan Mahmoud, was fully shared 
by his admirals, the Capital! Pacha, .Tahir Pacha, and Moharem 
Bey. An engagement was the inevitable result of the entrance of 
the allied fleet into Navarino ; an engagement in which theTurco- 
Egyptians fought for four hours with desperate valour, until the 
whole of the Sultan’s magnificent armament was destroyed, except 
a few insignificant barks that were left stranded on the shore. 
The consequences of the battle were immense ; far, indeed, beyond 
■what the better part of the conquerors either designed or desired. 
It was not merely that the Greek question was virtually decided 
by it; Ibrahim gladly retiring from the Morea to Egypt with the 
chief part of his army, and a division of French troops, under 
Marshal Maison, completing the deliverance of the Greek terri- 

* See Moltke, p. 6. 


512 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . 

tory; but Turkey was by this “ untoward event,” as the Duke of 
Wellington truly termed it, left defenceless before Russia. Men 
said, that “ the Sultan had destroyed his own army; and now his 
allies had destroyed his navy.” 1 Still Mahmoud and his people 
would not bend to the stranger and to the rebel; nor would the 
Divan, even after Navarino, accept the treaty of London, which 
the ministers of the three powers, especially of Russia, now pressed 
in more and more peremptory tone. But the Turkish statesmen 
knew their peril, and endeavoured to induce the ambassadors to 
remain at their posts, and to communicate to their respective 
courts the offers of the Porte respecting the future treatment of 
Greece. These were, a complete pardon and amnesty : a remission 
of all arrear of taxes and tribute : a restoration of confiscated 
property: a re-establishment of all privileges: and, finally, a 
pledge of milder government. 2 The ambassadors refused to accept 
any terms but those of the treaty, and on the Cth of December, 
left Constantinople. An attempt was made by the Reis Effendi 
to reopen negotiations; but the Russian minister (to whom the 
communication was sent) returned no answer; and the prepara¬ 
tions for war on the Russian frontier showed clearly that the 
design of the Emperor Nicholas was not to bring about a recon¬ 
ciliation, but to force a quarrel. Though Russia was nominally at 
peace with all the world (her Persian war having ended by a con¬ 
vention in November), she was calling out new levies of conscripts, 
concentrating troops in Bessarabia, and collecting military stores 
and transports in her harbours in the Black Sea in readiness for 
an invasion of the Ottoman dominions. There were also many 
topics of dispute between the Sultan and the Czar as to certain 
Asiatic fortresses wrongfully retained by Russia, and those never- 
failing sources of difference, the affairs of the Principalities and of 
Servia. Convinced that his great enemy intended to attack him 
in the spring, the Sultan took the bold step of being the first to 
declare war; and a Hatti-scheriff was issued on the 20th of De¬ 
cember, in which, addressing the Pachas and Ayans of his empire, 
the Sultan recited the wrongs which he had endured from Russia, 
among which he classed the unjust extortion of the treaty of Ak- 
kerman ; and he called on all true Mussulmans to show again the 
determined valour, with which the Ottomans had in ancient times 
established in the world the true religion, and to resist the foe, 
whose object was to annihilate Islam, and tread the people of 
Mahomet under foot. 

In the ensuing war the vigour shown by Mahmoud astonished 
1 Moltke. 8 Chesney, p. 15. 


MAHMOUD II. A.D . 1S0S-1S39. 513 

both friends and foes. Russia employed in the first campaign 
about 100,000 troops of all arms in European Turkey. The num¬ 
ber might easily have been greater; but she judged it prudent to 
retain large armies in Poland, Finland, and the Ukraine, and a 
far less spirited resistance on the part of the Turks was expected, 
than that which was actually encountered. In Asia, her general, 
Count Paskievitsch, led an army 30,000 strong into the Turkish 
provinces, besides having a reserve of 16,000 more. At sea her 
superiority was incontestable. She had sixeen line-of-battle ships 
in the Black Sea, besides frigates and smaller vessels; and in the 
Archipelago she had the fleet which had aided in destroying the 
Turkish navy at Navarino. Throughout the war this command 
of the sea was of infinite importance to her; and in particular, the 
operations against Varna in 1828, and the decisive movements of 
Diebitsch in 1829, were only rendered possible by her uncontrolled 
possession of the Euxine. Mahmoud had only been able to collect 
an army of about 48,000 troops trained on the new system. 
These were principally mere lads, who were selected in the hope 
that their prejudices against the Frankish innovations would not 
be so violent as generally prevailed among the elder Turks. The 
Prussian General, Baron Moltke, who served with the Turks 
throughout the war, and our countryman, Colonel Chesney, 
describe vividly the disheartening spectacle which this infant 
force presented, and its difference from the aspect of the old 
Ottoman troops. “ The splendid appearance, the beautiful arms, 
the reckless bravery of the old Moslem horde had disappeared 
but the German writer adds, “ yet this new army had one quality 
which placed it above the numerous host which in former times 
the Porte could summon to the field—it obeyed." Besides these 
troops, the Sultan was obliged to call together the feudal and irre¬ 
gular forces of his empire, chiefly from Asia; for throughout 
European Turkey the deepest discontent with their sovereign’s 
reforms prevailed among the Ottomans. Bosnia, a remarkably 
warlike and strongly Mahometan province, sent no troops at all; 
and many of the officers, whom he was obliged to employ, were 
attached to the old order of things, and were almost as bitter in 
their disaffection to the Sultan, as in their antipathy to the 
Russian Giaours. But the artillery force was numerous and 
loyal ; and the armed Turkish inhabitants of the towns, which the 
enemy assailed, showed as usual the greatest spirit in self-defence, 
and contributed greatly to the prolongation of the war, which was 
(in its first campaign, at least) principally a war of sieges. 

In the operations of 1828, in Europe, the Russians occupied the 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


5 H 

Principalities with little opposition, and crossed the Danube early 
in June. Brailow (or Ibrail) was taken on the 15th of June, but 
not till after an unexpectedly long and obstinate defence, which 
cost the invaders 4000 men, and much valuable time. The 
Russians then advanced on Shumla and Varna. Before Shumla 
they gained no advantage ; and suffered several severe blows. But 
Varna fell after a gallant defence, which was, however, ultimately 
tarnished by the treachery of Yussuf Pacha, the second in com¬ 
mand, who went over to the enemy with nearly 5000 men. Silis- 
tria repulsed the Russian corps that besieged it; and altogether, 
at the close of the European campaign, the position of the com¬ 
batants was such, that in the words of the ablest military critic of 
the war, 1 “ If we consider the enormous sacrifices that the war 
cost the Russians in 1828, it is difficult to say whether they or 
the Turks won or lost it. It remained for a second campaign to 
decide the value of the first.” 

In Asia, the genius of Paskievitsch had gained far less chequered 
advantages for the Russian Emperor. Besides Anapa (which was 
captured by the Russian armament that afterwards co-operated in 
the siege of Varna) the Turks lost in Asia during 1828, Kars, 
Akhalkhaliki, Hertwitz, Akhaltzikh, and other important fort¬ 
resses. They were beaten also in a pitched battle; and Paskie¬ 
vitsch obtained an admirable position for an advance into Asia 
Minor in the following year. But it was to the Danube and the 
Balkan that the statesmen of Europe looked most attentively; and 
the general feeling (especially in Austria) was, that Russia had 
been overrated, that the Sultan was unexpectedly powerful, and 
that the war was likely to be prolonged without any heavy catas¬ 
trophe to the Turkish Empire. Russia herself felt keenly the 
need of recovering her prestige by more signal success in another 
campaign, which she resolved to make a decisive one. The 
Russian ministers at the courts of the other European powers 
watched anxiously the probabilities of any mediation being- 
attempted. It was thought that France would be kept quiet 
through the well-known predilection of her King, Charles X., for 
Russia; and that the domestic troubles, which the Duke of Wel¬ 
lington, then Prime Minister of England, had to deal with in the 
Catholic question and other matters, diminished the risk of any 
activity in foreign politics on the part of England. Prussia was 
sure to be inactive. Austria was known to be more suspicious 
and jealous of Russia ; but she was dull of discernment, and slow 
in action; and if the Russians could gain such a sudden supe- 

1 Moltke. 


MAHMOUD If. A.D. 180S-1339. ' 515 

rionty in tne war over the Turks, as to force on and hurry to 
conclusion, a negotiation between the two belligerent powers only, 
the Russian court believed that the rest of Europe, however much 
it might dislike the terms of such a treaty, would not take up 
arms to set it aside. 1 

Accoidin 0 ly, in 1829, more numerous and better appointed 
forces crossed the Danube, and they were led by Marshal Diebitsch, 
a general who thoroughly entered into the spirit in which his 
imperial master wished the war to be conducted and concluded. 
“He besieged one fortress, and fought one battle; but this 
brought him into the very heart of the hostile empire. He 
arrived there followed by the shadow of an army, but with the 
reputation of irresistible success;” 2 Such is the expressive eulogy in 
which Baron Moltke epitomises the Turkish campaign of Marshal 
Diebitsch, thence surnamed Sabalskanski, that is to say, the 
Crosser of the Balkan. In Asia the Emperor Nicholas was 
equally well served by the genius and bravery of Marshal Paskie- 
vitsch, the victor of the battle-field of Akhaltzikh, and the captor 
of Bayezid, Khart, and Erzerum. 

The main Turkish army of Shumla, emboldened by the partial 
successes of the last year, commenced operations in 1829, by 

1 See the remarkable despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nessel¬ 
rode of 2Sth Nov., 1823, and another from the Prince de Lieven of the 16th 
January, 1829. They are in the third volume of Murhard, Nouveau Sup¬ 
plement, pp. 340, 383. The following passage from Count Pozzo di Borgo’s 
despatch is remarkable for the unintentional proof it gives in favour of Sul¬ 
tan Mahmoud’s reforms, and for its avowal of the motives that made Rus¬ 
sia force on the war : 

“ Lorsque le cabinet imperial a examine la question si le cas etait arrive 
de prendre les armes contre la Porte a la suite des provocations du Sultan, 
il aurait pu exister des doutes sur l’urgence de cette mesure aux yeux de 
ceux qui n’avaient pas assez medite sur les effets des reformes sanglantes que 
le chef de 1’Empire Ottoman venait d’executer avec une force terrible, et 
sur l’interSt que la consolidation de cet empire inspirait aux cabinets de 
l’Europe en general, et notamment a ceux qui sont moins bien disposes 
envers la Russie ; maintenant l’experience que nous devons faire doit reunir 
toutes les opinions en faveur du parti qui a ete adopte. L’Empereur a mis 
le systeme turc a l’epreuve, et sa majeste l’a trouve dans un commencement 
d’organisation phisique et morale qu’il n’avait pas jusqu’a present. Si le 
Sultan a pu nous opposer une resistance plus vive et plus reguliere, tandis 
qu’il avait k peine reuni les elements de son nouveau plan de reforme et 
d’amelioration, combien l’aurions-nous trouve formidable dans le cas ou il 
aurait eu le temps de Ini donner plus de solidite et de rendre impenetrable 
cette barriere que nous avons tant de peine a franchir, quoique l’art ne soit 
encore venu qu’impaifaitement au secours de la nature.” — Murhard, 
Nouv. Rec. de Traites, Nouv. Supp., vol. iii. p. 842. 

a Moltke, p. 476. : 


516 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

attempting (17th May) to recover Pravadi from the Russians. 
While the Grand Vizier’s army was engaged in this enterprise 
(which was conducted with great valour but little skill, and ad¬ 
mirably opposed by the Russian generals Roth and Rudiger), 
Marshal Diebitsch, who had commenced the siege of Silistria on 
the 18th of May, moved the greater part of the Russian force 
from before that fortress ; and by a series of rapid and brilliant 
movements, placed himself in connection with Roth and Rudiger 
in a position between Pravadi and Shumla. This brought on the 
battle of Kulewtslia, on the 11th of June; in which, after several 
fluctuations of fortune, the Turks were entirely defeated; but the 
Russian victory was far more caused by the superiority of 
Diebitsch as a general to Redshid Pacha, the Turkish Grand 
Vizier, than by any inferiority of the Turkish troops to the Russians. 
The Grand Vizier reassembled some of the fugitives at Shumla; 
but his force there was, in his judgment, so inadequate to defend 
the place, that, in the belief that the Russian general designed to 
capture Shumla before attempting any forward movement, the 
Turkish commander called in the greater part of the detachments 
which were watching the passes of the Balkan : a fatal error, 
which left Diebitsch at liberty to break through the hitherto im¬ 
penetrable barrier. As soon as Silistria fell, which was on the 
26th of June, Diebitsch was joined by the Russian corps, which 
had previously been detained before that important fortress, and 
he now prepared for the daring march which decided the wac. 
But even with the advantages, which the Russian Marshal’s 
generalship had secured, the march across the Balkan would not 
have been hazarded, if the Black Sea had not then been a Russian 
lake; and if friendly fleets had not been stationed both in that 
sea and in the iEgean, ready to co-operate with such troops as 
the generals of the Emperor Nicholas might lead across the moun¬ 
tains to either coast. Sizeboli on the western shore of the 
Euxine, and to the south of the Balkan chain, had been surprised 
and occupied by a Russian armament in February ; and in July a 
squadron of the Czar’s fleet, under Admiral Greig, with a great 
number of vessels carrying stores and provisions, cast anchor in 
the Bay of Bourgass; so that Diebitsch’s army might move lightly 
equipped, and unincumbered by waggons through the mountains, 
and, when it came down from them, find all things that were 
necessary for its support, and a secure basis for further operations. 
The losses of the Russians during the campaign had been so enor¬ 
mous (far more perishing by privation and disease than in battle), 
that after leaving 10,000 men to watch the Grand Vizier in 


MAHMOUD II. A.D. 180 S- 1839 . 517 

Shumla, Diebitsch could not muster more than 30,000 for his 
advance through the Balkan on the Turkish capital. But he 
reckoned justly on the moral effect already caused by the battle 
of Kulewtsha, and the capture of Silistria, and on the still greater 
panic, which the sight of a Russian army to the south of the 
trusted barrier would produce. It was known that the greatest 
excitement and disaffection prevailed in Constantinople and the 
other great Turkish cities, and among the commanders of the 
troops in Albania and Roumelia. Emboldened by these con¬ 
siderations, Diebitsch suddenly and secretly moved his columns 
on the 11th of July from the neighbourhood of Shumla upon the 
gorges of the Balkan, and in nine days he reunited his force to the 
south of the mountains. The feeble Turkish detachments, which 
were encountered in the passes, offered but a desultory and trifling 
resistance. As the Russian soldiers came down from the heights 
of the eastern Balkan, and saw “ the flags of their ships flying over 
the broad shining surface of the Bay of Bourgass,” 1 a general 
shout of joy burst from the ranks. Their progress was now one 
continued triumph; but a triumph rendered very hazardous by 
the ravages of dysentery and plague, which the invaders brought 
along with them, and which reduced their numbers by hundreds 
and by thousands. But this weakness was unknown to the Turks, 
who believed that at least 100,000 men had crossed the Balkan, 
and that they must have destroyed the Grand Vizier’s army 
before they left Shumla. An officer, whom the Pacha of Missivri 
sent forward to reconnoitre Diebitsch’s force, came back with 
these words: “ It were easier to count the leaves of the forest 
than the heads of the enemy.” Missivri, Bourgass, and the im¬ 
portant post of Aidos were occupied by the Russians, almost 
without opposition. Striking inland towards Adrianople, Die¬ 
bitsch pursued his resolute career, and on the 20th of August, the 
ancient capital of European Turkey capitulated to a pestilence- 
stricken and exhausted army of less than 20,000 Russians. With 
admirable judgment as well as humanity, Diebitsch, in his occu¬ 
pation of the Turkish cities, and throughout his march in Rou¬ 
melia, took the most effectual measures for protecting the in¬ 
habitants from the slightest military violence. The Christian 
population received the Russians with enthusiasm; and even the 
Moslems returned to their peaceable occupations, when they found 
that there was full protection for property, person, and honour, 
and that neither their local self-government nor their religious 
rites were subjected to interruption or insult. Diebitsch thus 

4 Moltke, 


5 i 3 N/STORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

saved his sickly and scanty army from being engaged in a guerilla 
warfare, in which it must inevitably have been destroyed; and he 
continued to impose upon the terrified enemy by the appearance 
of strength, and by well-simulated confidence, amid rapidly in¬ 
creasing weakness, and the deepest and most serious, alarm. He 
could not hope to keep up the delusion of his adversaries about the 
number of his army, if he advanced much nearer to the capital; 
and the amount of the Turkish troops now collected in Constan¬ 
tinople, the strength of the fortifications of that city, and the 
fanatic bravery of its armed population (which the appearance of 
a Russian army would be sure to rouse into action), made all hope 
of an ultimate success by main force utterly chimerical. More¬ 
over, in his rear, the Vizier’s army, that held Shumla, was superior 
to the Russian corps of observation left in front of it; and on his 
flank there was Mustapha, the Pacha of Scodra, with 30,000 ex¬ 
cellent Albanian troops. This officer had hitherto refused to obey 
orders from the Porte, but it was impossible for Diebitsch to 
reckon on the continuance of such insubordinate inactivity. The 
only alternatives for Diebitsch were to obtain a peace, or to be 
destroyed; and in order for him to obtain peace, it was necessary 
to keep up the boldest semblance of waging war. Fortunately 
for him, not only were the panic and disorder at Constantinople 
extreme; but both the Turkish statesmen and the ministers of 
the European powers there knew nothing of the real state of his 
army. An insurrection of the partisans of the Janissaries had 
been organised, but Sultan Mahmoud was beforehand with them; 
and it was suppressed by Chosreef Pacha, his chief of the Police, 
by a wholesale execution, with very little heed as to how many 
hundreds of innocent persons suffered, provided only the guilty 
did not escape. 1 But though discontent was thus silenced, it was 
known to be wide-spread and intense; and a general outbreak 
was daily expected, in which it was too probable that Constan¬ 
tinople would be destroyed by her own populace, aided by the 
mutinous bands of soldiery, who had escaped to the capital from 
the defeated armies and captured fortresses. Even the European 
ambassadors at Pera believed that Diebitsch was at the head of 
60,000 efficient troops; and they joined the Sultan’s ministers in 
urging him to save the empire from total destruction, by nego¬ 
tiating instantly with the Russian general, and obtaining peace at 
almost any sacrifice. Mahmoud is said long to have resisted their 
pusillanimous advice; and well would it have been for him and 
his empire, if a single faithful friend had then been near him, to 

1 Moltka 


MAHMOUD II. A.D. 1300 - 1839 . 519 

support his sovereign with manly counsel. At length the Sultan 
yielded to the importunities of all around him ; and plenipoten¬ 
tiaries were sent to the Russian camp, who concluded with Marshal 
Diebitsch, on the 28th of August, 1829, the treaty of Adrianople. 

By this treaty Russia obtained the sovereignty of part of the 
left bank of the Lower Danube, and of the Sulina mouth of that 
river. She was thus enabled to control that important artery of 
the commerce of Central Europe, especially of Austria. Her other 
European conquests were restored, and also those in Asia, with 
the material exception that the Russian Emperor retained as part 
of his dominions the important fortresses of Anapa, Akhaltzikh, 
Akhalkhaliki, and several valuable districts; and the treaty recog¬ 
nised, by way of recital, that “ Georgia, Imeritia, Mingrelia, 
Gouriel, and several other provinces of the Caucasus, had long been 
annexed in perpetuity to the Empire of Russia/’ A separate 
article (but declared to be read as part of the treaty) stipulated in 
favour of the Moldavians and Wallachians, that the Hospodars 
should be thenceforth elected for life; that no Turkish officer 
should interfere in their affairs, and that no Mussulman should be 
allowed to reside in any part of their territories. Nothing but a 
nominal sovereignty, and an annual tribute, was reserved to the 
Porte; and the tribute was not to be exacted for the two years 
following the war. 

In behalf of the Servians, the Sixth Article of the Treaty of 
Adrianople provided that all the clauses of the separate act of the 
Convention of Akkermann relative to Servia, should immediately 
be carried into effect, and ratified by a Hatti-scheriff of the Sultan, 
which was to be communicated to the Court of St. Petersburg 
within a month. The passage of the Dardanelles was to be open 
to Russian merchant vessels; an indemnity for injuries done to 
Russian commerce was to be paid in eighteen months ; and another 
sum, amounting to nearly £5,000,000 sterling, was to be paid to 
the Russian Government for the costs of the w r ar. Moreover, by 
the Tenth Article of the Treaty, the Sultan declared his adhesion 
to the stipulations of the Treaty of London, and of a subsequent 
convention of the Three Powers respecting Greece. The result of 
this branch of the negotiations w T as the erection of Greece into an 
independent kingdom, comprising all Continental Greece south of 
a line drawn from the Gulf of Arta to the Gulf of Yolo, thus 
leaving Thessaly and Albania as the Sultan’s frontier provinces. 
The islands of Euboea, the northern Sporades, and the Cyclades, 
also became members of the new State; the Ionian Islands re¬ 
maining under British Government, while Crete and the, islands off 


520 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

the Thracian and Asiatic coasts, "were still allowed to appertain to 
Turkey. 

It is said that Sultan Mahmoud’s wonted firmness failed him for 
a time when he signed the Treaty of Adrianople. He shed bitter 
tears, and for weeks shut himself up in his palace at Therapia, 
almost crushed in spirit. 1 His misery must have been severely 
augmented when he heard the truth as to the amount of force 
which his victors really possessed at Adrianople. So rapid had 
been the progress of disease among the Russian ranks, that at the 
moment when the peace was concluded, Diebitsch could not com¬ 
mand more than from 15,000 to 17,000 bayonets; 2 and at a grand 
review of the invading army in November, before they quitted 
Adrianople, scarcely 13,000 men of all arms could be brought 
together. 3 The mortality among the rest of the Russian forces 
employed in the European campaign of 1829 was almost equally 
terrible ; and it is computed that not more than 10,000 or 15,000 
Russians ever recrossed the Pruth; so that their army was in fact 
nearly destroyed during the second campaign. 4 After the peace 
was concluded, the Pacha of Seodra (who had been a Janissary, 
and vainly hoped that the Sultan’s exigencies Avould make him beg 
aid from his subjects on condition of restoring the old abuses), 
refused for a time to recognise the treaty; and threatened the 
Russians with a force of 30,000 Albanians, which would have 
ensured their destruction if more speedily employed. Had this 
man been loyal, or if, even without a sabre having been raised 
against Diebitsch’s army, no negotiation had been opened, and 
the Russians had been left to die of disease, the campaign must 
have closed more triumphantly for Turkey than even that of the 
Pruth. Invigorated by such success, she could (notwithstanding 
the Asiatic exploits of Paskievitsch) have maintained the struggle 
against Russia during 1830; and, before that year was over, the 
second French Revolution had broken out, Poland had risen 
against the Emperor Nicholas, and the obstinate struggle had 
commenced, in which Diebitsch perished, and in which the full 
power of Russia was taxed to the utmost, even by the unaided 
Poles. The whole current of the world’s history would have been 
changed. Poland might now be an independent state ; there 
would have been no Egyptian revolts; the name of Hunkiar 
Iskelessi would be unknown in the West; and France and Eng- 

1 Moltke, p. 770. 2 Colonel Cliesney, p. 255. 

3 Colonel Chesney. He was present at the review, 

* Moltke, Appendix, 


MAHMOUD II. A.D. 1808-1839. 521 

land might never have been required to join in a Russian war, if 
a single messenger of truth from Adrianople could have been heard 
in the Divan, or at Pera, in the August of 1829 ; or, if Sultan 
Mahmoud, in happy obstinacy, had resisted a little longer the soli¬ 
citations of those who urged on him “ Peace, peace,” when there 
should have been no peace. 

In the year after the treaty of Adrianople, the French seized 
and occupied Algiers (July 4, 1830), which, though practically in¬ 
dependent, had still acknowledged the titular supremacy of the 
Sultan, and was governed by a Dey, who professed to be his 
officer. The injury which the conquest of a Mahometan province 
by the Frankish Giaours inflicted on the general authority of 
Mahmoud in the world of Islam, was increased by the proclama¬ 
tion of the French General, Marshal Bourmont, who stated that he 
came to deliver Algeria from the yoke of the Turks. The Sultan 
was in no condition to interpose, or even to remonstrate; for far 
worse evils and convulsions in the integral parts of the Ottoman 
Empire showed how violent was the shock which it had sustained 
from the Russian war, and how much the spirit of disaffection and 
revolt had been increased by the issue of that contest. The un¬ 
fortunate are generally unpopular : and the very pride of the 
Turks made them impute the disasters of their sovereign to his 
Frankish innovations and abandonment of the old usages of the 
empire. The bonds of loyalty to the Head of the House of 
Othman grew weaker in proportion to the strength of Mahometan 
feeling; and, of the numerous insurrections that broke out in 
1830, and the two following j^ears, in European Turkey, none 
were more violent than those of the eminently warlike and fanatic 
Bosnians, and of the Mussulman tribes of Albania. They were 
quelled by the resolute spirit of Mahmoud, and the abilities of his 
Vizier, Redschid Pacha; but they exhausted more and more the 
resources of the heavily-burdened State. Asia was not much less 
mutinous; but it was in Egypt that the most deadly storm was 
gathering. Mehemet Ali had resolved on founding an hereditary 
dominion on the ruins of the apparently doomed empire of the 
Sultan. He had restored his navy after its destruction at Nava- 
rino; he possessed a veteran and admirably-disciplined army, 
chiefly officered by Frenchmen; and, above all, he had a general 
of science, experience, prudence, and energy, in his son, the cele¬ 
brated Ibrahim Pacha. He had obtained the Pachalic of Crete 
from the Porte, but had been refused that of Syria. He deter¬ 
mined to take it by force. A personal quarrel with the Pacha of 
Acre gave him a pretext for attacking that officer. The command 


522 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

of the Sultan that this civil war between his servants should cease, 
was contemptuously disregarded ; and Ibrahim besieged Acre with 
an army of 40,000 men, and a fleet of five ships of the line, and 
several frigates. The key of Syria was captured by him on the 
27th of May, 1832, and for seven years Mehemet Ali was the real 
sovereign of that important country. The disaffected armies of 
raw recruits, badly officered, and worse generalled, which the 
Sultan sent against the rebel Egyptian chief, were beaten by 
Ibrahim in three great battles, at Ems, in Upper Syria, on July 6, 
1832 ; at Beylan (in Cilicia, near the ancient battle-field of Issus), 
on the 29th of the same month; and at Konieh, in Asia Minor, 
on the 29th of October. The positions of these places indicate 
the rapid progress and bold designs of the Egyptian commander ; 
who seemed to annex Asia Minor to Mehemet’s dominions with 
the same ease as Syria; and whose advance upon Constantinople 
in the coming spring appeared to be inevitable and irresistible. 
In this agony of his House and empire, the Sultan sought aid first 
from England, but none unhappily was accorded. The execrable 
policy of paring down our military and naval forces, so as to effect 
the temporary saving of farthings, and to involve the ultimate 
expenditure of millions of pounds, besides sacrifices and risks of 
imperial character, for which no money can compensate, was then 
prevalent in this country ; and the answer returned to the Turkish 
application was an expression of regret that England had not the 
means of supplying the required assistance. Russia was watching 
eagerly for the opportunity which English folly thus threw in her 
■way. Her troops, and her transports, and her ships of war were 
ready at Sebastopol and Odessa; and when at last Mahmoud 
humbled himself to express to his ancient enemy a wish for a 
protecting force, prompt messengers were despatched to the great 
Crimean depot of Muscovite power, and a Russian squadron of 
four ships of the line set sail from Sebastopol, and landed 6000 of 
the Emperor’s troops near the mouth of the Bosphorus, on 
February 20, 1833. 

Meanwhile, the forward march of Ibrahim had been temporarily 
stayed by a messenger from Admiral Roussin, whom the French 
Government had sent with a fleet to aid the Sultan. A negotia¬ 
tion was entered into, but broken off after a few days; and in the 
beginning of March Ibrahim again pointed his columns towards 
the Bosphorus. But a second Russian armament from Odessa 
now had reached those straits, and on the 5th of April, 12,000 
soldiers of the Czar Nicholas were encamped on the Giant’s 


MAHMOUD II. A.D. 1808-1859. 523 

Mountain, near Scutari. Ibrahim felt that any further advance 
on his part would be madness; and occupied himself in procuring 
the largest possible increase to his father's power in the negotia¬ 
tions that followed, in which England and France (now thoroughly 
alarmed at the advantages gained by Eussia) took part with 
anxious zeal. 

The terms of compulsory reconciliation between the Sultan and 
his over-powerful vassal were embodied in a Firman of May the 
6 th, 1833, by which the Porte confirmed Mehemet Ali in his 
governments of Crete and Egypt, and added to them those of 
Jerusalem, Tripoli, Aleppo, Damascus, and Adana. This was 
virtually a cession to the Egyptian of nearly all the countries 
which the victories of Selim I. had incorporated with Turkey, 
besides the important island of Candia, which it had cost the 
Porte a twenty years’ war to wrest from Venice. At such a bitter 
cost was Mahmoud compelled to purchase the removal from Asia 
Minor of his insurgent Pacha; and before he could obtain the 
withdrawal of his equally formidable Eussian friends, he was 
obliged to sign the treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi on the 8th of July, 
1833, which, by its public articles, bound him to an offensive and 
defensive alliance with Eussia, and by a still more important 
secret article, provided that the Ottoman Porte should, when 
required by the Eussian Emperor, close the straits of the Dar¬ 
danelles against the armed vessels of all other foreign powers. 

It was the general opinion in Europe at this time, that Turkey 
was irretrievably ruined; and that the attempts of her reforming 
sovereign to resuscitate her power had been the mere galvanising 
of a corpse. Many, indeed, thought that Mahmoud had accele¬ 
rated the empire’s downfall, by destroying the lingering sparks of 
vitality in the old system, without being able to replace them by 
new life. And, indeed, had Mahmoud not been a man of the 
noblest energy, and of high genius, he might well have despaired 
of his country after such a Canme as Konieh. First, the foreign 
invader, and next, the home-rebel had crushed his armies, had rent 
from him his dominions, and had bowed him beneath the humilia¬ 
tion of treaties, worse even than those of Carlowitz and Kainardji. 
It might well have seemed, even to himself, that “ he had failed 
in the object for which he had striven all his life. Eivers of blood 
had been shed, the old institutions and sacred traditions of his 
country had been destroyed, the faith and pride of his people had 
been undermined for the sake of reform, and that reform was 
condemned by the event.” 1 But Mahmoud was one of the few 

1 Moltke, p. 451 . 


524 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

really great men, whom disappointment in a well-judged enterprise 
unnerves not, but rather rouses to more vigorous exertion. He 
knew that the old path of the Turkish government was the sure 
path to destruction, and refused to consult his own repose by 
letting his ministers return to it. He knew, too, the resources of 
his empire. He discerned and appreciated, even amid the general 
show of discontent, the deep layers of true allegiance, of bravery, 
and of national spirit, which the hearts of his Moslem subjects 
contained. He had also the wisdom and the magnanimity to value 
rightly the importance of conciliating the affections of the Rayas, 
by giving them equal and just laws, in defiance of the prejudices 
of his own, the long-dominant race. Sultan Mahmoud continued, 
amid good repute and evil repute, to re-organise the troops, the 
fleets, and the finances of his empire : to encourage education : to 
promote commerce : to give security for person and property: to 
repress intolerant distinctions ; and to remove by degrees the most 
galling of the burdens and prohibitions, which pressed upon his 
Christian subjects. The strong and almost unanimous testimony 
which English travellers from the East bore in favour of the policy 
of the Turkish Sultan, and their statements respecting the rapid 
improvement of the inhabitants of his empire, caused a marked 
reaction in the public feeling of England with respect to Turkey. 
When war broke out again in 1839, between the Sultan and the 
Egyptian Pacha, Turkey was supported by England, not only for 
the sake of English interests, but with the respectful cordiality 
which is only felt towards those who evince a sense of self-respect, 
and who prove that they are ready and willing to aid themselves. 
This new war was caused by the indignation of Mahmoud at the 
undisguised designs of Mehemet Ali, to convert the vast provinces, 
which he governed, into an hereditary monarchy for his own 
family. Mehemet declined to continue the payment of tribute to 
the Porte; and his removal of the Turkish guards from the 
Prophet’s Tomb, and substitution of his own Arab soldiers, con¬ 
stituted a still more open denial of the sovereignty of the Sultan, 
as chief of Islam. Attempts at negotiation only led to mutual 
complaints and recriminations; and the Sultan at last sent a final 
summons to the Pacha, requiring him to re-establish the Turkish 
guards at the Tomb of the Prophet, to pay regularly his tribute, 
and to renounce all sovereignty over Egypt, save so far as the 
Sultan might concede it to him. On obedience to this being 
refused, Mahmoud directed his generals and admirals to attack his 
refractory vassal. A numerous and well-appointed Turkish army 
had been collected at Bir on the Euphrates; and by the strenuous 


ABDUL MEDJID — ACCESSION, A.D. 1839 . 525 

exertions of many years, a well-disciplined and well-manned fleet 
of thirty-six vessels of different rates, twelve being ships of the 
line, had been formed and collected in the harbour of Constanti¬ 
nople. But venality and treachery baffled all the preparations of 
the Ottoman sovereign. When his army under Hafiz Pacha met 
the Egyptian under Ibrahim, at Nezib, on the 25th June, 1839, 
whole battalions and squadrons, whose officers had taken the gold 
of Egypt, deserted the Sultan’s standard, and ranged themselves 
with the enemy. The remainder was hopelessly routed, with the 
total loss of artillery, camp, baggage, and military stores of every 
description. Still fouler was the fate of the fleet. The Capitan 
Pacha, the infamous Achmet Fevzy, on the 8 th of June knelt 
before his imperial benefactor, Mahmoud, received the Sultan’s 
parting benediction, and with solemn oaths renewed his assurances 
of loyalty and devotion. On the 6 th of July following, the im¬ 
perial fleet was seen in full sail for Alexandria, and on the 13th 
the traitor who commanded it, brought it into the port of that 
city, and delivered it up to Mehemet Ali. It is some consolation 
to know that Sultan Mahmoud was spared the anguish of hearing 
of these calamities, especially of Achmet Fevzy’s ingratitude. His 
health had long been undermined by continued anxiety and toil. 
On the 1 st of July, 1839, before the messenger from Nezib reached 
Constantinople, Sultan Mahmoud II. died : and as gallant a spirit 
left the earth, as ever strove against the spites of fortune—as ever 
toiled for a nation’s good in preparing benefits, the maturity of 
which it was not permitted to behold . 1 

Before we consider the personal qualities of his successor, 
Sultan Abdul Medjid, and the constancy with which the reform¬ 
ing policy of Mahmoud has been maintained, it will be convenient 
first to trace rapidly to its conclusion the Egyptian war, which 
seemed to darken with such fatal disasters the opening of the 
young sovereign’s reign. A difference of opinion as to the amount 
of power which should be secured to Mehemet Ali, existed for a 
time between France and the other great powers of Europe, which 
at one period threatened to cause a general war. England, France, 
and Austria, concurred as to the necessity of arranging the Turco- 
Egyptian question, and of not leaving to Russia an opportunity 

1 A report was industriously circulated in the East, and also in Europe, 
that Sultan Mahmoud’s death was caused by habitual drunkenness. TI 10 
official report of his regular medical attendants, Drs. Macarthy and Con¬ 
stantine Caratheodeori, completely refutes this calumny; and it contains 
strong incidental evidence of the Sultan’s steady industry and high intel¬ 
lectual powers. See their “ Relation Officielle de la Maladie, et de la Mort 
du Sultan Mahmoud II.” Paris : J. B. Eailliere, 1841. 


526 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS . • 

of sole intervention, such as that which she gained in 1833. But 
France was no party to the treaty of July 15, 1840, between 
Turkey, England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which defined the 
terms on which the disputes between the Pacha and his sovereign 
were to be arranged. Mehemet Ali (who probably expected aid 
from France) refused for some time to accede to the requisitions 
of Turkey and the Four Powers; and an English fleet, under 
Admirals Stopford and Napier, proceeded to wrest from him his 
strongholds on the Syrian coast. Beyrout was bombarded on 
the 29th of August, i840; its Egyptian garrison was expelled, 
and the Turkish troops, which had been conveyed on board the 
English fleet, took possession of the ruins in the Sultan’s name. 
By a still more splendid achievement of the British navy, Acre 
was bombarded and captured on the 3rd of November. The 
other Syrian fortresses fell rapidly; and, aided by the British 
seamen and marines, and also by the native populations (which 
had found their Egyptian bondage far more grievous than the old 
Turkish rule), the Sultan’s forces were, by the close of November, 
completely masters of Syria. Menaced in Alexandria with the 
fate of Acre, the Pacha at last gave way. He restored the Sultan’s 
fleet. He withdrew his forces from Candia, and from the few 
Asiatic districts which they still retained; and negotiations, in 
which France (noAV directed by the wise statesmanship of 
M. Guizot) took part, were opened for the final settlement of 
these long-continued dissensions. The Sultan’s final Firman 
(Feb. 13, 1841) gave and confirmed to Mehemet Ali for himself 
and descendants in the direct line, the Pachalic of Egypt: one 
fourth of its revenues to be paid as tribute to the Porte, and 
certain naval and military contingents to be supplied on demand. 
In the summer of the same year, a convention of great importance 
with regard to the right of Turkey to control the navigation of 
the Dardanelles, was agreed to by the representatives of England, 
Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte. The first and 
second articles of this convention, which was signed at London 
on July 13, 1841, were as follows : 

“ Art. I. — His Highness, the Sultan, on the one part, declares 
that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle 
invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, and in virtue 
of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of 
foreign powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the 
Bosphorus ; and so long as the Porte is at peace, his Highness will 
admit no foreign ships of war into the said straits. 

“ Art. II.—And their Majesties, the Queen of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of 


ABDUL MEDJID — ACCESSION ,, A.D> 1839 . 527 

Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, 
and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, engage to respect 
this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the 
principle above declared.” 

This formal recognition of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus 
being mere Turkish streams, and not highways for the fleets of 
all nations (as seas in general are), was of great value for Turkey. 
But still the convention of 1841 did not free the Porte from the 
chain by which the treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi had bound it to 
Russia. That liberation was not to be effected without the aid of 
the armed force as well as of the diplomacy of the Western 
powers. It was fortunate for the Ottoman Empire, that a pacific 
period of twelve years intervened before the struggle for that 
liberation commenced ; and, that time was given for the develop¬ 
ment of measures of internal reform. 


523 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


k 


CHAPTER XXV. 

* ' r 

REFORMS OF SULTANS MAHMOUD IL AND ABDUL MEDJID— 
ABOLITION OF THE COURT OF CONFISCATION—POWER OF LIFE 
AND DEATH TAKEN FROM THE PACHAS—THE VAKOUFS—THE 
TIMARS AND THE ZIAMETS ABOLISHED—THE DEREH BEYS PUT 
DOWN — FINANCIAL REFORMS — EDICTS IN FAVOUR OF THE 
RAYAS—REFORM OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION—ACCES¬ 
SION OF ABDUL MEDJID—ARMY REFORMS—THE TANZIMAT— 
RUSSIAN AGGRESSIONS—THE CRIMEAN WAR—PEACE OF PARIS 
—HATTI-Y-HUMAYOUN—ACCESSION OF SULTAN ABDUL-AZIZ— 
CRETAN WAR—ROUMANIA AND SERVIA MADE INDEPENDENT 
STATES—SULTAN VISITS ENGLAND—RUSSIA REPUDIATES THE 
TREATY OF PARIS AS TO THE BLACK SEA—TROUBLES IN 
HERZEGOVINA—NATIONAL INSOLVENCY—DETHRONEMENT AND 
DEATH OF ABDUL-AZIZ—MURAD V., MADE SULTAN, DEPOSED 
— AHMED HAMID II. PRESENT SULTAN—SERVIAN WAR — 
MENACES OF WAR WITH RUSSIA — HOPES OF PEACE NOT 
EXTINCT. 

Among the many services rendered to his country by Sultan 
Mahmoud II., was his careful education of the young princes, who 
were likely to succeed him on the throne. The eldest survivor of 
these, at the time of Mahmoud’s death, Prince Abdul Medjid, was 
only sixteen years of age. But, providentially for Turkey, her 
youthful sovereign possessed not only eminent natural abilities, 
but a thoughtful earnestness of character beyond his years. The 
last charge of his father to him had been, that he should perse¬ 
vere in the completion of those remedial measures, the principles 
and importance of which had been fully taught him, and in 
the enlightenment and amelioration of all classes of his sub¬ 
jects. 

A detailed account of the various changes introduced into every 
part of the polity of the Turkish Empire by Mahmoud would 
exceed the due limits of this chapter. But the main points of the 
more momentous measures may be advantageously surveyed 


MAHMOUD II. AND ABDUL MEDJIlj S REFORMS. 529 

together; and among the first in value as well as in date (next to 
the all-important army reforms, which will be separately con¬ 
sidered), are the edicts, by which Sultan Mahmoud, soon after he 
was emancipated from the military tyranny of the Janissaries, 
closed the Court of Confiscations, and took away the power of life 
and death from the Pachas. Previously to the first of these Firmans, 
the property of all persons banished or condemned to death was 
forfeited to the crown; and a sordid motive for acts of cruelty 
was thus kept in perpetual operation, besides the encouragement 
of a host of Delators of the vilest kind. By the second, it was 
rendered no longer in the power of a Turkish governor to doom 
men to instant death by a mere wave of his hand; but the Pachas, 
the Agas, and other officers, were enjoined that “ they should not 
presume to inflict themselves the punishment of death on any man, 
whether Raya or Turk, unless authorised by a legal sentence pro¬ 
nounced by the Cadi, and regularly signed by the judge.” Even 
then an appeal was allowed to the criminal to one of the Kadiaskers 
of Asia or Europe, and finally to the Sultan himself, if the criminal 
chose to persist in his appeal . 1 

About the same time that Mahmoud ordained these just and 
humane changes, he set personally an example of reform, by 
regularly attending the Divan, instead of secluding himself from 
the labours of state, according to the evil practice, which had been 
introduced so long ago as the reign of Solyman Kanouni, and 
which had been assigned as one of the causes of the decline of the 
empire by a Turkish historian nearly two centuries before Mah¬ 
moud's time . 2 Mahmoud redressed some of the worst abuses con¬ 
nected with the Vakoufs, by placing the revenues under the 
administration of the state; but he did not venture to apply this 
vast mass of property to the general purposes of the government. 
With the military fiefs, the Timars and the Ziamets, he dealt 
more boldly. These had long ceased to furnish the old effective 
military force, for the purpose of which they were instituted; and 
by attaching them to the public domains, Mahmoud materially 
strengthened the resources of the state, and put an end to a‘host 
of corruptions. One of the most resolute acts of his reign was his 
suppression of the Dereh Beys, the hereditary local chiefs (with 
power to nominate their successors in default of male heirs), who, 
by one of the worst abuses of the Turkish feudal system, had 
made themselves petty princes in almost every province of the 
empire. The reduction of these insubordinate feudatories was not 

? Sir Gr. Lament, vol. ii- p. 25. 2 See p. 210. 

34 


530 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

effected at once, or without severe struggles and frequent insurrec¬ 
tions. But Mahmoud steadily persevered in this great measure; 
and ultimately the island of Cyprus became the only part of the 
empire in which power, not emanating from the Sultan, was 
allowed to be retained by Dereh Beys. In dealing with the com¬ 
plicated questions caused by the embarrassed finances of his 
empire, and by the oppression and vexatiousness with which 
certain imposts pressed upon particular classes, Mahmoud showed 
the best spirit of the best of the Kiuprilis. A Firman of February 
22, 1834, abolished the vexatious charges which public func¬ 
tionaries, when traversing the provinces, had long been accustomed 
to make on the inhabitants. By the same edict all collections of 
money, except at the two regular half-yearly periods, were de¬ 
nounced as abuses. “No one is ignorant,” said Sultan Mahmoud, 
in this document, “that I am bound to afford support to all my 
subjects against vexatious proceedings ; to endeavour unceasingly 
to lighten, instead of increasing their burdens, and to ensure their 
peace and tranquillity. Therefore, those acts of oppression are at 
once contrary to the will of God, and to my imperial orders.” 

The kharatch, or capitation-tax, though moderate in amount, 
and exempting those who paid it from military service, 1 had long 
been made an engine of gross tyranny, through the insolence and 
misconduct of the government collectors. The Firman of 1834 
abolished the old mode of levying it, and ordained that in future 
it should be raised by a commission composed of the Cadi, tho 
Mussulman governors, and the Ayans, or municipal chiefs of the 
Bayas of each district. Many other financial improvements were 
effected, the narration of which would be too long for introduction 
here. By another important series of measures, the central 
administrative government was simplified and strengthened; a 
large mass of sinecure offices was abolished, and the Sultan set a 
valuable personal example of good sense, and economy, by re¬ 
organising the imperial household, and mercilessly suppressing all 
titles without duties, and all salaried officials without useful func¬ 
tions. 


I do not propose to prolong the regular history of the Ottoman 
Empire in this volume beyond the reign of Mahmoud II. But 
the reader may not be unwilling to have brought briefly before 

1 The Greek Armatoli who rendered military service, did not pay the 
kharatch. On the other hand, the Turks of Volo and Baba, and some few 
other places, who by special custom did not serve as soldiers, paid the 
kharatch. 



MAHMOUD II. AND ABDUL MEDJID'S REFORMS. 531 

his notice here some of the principal civil and military events 
affecting that empire, which have occurred during the reign of 
Mahmoud’s two nearest successors. 

On the 3rd November, 1839, Sultan Abdul Medjid issued an 
organic statute for the general government of the empire, com¬ 
monly named the Hatti-scherifT of Giilhane (the imperial palace 
where it was first proclaimed), and sometimes called the Tanzimat. 

In this very important document 1 the Sultan stated that he 
designed 

“ to attempt by new institutions to obtain for the provinces composing 
the Ottoman Empire the benefits of a good administration, and that 
these institutions would principally refer to these topics : 

“ ‘ 1. The guarantees which will insure our subjects perfect 
security for their lives, their honour, and their property. 

“ ‘ 2. A regular method of establishing and collecting the taxes. 

“‘3. An equally regular method of recruiting, levying the army, 
and fixing duration of the service.’ ” 

Some of the most important clauses are as follows : 

“ In future, the cause of every accused party will be tried publicly, 
in conformity with our divine law ; and until a regular sentence has 
been pronounced, no one can put another to death, secretly or publicly, 
by poison, or any other form of punishment. 

“No one will be permitted to assail the honour of any one, who¬ 
soever he may be. 

“ Every person will enjoy the possession of his property of every 
nature, and dispose of it with the most perfect liberty, without any 
one being able to impede him : thus, for example, the innocent heirs 
of a criminal will not be deprived of their legal rights, and the pro¬ 
perty of the criminal will not be confiscated. 

“ These imperial concessions extend to all our subjects, whatever 
religion or sect they may belong to ; and they will enjoy them without 
any exception. 

“ Perfect security is, therefore, granted by us to the inhabitants of 
the empire, with regard to their life, their honour, and their fortune, 
as the sacred text of our law demands. 

“ With reference to the other points, as they must be regulated by 
the concurrence of enlightened opinions, our Council of Justice 
(augmented by as many new members as may be deemed necessary), 
to whom will be adjoined, on certain days which we shall appoint, our 
Ministers and the notables of the empire, will meet for the purpose 
of establishing the fundamental laws on those points relating to the 
security of life and property, and the imposition of the taxes. Every 
one in these assemblies will state his ideas freely, and give his opinion. 

“ The laws relating to the regulations of the military service will be 

1 “The whole of it will be found in H°rtslefc’s “Map of Europe by 
Treaty,” vol. ii. p, 1002, 


34—2 



532 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

discussed by the Military Council, holding its meetings at the Palace 
of the Seraskier. As soon as a law is decided upon, it will be presented 
to us, and in order that it may be eternally valid and applicable we 
will confirm it by our sanction, written above it with our imperial hand. 

“ As these present institutions are solely intended for the regenera¬ 
tion of religion, government, the nation, and the Empire, we engage 
to do nothing which may be opposed to them.” 

On the 15th of July, 1840, the convention between Great 
Britain, Austria, Prussia, Prussia, and Turkey was signed for the 
pacification of the Levant (see Hertslet, vol. ii. p. 1008) which was 
followed by Firmans of the Sultan giving the hereditary govern¬ 
ment of Egypt to Mehemet Ali and his family, and fixing the 
tribute to be paid therefor to the Porte. 

Some mention must be made of the military reforms effected by 
Sultan Abdul Medjid. We have seen that Sultan Mahmoud was 
obliged to wage his Russian and Egyptian wars with hasty levies 
of compulsory recruits, taken from among the younger parts of the 
Moslem population. After the promulgation of the Hatti-scheriff 
of Glilhane, a regular system of recruiting the army was estab¬ 
lished; but it was in 1843, when Riza Pacha was Seraskier or 
commander-in-chief, that the remodelling of the military force of 
the empire was completed. The army was divided into the 
troops in active service, called the Nizam, and into those who had 
fulfilled their terms of active service, and thenceforth formed a 
reserve, called the Redif. A specified number of troops is 
required from each district; and this is filled up partly by volun¬ 
teers, partly by conscription, to which all young men of twenty or 
upwards are liable. The period of active service in the Nizam is 
five years. After that, the soldier is permitted to return home, 
but is then incorporated for seven years longer in the Redif of his 
district. This force is summoned together for drill and exercise 
at stated periods, and is liable to be embodied for service in case 
of war or other emergency. All writers on Turkish subjects con¬ 
cur in eulogising the sobriety, patience, obedience, and bravery of 
the Turkish common soldiers ; and in censuring the venality and 
incompetency which are frequent among the officers. But these 
are evils which a wise administration could gradually remedy; 
for, when bravery and aptitude for military discipline are general 
national qualities, and where the state provides schools of military 
education (both of which requisites already exist among the 
Ottomans), there must be an abundant material for good officers. 
All that is needed, is that the higher authorities shall watch care¬ 
fully for intelligence and merit; and shall reward those qualities, 


ABDUL MEDJID — ACCESSION , A.D. 1839 . 533 

'when found, by prompt and liberal promotion. But the con¬ 
scription has pressed severely on the Ottoman part of the popula¬ 
tion, which alone has supplied the armies. An edict, which was 
issued authorising the military service of the Christians, had little 
practical operation. 

Sultan Abdul Medjid was in two important points more fortu¬ 
nate than his father Mahmoud. He found in Omar Pacha an 
excellent general, who put down the various insurrections that 
were attempted against the Sultan’s reforms in Albania, Kurdis¬ 
tan, and Bosnia, and other provinces; and in the suppression of 
those movements Omar showed not only valour and military skill, 
but also humanity and sound judgment. And Abdul Medjid, 
during the years which intervened between the conclusion of the 
Egyptian war in 1841, and the outbreak of the Russian war in 
1853, obtained that necessary period of quiet for the “strengthen¬ 
ing of his military creations, and carrying out needful reforms,” 
which, as we have seen, was denied to his predecessor. During 
this period of twelve years, the advancement of the commercial 
and general prosperity of the empire was marked and rapid. A 
similar amelioration had been visible even to foreign statesmen 
during the latter part of Sultan Mahmoud’s reign; and in 1853, 
Lord Palmerston, in the British House of Commons, bore the 
most emphatic testimony in favour of the two reforming Sultans, 
by declaring that Turkey had made more progress and improve¬ 
ment during the last twenty years than any other country. 

Other and less friendly eyes were watching the revival of 
strength in the Ottoman Empire. But the prudence of Abdul 
Medjicl’s government gave Russia no occasion for quarrel; and 
when the revolutionary fervour of 1848 extended to Moldavia 
and Wallachia, the moderation and fairness with which the Porte 
acted towards the malcontents, presented a striking contrast to 
the eagerness with which a Russian army was marched across the 
Pruth. The forces of the Emperor Nicholas, to the number of 
between 40,000 and 50,000, continued to occupy the Principalities 
till 1850, when they were withdrawn, after lengthened negotia¬ 
tions on the subject with both the Turkish and British cabinets. 
But while the Porte was thus wisely pacific and conciliatory in its 
general conduct towards foreign powers, a memorable and noble 
proof was given in 1849, that Sultan Abdul Medjid had not 
degenerated from the high honour and chivalrous generosity of the 
ancient race of Othman and of Ertoghrul, “The Right-hearted 
Man.” 1 When the united forces of Russia and Austria put an end 

1 See page 1 . 


534 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

to the Hungarian war of independence, many of the chiefs, who 
had been most active in the Magyar cause, escaped into Turkey, 
and received hospitable shelter in the Sultan’s dominions. The 
Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg peremptorily demanded, 
first, their extradition, and afterwards their expulsion from 
Turkey. Sultan Abdul Medjid met these demands and the 
threats with which they were accompanied, with a dignified and 
firm refusal to violate the laws of hospitality, and betray the old 
principles of his race and creed. The two Emperors menaced 
more and more loudly, but in vain. Diplomatic relations between 
Eussia and Turkey were suspended ; and, for a time, war seemed 
certain; but England showed her. intention to aid the Ottoman 
Empire if thus attacked ; and the British fleet, under Sir William 
Parker, was ordered to Besika Bay in October, and in the next 
month entered the Dardanelles. Eussia and Austria thought it 
prudent to abstain from hostilities ; and the diplomatic relations 
which had been broken off were renewed. True to the old policy 
of Potemkin, that Eussia’s conquest of Turkey must be effected 
with the acquiescence of England, 1 the Emperor Nicholas sought 
more than once to induce the English Cabinet to participate in his 
schemes. Some overtures of this kind were made by him during 
his visit to this country in 1844 ; but the most remarkable proof 
of the continual designs of Eussia for the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire, is to be found in the well-known conversations 
of the Emperor Nicholas with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British 
ambassador at St. Petersburg, in the early part of 1853. 2 In 
these strange dialogues the sovereign of Eussia invited the repre 
sentative of this country to discuss with him the partition oi 
Turkey, offering Egypt and Crete to England. “ The Principali 
ties,” said the Czar, “ are, in fact, an independent state under my 
protection: this might so continue. Servia might receive the 
same form of government: so again with Bulgaria.” 

In another part of the same conversation the Emperor referred 
to the possession of Constantinople as the most difficult question 
to settle. He disclaimed any design that it should be permanently 
held by Eussia, though he said that circumstances might cause its 
temporary occupation by his troops. He stated his fixed resolu¬ 
tion that that city should never be held by the English, or French, 
or any other great nation. “ Again,” said he, “I never will per¬ 
mit an attempt at the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire, or 

1 See p. 420, supra. 

2 See Eastern Papers, part v., laid before the Houses of Parliament in 
1S54.—House of Commons’ Papers, No. SS. 


ABDUL MEDJID — AC c 

such an extension of Greece as would re. 
still less will I permit the breaking up ot 
publics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazziim 
tionists of Europe : rather than submit to any w 
ments, I would go to war, and would carry it on as x 
a man and a musket left.” The Czar spoke of Austria a , 

in interest with Russia, and in a manner which seemed /{• 

that he regarded her as entirely subservient to his policy.^" fie 
professed indifference as to what part France might think fit to 
take in Eastern affairs, so that there was a good understanding 
between Russia and England. Turkey was treated by him 
throughout these conversations as an expiring empire; and he 
assured the British minister, that his Government must have been 
deceived if it had been led to believe that Turkey retained any 
elements of existence. “ The sick man is dying. We have on 
our hands a sick man—a very sick man, and he may suddenly die 
on our hands.” Such was his reiterated expression : and the sum 
and substance of his revelations and hints may be fairly character¬ 
ised as a proposal, that the two strongest neighbours of the sick 
man should walk into his house and strangle him, and forthwith 
divide his goods and chattels between themselves. These over¬ 
tures were properly met by the ambassador and ministers of Eng¬ 
land with sincere disclaimers of any desire to participate in the 
spoils of the Ottomans, and with an expression of belief that “ the 
sick man” was not dying; that (in the words of Lord Clarendon’s 
despatch of March 23, 1853) “ Turkey only requires forbearance 
on the part of its allies, and a determination not to press their 
claims in a manner humiliating to the dignity and independence 
of the Sultan—that friendly support, in short, which among states 
as well as individuals the weak are entitled to expect from the 
strong—in order not only to prolong its existence, but to remove 
all cause of alarm respecting its dissolution.” It is impossible to 
read the narrative of these communications between the Russian 
Emperor and the English statesmen, without being convinced that 
Sir Hamilton Seymour judged rightly, when he stated to his court 
that “ It can hardly be otherwise but that the Sovereign who 
insists with such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neigh¬ 
bouring state, must have settled in his own mind that the hour, if 
not of its dissolution, at all events for its dissolution, must be at 
hand.” And, could there have been any doubt in the beginning 
of 1853, that the Czar designed an attack on Turkey, that doubt 
must have been removed by the full knowledge which since has been 
obtained of the immensity of the Russian stores and preparations 


,E OTTOMAN TURKS. 


tne Crimea, far exceeding anything which 
or precaution could require, and evidently 
ness for a sudden and overwhelming assault on 
o Turkish Empire 1 

which actually broke out in 1853, and which was 
terminated by the capture of Sebastopol in 1855, it 
oe useless and unbecoming to attempt a formal narrative 
here. The immediate pretext for it was caught from a revival of 
the old dispute between the Latin and Greek Christians in Pales¬ 
tine, respecting the custody of the Holy Places. 2 An interposition 
of the French Emperor, on behalf of the Roman Catholic subjects 
of France resident in the East, was at one time misconstrued into 
a general claim of protection for all members of the Latin Church, 
but such an assumption was promptly and explicitly disavowed by 
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French minister. But this was made a 
handle for the interference of Russia, and for a demand (among 
others) which her envoy, Prince Menschikoff, preferred in the 
most arrogant and domineering manner—a demand of a general 
protectorate by Russia of all inhabitants of the Turkish Empire, 
who profess the creed of the Greek Church. This is the same 
requisition which Russia had twice made before, but to which the 
Porte, even under the pressure of the greatest calamities, had never 
yielded. It had been preferred in the negotiations of 1773, before 

1 The following remarkable proof of the designs of Russia against Turkey, 
and of her ojDpressive influence on the Sultan’s Government, was communi¬ 
cated to me by Sir P. Colquhoun, who was resident at Constantinople, as 
representative of the Hanse Towns, at the time in question : 

“ Two artillery officers were sent out by the English Government in 1840 
with an artificer of Congreve rockets and other projectiles, a bombardier, 
and some workmen, to assist the Porte in fortifying the Bosphorus. But 
the Russian envoy, M. Titow, interfered to prevent the execution of the 
works which those officers designed ; and such was the influence of Eussia 
in the Divan, that the Porte dared not fortify the passage from the Black 
Sea to the Turkish capital, against the will of the Emperor Nicholas. The 
English officers and engineers remained for five years at Constantinople, 
during which time repeated attempts were made by them and the British 
ambassador to cause their plans to be carried out. At last, one of these 
officers returned to England with the engineering staff and the unused 
designs, and the other was employed on the Turco-Persian frontier. Every 
one in Constantinople, down to the smallest merchant, knew at that time 
the object of Russia in keeping the Bosphoi’us unfortified, and was aware 
that the Porte was obliged to obey her commands.” 

2 Very full and clear information on this subject, and on the various 
treaties made by various Christian Powers (especially France) with the 
Porte as to the Holy Places, will be found in. Phillimore’s “ International 
Law,” voL i. p. 577 ei seq_. 


ABDUL MEDJ1D—ACC a. 

the conclusion of the peace of Kairiara, 
pressed on Sultan Selim in 1805, a little A ' ! before 

general, Michelson, occupied the Principal! des. All tha. 
been admitted into the treaties between the two empires, air a 
(as well stated by an eminent jurist, Dr. Phillimore) to no- 
than— ^ v 

“ 1. That pilgrims, ecclesiastics, and travellers may visit, safely and 
untaxed, Jerusalem and the Holy Places. 

“ 2. That certain new chapels may be built in a particular quarter 
of Constantinople —a Vexample des autres puissances —besides the 
Ambassadorial Chapel, then existing. There is a similar provision in 
the French Treaty of 1740. 

“ 3. That the Sublime Porte, not the Emperor of Russia, shall 
continue to protect the Christian religion ; the interference of the 
Emperor being in the same clause limited to the making representations 
in favour of a particular church and its clergy, to which the Porte, on 
the ground of friendship alone, engages to listen.” 

On the refusal of Sultan Abdul Medjid to transfer the sove¬ 
reignty over thirteen millions of his subjects to the Emperor 
Nicholas, the armies of Russia (3rd July, 1853) passed thePruth, 
and occupied Moldavia and Wallachia, “as a material guarantee” 
for the fulfilment of the Czar’s demands. On the 9th of the 
same month, a manifesto of the Emperor Nicholas to the Russian 
nation appeared, in which he stated to his subjects that the solemn 
oath of the Sultan had been perfidiously broken, and appealed to 
their religious feelings against their old Mahometan adversary. 
On the 1st of October, the Porte declared war, which was carried 
on during the ensuing winter on the banks of the Danube by the 
Turkish army under Omar Pacha, with remarkable spirit and suc¬ 
cess. Instead of waiting, as in former wars, to be attacked, the 
Turks crossed the river, and gained victories at Oltenitza (Novem¬ 
ber 4) and at Citate (November 5). The loss on either side in 
these actions was not heavy; but they were of incalculable impor¬ 
tance in demonstrating to Turkey, to Russia, and to Europe, the 
reality of the improvement which had been effected in the Otto¬ 
man military system : and they tended materially to augment, in 
the Turkish ranks, that self-confidence and self-respect which are 
material elements of success in war. The aid of France and 
England was, from the very commencement of the war, given 
frankly and zealously to the Sultan. Their fleets entered the 
Dardanelles in September; and in the spring of the next year, 
each of the great European nations of the West had landed 

1 See p. 401, svprd. 


HE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


opean Turkey, and had occupied the Baltic 
ae Euxine with its navy; thus compelling Russia to 
.cage portions of her force in the north-west for home 
once against the allies of the Porte. In Turkey, the great 
Mature of the war, during the first half of the year 1854, 
was the siege of Silistria by the main Russian army, under the 
command first of General Schilders, and afterwards of Marshal 
Paskievitsch. The defence of that fortress by the Ottomans under 
Moussa Pacha (who was killed near the end of the siege), and 
two English officers, named Butler and Nasmyth, is one of the 
noblest examples of heroic valour and endurance that are recorded 
in military history. The Russians were repeatedly repulsed in a 
series of desperate and murderous assaults; and finally recrossed 
the Danube on the 15th of June, with immense loss of men and 
military stores of every description. The Turks passed the 
Danube in pursuit of the retreating Russians, and had gained 
further advantages, when hostilities in Moldavia and Wallachia 
were checked by Austria marching her troops into those Princi¬ 
palities, and by the belligerents acquiesciug in a convention for 
their being left in her temporary occupation. The French and 
English armies, that had been hitherto prepared to defend Varna 
if Silistria fell, now assumed the offensive; and, in September, 
the memorable expedition to the Crimea was undertaken. 

That Peninsula became now the region, to which the anxious 
interest of all Europe was for more than a twelvemonth directed. 
The allied armies landed near Eupatoria, and took possession of 
that city on September 14, and on the 20th the victory of the 
Alma opened to them the road to Sebastopol. The siege of that 
renowned stronghold began in the same month, and was prolonged 
with almost unexampled bravery and resolution cn both sides 
until the 8th of September, 1855, when the victorious assault was 
delivered, in which the French column captured the long-coveted 
Malakoff Tower, and on the following day the city was in the 
possession of the allies. 

In Asia, the incompetency of the Turkish commanders gave 
several easy triumphs to the Russians ; but the important city of 
Kars was nobly defended by the garrison and armed citizens under 
their English leaders, Williams and Teesdale, and the Hungarian 
Ivmety. On the 29th of September, they gained a signal victory 
over the Russian army under General Mouravieff; but they were 
unable to break the blockade: no relief came from without, and 
at last, on the 25th of November, the worn and wasted band of 
heroes was starved into surrender. 


ABDUL MEDJID — ACCESSION, A.D. 1839 . 539 

Negotiations were opened, on the intervention of Austria, early 
in 1855, between Russia and the powers in alliance against her, 
consisting of Turkey, England, France, and Sardinia. The Russian 
Court consented that the following five propositions should be 
taken as the basis of a pacification: 

11 1. Danubian Principalities. —Complete abolition of the Russian 
protectorate. The Danubian Principalities shall receive an organisa¬ 
tion conformable to their wishes, to their wants, to their interests ; and 
this new organisation, respecting which the population itself will be 
consulted, shall be recognised by the contracting Powers and sanctioned 
by the Sultan as emanating from his sovereign initiative. No state 
shall be able, under any pretext whatever, under any form of pro¬ 
tectorate, to interfere in the question of the internal administration 
of the Principalities ; they shall adopt a definitive permanent system 
demanded by their geographical position ; and no impediment shall be 
made to their fortifying, in the interest of their safety, in such 
manner as they may deem advisable, their territory against foreign 
aggression. 

“ In exchange for the strong places and territories occupied by the 
Allied armies, Russia consents to a rectification of her frontier with 
Turkey in Europe. It would commence in the vicinity of Choytm, 
follow the line of the mountains, which extend in a south-easterly 
direction, and terminate at Lake Sasik. The line ( trace ) shall be 
definitively regulated by the general treaty ; and the conceded terri¬ 
tory would return to the Principalities and to the suzerainty of the 
Porte. 

“2. The Danube. —The freedom of the Danube and of its mouths shall 
be efficaciously assured by European institutions, in which the con¬ 
tracting Powers shall be equally represented, except the particular 
positions of the lords of the soil on the banks ( des riverains ), which 
shall be regulated upon the principles established by the act of the 
Congress of Vienna as regards the navigation of rivers. Each of the 
contracting Powers shall have the right to keep one or two small 
vessels stationed at the mouths of the river, destined to assure the 
execution of the regulations relative to the freedom of the Danube. 

“ 3. Neutralisation of the Black Sea. —This sea shall be open to 
merchant vessels, closed to war navies (marines militaires ) ; conse¬ 
quently, no naval military arsenals shall be created or maintained 
there. The protection of the commercial and maritime interests of 
all nations shall be assured in the respective ports of the Black Sea 
by the establishment of institutions conformable to international law, 
and to the customs sanctioned in such matters. The two Powers which 
hold the coast engage themselves to maintain only the number of 
light vessels, of a fixed force, necessary for their coast .service. This 
convention, concluded separately between these two Powers, shall 
form part as an annex of the general treaty after receiving the 
approval of the contracting parties. This separate convention cannot 
be annulled or modified without the consent of the signataries of the 


54 o HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

general treaty. The closing of the Straits will admit the exception 
applicable to the stationary vessels mentioned in the preceding 
article. 

“4. Christian Subjects of the Porte. —The immunities of the Ray a 
subjects of the Porte shall be religiously preserved, without infringe¬ 
ment on the independence and dignity of the Sultan’s crown. As 
deliberations are taking place between Austria, France, Great Britain, 
and the Sublime Porte, to assure to the Christian subjects of the 
Sultan their religious and political rights, Russia shall be invited, 
when peace is made, to associate herself thereto. 

“ 5. The belligerent Powers reserve to themselves the right which 
appertains to them of producing in an European interest special con¬ 
ditions over and above the four guarantees.” 

Paris was selected as the place for the conference; and there 
accordingly assembled the Plenipotentiaries of France, England, 
Russia, Turkey, and Sardinia, which last-mentioned country had, 
during the latter part of the war, co-operated gallantly with 
the two Great Powers of the West in the common cause of 
justice and of national independence. Austria, as the mediating 
power, took part by her diplomatic representatives in the whole 
proceedings of the Congress. Prussia, which had at first stood 
aloof, was induced, at the end of the discussions, to become a party 
to the terms on 'which the others had debated and resolved. At 
last, on Sunday, the 30th of March, 1856, a treaty, framed in 
accordance with the propositions that have been cited, was signed 
by the ministers of the Seven Powers, and peace was restored. 

The terms of the Treaty of Paris may be seen at length in 
“ Hertslet,” second volume, page 1250. Those, which it seems 
material to cite here, were as follows : 

By Article VII. the Sublime Porte was declared by the other 
signatary Powers to be admitted to participate in the advantages 
of the Public Law and System ( concert) of Europe. The Christian 
sovereigns engaged, each on his part, 

“ to respect the Independence and the Territorial Integrity of tho 
Ottoman Empire ; guarantee in common the strict observance of that 
engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its 
violation as a question of general interest. 

“ Mediation in event of Misunderstanding between the Sublime Porte and 
one or more of the Contracting Powers. 

“ Art. YIII. If there should arise between the Sublime Porte and 
one or more of the other Signing Powers, any misunderstanding which 
might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte, 
and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, 


ABDUL MEDJID — ACCESSION, A.D. 1839 . 541 

shall afford the other Contracting Parties the opportunity of pre¬ 
venting such an extremity by means of their Mediation. 

“ Amelioration of Condition of Christian Population of Ottoman 

Empire. 

“Art. IX. His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having, in his constant 
solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a Firman which, 
while ameliorating their condition without distinction of Religion or 
of Race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian popula¬ 
tion of his Empire, and wishing to give a further proof of his senti¬ 
ments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting 
Parties the said Firman, emanating spontaneously from his Sovereign 
will. 

“ Non-interference of Allies in Internal Affairs of Ottoman Empire. 

“ The Contracting Powers recognise the high value of this com¬ 
munication. It is clearly understood that it cannot, in any case, give 
to the said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or 
separately, in the relations of his Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, 
nor in the Internal Administration of his Empire. 

“ Closing of Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles. 

“Art. X. The Convention of 13th of July, 1841, which maintains 
the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire relative to the Closing of 
the Straits of the Bosphorus and of Dardanelles, has been revised by 
common consent. 

The Act concluded for that purpose, and in conformity -with that 
principle, between the High Contracting Parties, is and remains an¬ 
nexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same force and validity 
as if it formed an integral part thereof. 

“ Neutralisation of the Black Sea. 

« Art. XI. The Black Sea is Neutralised ; its Waters and its Ports, 
thrown open to the Mercantile Marine of every Nation, are formally 
and in perpetuity interdicted to the Flag of War, either of the Powers 
possessing its Coasts, or of any other Power, with the exceptions 
mentioned in Articles XIY. and XIX. ef the present Treaty. 

“ Commercial Regulations in the Black Sea. 

u Art. XII. Free from any impediment, the Commerce in the Ports 
and Waters of the Black Sea shall be subject only to Regulations of 
Health, Customs, and Police, framed in a spirit favourable to the 
development of Commercial transactions. 

« Military Maritime Arsenals not to be established or maintained on 

Coasts of Black Sea. 

11 Art. XIII. The Black Sea being Neutralised according to the 
terms of Article XI., the maintenance or establishment upon its Coast 
of Military Maritime Arsenals become alike unnecessary and pur- 


HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 


542 

poseless ; in consequence, his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, 
and his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, engage not to establish or to 
maintain upon that Coast any Military-Maritime Arsenal. 

“ Russian and Ottoman Naval Force in Blaclc Sea. 

11 Art. XIY. Their Majesties the Emperor of All the Russias and 
the Sultan having concluded a Convention for the purpose of settling 
the Force and the Number of Light Vessels, necessary for the service 
of their Coasts, which they reserve to themselves to maintain in the 
Black Sea, that Convention is annexed to the present Treaty, and 
shall have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part 
thereof. It cannot be either annulled or modified without the assent 
of the Powers signing the present Treaty.” 

By the Convention of the same date referred to in the treaty, 
and referred to in it, it was declared that— 

“ Prohibition to Foreign Ships of War to enter the Bosphorus and 

the Dardanelles. 

“ Art. I. His Majesty the Sultan, on the one part, declares that he 
is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably 
established as the ancient rule of his Empire, and in virtue of which 
it has, at all times, been prohibited for the Ships of War of Foreign 
Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus; 
and that, so long as the Porte is at Peace, his Majesty will admit no 
Foreign Ship of War into the said Straits. 

11 Agreement of Six Powers to respect this Prohibition. 

“ And their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the 
French, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of All the Russias, and the 
King of Sardinia, on the other part, engage to respect this determi¬ 
nation of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above 
declared. 

“ Admission , under Firman , of Light Vessels in Service of Foreign 

Missions. 

“ Art. II. The Sultan reserves to himself, as in past times, to 
deliver Firmans of Passage for Light Vessels under Flag of War, 
which shall be employed, as is usual, in the service of the Missions of 
Foreign Powers.” 

Another convention of the same date, between Russia and 
Turkey, fixed the number of light vessels to be maintained by each 
Power in the Black Sea. 

By a treaty of the 15th April, 1856, between Great Britain, 
Austria, and France, these three contracting parties bound them¬ 
selves to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, as 
follows: 


ABDUL MEDJID — ACCESSION , A.D. 1839 . 543 

11 Guarantee of Independence and Integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 

“ Art. I. The High Contracting Parties Guarantee, jointly and 
severally, the Independence and the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, 
resorded in the Treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March, 1856. 

“Any Infraction of Treaty of 30th March , 1856, to be considered as 

a casus belli. 

“ Art. II. Any infractions of the stipulations of the said Treaty 
■will be considered by the Powers signing the present Treaty as a 
casus belli. They will come to an understanding with the Sublime 
Porte as to the measures which have become necessary, and will 
without delay determine among themselves as to the employment of 
their Military and Naval Forces.” 

While the negotiations for the close of the Crimean war were in 
progress, Sultan Abdul Medjid put forth another important state 
document, called the Hatti-y-Humayoun, addressed to his Grand 
Vizier, Alati Pacha, by which he bound himself to maintain the 
franchises and securities given by the Hatti-scheriff of Giilhane to 
all classes of his subjects, without distinction of rank or religion. 
It contained numerous directions for the summoning of local 
councils of each Christian community for local self-government, for 
ensuring free exercise of religion, for providing mixed tribunals in 
matters where the litigants were of different religious persuasions, 
for raising contingents of Christian troops, and for numerous 
improvements in administration of legal and of commercial matters. 

The execution of these orders has not equalled the excellence of 
their design. 

By another edict of the same year, the Sultan forbade the 
further importation of slaves into his empire. 

There continued to be numerous discussions between Bussia 
and Turkey as to the government of Moldavia and Wallachia. 
England and France and other Powers took part in some of these, 
and in 1858 a treaty 1 was executed by which these two Princi¬ 
palities were recognised as united, but under the suzerainty of the 
Sultan. Practically, they were made a free state, under the 
government of an elective Hospodar. 

In 1860 the disturbances that took place in Syria, in the 
districts of Lebanon, grew so serious, as to attract the anxious 
notice of the chief Powers of Europe. There was actual civil 
war between the Druses and the Maronites; and the troops of 
the Turkish Government, instead of repressing these disorders, 
took part with the Mahometan portion of the combatants in plun¬ 
dering Maronite villages, and slaughtering the inhabitants. There 

1 Herts., vol. ii. p. 1330. 


544 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

was also an outbreak of the fanatic fury of the rabble of Damascus; 
and the authorities there connived at, if they did not promote, 
foul plunder and massacre, of which the Christians of that city 
were the victims. A convention was agreed to by Great Britain, 
Russia, France, Austria, and Prussia, to which it is to be carefully 
observed that the Sultan was a consenting party, in pursuance of 
which a French army of 10,000 men was sent to Syria to restore 
order. But the Porte, alarmed at the probable effects of this 
apparent confession of its imbecility, took energetic measures, 
while the French expedition was yet on its way, to restore order 
and to punish the chief offenders. Fuad Pacha executed this 
mission with such strenuous severity, that the French, on their 
arrival, found the province pacified ; and they returned to France, 
after occupying the chief military posts in Syria for a short 
period. 

On the 25th of June, 1861, Sultan Abdul Medjid died, and was 
succeeded by Sultan Abdul Aziz. 

The important Island of Crete now became the part of the 
Ottoman dominions that caused general disquiet in Europe. A 
wide-spread insurrection against the Turkish rule broke out there; 
which was aided and maintained almost undisguisedly for a con¬ 
siderable time by the government of Greece. It was generally 
believed that Greece herself was encouraged to this aggressive 
policy by help and by promises of support given by another far 
stronger empire. The Cretan war continued until 1867, when 
the Porte formally insisted on the Greeks giving up their co¬ 
operation with the insurgents. Diplomatic relations between 
Greece and Turkey were broken off; and there seemed to be 
every probability of open war between these two states—a war in 
which other and stronger belligerents would probably have soon 
taken part. But the Great Powers (Britain, Austria, France, 
Italy, Prussia, and Russia) concurred in a formal declaration 
(20th January, 1869 ; see Hertzlett, vol. iii., 1864), which expresses 
regret and censure as to the conduct of Greece, and pronounces 
that “ It is indeed unquestionable that the principles of Inter¬ 
national Law oblige Greece, like other nations, not to allow that 
bands should be recruited on her territory, or that vessels should 
be armed in her ports to attack a neighbouring state.” In obe¬ 
dience to this requisition by her expected coadjutor, as well as by 
the other great states of Christendom, Greece became a party to 
the convention; and diplomatic relations between her and Turkey 
were restored. Some concessions were made by the Sultan's 


ABDUL AZIZ—ACCESSION. A.D. 1 S 61 . 545 

government to the demands of the Cretan chiefs, and the insur¬ 
rectionary movements in that island terminated. 

It has been mentioned that Turkey, in Sultan Abdul Medjid’s 
reign, consented to the reunion of Moldavia and Wallachia as a 
single dominion, practically independent of the Porte. In 1866 
the ruling dynasty of these principalities (now generally spoken 
of under the collective name of Roumania) was changed; and 
Prince Charles of Hohenzollern was invested by the Sultan as 
their hereditary prince. The close family connection of Prince 
Charles with the monarch of Prussia, whom the Seven Weeks’ 
War with Austria has made Emperor of Germany, gives an un¬ 
usual degree of interest to this change of princely dynasty on 
the northern bank of the Danube. 

Continual complaints had been made by the party in Servia, 
which was under the influence of the Sultan’s enemies, that the 
liberty of that country was incomplete, so long as Belgrade and 
other Servian fortresses were occupied by the Sultan’s soldiers. 
In April, 1867, the Porte, by the advice of France and England, 
endeavoured to obviate all risk of hostilities against Turkey being 
any longer fomented in that quarter, by issuing a Firman (see 
Hertslet, vol. iii. p. 1800), in consequence of which the Turkish 
garrisons were withdrawn ; and Servia was made a completely in¬ 
dependent power, so far as regarded her former masters. 

While the troubles connected with the Cretan insurrection -were 
still unsettled, Sultan Abdul Aziz travelled beyond his dominions 
for a pacific visit to some of the chief states of Christendom. He 
was in London in 1867. No other Turkish Sultan ever took a 
similar journey. 

The Porte took no part direct or indirect in the war of 1870, 
between France and Germany; but the disasters which befell 
France in that struggle were of calamitous importance to Turkey. 
While France was strong, she was both willing and able to co¬ 
operate with England in securing the substantial observance of 
the conditions, on which the Crimean war had been terminated. 
The most important of these, for the safety of the Ottoman Em¬ 
pire, was the convention for neutralising the Biack Sea. This 
restriction on the aggressive power of Russia was now repudiated 
by the Russian Government. 

I shall repeat here some of the observations lately made on this 
subject in my work on International Law, as they appear to me, 
on reflection, to be fully warranted by the facts and by the justice 
of the case. 


546 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS. 

“ In 1856, after the fall of Sebastopol, peace was made between 
Russia and the Allies by the general Treaty of Paris of the 30th of 
March, 1856. That treaty contained many provisions as to many 
subjects ; but its most important stipulation was an engagement on the 
part of Russia to limit her naval forces and armaments on the Black 
Sea to a defined minimum. This limitation of the Russian forces in 
this quarter had been one of the main objects of the war ; and it was 
especially in order to effect it that the Crimean expedition had been 
planned and persevered in by France and England. 

“ So long as the strength of both these two great Western Powers 
remained unimpaired, Russia made no protest against this treaty, and 
preferred no claim to be released from any part of it. But near the 
end of 1870, when the military force of France had been crushed by 
her defeats in the war with the Germans, when Paris was besieged, 
and the submission of France to her invaders was obviously only a 
question of time, the English Government- were informed by the 
Russian Minister, in the name of the Emperor, that ‘ His Imperial 
Majesty cannot hold himself bound by the stipulations of the Treaty 
of 18th (30th) of March, 1856, as far as they restrict his sovereign 
rights in the Black Sea.’ The Russian Note, containing this ‘ De¬ 
nouncement ’ of the Treaty of Paris, will be found in the 3rd volume 
of Hertslet’s ‘ Map of Europe by Treaty,’ p. 1892. It should be read 
through, as should also be the ‘ Further Russian Note ’ which follows it, 
by all who wish to be satisfied as to the real character of these 
transactions. 

“ It will be seen that Prince Gortchakoff complains of the stipu¬ 
lations about Black-Sea armaments pressing hardly upon Russia ; but 
besets the chief pretext for Russia’s conduct in the following words: 
‘The Treaty of 18th (30th) of March, 1856, has not escaped the modi¬ 
fications to which most European transactions have been exposed, and 
in the face of which it would be difficult to maintain that the written law, 
founded upon the respect of Treaties as the basis of Public Right, and 
regulating the relations between States, retains the moral validity which 
it may have possessed at other times.’ He goes on to complain, first, of 
some changes of government which had occurred in the Principalities 
of Moldavia and Wallachia ; and secondly, of foreign men of war 
having been suffered to enter the Straits and the Black Sea. As to 
the first of the matters thus particularised, it is obvious that the 
affairs of the Principalities had nothing to do with the stipulations as to 
the Euxine ; they were of no real importance in themselves, and the 
mention of so frivolous an excuse shows the weakness of the Russian 
case. As to foreign ships of war passing the Dardanelles and Bos¬ 
phorus, it appeared, from inquiries made by the British Government, 
the result of which was published in a Parliamentary Paper, that in 
sixteen years eight ships of war only had so passed ; that one of these 
was Russian, only three French or English, and that no infraction of 
treaty had taken place as to any of them. 

“ The really important new facts which had occurred between the 
Spring of 1856 and the winter of 1870, and which to the Muscovite 


ABDUL AZIZ — ACCESSION. A.D. 18 S 1 . 


547 

mind { modified the moral validity ’ of the Treaty of Paris, were, first, 
the temporary prostration of France after the catastrophes of Sedan 
and Metz, and her consequent inability to side with England in 
upholding the treaty which had been the result of their joint efforts 
in the Crimean war ; and secondly, the determination which the 
German and Austro-Hungarian Powers had formed not to co-operate 
with England in any armed resistance to Russia’s project for nulli¬ 
fying the protection to the independence of Turkey, which that 
Treaty of 1856 had created, when it limited the Russian armaments 
in and near to the Euxine. The English Government had ascertained 
this ; and the English Premier informed the House of Commons in 
the Debate on the Address in 1871, that “ We should not have had 
a single ally among the Neutral Powers if we had proposed simply 
to insist on the neutralisation of the Black Sea.’ There can be no 
doubt that Prince Gortchakoff had learned with equal accuracy 
what policy Austria and other Powers intended to pursue if England 
went to war for the sake of the denounced treaty. 

“ Under these circumstances the British Foreign Secretary sent a 
reply to the Russian Notes protesting against Russia declaring as a 
general doctrine that a single party to a treaty might destroy the 
treaty at pleasure ; but containing the following invitation :—‘ If 
instead of such a declaration the Russian Government had addressed 
her Majesty’s Government and the other Powers who are parties to 
the Treaty of 1856, and had proposed for consideration with them 
whether anything had occurred which could be held to amount to an 
infraction of the treaty, or whether there is anything in the terms 
which, from altered circumstances, presses with undue severity upon 
Russia, or which, in the course of events, had become unnecessary for 
the due protection of Turkey, her Majesty’s Government would not 
have refused to examine the question in concert with the cosignataries 
to the treaty.” 1 

“ The hint was taken. Russia condescended to admit that ‘ it is an 
essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate 
itself from the engagement of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations 
thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers by means 
of an amicable arrangement.’ 2 This ceremonious admission was made 
by a proctocol signed on the 17th of January at London, and by a 
treaty signed there on the 13th of the following month, the articles 
of the Treaty of Paris as to the navigation of the Black Sea were 
abrogated, and Russia gained her purpose of discarding the restraints 
ehe had submitted in 1856.” a 

In 1875 the turbulence and armed strife which for centuries 
have been chronic in Herzegovina and the districts near its ill- 
defined frontiers, broke out into unusual violence, and were soon 
accompanied by open insurrection against the Sultan by the great 
majority of the Herzegovenes. Armed bands also from Monte- 

1 Hertslet, vol. iii. p. 1200. 2 Ibid., p. 1904. 3 Ibid., p. 1919. 

35—2 


543 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN TURKS 

negro were engaged in frequent and active attacks on the Turkish 
forces, and in Mahometan districts ; nor have there been wanting 
sure proof of substantial sympathy with the. insurgents, or, at 
least, of enmity towards the Ottoman on the part of much more 
formidable powers. Tumults, amounting to civil war, were ex¬ 
cited in many districts of Bosnia, where the population is partly 
Mahometan, and partly Christian. Insurrectionary societies were 
actively at work in Bulgaria; and the Sultan’s Government was 
placed in difficulties, of which a disastrous confession was made to 
Europe by an official announcement that the interest due to the 
public creditors of Turkey could not be provided. 

The Turkish National Debt was an evil novelty in the insti¬ 
tutions of the empire, which had come into existence during the 
Crimean war, and had rapidly grown into perilously large propor¬ 
tions. Only a small portion of the money had been borrowed at 
home. The great mass had been raised by successive loans 
contracted with the capitalists of Western Europe, and chiefly in 
the London Market. It amounted in 1876 to 195 millions. The 
first decree on the subject, in October, 1875, promised speedy 
payment of half the interest, and securities for the residue; but 
these, like most other promises of the kind, proved worthless; 
and in July, 1876, it was frankly announced that payments 
in respect of the National Debt must cease, while the state 
troubles continued. This declaration of insolvency on the part 
of Turkey did more than anything else to create a wide-spread 
belief that the speedy downfall of the Ottoman Empire was to be 
expected; and it also did much to create the disfavour, with 
which the Turks have lately been regarded in England, compared 
with the general zeal in their behalf, which was generally felt here 
when Turkey was attacked by Bussia in 1854. Defaulters are 
always unpopular. 

On the 30th of May, 1876, Sultan Abdul-Aziz was formally but 
forcibly deposed. On the 4th of June following, he Avas found 
dead in the place of confinement to which he had been removed. 

Murad (or Amurath) Y. was proclaimed Sultan in his stead; 
but the new sovereign proved hopelessly imbecile, and he was in 
turn deposed on the 31st of August. His brother, Abdul 
Hamid II., was then proclaimed Sultan, and at present continues 
to hold that station. 

The troubles and hostilities in the north-western districts of 
the empire and in Bulgaria assumed more and more alarming pro¬ 
portions. Servia, which had no ground of complaint whatever 
against Turkey for aught that had occurred during the present 


ABDUL HAMID II. — ACCESSION. A.D. iS 76 . 549 

generation, and which had received complete independence when 
Belgrade and her other fortresses were evacuated by the Ottomans, 
took undisguised part in aiding the Herzegovines, and in exciting 
the Bulgarians to insurrection. The movements in Bulgaria were 
quelled by the Turkish Government; but it was done by the 
employment of irregular troops, who committed cruelties and 
outrages, the report of which filled western Christendom with 
horror, and did more harm to the Turkish cause than could have 
been produced by any reverses in the field, or by the loss of whole 
provinces. 

In July, 1876, Servia and Montenegro declared war against 
Turkey. The Servian armies were largely recruited by Russian 
soldiery, and were chiefly officered by Russians, who took part in 
the campaign with the full knowledge and sanction of their govern¬ 
ment. The Turks were almost uniformly successful in this war, 
and were only checked from a victorious advance on the Servian 
capital by the peremptory interposition of Russia. An armistice 
was agreed to on the 31st of October. Against the Montenegrins 
the Turks were generally unsuccessful. Hostilities in this region 
also were suspended at the close of the autumn by an armistice. 

There have been numerous changes of ministers at Constanti¬ 
nople, which it is needless to discuss here : nor is it necessary to 
examine the details of the constitutional decree put forward in the 
name of the new Sultan, which purports to be still more liberal than 
even that of Giilhane, and the Hatti-y-Humayoun. After years 
must show whether it has to have any practical value, if indeed 
the opportunity of putting it in practice be ever allowed to the 
House of Othman. 

In November the Emperor Alexander made a public speech to 
the local authorities at Moscow, in which he announced that if 
Turkey did not give due guarantees for the better government of 
its Christian subjects, he would enforce them, either in concert 
with his allies, or by independent action. In the same month he 
ordered the mobilisation of part of his army ; and large masses of 
Russian troops have been stationed since then in Bessarabia, ready 
to commence the invasion of Turkey at their Emperor’s command. 


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INDEX 


A 

Abdul Aziz, Sultan, 544 ; Cretan War, ib. ; 
visits England, 545. 

Abdul Hamid II., present Sultan, 548. 

Abdul Hamid 1. succeeds as Sultan, 409 ; pro- 
laims a holy war against Russia, ib. ; con¬ 
tinued reverses, ib. ; Peace of Kainardji, 
410 ; war renewed, 430 ; death, 433. 

Abdul Medjid succeeds as Sultan at the age of 
sixteen, 528 ; issues the iiatti-scheritf of 
Giilhan6, 531; makes further reforms, 532 ; 
proclaims war with Russia in 1853 ; peace, 
540 ; death, 544. 

Aboukir, battle of, 463. 

Achmet 1., accession of, 238; boyhood pro¬ 
mises a vigorous reign, ib. ; weakness of 
maturer years, ib. ; makes peace with Austria, 
239 ; no great European power attacks his 
dominions, 240; war with Persia continued, 
241; his death, ib. ; tobacco introduced into 
Turkey in his reign, see note, ib. 

Achmet II. proclaimed Sultan, 310 ; confirms 
Kiuprili in his dignity of Vizier, ib. ; wars 
unsuccessfully with the Imperialists, 311; 
dies, ib. 

Achmet III., accession of, 324 ; complains to 
the Czar Peter of his warlike preparations, 
325 ; affords hospitality to Charles XII. of 
Sweden, 326 ; makes Nououman Kiuprili 
Grand Vizier, 327; declares war against 
Russia, 328 ; his Vizier reduces the Russians 
to great extremity, 332 ; makes a treaty of 
peace with them, 333 ; again prepares for 
war with the Czar, 337 ; draws up another 
treaty through the intervention of the Eng¬ 
lish and Dutch, ib. ; gives the Vizierate to 
Damad Ali, his favourite son-in-law, 338 ; 
war against the Venetians in the Morea, 
339 ; successes there, ib. ; war declared 
against Austria, 346 ; Turks defeated, 342 ; 
loss of Belgrade, 344 ; seeks for peace with 
Austria, ib. ; concludes a solemn treaty of 
eternal peace with Russia, 346; assists the 
Czar against Persia, 347 ; disorders and re¬ 
volts of his frontier provinces, 348 ; he is 
deposed, 349 ; remarks on his reign, ib. 

Acre, bombardment of. 526. 

Adair, Sir Robert, concludes the treaty of the 

Aden taken aAd fortified by the Turks, 179. 


Adje-Eey, celebrated Turkish captain, cap¬ 
tures Gallipoli, 20. 

Adrianople captured by Amurath, 22 ; treaty 
of, 521. 

Ahmed Kiuprili becomes Grand Vizier, 277 ; 
abilities as ruler, ib. ; noble rebuke to the 
chief of the Ulema, ib. ; heads the Ottoman 
armies in the war with Austria, ib. ; first 
achievements, ib. ; disposition of his forces 
at the battle of St. Gothard, 281 ; he is de¬ 
feated, 283 ; plans the reduction of Candia, 
284; takes the city, 285 ; assists the Cos¬ 
sacks against Poland, 286 ; he is routed near 
Khoczin, 288 ; death and character, ib. 
Akindji, Turkish light horsemen, 3. 
Alaeddin, Sultan of Seljukian Turks, 2. 
Alaeddin, son of Othman, 11; Vizier to Orchan, 
12; introduces laws, 13 ; creates a standing 
army, ib. 

Algiers seized by the French, 521. 

Ali Pacha, of Yanaka, birth and character of, 
499; rebellion against the Sultan, 501; 
death, ib. 

Amurath I., his wars and conquests, 22 ; 
marries the daughter of Sisvan, 24 ; con¬ 
duct during peace, ib. ; marriage of his son 
Bajazet, 25 ; quells an insurrection, ib. ; ex¬ 
tent of his • dominions in Europe, 26 ; 
powers allied against him to seize his Euro¬ 
pean conquests, 27 ; crosses the Hellespont 
to meet his foes, 28; defeats the King of 
Servia on the plains of Kossova, 29; mor¬ 
tally wounded by Milosch, 32. 

Amurath II. recognised as Sultan, 59 ; defeats 
the pretender Mustapha, 60 ; besieges Con¬ 
stantinople, ib. ; raises the siege, 61 ; civil 
war, 62 ; treaty with Greek Emperor, ib. ; 
captures Thessalonica, ib. ; repulsed from 
Belgrade, 63 ; struggle with the Western 
powers, 64 ; anxious for tranquillity in his 
European dominions, makes a treaty of 
peace, 66 ; domestic qualities, 67 ; abdicates 
in favour of his son Mahomet, ib. ; treaty 
of peace broken by the Christian powers, 
ib. ; emerges from retirement to meet his 
foes, 68 ; defeats Hunyades, 70; seizes 
Scanderbeg’s patrimony, 72 ; long war with 
him, 73 ; dies at Adrianople, 73 ; buried at 
Brusa, ib. ; what the historian Knolles says 
of his sepulchre, 74. 

Amurath III., accession of, 224 ; first act of 




INDEX. 


552 

liis reign. it>. ; chief ladies who influenced 
him, 225; war with Persia, 226 ; most re¬ 
markable episode of it, 227 ; war declared 
against Austria, ib. ; England sends mer¬ 
chants to the Porte, ib. ; Queen Elizabeth’s 
object in sending an ambassador to the 
Ottoman Court, ib. ; general prevalence of 
venality and corruption in Amurath’s reign, 

228 ; the armies infected with the taint, 

229 ; his death, 230 

Amurath IV. ascends the throne, 246; symp¬ 
toms of the downfall of Turkey, ib. ; for¬ 
midable mutiny of the Spahis, 247 : obliged 
to sacrifice the life of his Grand Vizier, 248 ; 
his skill in reducing the mutinous troops 
to order, 249 ; severity and cruelty, 250 ; 
puts the chief Mufti to death, 253 ; conquers 
the city of Eriwan, 254; commences the 
siege of Bagdad, 255; sets an example of 
patient energy and courage, ib. ; takes the 
city, ib. ; massacre of the inhabitants, 256; 
makes a triumphal entry into Constanti¬ 
nople, ib. ; peace with Persia, ib. ; his 
death, 257. 

Angora, battle of. 43. 

Anne, Empress of Russia, prepares for war 
with Turkey, 356; adopts the Oriental 
project, 372. 

Asia Minor, solidity of the Turkish power 
established there, 17. 

Austria under Charles V., great power of that 
Emperor, 157; contest between Austrians 
and Turks for Hungary, 166; humbled by 
the House of Othman, and brings peace by 
paying tribute, 173; Charles V. takes Tunis, 
177; fails at Algiers, 178; Solyman I. fails in 
his siege of Vienna. 169 ; Maximilian II. 
renews the war in Hungary—successes of 
the Turks, 193; loses the great battle of 
Cerestes, 235; peace of Sitvatorok concluded 
without Austria submitting to indignities, 
war in 1661,278; the Austrians under Mon- 
tecuculi defeat the Turks at St. Gothard— 
great importance of this victory, 2S0; great 
effort made by the Turks to conquer Aus¬ 
tria, 291; second siege of Vienna, ib. ; the 
Poles come to the aid of Austria, and King 
Sobieski totally defeats the Tui’ks, 292; 
great conquests made by the Austrians in 
Hungary, 294; further conquests in Tran¬ 
sylvania, Bosnia, and Servia, 303; their 
progress checked for a time by Kiuprili- 
Eade, but Austrians completely victorious 
at Salankeman, 310; triumphs of Prince 
Eugene, 313; the Austrian Emperor Leo¬ 
pold cuts short the career of conquest in 
the East—treaty of Carlowitz, 319; Austria 
joins Russia against Turkey in 1737, 365; 
obtains little success, 370; meets disgraceful 
defeats in 1739—treaty of Belgrade, 375; 
Austria honourably treated by the Turks 
during her troubles in wars of succession 
and the Seven Years’ War, 377; Austria 
under Joseph aids Catherine II. in despoil¬ 
ing Turkey—his deserved ill-success, 429 ; 
Emperor Leopold makes peace, 435; de¬ 
mands with Russia the extradition by 
Turkey of the Hungarian Refugees, but is 
refused, 531. 


B 

Bagdad taken by Sotyman, lost to the 
Persians, retaken by Amurath IV., 284. 

Bajazet I., his ferocity and valour, 32; suc¬ 
ceeds his father Amurath. ib. ; orders his 
brother to be killed, ib. ; enters into a 
treaty with Lasarevich and marries his 
sister, 32; defeats the King of Hungary, 33; 
takes the title of Sultan, 34; falls into ex¬ 
cesses, ib. ; startled from his revels by a 
crusade against him, 35; capture of some of 
his towns, 36; meets and defeats his foes, 
38,39; cruelty to his prisoners, 40; allows the 
Count of Nevers to be ransomed, ib. ; leave- 
taking between him and the Christian 
lords, 41-43; further conquests, 43; takes 
Athens in 1397, 44; prepares to besiege Con¬ 
stantinople, ib. ; Timour assails him, ib .; 
he is defeated and taken prisoner, 49 ; Ti- 
mour’s treatment of him and his death, 50; 
buried at Brusa, ib. 

Bajazet II. struggles for the sovereignty with 
his brother I)jem, 114 ; civil wars follow, 
115; he is victorious, ib. ; pays an annual 
tribute towards keeping his brother in 
captivity, 116; rise of Turkish navy in his 
reign, 121 ; his dreamy disposition renders 
him unfit for war, 122; domestic dissen¬ 
sions, ib. ; engages his rebellious son Selim 
with regret, 124 ; defeats him, ib. ; obliged 
to abdicate in his favour, 125; begs to re 
tire to Demotika, ib. ; dies- before he gets 
there, 121; remarks on his reign, ib. 

Balkan mountains, passages of, 65. 

Barbarossa, history of, and his naval achieve¬ 
ments, 174. 

Belgrade besieged by Mahomet II., defended 
by Hunyades, who defeats Mahomet, 88; 
taken by Solyman I., 161; taken by the 
Austrians, 315; recovered by the Turks, 
375 ; treaty concluded at, ib. 

Bey, rank of, 101. 

Beylerbey, rank of, 101. 

Borgia, Alexander, 120. 

Bosnia annexed to the Ottoman Empire, SS. 

Brusa surrenders to the Ottomans in 1326, 
10; Othman buried there, 11. 

Bulgaria conquered by Amurath I., 29. 

Butler, English officer, distinguished at the 
siege of Silistria, 538. 


C 

Caldf.ran, battle of, 13S. 

Caliphate acquired by the Sultans, 150. 
Candia, war of, 270. 

Carlowitz, peace concluded at, 319. 

Catherine of Russia extricates the Czar and 
his army from destruction, 332. 

Catherine II., Czarina of Russia, see Russia. 
Cerestes, battle at, 226. 

Cervantes wounded at Lepanto, 219. 

Charles V., Emperor of Germany, see Aus¬ 
tria. 

Charles XII. of Sweden takes refuge in 
Turkey after his defeat at Pultowa, 3z7. 
Clioiseul, the Trench minister, endeavours to 



INDEX. 


553 


lay before Europe the ambition of Russia, 
343. 

Cicala. Pacha, 223. 

Constantinople, Othman’s dream of its con¬ 
quest, 7; frequently besieged, seldom cap¬ 
tured, 70 n. ; names of its besiegers, ib. ; 
siege and capture by Mahomet II., p. 76 et 
seq. ; population, 86. 

Constantine XI., his defence Of Constanti¬ 
nople, 76; prepares for death as a Christian 
soldier, 83; is killed in battle, 84. 

Crescent assumed as device of Ottoman 
Turks, 3. 

Crete, 523; see Candia. 

Crimea, subjugation of the, by the Turks, 90 
great value as a possession, ib. ; formally 
annexed to the Russian dominions, 422. 

Cyprus, Isle of, subdued by the Turks, 217. 

Czar, meaning of, 212 n. 

D. 

Damad Ali, Coumourgi, raised to the dignity 
of Grand Vizier, 338 ; heads an army against 
the Venetians in the Morea, and reconquers 
it, commands the army against the Aus¬ 
trians in person, 341; mortally wounded 
and his troops defeated fighting against 
Prince Eugene, 342. 

Dardanelles, treaty of, 487. 

Dere Beys suppressed by Mahmoud II., 529. 

Deys, origin of the title, 237. 

Diebitsch, Marshal, leads the forces of the 
Emperor Nicholas into the Danubian Prin¬ 
cipalities, 515 ; commences the siege of 
Silistria, 516; gains that important post, 
ib. ; takes Adrianople, 517. 

Di van, explanation of, 92. 

Djem, Prince, 114; struggles for the sove¬ 
reignty, ib. ; civil wars in consequence, 115; 
escapes to the Franks, kept in treacherous 
captivity, 116 ; transferred by Charles VIII. 
of France to the custody of the Pope, 120; 
murdered by Borgia, ib. 

Djemali Mufti, his influence over Selim I., 
150. 

Don, proposal to unite that river with the 
Volga, 215. 

Dragut, Turkish admiral, 179. 

E. 

Egypt held by the Mamelukes, 122; con¬ 
quered by Selim I., its government under 
him, 148; decline of the authority of the 
Sultans, 419 ; real supremacy of the Mame¬ 
lukes, 450; French, under Napoleon, attack 
the province ( see Napoleonj ; French ex¬ 
pelled by English expedition, 464; Mehemet 
Ali Pacha of Egypt, 493; crushes the Mame¬ 
lukes, ib. ; state of Egypt under him, 494 ; 
his schemes for hereditary empire, 521; 
war between Egypt and Turkey, 522 ; vic¬ 
tories of the Egyptians under Mehemet’s 
son, Ibrahim Pacna, ib. ; practical indepen¬ 
dence of Egypt, 526. 

Elizabeth, Queen, sends an ambassador to 
seek aid from Turkey, 222. 

Elmo Fort 190. 


England under Elizabeth seeks aid from the 
Turks against the Spaniards, 227 ; King 
James I.’s ambassador describes the decay, 
and prophecies the speedy destruction of 
the Turkish Empire, 245: England inter¬ 
venes to save Turkey at the congress of 
Carlowitz, 319 ; Sultan Achmet 111. pub¬ 
licly avows the value of England’s friend¬ 
ship, 324 ; England’s co-operation affirmed 
by Potemkin to be necessary for the success 
of Russian schemes against Turkey, 421 ; 
Fox treats coldly the urgent advice of 
France to prevent the annexation of the 
Crimea, 425 ; honest common sense of King 
George III., ib. ; Pitt endeavours in vain to 
check Russia, and unscrupulous opposition 
of Fox to his wise policy, 441; English expe¬ 
dition expels the French from Egypt, Eng¬ 
land leagued with Russia against Turkey 
in 1807, English expedition under Admiral 
Duckworth, 479; part taken by England as 
to the Greek insurrection, 502, 503; cannot 
or will not aid Turkey in 1832, 522: sup¬ 
ports her against Mehemet Ali, 524, 526 ; in 
conjunction with France supports and saves 
her in the Crimean War, £37; aids in paci¬ 
fying Syria and Crete, 543, 544; endures 
Russia’s contempt of the treaty of Paris, 
545 ; joins in conference at Constantinople, 
which effects nothing, 549; 

Ertoghrul, leader of Oghouz Turks, 1; suc¬ 
cours Alaeddin, 2 ; his successes and tac¬ 
tics, 3 ; gains a battle between Brusa and 
Yenischeer, ib. 

Eugene, Prince, heads the Imperialists 
against the Turks, see Austria. 

Europe, Turks obtain their first settlement 
in, 15. 

F. 

Ferdinand of Austria claims the crown of 
Hungary, 166 ; humbled by the Turks, 173. 

Folard, Chevalier, remarks of, respecting the 
defeats of the Turkish armies in the 18th 
century, 281. 

Fondi, Giulia Gonzaga, 177. 

Fox opposes Pitt’s policy respecting Russia, 
441. 

France, under Francis I., implores the aid of 
the Turks, 173 ; Barbarossa’s fleet aids the 
French, 178 ; Louis XIV., in 1680, urges the 
Turks to persevere in war with Austria, 
309. The French statesman Choiseul vainly 
warns England of the perilous progress of 
Russian power and ambition, 388; the 
French Court again endeavours to rouse 
England to prevent the annexation of tho 
Crimea, 423; French attack on Egypt, see 
Napoleon I. ; peace between France and 
Turkey, 466; designs of Napoleon against 
Turkey after his victories over Austria in 
1S05, 477 ; he wishes her aid against Russia, 
and sends to Constantinople General Sebas- 
tiani, who aids the Turks in the defence 
against the English squadron, 478 ; French 
co-operate with English and Russians 
against the Turks at Navarino, send an ex¬ 
pedition, which seizes and appropriates 
Algeria 521. 





554 


INDEX. 


Fratricide, imperial, legalised by Mahomet II., 
113. 

Free Trade, the national system of Turkey, 
207. 

G. 

Galleys, Mediterranean, their build, and 
tactics, 174, n. 

Gothard, St. Convent of, 2S0; gives name to a 
memorable battle between the Turks and 
Austrians, ib. 

Greeks, early collisions and alliances between 
Greek Emperors and the first Sultans, 10, 

10, 18, 22; Greek Empire finally overthrown 
by Mahomet, 11, 76; the Peloponnesus and 
other districts annexed by him, 87 ; Venice 
conquers it, 294 ; it is soon reconquered by 
the Turks, 338 ; Russian expedition under 
Orloff rouses Greeks to arms, 391; national 
spirit kept alive by Lambrohigas and 
others, 498; Greek insurrection, its promo¬ 
ters, 496 ; gallantry of the Greeks, 502 ; 
nearly crushed by the Sultan’s Egyptian 
army, ib. ; saved by intervention of the 
great Christian Powers, 503; Greek king¬ 
dom, 519 ; Greeks foment insurrection in 
Crete, 544 ; they are stopped by the Great 
Powers, ib. 

Giilhane, Hatti-scheriff of, 531. 

H. 

Hadji Beytarch, 14 ; names the corps of 
Christian children, ib. 

Hafiz. Grand Vizier, 247 ; death, 249. 

Han way, English traveller, 353; his biography 
of Topal Osman, ib. 

Hassan of Algiers, 392 ; desperate bravery ; 
raises the siege of Lemnos, 393 ; endeavours 
to restore the Empire, 416 ; recovers the 
Morea, 419 ; heads the Turkish army against 

' the Russians, 427 ; being unsuccessxul, is 
put to death, 435. 

Retseria, origin of the, 498. 

Holy War, Mahometan creed as to it being a 
duty, 112. 

Hungary, first collision with Ottoman power, 
23 ; defeated at the Marizza ; shares in the 
defeat at Kossova, 30 ; victories of Hun- 
ades, 66; defeated by Amurath II. at 
r arna, 70 ; he defeats and repels Mahomet 

11. from Belgrade; war between King 
Louis II. and boiyman, 165 ; “ the destruc¬ 
tion of Mohacz,” 165 ; Turks capture Buda 
and other cities ; Ferdinand of Austria, and 
Zapolya, as the Sultan's vassal, contend for 
the kingship of the country, 166 ; large por¬ 
tion reconquered by Austria after the second 
siege of Vienna, 294; Hungarian chief Te- 
kea sheltered by Turkey, 320 ; Hungarian 
refugees, in 1848, similarly sheltered, 534. 

Hunyades the Great, see Hungary. 

I. 

Ibrahim of Aleppo, compiler of the great code 
of Ottoman law, 113. 

Ibrahim taken from prison to be Sultan, 258 ; 
excesses and bad government, ib. ; sells all 

the odices of state to supply his prodigality, 


. 258; creates new taxes, 261; conspiracy 
against him, 263 ; demands of the, conspi¬ 
rators, 265 ; deposition of Ibrahim, 267 ; na 
is put to death, ib .; principal events of his 
reign, 269. 

Ibrahim Pacha, nearly crushes the Greeks, 
502 ; his victories over the Turks, 522. 

Ismail Shah, Prince of Persia, 123-132. 

Ismail, siege of, town of, by Suwarrow, 430. 

J. 

Janissaries, corps of, formed, 14 ; main 
strength of the Turkish armies, instituted 
in reign of Orchan, formed by forced levies 
of Christian children, ib. ; number of Chris¬ 
tians thus levied and forcibly converted 
into Mahometan soldiers, 14, 15 ; meaning 
of name of “Janissary,” ib. ; force under 
Mahomet II., 11-9S-; compels Selim I. to 
grant a donation, 128 ; mutiny quelled by 
feolyman 1., 164 ; their numbers under him, 
201 ; he. courts their favour, ib. ; they re¬ 
volt against Othman II. and depose him, 
243 ; their mutinies under Amurath IV., 
247 ; he quells them, 249 ; in Mahomet IV.’s 
reign the levy of Christian children to re¬ 
cruit the Janissary force ceases, 295 ; sub¬ 
sequent constitution of the force, great 
increase of its number, 296 ; their lawless¬ 
ness and mutinies, 301 ; struggle between 
them and Sultan Selim III., 4S1; they 
prevail, ib. ; they are finally crushed and 
destroyed by Mahmoud II., 502. 

Jassy, 329 ; treaty of, 443. 

John, Don, of Austria, commands the con¬ 
federate rieets against the naval forces of 
Turkey at Lepanto, 219. 

K. 

Kainardji, treaty of, 411. 

Kara George, commander-in-chief of the Ser¬ 
vians, StK Sekvia. 

Kara Mustaplia, Vizier to Mahomet IV. ; fatal 
enterprise against Vienna, 261 ; weakness 
of his plans ; rout of his army, 293. 

Kars, noble defence of, 538 ; garrison, worn 
out by starvation, surrender to the Rus¬ 
sians, ib. 

Kediik Ahmed, subjugates the Crimea, 90; 
effects a landing in Italy, 92. 

Iviuprili Zade Muctapha, created Grand 
Vizier, 304 ; wisdom of his government, ib. ; 
conduct towards the Rayas, 306 ; killed in 
battle fighting against the Austrians, 310. 

Klephts, Greek robbers and soldiers, 4y7. 

Kossova, fate of Servia decided at, 30. 

Krim Ghirai, the Tartar Khan, sweeps over 
southern Russia, 3S5; discipline of his 
troops, 386 ; death, ib. 

L. 

Laws of war, Turkish, 112. 

Leopold, Emperor of Austria, attacked by 
the Turks, seeks aid from bobieski. King of 
Poland, 290. 

Lepanto, battle of, 219. 

Literature, Turkish, 295. 




INDEX . 


5 *'f 


Louis II., King of Hungary, perishes in the 
battle of Mohacz, 165. 

Louis XIV. sends an ambassador to the Porte 
to encourage hostilities against the Aus¬ 
trians, 309. 

M. 

Mahmoud I., 352; continnes the war with 
Persia, 353 ; makes peace with the dreaded 
Nadir, 354 ; proclaims war against Russia, 
355 ; sustains losses in the Crimea, 360 ; 
anxious for peace with Russia, 365; rejects 
the terms offered, ib. ; distributes honours 
and rewards to the officers and soldiers who 
distinguished themselves in the campaign 
against the Austrians, 371 ; concludes the 
peace of Belgrade, 375 ; latter part of his 
reign remarkable by the rise of the sect 
called Wahabites, 376 ; dies in 1754, 377. 

Mahmoud II. proclaimed Sultan, 473 ; makes 
peace with England, 487 ; war with Russia 
renewed, ib. ; peace, 490 ; refuses to give up 
the Danubian provinces to Russia, ib. ; 
character of Mahmoud, 492 ; Greek insur¬ 
rection, 496 ; war with Ali Racha, 499 ; puts 
him to death, 500 ; summons the forces of 
Mehemet Ali to Greece, ib. ; destroys the 
Janissaries, 504 ; signs the treaty of Akker- 
man, 507; refuses to recognise the inde¬ 
pendence of the Greeks, 510; declares war 
with Russia. 513 ; signs the treaty of Adria- 
nople, 519 ; his grief after the signature, 
520 ; vainly endeavours to crush the power 
of Mehemet Ali, 521; applies to England 
for aid, which is not granted, 522 ; has re¬ 
course to Russia, ib. ; treaty of Uukiar 
Iskelessi, 523; fresh war with Mehemet 
Ali, 524; worn dow r n by anxiety he dies, 
525 ; sketch of his various reforms, 528. 

Mahomet I., son of Bajazet I., escapes after 
the battle of Angora, 50 ; quarrels between 
him and his brothers, 52 ; succeeds as Sul¬ 
tan, 53; makes a treaty with the Venetians, 
54 ; compels Djouneid to beg for peace, 55 ; 
conduct to the Prince of Caramania, ib.; 
war with the Venetians, 56 ; revolt of the 
Dervishes, ib. ; defeats the impostor who 
personated his brother Mustapha, 57 ; con¬ 
duct towards his brother Kasimir, 58 ; his 
death, 59; buried at Brusa, ib. ; character, ib. 

Mahomet II., accession of, 75 ; character, SO ; 
prepares for the siege of Constantinople, 
77 ; arrives before the city, 79 ; plan of at¬ 
tack, ib. ; commences the siege, ib. ; brilliant 
exploit of Christian ships, 80 ; cruelty of 
Mahomet towards Baltaoghli, 81 ; summons 
Constantine to surrender, 82 ; he refuses, 
ib. ; the assault begins, May 29, 1453, S3 ; 
capture of the city, S4 ; his conduct after 
victory, ib. ; takes possession of the Impe¬ 
rial palace, S5 ; cruelty to Notaras and his 
family, ib. ; proclaims himself protector of 
the Greek Church, S6 ; mode of replenish¬ 
ing his new capital, S7 ; comparison be¬ 
tween Mahomet's conquests and those cf 
Alexander and Napoleon, ib. ; besieges Ecl- 
giade, 88; is defeated, 89; successes in 
Asia, 80 ; conquers Euboea, ib. ; merciless ! 


cruelty to the Venetian commander, 91 ; 
attacks the eastern coasts of the Adriatic, 
ib. ; makes peace with Venice, ib. ; prepares 
to subjugate Italy, ib. ; attacks Rhodes, 91 ; 
secures an entrance for his armies into 
Italy, 92 : dies, ib. ; his institutes of govern¬ 
ment, chap. vi. 

Mahomet III., accession of, 231; kills his 
nineteen brothers, ib. ; his armies in Wal- 
lachia and Hungary meet with disasters, 
232; resolves to head his troops, ib. ; un¬ 
furls the sacred standard, 233; captures 
Erlau, 235 ; battle of Cerestes, ib. ; brilliant 
charge of Cicala, 236 ; returns to Constan¬ 
tinople, 237 ; spends the rest of his reign in 
inglorious indolence, 238 ; death, ib. 

Mahomet IV., proclaimed Sultan at the age of 
seven, 267 ; factions during his minority, 
272 ; his empire increases in importance 
under the stem rule of Mohammed Kiup- 
rili, 275 ; advances towards manhood, 277; 
places implicit confidence in Ahmed Kiup- 
rili, ib. ; marches with his troops as far as 
Adrianople, 278 ; places the sacred standard 
in Kiuprili’s hands, ib. ; Kiuprili loses the 
battle of St. Gothard, 279 ; truce for twenty 
years follows, 284: expedition against 
Candia planned, which the Sultan proposes 
to head in person, 284; shrinks from his 
proposal, ib. ; accompanies his army to the 
siege of Kaminiec, 287 ; makes peace with 
Poland, and returns in triumph to Adria¬ 
nople, ib. ; inglorious war with Russia, 288 : 
disastrous war with Austria and second 
unsuccessful siege of Vienna, 291; orders 
Kara Mustapha to be executed, 294 ; is de¬ 
posed, ib. ; character and sketch of the prin¬ 
cipal events of his reign, 295. 

Malta sieged, 1S7. 

Mamelukes’, origin of, 140; they conquer 
Egypt and Syria, 141 ; wars between them 
and the Ottoman Turks, ib. ; their defeat 
by Selim I., 143; by Napoleon; destroyed 
by Mehemet Ali, 493. 

Mediterranean, description of the system of 
naval warfare in the, see note, 147. 

Mehdi, religious impostor in Kurdistan, 29S. 

Mehemet Ali, 493 ; orders the massacre of the 
Mamelukes, ib. ; overthrows the power of 
the Wahabites, 494; becomes master of 
Syria, 495; compels the Sultan to confirm 
him in his different governments, ib. ; war 
against the Sultan, 522 ; the Pachalic of 
Egypt confirmed to him and his descend¬ 
ants, 526. 

Milosch Obrcnowitch, preserves Servia, 495. 

Mohacz, at the battle of, the fate of Hungary 
was decided, 165. 

Mohammed Kiuprili, Grand Vizier, 273; rise 
of the Kiuprili family, 273; his merciless 
reforms, 275; numbers put to death by him, 
ib. ; Turkish legend connected with his 
unroofed tomb, 276 n. ; his dying advice to 
the Sultan, ib. 

Monezinade Ali, commander of the Ottoman 
licet at the battle of Lepanto, 219; death, ib. 

Montecuculi. meets the whole Ottoman 
force, 279; changes the balance of supe¬ 
riority, 239. . - , ... 



INDEX. 


556 


Morosini, commander of the city of Candia, 
2S5 ; conquers the Morea, 303. 

MUnnich, General, see Russia. 

Mustapha I., 242; deposed, ib. ; reinstalled, 
243; deposed a second time, 244. 

Mustapha II. succeeds Achmet II., 311; pro¬ 
claims his intention to combat his enemies 
in person, ib. ; demands the opinion of the 
Divan, 312 ; the Divan oppose his heading 
the troops, ib. ; he persists in his resolu¬ 
tion, ib. ; gains some important fortresses, 
ib. ; meets Prince Eugene at Zenta, 313 ; 
completely defeated by him, 314 ; retires to 
Constantinople, 315; insurrection against 
him, which obliges him to abdicate, 324. 

Mustapha III., accession of, 378; first years 
of his reign not unpromising, ib.: governs 
for himself, 380; protests against the occu¬ 
pation of Poland by Russian and Prussian 
troops, ib. ; declares war against Russia, 
383 ; orders the Dardanelles to be defended, 
393 ; loses the Crimea, 397; death, 409. 

Mustapha IV., made Padischah, and soon 
deposed, 482. 

Mustapha Bairactar, endeavours to reinstate 
Selim III.,. 482; assumes the Vizierate 
under Mahmoud II., 4S3 ; killed, 484. 

Mustapha, Prince, son of Solyman I., put to 
death, 185. 

N 

Nadir Kouli Khan, exploits of, against the 
Ottomans, 349 ; besieges Bagdad, 354; 
gains repeated victories over the Ottomans, 
who gladly make peace with him, ib. 

Napier, Admiral, 520. 

Napoleon Bonaparte attacks Egypt, 460: 
massacres the Turks at Jaffa, 402 ; besieges 
Acre, ib. ; gains the battle of Aboukir, 401 ; 
leaves Egypt, ib. ; acknowledges the sove¬ 
reignty of the Porte over Egypt, 406; at 
Tilsit is ready to abandon Turkey to Russia, 
485 ; but grudges Constantinople, 486. 

Nasmyth, English officer, aids in defence of 
Silistria, 538. 

Navarino, battle of, 503. 

Nicholas I. ascends the throne of Russia, 5S7; 
see Russia. 

O 

Orchan, son and successor of Othman, 12; 
makes his brother Alaeddin Vizier, ib. ; 
captures Nicomedia, 16 ; takes Nice, ib. ; 
obtains possession of nearly the whole of 
the north-west of Asia Minor, ib. ; conduct 
during peace, ib ; marriage with Theodora, 
18; bold stroke of Solyman Pacha, Orchan’s 
son, in behalf of his own race, 19 ; Orchan 
sends Solyman to assist Cantacuzene, ib. ; 
death of Solyman before that of his father, 
20; death of Orchan, ib. 

' Orloff, Count Alexif, high admiral of the 
Russian fleet, see Russia. 

Othman I., son of Ertoghrul, 1,4; Turks take 
their name from him, ib. ; waged war as 
an independent potentate, 5 ; seeks the 
daughter of Edebali in marriage, ib.; is re¬ 
fused, ib. ; gains a strong supporter in 
Michael of the Peaked Beard, 6; constancy 
to Malkatoon, ib. ; wonderful dream, ib. ; 
marriage, 7 ; conquests and personal ap¬ 


pearance, 8; triumphs over the Greeks, 8; 
kills his uncle, 9; death and advice to his 
son, 11 ; character, ib. 

Othman If., proclaimed Sultan, 242 ; makes 
peace with Persia, ib. ; makes war with 
Poland, ib. ; his plot for the overthrow of 
the Janissaries discovered, 243 ; he is de¬ 
posed and murdered, ib. 

Othman III., accession of, 378 ; preserve* 
peace during his short reign, ib. 

Otranto taken by Turks, 92. 

Ouloudj Ali, Turkish admiral at the battle of 
Lepanto, 219; bravery, ib. ; recompensed 
for his zeal, 221; constructs a new fleet, 
222; captures Tunis, ib. 

P 

Pacha, title of, 97. 

Padischa, meaning of the title, 98. 

Paskievitsch, Count, see Russia, 

Peter the Great, Czar of Russia, see Russia. 

Piale, Turkish admiral, his victories, ISO. 

Piri Reis, Turkish admiral, 179, 

Pitt, prime minister of England ; policy re¬ 
specting Russia, 441. 

Potemkin, Prince, see Russia. 

Truth, treaty of tne, see Russia. 

R 

Rayas, 105; in danger from the bigotry of 
Selim I., saved by the Mufti Djemali, 154 ; 
Solyman’s legislation for them, 205. 

Reis-Kemal, admiral of the Turks, 121. 

Renegades, number and important services 
of, 107. 

Rliiga, Greek poet, 49S. 

Rhodes, Island of, attacked by Mahomet II., 
91; conquered by Solyman I., 161. 

Roe, Sir Thomas, English ambassador at the 
Porte, 245 ; remarks respecting the state of 
Turkey, ib. 

Roumelia, 29. 

Russia, name of. first appears in Turkish his¬ 
tory in reign of Bajazet II. ; arrogance of 
the first Russian ambassador at Constanti¬ 
nople, 126 ; Russia’s long subjection to the 
Tartars; her gradual deliverance from them; 
Ivan III. forms schemes of reigning at Con¬ 
stantinople, and marries the last Greek 
princess ; the Czars thenceforth assume the 
old imperial cognizance of the emperors of 
Constantinople, 213 ; Ivan the Terrible con¬ 
quers Astrakhan and Kasan, 214 ; Russia 
then generally regarded by Western Europe 
as a region of mere savages ; warnings of 
Chancellor, the navigator, as to her ele¬ 
ments of strength; King Sigismund calls 
her “the hereditary enemy of all free 
nations,” 214 n. ; first hostile collision be¬ 
tween Russians and Turks in reign of 
Selim II., 215 ; the Russians repulse the 
Turks from Astrakhan, 216 ; Russia weak¬ 
ened by revolt and civil war when the 
House of Romanoff acquire the empire 
240 ; war with the Turks respecting Azoph, 
268 ; the Russians beat the Turks in the 
Ukraine in Mahomet IV.’s reign ; instinc¬ 
tive dread with which the Turks even then 
regarded the growing power of the Czar 





INDEX. 


55 7 


201 and n. ; the Czar Peter joins Austria in 
war against Turkey ; captures Azoph, 317 ; 
demands in vain the extradition of Charles 
XII., 327 ; war with Turkey resumed in 
1710, 329 ; campaign of thePruth ; extreme 
peril of the Czar and his army, 330 ; treaty 
of the Pruth, 333 ; Russia brings on war 
with Turkey in 1736 ; army under Marshall 
Mtinnich sent to invade the Crimea, 357; 
Oczakof taken. 368 ; his “ Oriental Pro¬ 
ject" that the Czarina should excite the 
Greeks and other Rayas against the Turks, 
and should send an army against Constan¬ 
tinople, 372 ; the advance of the Russians 
checked by the Turkish victories over the 
Austrians ; treaty of Belgrade. 375 ; Cathe¬ 
rine II. plans aggression against Turkey ; 
great successes of the Russian armies under 
Romanzoff, 388 ; the “ Oriental Project ” of 
Miinnich revived ; Russian expedition sent 
to the Mediterranean, 390 ; rising of the 
Greeks, 391 ; victoi-ies of the Russians in 
the Danubian provinces, 394 ; they conquer 
the Crimea, 396 ; treaty of Kainardji, 411 ; 
continued designs of Catherine for the con¬ 
quest of Constantinople, 420; formal an¬ 
nexation of the Crimea to Russia, 422 ; war 
renewed ; great victories under Suwarrow ; 
peace of .) assy, 443 ; preparation of Cathe¬ 
rine for fresh war and the march on Con¬ 
stantinople, stopped by her death, 444; 
arrogant demands made by Russia on Selim 
III., 474; war renewed, bat languidly; 
truce of Slobosia ; treaty of Bucharest, 4S0, 
490 ; Servians abandoned by Russia, 491 ; 
Emperor Nicholas forces treaty of Akker- 
man on Turks, 507 ; with aid of France and 
England destroys the Turkish fleet at Na- 
varino ; war with Turkey ; Russian suc¬ 
cesses ; treaty of Adrianople, 513-521; treaty 
of Iskelepi, 523 ; further attacks on Turkey, 
536 ; the Crimean War ; treaty of Paris, ib. 
543 ; Russia repudiates its most important 
part, 546; aids the Servians in 1876, 549. 

S. 

bCAxnERBEG, opponent of Amuratli II., 73 ; 
holds out gallantly against Mahomet II., 
88 ; overpowered, ib. 

Sehiis, their tenets, 131 ; massacre of, by 
Selim I., ib. 

Se.im I., youngest son of Bajazet II., 123 ; 
rebels against his father. 123,124; retires to 
the Crimea, 124 ; recalled by his father, 
who abdicates in his favour, ib. ; character, 
127; devoted to war, 128; honours men of 
learning, 129; brother Ahmed rebels, ib. ; 
cruelty of Selim to his nephews, il\ ; revolt 
and death of Prince Korkoud, ib. ; death 
of Prince Ahmed, 130; massacre of the 
Schiis, 131; war with Persia, 132; Selim's 
letter to Ismail, 133; Ismail’s reply, 136; 
Ottoman army advances upon Tabriz, 137 ; 
tumult of the Janissaries, ib. ; engagement 
with the Persian army, 138; victory of 
Selim, 139; Syria and Egypt become objects 
of his ambition, 140; places himself at the 
head of his army, 142; occupies several of 
the Syrian citios, 143: marches towards 


Cairo, ib. ; fights a battle at llidania, a vil¬ 
lage near Cairo, and is victorious, 144; 
valour of the Mamelukes in defence of 
Cairo, ib. ; treachery of Selim to them, i b. ; 
noble and fearless bravery of Kourt Bey, 
145; Selim orders the death of Touman 
Bey, 146; becomes complete master of 
Egypt, 147; cruel government there, ib. ; 
shows his sense of literary merit, 148; 
abandons the idea of conquests beyond the 
cataracts of the Nile, 149; punishment of 
Younis Pacha, ib. ; government of Egypt a 
source of great anxiety to him, ib. ; resolves 
to divide the authority among the different 
races of the country, ib. ; obtains the 
Caliphate from the conquest of Egypt, 150; 
authority much augmented by that circum¬ 
stance. ib. ; returns to Syria, 151; back 
to Constantinople, ib. ; directs his attention 
to his navy, 151; prepares for some great 
expedition, ib. ; approaches of death, 152; 
death, 153; remarks on his reign, and in¬ 
fluence of the Mufti Djemali over him, 154. 

Selim II., accession of, 212 ; degeneracy, ib .; 
order preserved during the beginning of 
his reign by his father’s statesmen and 
generals, ib. ; concludes a peace with Aus¬ 
tria, 213; sketch of the state of Russia 
at that period, ib. ; project of the Vizier 
Sokolli respecting Russia, 215; the Czar 
Ivan sends an ambassador to Constan¬ 
tinople, who is favourably received, 216; 
Selim resolves on the conquest of Cyprus, 
217; gains possession of the island, ib. ; 
battle of Lepanto, 220 ; defeat of the Turks, 
221; peace with Venice, 222; death and 
character, 223. 

Selim III. succeeds as Sultan, 433; opening 
of his reign marked with calamity, 435; 
orders Gazi Hassan to be put to death, ib. ; 
peace with Austria and Russia, 443 ; sketch 
of the Turkish Empire before his intended 
reforms, 446; creates new troops, 459; 
war with Napoleon, who attacks Egypt, 
460 ; determines to act vigorously against 
the rebel in Servia, 467; attacks the rebel 
Dahis by means of the Servians, ib. ; war 
against Russia and England, 475; compelled 
to abdicate, 482; strangled. 4S3. 

Servia, comes into collision with the Ottoman 
power temp. Amurath I., 22; defeated by 
Turks at the Marizza, ib. ; begs peace from 
the Sultan, ib. ; heads the great movement 
of Sclavonic nations against Amurath I., 
27; defeated at Kossova, 30; becomes a 
vassal-state to the Ottomans, 32 ; Servians 
give valuable aid to the Austrian armies 
against the Turks, 467; the armed Servians 
are employed by Sultan Selim III. to aid 
him against his own mutinous Mahometan 
vassals and soldiers, 467; Kara George 
heads the Servians, 470; Servians refuse to 
disarm at the Sultan’s bidding, 472; en 
couraged by Russia. 473; they repel the 
Turks. 476; abandoned by the Russians at 
the pacification of Bucharest, 491; gallant 
resistance to the Turks, 495; partially libe¬ 
rated by treaties of Akkerman and Adria 
noplo, 6C7-519; makes war on Turkey, 649. 





INDEX. 


55 ^ 


Sinope, 89. 

Sitvatorok, treaty concluded at, 209. 

Sobieski breaks the treaty made with the 
Turks, 28S; defeats them near Khoczim, ib.) 
r.ids the Emperor Leopold against the 
Turks; completely routs them, 292. 

Sokolli, Grand Vizier to Solyman I., 224; 
proposes to unite the Don and Volga by a 
canal, 215. 

Solyman I., titles of, 15S; great men of his 
age. ib. ; first acts of his reign, 159; mill* 

. tary abilities, 160; takes Belgrade, 161; pre¬ 
pares for the siege of Rhodes, 162; offers 
terms of capitulation, 163 ; honourable con¬ 
duct towards the Knights of St. John, ib. ; 
sensible of the necessity of keeping the 
turbulent Janissaries constantly engaged in 
warfare, 164; invades Hungary, wins the 
battle of Mohacz, 165; conduct towards Fer¬ 
dinand of Austria and Zapolya, rival claim¬ 
ants for the ci-own of Hungary, 166; com¬ 
mences the siege of Vienna, 167; valour of 
the besieged, 16S; obliged to draw off his 
troops, 170; savage behaviour of his sol¬ 
diery, ib. ; repulse fi’om Vienna, a critical 
epoch, ib. ; leads his armies into Persia, 
ib. ; effects many important conquests, ib. ; 
fresh wars in Hungary, ib. ; makes an ad¬ 
vantageous treaty of peace with Austria, 
ib .; turns his attention to his navy, 173; 
brilliant exploits of his admirals, 174; do¬ 
mestic tragedies, 1S2; failure of the expe¬ 
dition against Malta, 187; new struggle 
with Austria, 193; feeble state of his 
health, ib. ; encamps before Szigeth, ib. ; 
dies there, 194; death kept secret, 195; 
Szigeth taken, ib .; death revealed, 196: 
immense extent of his empire, 197; his 
division of it into governments, 19S; 
number of races he ruled over, 199; his 
military force, 201; organisation of the 
feudal system, 203; laws, 204; splendour 
of his public buildings, 209; his literary 
attainments, ib. 

Oolyman II., succeeds as Sultan, 301; insur¬ 
rections and outrages in the beginning of 
his reign, ib. ; marches towards the Hun¬ 
garian frontier, 302; retreats to Philippo- 
polis, 303; gains advantages over the Rus¬ 
sians, 304; convenes an extraordinary Di¬ 
van, ib. ; makes Kiuprili-Zade Mustapha 
Grand Vizier, ib .; dies, 310. 

Spahis, royal horse-guards, 20, 204. 

Sultan-OEni, or Sultan’s front, 4. 

Suwarrow, his character, 437 ; see Russia. 

Szigeth, siege and destruction of, 193. 

T 

T belli, Count, heads a Hungarian revolt. 


291 ; defeats the Imperialists in Transyl¬ 
vania, 309; conquered by them, 311. 

Thornton, remarks of, on the treaty of tho 
Pruth, 334. 

Tiflis, 443. 

Timars, 100,103. 

Timour the Tartar, 42; unparalleled as a con¬ 
queror, 43; assails Sivas, ib. ; besieges An¬ 
gora, 44; takes Bajazct prisoner, 4S; dies 
at Otrar, 50. 

Tobacco introduced among the Turks, 241, n. 

Topal Osman, Grand Vizier to Mahmoud 1., 
351; superseded in his office, 353; sent into 
Asia as generalissimo of the Turkish forces, 
ib. 

Torches, battle of the, 234. 

Tott, Baron de, assists Krim Ghirai against 
the Turks, 3S5. 

Turkish character, 108. 

U 

Ultima, order of men learned in the law, 20S. 

Unkiar-Iskelessi, treaty of, 523. 

V 

Valette, La. Grand Master of the Knights of 
St. John; noble heroism during the siege 
of Malta, 182. 

Venice, her early power in the eastern Medi¬ 
terranean, 18; Sultan Orchan aids the 
Genoese and Greeks against her, ib. ; me¬ 
naced by the armies of Mahomet II., 92; 
warfare with Bajazet II., 122; Selim II. 
wrests Cyprus from her, 217; Venice shares 
in the victory at Lepanto, but is a loser by 
the war, 222; the Twenty Years’ War of 
Candia, 270, 271; Candia taken by Ahmed 
Kiuprili in spite of Morosini’s gallant de¬ 
fence, 2S5 ; war renewed after defeat of the 
Turks befor; Vienna; Morosini conquers 
the Peloponnesus; other conquests made 
by Venice, 294; the Turks reconquer <. em, 
33S; feebleness of Venice notorious, and 
scoffed at by the Turks, ib. n. 

Vienna, siege of, 1 “ • saved by the heroism of 
her defenders, 169 , besieged a second time 
by the Turks, 291 ; they are completely 
routed, 294. 

W 

Wahabites, 493. 

Z 

Zapolya claims the crown of Hungary, 1 

Ziamets, 100, 203. 

Zriny, Count, heroic governor of Szig .th, 
193. 


THE END. 





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